A decade ago, a heated debate raged over the benefits of “a la carte” (or “unbundling”) mandates for cable and satellite TV operators. Regulatory advocates said consumers wanted to buy all TV channels individually to lower costs. The FCC under former Republican Chairman Kevin Martin got close to mandating a la carte regulation.

But the math just didn’t add up. A la carte mandates, many economists noted, would actually cost consumers just as much (or even more) once they repurchased all the individual channels they desired. And it wasn’t clear people really wanted a completely atomized one-by-one content shopping experience anyway.

Throughout media history, bundles of all different sorts had been used across many different sectors (books, newspapers, music, etc.). This was because consumers often enjoyed the benefits of getting a package of diverse content delivered to them in an all-in-one package. Bundling also helped media operators create and sustain a diversity of content using creative cross-subsidization schemes. The traditional newspaper format and business is perhaps the greatest example of media bundling. The classifieds and sports sections helped cross-subsidize hard news (especially local reporting). See this 2008 essay by Jeff Eisenach and me for details for more details on the economics of a la carte.

Yet, with the rise of cable and satellite television, some critics protested the use of bundles for delivering content. Even though it was clear that the incredible diversity of 500+ channels on pay TV was directly attributable to strong channels cross-subsidizing weaker ones, many regulatory advocates said we would be better off without bundles. Moreover, they said, online video markets could show us the path forward in the form of radically atomized content options and cheaper prices.

Flash-forward to today. As this Wall Street Journal article points out, online video providers are rejecting a la carte and recreating content bundles to keep a diversity of programming flowing. This happened in unregulated markets without any FCC rules. YouTube, Hulu, PlayStation, and many other online video providers are creating new bundles and monetization schemes.

It is also worth noting that this same sort of “re-bundling” of content is happening with online news sources and other digital platforms as various sites struggle to find content monetization schemes that can sustain diverse, high-quality content in the Digital Era. Content bundling and various paywall schemes are helping them do so.

The lesson here is that the economics of content creation and delivery are quite dynamic, challenging, and extremely hard to predict. Mandating “a la carte” unbundling of content sounded smart and well-intentioned to many people a decade ago, but it proved to be problematic even in highly competitive online markets. Thankfully, we did not mandate unbundling by law. We waited and watched to see how it naturally played out in various markets. We now have a better feel for how big of a mistake mandatory a la carte would have likely been in practice.

Two weeks ago, as Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg was getting grilled by Congress during a two-day media circus set of hearings, I wrote a counterintuitive essay about how it could end up being Facebook’s greatest moment. How could that be? As I argued in the piece, with an avalanche of new rules looming, “Facebook is potentially poised to score its greatest victory ever as it begins the transition to regulated monopoly status, solidifying its market power, and limiting threats from new rivals.”

With the exception of probably only Google, no firm other than Facebook likely has enough lawyers, lobbyists, and money to deal with layers of red tape and corresponding regulatory compliance headaches that lie ahead. That’s true both here and especially abroad in Europe, which continues to pile on new privacy and “data protection” regulations. While such rules come wrapped in the very best of intentions, there’s just no getting around the fact that  regulation has costs. In this case, the unintended consequence of well-intentioned data privacy rules is that the emerging regulatory regime will likely discourage (or potentially even destroy) the chances of getting the new types of innovation and competition that we so desperately need right now.

