Today on Capitol Hill, the House Energy and Commerce Committee is holding a hearing on the NTIA’s recent announcement that it will relinquish its small but important administrative role in the Internet’s domain name system. The announcement has alarmed some policymakers with a well-placed concern for the future of Internet freedom; hence the hearing. Tomorrow, I will be on a panel at ITIF discussing the IANA oversight transition, which promises to be a great discussion.

My general view is that if well executed, the transition of the DNS from government oversight to purely private control could actually help secure a measure of Internet freedom for another generation—but the transition is not without its potential pitfalls.

The NTIA’s technical administration of the DNS’ “root zone” is an artifact of the Internet’s origins as a U.S. military experiment. In 1989, the government began the process of privatizing the Internet by opening it up to general and commercial use. In 1998, the Commerce Department created ICANN to oversee the DNS on a day-to-day basis. The NTIA’s announcement is arguably the culmination of this single decades-long process of privatization.

The announcement also undercuts the primary justification used by authoritarian regimes to agitate for control of the Internet. Other governments have long cited the United States’ unilateral control of the root zone, arguing that they, too, should have roles in governing the Internet. By relinquishing its oversight of the DNS, the United States significantly undermines that argument and bolsters the case for private administration of the Internet.

The United States’ stewardship of the root zone is largely apolitical. This apolitical approach to DNS administration is precisely what is at stake during the transition, hence the three pitfalls the Obama administration must avoid to preserve it.

The first pitfall is the most serious but also the least likely to materialize. Despite the NTIA’s excellent track record, authoritarian regimes like Russia, China, and Iran have long lobbied for the ITU, a clumsy and heavily politicized U.N. technical agency, to take over the NTIA’s duties. In its announcement, the NTIA said it would not accept a proposal from an intergovernmental organization, a clear rebuke to the ITU.

Nevertheless, liberal governments would be wise to send the organization a clear message in the form of much-needed reform. The ITU should adopt the transparency we expect of communications standards bodies, and it should focus on its core competency—international coordination of radio spectrum—instead of on Internet governance. If the ITU resists these reforms at its Plenipotentiary Conference this fall, the United States and other countries should slash funding or quit the Union.

ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) presents a second pitfall. Indeed, the GAC is already the source of much mischief. For example, France and Luxembourg objected to the creation of the .vin top-level domain on the grounds that “vin” (wine) is a regulated term in those countries. Brazil and Peru have held up Amazon.com’s application for .amazon despite the fact that they previously agreed to the list of reserved place names, and rivers and states were not on it. Last July, the U.S. government, reeling from the Edward Snowden revelations, threw Amazon and the rule of law under the bus at the GAC as a conciliatory measure.

ICANN created the GAC to appease other governments in light of the United States’ outsized role. Since the United States is giving up its special role, the case for the GAC is much diminished. In practice, the limits on the GAC’s power are gradually eroding. ICANN’s board seems increasingly hesitant to overrule it out of fear that governments will go back to the ITU and complain that the GAC “isn’t working.” As part of the transition of the root zone to ICANN, therefore, new limits need to be placed on the GAC’s power. Ideally, it would dissolve the GAC.

The third pitfall comes from ICANN itself. The organization is awash in cash from domain registration fees and new top-level domain name applications—which cost $185,000 each—and when the root zone transition is completed, it will face no external accountability. Long-time ICANN insiders speak of “mission creep,” noting that the supposedly purely technical organization increasingly deals with trademark policy and has aided police investigations in the past, a dangerous precedent.

How can we prevent an unaccountable, cash-rich technical organization from imposing its own internal politics on what is supposed to be an apolitical administrative role? In the long run, we may never be able to stop ICANN from becoming a government-like entity, which is why it is important to support research and experimentation in peer-to-peer, decentralized domain name systems. This matter is under discussion, among other places, at the Internet Engineering Task Force, which may ultimately play something of a counterweight to an independent ICANN.

Despite these potential pitfalls, it is time for an Internet that is fully in private hands. The Obama administration deserves credit for proposing to complete the privatization of the Internet, but we must also carefully monitor the process to intercept any blunders that might result in politicization of the root zone.

The forum has largely been overtaken by discussion of ICANN’s move to organize a new Internet governance coalition. ICANN representatives have had both open- and closed-door meetings to push the proposal, but there are still many questions that have not been adequately answered.

One important question is about the private discussions that have led to this. The I-stars came out at least nominally aligned on this issue, though there is speculation that they are not all totally unified. Over drinks, I mentioned to an ICANN board member that it rubs a lot of people in civil society the wrong way that the I-stars seem to have coordinated on this in private. He replied that I was probably assuming too much about the level of coordination. If that’s the case, then I wonder if we will hear more from the other I-stars about their level of support for ICANN’s machinations.

