I’ve had quite enough of service providers of one kind or another making me part of their new social network. (I’m looking at you, Google Buzz.)

So here’s an article about how to control iTunes’ new Ping social network, which comes with iTunes 10.

Apple did a couple things right: They made it very clear in the “Terms and Conditions” click-through for the new version of the software that you’re getting Ping. It also appears to default to “off.” That’s what I found when I followed the directions in the article linked above, anyway.

If you want to be in yet another social network, you can enable Ping using those directions. You also might want to get your head checked. Something might be wrong in your real life.

Oh yeah, that was me. And a lot of others. Well, we were wrong. The mobile app store market (Apple, Android, etc) is brimming with a bonanza of micro-business opportunities for producers and consumers alike. I am consistently amazing by the range of offerings available today, the vast majority of which remain free of charge. But what is more impressive is the growing array of applications and games available for mere pennies. Sure, some are more than a buck — but not that much more. I was just looking through the 40+ apps that I’ve got on my Droid right now (not really sure how many I’ve downloaded overall since I’ve deleted a lot) and I would guess that I paid for at least 25% of them–many after being “upsold” by first trying the free versions and then buying. Yes, I know there continues to be a debate about what counts as a “micropayment,” but the fact that so many more people are paying just a couple of bucks or less for content in these mobile app stores suggests that its only going to easier for people to pay even smaller sums for content in coming years.

What got me thinking about all this was slide #75 in Mary Meeker’s latest slideshow about Internet trends. The Morgan Stanley web guru notes that users are more willing to pay for content on mobile devices than they are on desktop computers for a number of reasons, but the first of which she listed was: “Easy-to-Use/Secure Payment Systems — embedded systems like carrier billing and iTunes allow real-time payment.”  The important point here is that the combination of these slick, well-organized online app stores + secure, super-easy billing systems have combined to overcome the so-called”mental transaction cost problem,” at least to some extent. We’re not nearly as reluctant today to surf away when something says “$0.99” on our screen. Increasingly, we’re hitting the “Buy” button.

The really interesting question, of course, is to what extent we can expect this model to grow and become more widely utilized for other types of content.  A lot of folks in the news business remain hopeful that a micropayment model can help them monetize their content in an age of business model uncertainty and highly disruptive change.  I’m skeptical that micropayments are going to “save the news,” since funding hard news and “broccoli journalism” is really expensive, and micropayments alone will never cover the costs. But perhaps they don’t have to. Micropayments could become just one part of an array of new business models that media operators could tap in an effort to reinvent themselves and thrive going forward. Subscriptions, advertising support, foundational / philanthropic funding, and more could also be part of the answer. We just don’t know what will work going forward. But I’ve grown at least a tad bit more optimistic that micropayments can at least be considered part of the conversation again.

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

The Wall Street Journal reports (see Financial Times, too) that “CBS Corp. and Walt Disney Co. are considering participating in Apple Inc.’s plan to offer television subscriptions over the Internet, according to people familiar with the matter, as Apple prepares a potential new competitor to cable and satellite TV.”

If Apple signs up enough networks to launch a viable service—still a very big if—it could ultimately alter the economics of the television business. The service could undermine the big bundles of channels that cable, satellite and telecommunications companies, including Comcast Corp. and DirecTV Inc., have traditionally sold in packages to subscribers.

And Brian Stelter of The New York Times says of the plan:

Broadband Internet subscriptions to TV networks could potentially destabilize the bedrock of the television business, which relies on subscribers paying for dozens of bundled channels.

As we have noted have noted here in our ongoing “Cutting the Video Cord” series, it’s just another sign that the video marketplace is vibrantly competitive and experiencing unprecedented innovation. So, why is Washington regulating this marketplace like we still live in the disco era?

The New York Times itself seems to be of two minds on this: Brian seems to recognize that the rise of Internet television means that cable providers no longer have any sort of special “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” control over the programming available to consumers, just as his colleague Nick Bilton at the Times‘ BITS blog recently declared that “Cable Freedom Is a Click Away.” And yet, as Berin recently noted, when the DC Circuit struck down the FCC’s outdated 30% cap on the number of homes a single cable provider could serve (based on “gatekeeper” concerns) back in September, the  Times editorial page bemoaned the decision and demanded further regulation of the cable industry—even as Internet TV is fundamentally changing the marketplace for video programming and rendering moot “gatekeeper” concerns far more effectively than any law could ever do.