Others now appear to be coming around to this view. On April 23, both the  New York Times and The Wall Street Journal ran feature articles with remarkably similar titles and themes. The New York Times article by Daisuke Wakabayashi and Adam Satariano was titled, “How Looming Privacy Regulations May Strengthen Facebook and Google,” and The Wall Street Journal’s piece, “Google and Facebook Likely to Benefit From Europe’s Privacy Crackdown,” was penned by Sam Schechner and Nick Kostov. “In Europe and the United States, the conventional wisdom is that regulation is needed to force Silicon Valley’s digital giants to respect people’s online privacy. But new rules may instead serve to strengthen Facebook’s and Google’s hegemony and extend their lead on the internet,” note Wakabayashi and Satariano in the  NYT essay. They continue on to note how “past attempts at privacy regulation have done little to mitigate the power of tech firms.” This includes regulations like Europe’s “right to be forgotten” requirement, which has essentially put Google in a privileged position as the “chief arbiter of what information is kept online in Europe.” Meanwhile, the  WSJ article opens with this interesting story about the epiphany EU regulator Věra Jourová had upon visiting with the supposed victims of the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR:

When the European Union’s justice commissioner traveled to California to meet with Google and Facebook last fall, she was expecting to get an earful from executives worried about the Continent’s sweeping new privacy law. Instead, she realized they already had the situation under control. “They were more relaxed, and I became more nervous,” said the EU official, Věra Jourová. “They have the money, an army of lawyers, an army of technicians and so on.”

Indeed they do. And that means that they are better positioned to absorb the significant costs of compliance that will be associated with the new GDPR rules, which are somewhat ambiguous and will require a great deal of ongoing interpretation and legal wrangling.  The Journal essay also cites an unnamed Brussels lobbyist for an media-measurement firm saying, “The politicians wanted to teach Google and Facebook a lesson. And yet they favor them.” Consider this paragraph from the WSJ essay about how the two firms worked diligently to come into compliance with the new GDPR regulations:

Once the law passed in spring 2016, Google and Facebook threw people at the problem. Google involved lawyers in the U.S., Ireland, Brussels and elsewhere to pore over contracts and procedures, said people close to the company. Facebook mobilized hundreds of people in what it describes as the largest interdepartmental team it has ever assembled. Facebook lawyers spent a year scrutinizing the law’s lengthy text. Designers and engineers then toiled over how to implement changes, according to Stephen Deadman, Facebook’s global deputy chief privacy officer. During the process, Facebook got frequent access to regulators across Europe. It met with Helen Dixon, the data protection commissioner in Ireland, where the company bases its European operations, and her staff to run through changes Facebook was planning. Ms. Dixon’s agency provided the firm with feedback on the wording of its consent requests, Facebook said.

Now ask yourself how many other smaller existing or new firms would be in a position to do the same thing. Answer: Not many. We’re already seeing the deleterious effects of the GDPR on market structure, the  Journal reports. “Some advertisers are planning to shift money away from smaller providers and toward Google and Facebook,” Schechner and Kostov note. And they end their essay with the telling thoughts of Bill Simmons, co-founder and chief technology officer of Dataxu, Boston-based company that helps buy targeted ads, who says, “It is paradoxical. The GDPR is actually consolidating the control of consumer data onto these tech giants.” The  NYT essay included a funny tidbit about how “Some privacy advocates also bristle at the idea that these new restrictions would help already powerful internet companies, noting that is a well-worn argument employed by tech giants to try to prevent future regulation.” That’s a highly unfortunate attitude. If privacy advocates really care about improving the situation on the ground, then the best way to do that is with more and better choices. Sadly, it seems that with each passing day the write off the idea of any new competition emerging to today’s tech giants. “Can Facebook be replaced?” asks Olivia Solon writing in The Guardian today. Some probably think not, but as Solon notes, “prominent Silicon Valley investor Jason Calacanis, who was an early investor in several high-profile tech companies including Uber certainly hopes so. He has launched a competition to find a ‘social network that is actually good for society,'” and his “Openbook Challenge will offer seven “purpose-driven teams” $100,000 in investment to build a billion-user social network that could replace the technology titan while protecting consumer privacy.” In a blog post announcing the Challenge, Calacanis wrote: “All community and social products on the internet have had their era, from AOL to MySpace, and typically they’re not shut down by the government — they’re slowly replaced by better products. So, let’s start the process of replacing Facebook.” I don’t have any idea whether this Openbook Challenge will succeed. It’s hard building big, scalable digital platforms that satisfy the diverse needs of a diverse world. But this is exactly the sort of innovation that we should be encouraging. Even the very threat of new competition will keep the big dogs on their toes. Alas, all the new regulations being consider will likely just leave us with fewer choices and regulations that probably won’t even do all that much to truly better protect our data or privacy. But hey, at least it was all well-intentioned!