More basically, we still don’t know much about the Rio non-summit. It will be in Rio, it will be in May, there will be some sort of output document. But we don’t know the agenda, or the agenda-setting process, or even the process for setting an agenda-setting process.

And strategically, we don’t know how the Brazil meeting is going to affect all of the other parts of the take-over-the-Internet industry in the coming year. The CWG-Internet happens next month, and they will take up Brazil’s proposal from the WTPF. But since Brazil is positioning itself as a leader in this new process (and aligned with ICANN now), what will they try to get at the CWG? WTDC is in March-April. And of course the Plenipot will be in the fall next year. If the Brazil summit is perceived to have failed in any sense, will that make the battle at Plenipot even more intense?

Also, whose idea was it to have a gala without alcohol?

As expected, today at 1pm there was a packed, off-the-books meeting facilitated by the “I-star” organizations (ICANN, ISOC, IETF, and a bunch of groups that don’t begin with I). The purpose of the meeting was to build support for a new Internet governance “coalition.” The argument is that because of the NSA’s global surveillance programs, the US is losing support for its perceived leadership on Internet governance. In order to avoid greater governmental or intergovernmental intrusion into the Internet, the technical community, as signaled in the Montevideo statement, must go on the offensive and create an alternative to such intrusion.

This argument is controversial, to say the least. To what extent does the “offensive” entail creating a top-down institution to deal with Internet policy issues? Neither the technical community nor civil society wants government to be in charge of the Internet, but the technical community (especially ICANN) seems much more comfortable with top-down non-governmental control. I worry that ICANN is going to become increasingly government-like. In any case, we are witnessing a small but historic rift between civil society and the technical community, which have always been on the same side in the war to keep governments off the Internet.

Even if ICANN’s argument makes a kind of sense, it may be reckless to pursue it in the proposed way. It’s now looking like there will be a don’t-call-it-a-summit in Rio in early May, hosted by the Brazilian government, to discuss these issues. Even if ICANN has good reason to believe that Brazil is negotiating in good faith, there is always the possibility that Brazil gets what it wants in the end. They are not likely to just roll over.

I’m open to the idea that we need an affirmative answer to the question of Internet policy institutions. But I’d feel a lot more comfortable if such institutions evolved bottom-up rather than emerging from a grand push, organized secretly by some members of the technical community, to create an alternative. Hopefully with the creation of the new coalition mailing list, everything can be done out in the open from here on out.

Day 1 of the Internet Governance Forum is in the books, and everyone is talking about what will happen on Day 2. Brazil recently announced that it will host a meeting on Internet governance in April. Tomorrow, ICANN is hosting a meeting at 1pm to explain how the April meeting will work.

Everyone that I’ve talked to in the hallways has brought up the meeting in April. No one is quite sure what to expect.

On one hand, Brazil has been part of the coalition that is pushing to do more Internet governance at the ITU. On the other hand, ICANN seems to be a willing participant in Brazil’s scheme. The recent “Montevideo Statement,” issued by various Internet organizations, called for globalizing the IANA function, which means at a minimum removing the US’s special role of maintaining the domain name system’s root zone file.

ICANN wants independence from the US government, and Brazil wants ICANN to be independent from the US government (and possibly dependent on the ITU), so this makes them allies for now.

Bizarrely, NSA surveillance continues to be cited as a reason for Brazil’s actions, although of course the IANA function has nothing to do with surveillance. The IANA issue is mostly about status. Other governments seem to feel slighted by the US’s control of the root zone file.

In any case, tomorrow we may know slightly more about ICANN and Brazil’s schemes.

The New York Times reports:

The Russians, who with only minimal success, had for years sought to make these companies provide law enforcement access to data within Russia, reacted angrily. Mr. Gattarov formed an ad hoc committee in response to Mr. Snowden’s leaks.

Ostensibly with the goal of safeguarding Russian citizens’ private lives and letters from spying, the committee revived a long-simmering Russian initiative to transfer control of Internet technical standards and domain name assignments from two nongovernmental groups that control them today to an arm of the United Nations, the International Telecommunications [sic] Union.

It’s not immediately clear to me how moving Internet standards and DNS from IETF and ICANN to the ITU is supposed to stop the NSA from spying on Russians, so the smart read is that this is retaliation pure and simple.

Brazil’s foreign minister, Antonio Patriota, for example, a week ago endorsed the Russian proposal to transfer some control over Internet technical standards to the United Nations telecommunications agency.