“Right hand, meet Left hand. Howyadoinnicetameetcha!”

I’ve always generally agreed with the conventional wisdom about micropayments as a method of funding online content or services: Namely, they won’t work.  Clay Shirky, Tim Lee, and many others have made the case that micropayments face numerous obstacles to widespread adoption.  The primary issue seems to be the “mental transaction cost” problem: People don’t want to be diverted–even for just a few seconds–from what they are doing to pay a fee, no matter how small.  [That is why advertising continues to be the primary monetization engine of the Internet and digital services.]

That being said, I keep finding examples of how micropayments do work in some contexts and it has kept me wondering if there’s still a chance for micropayments to work in other contexts (like funding media content).  For example, I mentioned here before how shocked I was when I went back and looked at my eBay transactions for the past couple of years and realized how many “small-dollar” purchases I had made via PayPal (mostly dumb stickers and other little trinkets). And the micropayment model also seems to be doing reasonably well in the online music world. In January 2009, Apple reported that the iTunes Music Store had sold over 6 billion tracks.

And then there are mobile application stores.  Just recently I picked up a Droid and I’ve been taking advantage of the rapidly growing Android marketplace, which recently hit the 20,000 apps mark. Like Apple’s 100,000-strong App Store, there’s a nice mix of paid and free apps, and even though I’m downloading mostly freebies, I’ve started buying more paid apps. Many of them are “upsells” from free apps I downloaded. In most cases, they are just 99 cents. A few examples of paid apps I’ve downloaded or considered buying: Stocks Pro, Mortgage Calc Pro, Currency Guide, Photo Vault, Weather Bug Elite, and Find My Phone. And there are all sorts of games, clocks, calendars, ringtones, heath apps, sports stuff, utilities, and more that are 99 cents or $1.99.  Some are more expensive, of course.

I don’t have any idea how big this marketplace is in the aggregate, but according to AndroLib, “fully 62.2% of the apps available are completely free, compared to just 37.8% that are paid apps. That’s in stark contrast to the [Apple] App Store, which now has over 100,000 individual apps, of which (by some recent counts) a hefty 77% are paid applications — although only 30% of total App Store downloads are for paid apps.” That suggests that micropayments are doing quite well in mobile marketplaces. And this Wall Street Journal piece I was reading just yesterday, “Mobile-Payment Services Grow,” suggests there are lots of innovative things are happening in this space right now.

Of course, this gets into the semantic issue of, “what is a micropayment”? Does 99 cents qualify? I don’t know. I’ve never found any widely accepted definition of the term. Moreover, even if it’s true that a lot of people are buying “small-dollar” apps in mobile marketplaces, that doesn’t mean micropayments can fund all media going forward. It’s unlikely, for example, that we can fund quality journalism one micropayment at a time. People are just not going to pay a quarter (or even a penny) every time they want to read an article.  They might, however, be willing to pay a small monthly or annual access fee for some sites or services.  But with the exception of The Wall Street Journal and a handful of other media services, that model just doesn’t seem to have legs right now. [Although take a look at Dale Jefferson’s amazing newspapers app in the Android marketplace. Very cool. Perhaps media providers will learn from aggregation efforts like that and find a way to charge a small fee for access. But at less that one British pound — the cost of Jefferson’s app — I can’t imagine that funding a lot of content. They’ll need plenty of ads and other revenue streams to make up for what they are losing.]

Anyway, I’m not saying I have any answers here, just that my mind is still open regarding the possibility of micropayments as a method of funding online services and content. It may end up being easier for the former rather than the latter, however.

FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski suggested at an FCC field hearing this week that the federal government might create its own “version of iTunes.” Multichannel News reports:

The chairman asked panelists to think about the value of a clearinghouse where best practices could be shared. He suggested that might be a way to spur the spin-off of public-sector apps from private sector initiatives and to prevent reinventing the wheel, rather than tapping into what is already being done. There is not a lot of shared info out there, he said.

If all we’re talking about is a clearinghouse that provides easy access to apps for government-developed apps, Google Code or SourceForge may be a better model than iTunes—though perhaps without the instant name recognition by ordinary consumers. Like SourceForge, Google Code allows hosting and management of open source projects, including Google’s own products. iTunes, by contrast, essentially offers consumers finished apps. Also, iTunes is a stand-alone piece of software, of which the Apps Store is  just one part, while I can’t imagine why Genachowski’s “store” need be anything more than a website.

Whatever the analogy, such a “store” could well be a valuable tool for sharing the benefits of software development by government employees, both with the private sector and among federal agencies as well as state, local and even foreign governments. But what, exactly, Genachowski had in mind for the store remains awfully vague: Multichannel News mentions, as examples, “applications that do everything from monitoring heart rates and blood sugar to checking for greenhouse gas levels.” If the idea ever goes anywhere, it should be based on two principles:

1. All apps should be open source and available to all users to use as they see fit.
2. The store should be limited to apps developed by government employees to meet the needs of government agencies.

These principles would maximize the store’s value in making taxpayer-funded software development easily accessible. As a moral matter, it might be appropriate to limit access to U.S. taxpayers, but why bother? Attempting to authenticate users would add unnecessary complexity and raise privacy concerns needlessly: Any app we wouldn’t want to fall into the hands of, say, North Korea, simply shouldn’t be in the store at all. Sharing apps internationally would expand the potential developer base while helping to public and private sectors alike in the U.S. and abroad. If a school district in Sheboygan, WI or a village in Sudan can benefit from an app rather than starting over, so much the better for everyone!

The second requirement, combined with the open source requirement, would also help to reduce direct competition between government coders and private coders. A clearinghouse for apps government truly needs to develop on its own makes a great deal of sense: If we’re already paying a government-employee to write an app so his agency can function more effectively, that  should be shared. But a broader “public option for software” could well harm both for-profit and not-for-profit development of software by the private sector. Unless its mandate were carefully constrained by statute, such a clearinghouse could easily grow into a “public works” program for the digital age, with pressure rising for government to fund software development for as a “public good.” How to draw that line would be difficult, and it’s probably not a task that should be left to the FCC; Congress should address the question.

Keeping government-developed apps open source would allow the private sector to benefit from public sector development, rather than competing with it. But if a private company wants to incorporate a government-developed app into proprietary software, they should be free to do so. The government shouldn’t be prejudicing the private sector’s choice of business models by requiring that its apps stay open source. Nor should the government prevent commercialization of software that springs from federally funded research, as currently permitted by the Bayh-Dole Act.

Perhaps the greatest danger of such a program is that it could become a vehicle for subtle government propaganda—in violation of existing laws against using taxpayer dollars to distribute propaganda inside the U.S. The iTunes store analogy is particularly inapt (no pun intended) because iTunes, of course, provides pure content as well as apps. But apps themselves could come with a particular slant because it is increasingly difficult to distinguish “pure content” from “pure apps.” This danger could be particularly acute if the store turned into a “jobs program,” which would be inherently political, just as FDR’s New Dealers used programs like the WPA Arts Project to advance a certain ideological message, and New Deal programs in general as a way of rewarding supporters and punishing opponents. We certainly wouldn’t a Republican administration, say, trying to take revenge on Google for its support of Democrats by investing public money into direct competitors to Google’s software. Nor would we want to funding for software development to become just another dimension for the culture wars.

With those important caveats, this could be a great idea.

Adam Thierer and I have warned that neutrality regulation, once imposed on broadband providers, will extend to other Internet services wherever “gatekeepers” are alleged to control access to a platform used by others. In short, the slippery slope of creeping common carriage is real and we’re already heading down it, with cyber-collectivist “luminaries” like Jonathan Zittrain and Frank Pasquale demanding neutrality regulation for devices, application platforms like iTunes and Facebook, and search!

TLF Reader Jim Reardon made a particularly astute observation on my post asking whether Americans really want net neutrality regulation:

Regulation of any service, product or industry is preceded by definition. Once defined, it is subject to taxation. [Net Neutrality regulation] is a prelude to taxation of Internet products and services. It will likely start with telephony services and proceed accordingly to financial services, and continue from there. As such, the activity is essentially neutral insofar as technology innovation is concerned — so long as applicable taxes are paid the government will ensure that the service is not disfavored by the network operators.