While these are not major changes in policy positions, the NSA’s surveillance programs seem to be galvanizing those who want the ITU to take an active role in Internet governance. It’s time for the USA to practice what it preaches on Internet freedom.

Next week, I’ll be in Geneva for the 2013 World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum, better known by the acronym WTPF-13. This is the first major ITU conference since the WCIT in December, and the first real test of whether what some are calling the “post-WCIT era” really exists, and if so, what it means. For those just now tuning in, the WCIT was a treaty conference in Dubai in which some ITU member states pushed hard to make elements of the Internet subject to intergovernmental agreement, resulting in the refusal of 55 countries to sign the treaty. I published a retrospective account of my experience at the WCIT at Ars Technica.

The WTPF will be different than the WCIT in several important ways:

• It’s not a treaty conference. The output of the meeting is instead a report and several opinions. Draft text of these have been negotiated over three preparatory meetings of an “Informal Experts Group” (IEG). The WTPF will finalize the text, which is non-binding, but is likely to be selectively quoted at future treaty conferences in order to pursue the agenda of each member state.
• Sector members can participate. The ITU is an intergovernmental organization, and member states are its primary constituency. However, the ITU also allows for “sector members,” which are mostly corporations that are involved in international telecommunications. Sector members will have microphones and be able to address the chair during the WTPF, something they could not do during the WCIT. It has not yet been made conclusively clear to me whether sector members will be able to formally vote, if a formal vote is held. (Secretary-General Hamadoun Touré said there would be no voting at the WCIT, but both informal and formal votes were held.)
• The Internet is explicitly on the table. The Secretariat promised that Internet governance would not be considered at the WCIT, but it ultimately was, which is one reason that the conference failed to produce a treaty that all countries could feel comfortable signing. But the official theme of the WTPF is “international Internet-related public policy matters,” so there is widespread agreement that the Internet is a suitable topic of discussion at the WTPF, even if there is little agreement on conclusions.
• Anybody can download and read the official WTPF documents. Before and during the WCIT, working drafts and member state contributions were kept secret. Jerry Brito and I started WCITLeaks in order to give the general public access to these documents. For whatever reason—whether exposure of the lack of transparency in the WCIT process embarrassed the ITU Secretariat, or they were planning to make the WTPF more open anyway—all WTPF documents are available for your perusal, several in all six official ITU languages. Either way, I’m happy to applaud the decision to make the documents available.
• The WTPF is only three days long. The WCIT was almost two weeks. This imposes significant limitations on the amount of deliberation that can occur. There is also a WTPF every 4 years, whereas a WCIT happens only on an as-demanded basis.

Since the conference is going to be short, I expect that most of the debate will focus on the six draft opinions that have been attached to the Secretary-General’s report. The report itself is probably too long to receive substantial revision in only three days. Consequently, the opinions are likely to be where the action is. The draft opinions are:

1. Promoting Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) as a long term solution to advance connectivity
2. Fostering an enabling environment for the greater growth and development of broadband connectivity
3. Supporting Capacity Building for the deployment of IPv6
4. In Support of IPv6 Adoption and transition from IPv4
5. Supporting Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance
6. On supporting operationalizing the Enhanced Cooperation Process

Opinions 1 and 2 will be consider in Working Group 1, 3 and 4 will be considered in Working Group 2, and 5 and 6 will be considered in Working Group 3.

The United States has expressed qualified support for the current draft text of all six opinions in its contribution to the WTPF:

The United States is prepared to endorse the consensus achieved by the IEG and adopt the six non-binding opinions as presented in the annex to the Secretary General’s report. We take this approach based on our desire for a successful forum, despite some concerns with respect to the opinions on multi-stakeholderism and enhanced cooperation. But we recognize, as we hope all participants do, that to attempt to renegotiate the text or introduce new topics or opinions during this meeting would cause significant difficulties and upset the consensus already achieved.

Nevertheless, other countries have proposed substantial changes to the draft IEG text. Perhaps the most controversial opinion is number 5 on multi-stakeholderism. Multi-stakeholderism is a tricky element of international Internet politics. Most participants have agreed at one point or another that the “multi-stakeholder” institutions that currently govern the Internet are an important part of the Internet’s success. However, this has led the more authoritarian countries to insist that governments are stakeholders too, and it has led those who support greater ITU involvement in international Internet policy to insist that the ITU is a multi-stakeholder organization.

For example, in a speech two weeks ago in Brussels, Secretary-General Touré said:

This opinion reiterates what I have been saying for some time—that the ITU has been multi-stakeholder from its inception, and that it was the success of the multi-stakeholder approach within ITU that inspired the multi-stakeholder principles agreed at the ITU-led World Summit on the Information Society, WSIS.