Absolutely right! One of the greatest barriers to government regulation and taxation of the Internet today is the lack of clear definitions: The FCC rules will tell you precisely what “cable television” or “commercial radio” mean, but the concepts of “social networking,” “Internet video,” “blogging,” and even “search” are indeterminate and constantly evolving.

Ronald Reagan once quipped:

Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few short phrases: If it moves, tax it.  If it keeps moving, regulate it.  And if it stops moving, subsidize it.

Fortunately, government’s ability to implement this view depends—to paraphrase President Clinton—”on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ ‘it’ is”: Allowing “it” to remain beautifully amorphous may be the best way to keep government at bay.

Over at TechDirt, Mike Masnick has an interesting post asking “Why Did Apple Approve Spotify?” which builds on an AdAge column asking a similar question: “Did Apple Sacrifice ITunes With Latest Apps?”  As the title of that AdAge piece suggests, some folks are wondering if Apple shot itself in the foot by approving Spotify, a music streaming app that some regard as a potential iTunes killer.  I don’t really have any comment on the business angle here, rather, I wanted to just comment on Mike’s suggestion that one possible explanation for Apple’s approval of the app is that:

As we noted when the app was approved, Apple appears to be somewhat gunshy, following the FCC inquiry into why it “blocked” Google Voice on the iPhone (and, yes, Apple still insists it didn’t actually block the app, but Google says otherwise). Given the scrutiny, Apple probably realized that it was in for some serious political trouble if it blocked an app like Spotify, which would have received a lot of press attention. Oddly, the AdAge article doesn’t mention this at all.

Indeed, it is odd that AdAge didn’t bother mentioning that fact.  But what I find doubly odd here is that nobody is even blinking an eye at the prospect of such political meddling with — or even possible FCC regulation of — Apple, iTunes, or music streaming market in general!  Seriously, have we gotten to the point now in our Bold New World of Neutrality Regulation that innovative high-tech companies must live in fear of constant regulatory intervention even when they completely lack any statutory authority to play these games?  Moreover, does anyone think that the a bunch of Beltway bureaucrats can micro-manage music and high-tech application markets and give us more options than we have today?

I know the prospect of such meddling makes some academics and regulatory activists groups happy, but I can’t see how this ends well for consumers or high-tech markets more generally.  Regardless, for those of you who laugh when we suggest that the slippery slope of regulation is real, consider this case to be Exhibit A.  Or perhaps it’s Exhibit B since the Google Voice spat with Apple was already moving the FCC in the direction of becoming a device regulator and applying “handset neutrality” principles that have no basis in law.  It’s your anything-goes government at work.

The Wall Street Journal reports today that student loan borrowing for college “in the 2008-09 academic year grew about 25% over the previous year, to $75.1 billion,” with the average student borrowing $13,172 to pay for college. So it should come as an enormous relief that one Internet start-up, StraighterLine, has essentially made the university fully virtual, offering classes for just $99/month.  While this may seem like a boon for students, especially the millions of Americans for whom even community college tuition seems an insurmountable obstacle to climbing up the economic ladder, such “e-Learning” offerings are already, predictably, coming under attack by entrenched interests in “Big Ed” (the professoriat!) as the “media-software–publishing–E-learning-complex.”

In Washington Monthly, Kevin Carey explains why “The next generation of online education could be great for students—and catastrophic for universities.” In a nutshell, the story is the same basic theme of Chris Anderson’s book Free!: digital distribution of information will ultimately drive costs down to zero. Carey shows how universities are essentially facing the same sorts of pressure from disruptive innovation as newspapers—except with more capital costs:

Colleges are caught in the same kind of debt-fueled price spiral that just blew up the real estate market. They’re also in the information business in a time when technology is driving down the cost of selling information to record, destabilizing lows. In combination, these two trends threaten to shake the foundation of the modern university, in much the same way that other seemingly impregnable institutions have been torn apart. In some ways, the upheaval will be a welcome one. Students will benefit enormously from radically lower prices—particularly people like Solvig who lack disposable income and need higher learning to compete in an ever-more treacherous economy. But these huge changes will also seriously threaten the ability of universities to provide all the things beyond teaching on which society depends: science, culture, the transmission of our civilization from one generation to the next. Whether this transformation is a good or a bad thing is something of a moot point—it’s coming, and sooner than you think.

Carey tells the the fascinating tale of StraighterLine, whose founder, Burck Smith, predicted the rise of digital higher education in his graduate thesis at Harvard’s Kennedy School of government in 1999. He predicted that we would look back from 2015 and see that:

Technological change was the spark that ignited the wildfire of change. Like a hole in a dike, cheap and instantaneous Internet-based content delivery and communication nibbled away at barriers to institutional competition… . Suddenly, a student seeking an introductory statistics course could choose from hundreds of online courses from anywhere in the world… . Feeling the effects of low-cost competition, site-based education providers started cutting course costs and prices to attract students.

Carey’s tell would resonate well with anyone who’s read George Gilder’s brilliant works Microcosm and Telecosm, about how innovation in general and digital economics radically drive down costs.

Even as the cost of educating students fell, tuition rose at nearly three times the rate of inflation. Web-based courses weren’t providing the promised price competition—in fact, many traditional universities were charging extra for online classes, tacking a “technology fee” onto their standard (and rising) rates. Rather than trying to overturn the status quo, big, publicly traded companies like Phoenix were profiting from it by cutting costs, charging rates similar to those at traditional universities, and pocketing the difference. This, Smith explained, was where StraighterLine came in. The cost of storing and communicating information over the Internet had fallen to almost nothing. Electronic course content in standard introductory classes had become a low-cost commodity. The only expensive thing left in higher education was the labor, the price of hiring a smart, knowledgeable person to help students when only a person would do. And the unique Smarthinking call- center model made that much cheaper, too. By putting these things together, Smith could offer introductory college courses à la carte, at a price that seemed to be missing a digit or two, or three: $99 per month, by subscription. Economics tells us that prices fall to marginal cost in the long run. Burck Smith simply decided to get there first.

Essentially what Smith did was to unbundle content:

To anyone who has watched the recent transformation of other information-based industries, the implications of all this are glaringly clear. Colleges charge students exorbitant sums partly because they can, but partly because they have to. Traditional universities are complex and expensive, providing a range of services from scientific research and graduate training to mass entertainment via loosely affiliated professional sports franchises. To fund these things, universities tap numerous streams of revenue: tuition, government funding, research grants, alumni and charitable donations. But the biggest cash cow is lower-division undergraduate education. Because introductory courses are cheap to offer, they’re enormously profitable. The math is simple: Add standard tuition rates and any government subsidies, and multiply that by several hundred freshmen in a big lecture hall. Subtract the cost of paying a beleaguered adjunct lecturer or graduate student to teach the course. There’s a lot left over. That money is used to subsidize everything else. But this arrangement, however beneficial to society as a whole, is not a particularly good deal for the freshman gutting through an excruciating fifty minutes in the back of a lecture hall.

The analogy to newspapers is clear:

What happens when the number of students making that choice reaches a critical mass? Consider the fate of the newspaper industry over the last five years. Like universities, newspapers relied on financial cross-subsidization to stay afloat, using fat profits from local advertising and classifieds to prop up money-losing news bureaus. This worked perfectly well until two things happened: the Internet made opinion and news content from around the world available for nothing, and the free online classified clearinghouse Craigslist obliterated newspapers’ bedrock revenue source, the want ads. Suddenly, people didn’t need to buy a newspaper to read news, and the papers’ ability to subsidize expensive reporting with ad revenue was crippled. The result: plummeting newspaper profits leading to a tidal wave of layoffs and bankruptcies, and the shuttering of bureaus in Washington and abroad. Like Craigslist, StraighterLine threatens the most profitable piece of a conglomerate business: freshman lectures, higher education’s equivalent of the classified section. If enough students defect to companies like StraighterLine, the higher education industry faces the unbundling of the business model on which the current system is built. The consequences will be profound. Ivy League and other elite institutions will be relatively unaffected, because they’re selling a product that’s always scarce and never cheap: prestige. Small liberal arts colleges will also endure, because the traditional model—teachers and students learning together in a four-year idyll—is still the best, and some people will always be willing and able to pay for it….. Regional public universities and nonelite private colleges are most at risk from the likes of StraighterLine. They could go the way of the local newspaper, fatally shackled to geography, conglomeration, and an expensive labor structure, too dependent on revenues that vanish and never return.