Now, Opinion 5 does  not say that the ITU is a multi-stakeholder organization (read it yourself), and the ITU is certainly not and has never been a multi-stakeholder institution, unless “multi-stakeholder” is defined as simply having multiple stakeholders. Among those who originally advocated multi-stakeholderism, the term connotes a certain bottom-up, voluntary, inclusive, and even informal process, which is incompatible with intergovernmentalism. This…loose talk…by the Secretary-General appears to be intended to position the ITU to take a more active role in Internet governance. Some member states share Dr. Touré’s apparent agenda. For example, Brazil’s proposed replacement for Opinion 5 explicitly says, “ITU is a multistakeholder organization.”

Russia’s proposed edits to Opinion 5 focus much less on the ITU itself and more on the role of government. For instance, it invites member states:

to exercise their rights on Internet Governance to control distribution, appropriation and development of Internet numbering, naming, addressing and identification resources and support the operation and development of the basic information and communication infrastructure, include the Internet, at the national level.

In other words, Russia wants to supplant existing Internet governance structures with national laws.

Aside from Opinion 5, the other major issue I am keeping my eye on is Working Group 2 on IP addresses and the IPv6 transition. Late last week, there was an unexpected shuffling of Working Group chairs. The chairwoman of WG3 was removed, the chairman of WG2 was moved to WG3, and Musab Abdullah from Bahrain was announced as the new chairman of WG2.

Those of us who were at the WCIT remember Mr. Abdullah as a forceful advocate for measures, like calling party identification and government-managed naming and numbering resources, that would have enabled greater government control of telecommunication services. And Bahrain is one of the most repressive regimes with respect to the Internet in the world. Reporters Without Borders considers Bahrain one of only five “state enemies of the Internet” in 2013.

So why did this shakeup of Working Group chairs happen, and why is one of the world’s top censors now chairing the Working Group on IP addressing? Could there be a strong push in favor of an expansive role for governments in assigning IP addresses, one that would allow governments to more easily link IP addresses to individuals in order to support censorship? We’ll find out next Wednesday morning when WG2 convenes.

For updates during the WTPF, follow me on Twitter. As always, any views expressed in this post or in future posts and tweets are my own, and should not be attributed to any government or delegation.

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public. — Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

As we approach the World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum, the debate over whether intergovernmental organizations like the International Telecommunication Union should have a role to play in Internet governance continues. One argument in favor of intergovernmentalism, advanced, for instance, by former ITU Counsellor Richard Hill (now operating his own ITU lobbying organization, delightfully named APIG), goes as follows:

• Everybody already agrees that governments are sovereign within their own territories.
• Other than a few “separatists,” everyone agrees that national laws apply to use of the Internet within national borders.
• It may be advantageous to “harmonize” national laws concerning the Internet.
• Harmonization of national laws happens through intergovernmental organizations, such as the ITU.
• Therefore, intergovernmental organizations such as the ITU should have a role in Internet governance.

My purpose in this post is to unpack the third premise. Who exactly benefits (and who is harmed) when national governments harmonize their national laws concerning the Internet?

One way to begin to answer this question is to see which governments think they would benefit from a greater intergovernmental role. One rough metric might be International Telecommunication Regulations (Dubai, 2012) signatories. In the map below, signatories are shown in black.

If it’s not clear from the map, there is a strong correlation between authoritarianism and support for the ITRs. Ninety-one percent of those countries ranked as Full Democracies in the Democracy Index opposed the ITRs, while 91 percent of those countries listed as “Authoritarian” supported them.

What national laws do these authoritarian regimes believe need harmonization? I am not privy to any government’s internal deliberations, but as The Economist reports, many of these countries are engaged in “monitoring, filtering, censoring and criminalising free speech online.” It seems to me that the most reasonable hypothesis is that countries like Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, China, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Iraq, and Sudan would benefit from a “national Internet segment” because it would normalize the idea of such monitoring and censorship.

In other words, authoritarian regimes favor intergovernmental “harmonization” of national Internet laws because it would enable them to get away with more authoritarianism. China already basically operates a “national Internet segment;” traffic into and out of China is filtered by the government. It is going to be a problem for the Chinese government when its subjects become wealthier, more empowered, and ultimately able to point to Internet policy outside of China and politely ask why part of the Chinese Internet is missing. If other countries were to adopt national Internet segments, the Chinese government would be able to avoid this uncomfortable conversation.

The “cooperation” that is likely to result from intergovernmental Internet policymaking is not the solving of communications problems, which is already accomplished quite ably through international technical organizations such as the Internet Engineering Task Force, but a kind of collusion. If we all agree to respect each other’s right to control information within our respective borders, say the authoritarian regimes, we can tame the more revolutionary aspects of the Internet and solidify our grip on power.

In practice, therefore, intergovernmentalism seems to enable national policies that are not only deplorable from a broadly liberal perspective, but illegal under international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Intergovernmentalism should be opposed, therefore, not merely by “separatists,” those who believe national governments have no business applying national law to the Internet. It should be opposed by anyone who does not wish to advance the agenda of censorship.

Louis XVI

Americans often quote, or allude to, the French expression ” Le Roi est mort, vive le Roi!” But few realize that this apparent paradox was meant quite literally by the French:From its first official proclamation in 1422 upon the coronation of Charles VII to 1774, when Louis XV finally died, the term expressed the abstract constitutional concept that sovereignty transfered from the old king (the first “Le Roi“) to the new king (the second  “Le Roi“) the very instant the old king died. Thus, France was literally never without a king until until the monarchy was finally dis-established in early 1793. When Louis XVI was guillotined later that year, his death was acclaimed simply with “Le Roi est mort!“

Tomorrow, September 30, ICANN’s Joint Project Agreement with the Department of Commerce finally terminates. “ Le JPA est mort!” But a new agreement (the “Affirmation”) will take its place, apparently providing more accountability than the JPA ever did. Vive l’Affirmation! There may come a day when, like Louis XVI, ICANN’s JPA-like agreement with Commerce terminates and nothing is there to replace it, but that day has not yet come.

Grant Gross has a great piece on this new agreement. Grant extensively quotes my PFF Adjunct Fellow (my ICANN mentor and former ICANN board member) Mike Palage, who explained that the JPA’s successor (JPA II?):

will tell [ICANN] what it should do, but it can’t legally bind them [much like past agreements]… It gives the appearance in the global community that the U.S. government has recognized that ICANN has done what is was supposed to do. What it’s also doing is … it’s putting in some accountability mechanisms.”

Yet Palage expressed concern about the new agreement:

Now while the devil will be in the detail, the only concern I have is that the private sector be on equal footing with the public sector in being able to hold ICANN accountable… If ICANN is to remain a public-private partnership that is founded on the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, accountability and bottom-up coordination, then both the private and public sectors should have equal confidence in the accountability mechanism available to them.

Mike explained how to choose the “Right Path to a Permanent Accountability Framework” in a PFF paper in August, and has explained a clear vision for ICANN 3.0.

PFF Adjunct Fellow Mike Palage led this extraordinary discussion of ICANN’s origins, evolution and future with four of ICANN’s “Founding Fathers”: Milton Mueller (author of Ruling the Root), law professor David Johnson, ICANN’s first CEO Mike Roberts and then ICANN CEO Paul Twomey. In particular, the group discussed ICANN’s mission, governance structure, and accountability; the difficult issue of new generic Top Level Domain names (gTLDs) and trademark concerns; and ICANN’s future relationship with the U.S. government. Be sure to check out the handy ICANN Glossary on page 33. The audio can be downloaded here.

Here’s the transcript (PDF):

TLF readers are undoubtedly familiar with the concept of regulatory capture. It’s a form of government failure, when a regulatory agency becomes overly influenced by the special interests of those (often large companies) it oversees.  Over at the NetChoice blog, my colleague Steve DelBianco talks about a different form of capture that’s equally bad–government capture of private sector management of the Internet’s addressing system. He asserts:

Before the US Government abdicates its oversight of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) it should take a long, hard look at the mounting efforts by world governments to assume greater power over the Internet’s addressing system. If those efforts meet no further resistance, the once-theoretical threat of “capture” could become a reality.

So what? In place of U.S. oversight, there are those that wish to create an international government bureaucracy to run ICANN:

In place of U.S. Government management, the [European] Commission recommends the creation of a multi-governmental tribunal with authority over ICANN. The European Commission posits that this new bureaucratic structure would not involve itself in “day-to-day” activities, but the distinction between “day-to-day” and other activities is utterly meaningless from a policy standpoint. Also, given the activism of the countries involved in such an effort, it would be ludicrous to expect such an entity to use its newfound power sparingly.

Steve’s post has a lot of background and explains things in detail, but I’ll share his ultimate conclusion:  our Commerce Dept. should be working with ICANN to retain the protective aspects of the JPA while ICANN develops permanent mechanisms to prevent external capture. It better hurry…it has only until the end of September to do something!