The difference between newspapers and higher education is that, in education, the government ultimately holds all the cards through the power of accreditation:

Credits and degrees can only be granted by—and students paying for college with federal grants and loans can only attend—institutions that are officially recognized by federally approved accreditors. And the most prestigious accreditors will only recognize institutions: organizations with academic departments, highly credentialed faculty, bureaucrats, libraries, and all the other pricey accoutrements of the modern university.

Carey concludes by noting that government regulation ultimately threatens innovation and will likely protect “Big Ed” from competition, just as it has protected the Big Three auto manufacturers:

Smith’s struggle to establish StraighterLine suggests that higher education still has some time before the Internet bomb explodes in its basement. The fuse was only a couple of years long for the music and travel industries; for newspapers it was ten. Colleges may have another decade or two, particularly given their regulatory protections. Imagine if Honda, in order to compete in the American market, had been required by federal law to adopt the preestablished labor practices, management structure, dealer network, and vehicle portfolio of General Motors. Imagine further that Honda could only sell cars through GM dealers. Those are essentially the terms that accreditation forces on potential disruptive innovators in higher education today.

Carey’s story highlights not only what the future of universities might look like, but the dangers of subsidizing newspapers as well. Many who have bemoaned the demise of newspapers have called for indirect government support in the form of preferential tax treatment by relaxing non-profit rules to accommodate newspapers, letting newspaper subscribers deduct their annual newspaper spending or perhaps even borrowing from the French and giving income tax breaks to newspaper journalists—or direct subsidies like bailouts for newspapers or expanded public funding the model of NPR. The obvious problem raised by such proposals is the old Golden Rule: “He who has the gold, makes the rules.” Control necessarily follows funding.

The more subtle, long-term problem with such subsidies is that they require some form of accreditation to determine who or what is eligible for government largess or tax breaks.  This creates essentially the same problem Carey predicts with universities: Established interests will lobby government to protect them from competition by radically cheaper, innovative business models based on new digital technologies. This, in turn, will both retard the development of education, and therefore the advancement of knowledge, and increase the problem of government control: The lower down what George Gilder called the “Learning Curve” we go in terms of figuring out how to make e-Learning inexpensive, the greater Big Ed will depend on government for protection. If that happens, academic freedom will become as meaningless as freedom of a press dependent on government funding.

As a practical matter, I wonder:

1. How services like StraighterLine will compete with free offerings of course materials through services like iTunes University, which offers a growing compendium of free college lectures (but not course materials, tests or tutoring)
2. When we’ll finally see e-Learning costs drop enough that an ad-supported model might become feasible. You may laugh now, but today’s $99/month could well be tomorrow’s $9.99/month—at which point advertising models might prove competitive, especially if advertisers can get the revenue boost of delivering personalized marketing to users.

The latest edition (Version 4.0) of my PFF special report on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now up.  For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education and media literacy efforts, and various other tools, methods, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety.  After evaluating that state of this market, I conclude: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”  Moreover, I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation.

Version 4.0 of the report is now over 250 pages long (up from 200 pages in Version 3.0) and it contains almost 70 exhibits (up from 50), 725 references (up from roughly 500), and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. Other new sections or appendices have also been added to the report, including:

• a new section examining how many households really need parental control tools;
• a new appendix on the downsides of mandatory parental controls and restrictive default settings;
• a new section on the dangers of “deputizing the online middleman” solution as an approach to solving child safety concerns;
• a new appendix reviewing the findings of 5 past online safety task forces;
• … and much more.

I issue major updates once a year and 1 or 2 minor tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety marketplace and debate. The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past couple of years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

In episode #44 of “Tech Policy Weekly,” Berin Szoka and Adam Thierer engage in a debate with Internet security expert Chris Soghoian, who is a student fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. He is also a Ph.D. candidate at Indiana University’s School of Informatics.

Chris is an up-and-coming star in the field of cyberlaw and technology policy as he has quickly made a name for himself in debates over privacy policy, data security, and government surveillance.  He straddles the line between academic and activist, and the role he often plays in many tech policy debates is somewhat akin to what Ralph Nader has done in many other fields through the years. Except, in this case, instead of “Unsafe at Any Speed” it’s more like “Unsafe at Any Setting,” since Chris is often raising a stink about what he regards as unjust or unreasonable privacy or security settings that various online websites or service providers use.

On the show, Chris talks about two of his recent crusades to get certain online providers to change their default settings to improve user security or privacy: (1) His effort this week to get major email providers—and Google in particular—to change their default security settings on their email offerings; and (2) his earlier crusade to create permanent opt-out cookies to stop behavioral advertising by advertising networks.

There are several ways to listen to today’s TLF Podcast. You can press play on the player below to listen right now, or download the MP3 file. You can also subscribe to the podcast by clicking on the button for your preferred service. (And do us a favor, Digg this podcast!)

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Finally, here’s some relevant links that were mentioned during today’s show:

• Chris Soghoian’s webpage + his Harvard Berkman Center page
• Chris’s blog (“Slight Paranoia”)
• Chris’s “TACO” (Targeted Advertising Cookie Opt-Out) plug-in for Firefox (and description of it on his home page)
• Chris’s “Caught in the Cloud” paper (+ a video of him presenting it at Harvard)
• The letter from 38 cybersecurity researchers that Chris sent to Google
• Berin Szoka’s response to Chris’s “Caught in the Cloud” paper
• Berin’s discussion of the issue of preserving user choice through permanent opt-out cookies

I’ve been hammering Jonathan Zittrain pretty hard here over the past year for the thesis he sets forth in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It that digital “generativity” is at risk today. The reason I have been doing so is because all signs point in the exact opposite direction, and more so with each passing day. Contrary to Jonathan’s fear that the Internet and digital technologies are growing more closed, tethered, and sterile, I have argued that the facts on the ground show us how the world is actually becoming far more open, untethered, and innovative.  And that’s true even for the technology that Jonathan singles out in the book for special scorn — the iPhone.

Consider David Pogue’s post today on the New York Times‘ technology blog today entitled “So Many iPhone Apps, So Little Time.” Pogue reports that:

there are now 15,000 programs available on the App Store, and so many more are flooding in that Apple’s army of screeners can’t even keep up. I keep meaning to write a thoughtful, thorough roundup of the very best of these amazing programs, but every day that I don’t do it, the job becomes more daunting. […] Apple, which runs the store, keeps 30 percent of each sale. Even so, Ocarina [an application Pogue discusses in his essay] demonstrates that a programmer can make a staggering amount of money from the iPhone store. It’s a crazy new software model that I don’t remember seeing anywhere else. It’s not a boxed software program for $600, or even a shareware program you download for $25. It’s a buck a copy. The beauty here is that at these prices, there’s very little risk in trying something out. How many software programs have you bought for your Mac or PC? Two? Four? Well, the average iPhone owner may wind up installing 10, 20 or 30 programs. In all, according to Apple, iPhone owners have downloaded 500 million copies of these programs. Half a billion–since last July. There’s a lot of gloom in the tech industry (and every industry, for that matter). But even when the economy is crashing down around us, there’s still amazing power in a single good idea. And the one on display here–pricing software so low that millions of people buy it without batting an eye–is turning a few clever programmers into millionaires.

I ask you: Does this sound like a world that is growing less generative, as Zittrain argues? Because it sure doesn’t sound like it to me.  Moreover, if you still don’t think the iPhone is open enough, then there’s always a simple solution to that: just buy another phone!

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Just FYI, the latest update of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now live. The new version, Version 3.1, provides minor updates to all sections of the book and a new appendix of relevant research in the field. I issue major updates early each year and 1 or 2 tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety market and debate.

For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past two years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

Channeling Jonathan Zittrain, Alex Curtis of Public Knowledge continues his incessant ranting against Apple and the iPhone for supposedly not being open enough and, therefore, somehow harming consumers and 3rd party developers. In his essay today about the supposed evils of the iPhone App Store, he accuses Apple of an “1984 kind of total control.”

Hmmm, let’s see… Apple creates a great new product that is so insanely sexy and innovative that even Apple-haters like me are forced to admit that it is the most brilliant tech gadget of the decade. Millions of people have flocked to Apple stores, stood in lines so long that you’d think they were giving away free pot and floor bongs inside, and then voluntarily handed over seemingly all their disposable monthly income to get their hands on one of these things.

OK, so how is this like 1984 again? Is evil Steve Jobs forcing the masses to buy this product? Of course not. So it strikes me that we can easily dispense with analogies to a book about coercive, totalitarian government control like 1984.

And if all this anti-iPhone ranting is just about the degree of control that Steve Jobs and Apple exercise over product add-ons then hey, I’ve got an easy answer for you: go get a different phone! My current phone — and I tend to cycle through phones pretty quickly in the search of increasing functionality and 3rd party app-friendliness — is the wonderful HTC Touch. Specifically, I have the newer model that Verizon is offering with the oh-so-clunky moniker XV6900. (The Verizon branding / marketing department isn’t going to win any awards with robotic phone names like that!) Anyway, despite the silly name, this phone is a masterpiece. It has more functions than I know what to do with. And did you say you want 3rd party apps? Well, head over to Handango and check out the HTC Touch store there. I hope you have some time on your hands because you’ll be sorting through 5,100+ software apps available there for the device. But that just scratches the surface. There are so many other apps and freeware I have pulled off the Net for this phone that I can’t even begin to count them all. Hell, spend a couple of hours over on the Howard Forums trying to sort through all the stuff that you can do with this phone and your head will start to spin. It’s insane. And, as I’ve found out with this phone and my previous and equally app-friendly HTC XV6700, it’s also an easy way to quickly eat up all your storage and slow your memory down to a crawl.

The bottom line is, Apple offers people a choice. Yes, there is a little more hand-holding in their world than I can stand. I wrote about that in my original review of Zittrain’s book; a book that makes Apple out to be some sort of evil anti-consumer nemesis because their products aren’t perfectly open to tinkering. But that’s not what everyone is looking for in a phone. Many people just want stability, sexiness, and a somewhat smart device with a degree of tinkerability. Thus, Apple creates some trade-offs for its consumers, but it’s a deal most of them will gladly take.

Again, if Curtis doesn’t like the sound of that deal, then he should just go get a different device. There are millions of people who would happily buy his old iPhone, or take his place in line the next time Jobs rolls out another upgraded iPhone at an even lower price.

PFF has just releasing an updated edition of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.” The new version, Version 3.0, includes two new appendixes and updates to each section to reflect new parental control tools and programs developed in the last nine months.

The updated report is timely as it comes on the heels of the recently-announced Internet Safety Technical Task Force, which is being chaired by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. I am privileged to serve as a member of the Task Force, which is evaluating various online safety technologies and strategies and then reporting back to state attorneys general with our findings.

Those issues and much more are covered in the latest edition of my report. The report explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

Version 3.0 of the special report, now over 200 pages, contains over fifty exhibits and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. A greatly expanded section on video empowerment technologies has also been included. Finally, two appendices have also been added: a comprehensive legislative index cataloging over thirty bills introduced in Congress on these issues (complied with John Morris of Center for Democracy & Technology), and a glossary of 35 relevant terms and cases.

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, as are the previous editions. And I am happy to provide hard copies to those who are interested.

PFF has just released my latest paper entitled “Parental Control Perfection? The Impact of the DVR and VOD Boom on the Debate over TV Content Regulation.” In the report, I focus on the extent to which new video technologies, such as digital video recorders (DVRs) and video on demand (VOD) services, are changing the way households consume media and are helping parents better tailor viewing experiences to their tastes and values. I provide evidence showing the rapid spread of these technologies and discuss how parents are using these tools in their homes. Finally, I argue that these developments will have profound implications for debates over the regulation of video programming. As parents are given the ability to more effectively manage their family’s viewing habits and experiences, it will lessen—if not completely undercut—the need for government intervention on their behalf.

This 16-page report can be found at: http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.20DVRboomcontentreg.pdf

Steve Jobs wants to sell you back copies of your own home movies for a $1.99 apiece! Or so declares this humorous Onion parody, (which almost sounds like it might have been secretly penned by our own Tim Lee!)

And while you’re over at The Onion site, you might also want to check out this funny take-off on the government’s ongoing lost laptop problems, which I’ve been writing quite a bit about here.