Updates :

• Nick Kostov and Sam Schechner, “Google Emerges as Early Winner From Europe’s New Data Privacy Law,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/eus-strict-new-privacy-law-is-sending-more-ad-money-to-google-1527759001

If there is one thing I have learned in almost 23 years of covering communications and media regulation it is this: No matter how well-intentioned, regulation often has unintended consequences that hurt the very consumers the rules are meant to protect. Case in point: “universal service” mandates that require a company to serve an entire area as a condition of offering service at all. The intention is noble: Get service out to everyone in the community, preferably at a very cheap rate. Alas, the result of mandating that result is clear: You get less competition, less investment, less innovation, and less consumer choice. And often you don’t even get everyone served.

Consider this Wall Street Journal article today, “Google Fiber Is Fast, but Is It Fair? The Company Provides Neighborhoods With Faster and Cheaper Service, but Are Some Being Left Behind?” In the story, Alistair Barr notes that:

U.S. policy long favored extending service to all. AT&T touted its “universal service” in advertisements more than a century ago. The concept was codified in a 1934 law requiring nationwide “wire and radio services” to reach everyone at “reasonable charges.” In exchange for wiring a community, telecommunications providers often gained a monopoly. Cities made similar deals with cable-TV providers beginning in the 1960s.

The problem, of course, is that while this model allowed for the slow spread of service to most communities, it came at a very steep cost: Monopoly and plain vanilla service. I documented this in a 1994 essay entitled, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly.” As well-intentioned regulatory mandates started piling up, competition slowly disappeared. And a devil’s deal was eventually cut between regulators and AT&T to adopt the company’s advertising motto — “One Policy, One System, Universal Service” — as the de facto law of the land.

It took us almost a century to dig ourselves out of that mess and move towards telecommunications competition. Alas, we’re still living with the vestiges of this old regulatory mentality. Cities and counties across America still impose a wide variety of “universal service” regulatory mandates. Again, their intention is noble: They want everyone in their community served. You can’t blame them for that. But the result is still the same: Limited facilities-based competition and investment.

And so we return to today’s Wall Street Journal story about Google Fiber, which explains how local officials are finally starting to understand these realities. The story notes:

In 2011, Google struck a deal with authorities in both Kansas City, Kan., and Kansas City, Mo., to build the service based on customer demand. City officials say they didn’t push hard for universal coverage because they thought faster Internet service would boost the local economy and they were competing against so many other cities. “The main point was to win and bring that infrastructure to our city,” said Rick Usher, assistant city manager of Kansas City, Mo. As phone and cable companies slowed their own expansion plans, more cities allowed the selective approach.

Google’s ‘build-to-demand’ model is catching on because it produces results: More infrastructure investment, innovation, and competition. Traditional telecom and broadband operators are prepared to step up investment, too, when the incentives are right:

Verizon was required by cities and some state laws to build and offer its FiOS service widely across cities. It stopped expanding to new cities in 2010; to date, it has spent more than $23 billion on the FiOS rollout. Chief Financial Officer Fran Shammo said in March that the company wouldn’t expand to additional markets until FiOS had “finally returned its cost of capital.” If Verizon resumes expansion, the company would consider Google’s build-to-demand model because it has the potential to be more profitable, said Chris Levendos, a Verizon executive overseeing the FiOS build-out in Manhattan. Others are doing just that. AT&T said in April it would offer Internet speeds of up to one gigabit in as many as 100 cities. It is building to demand and working with local authorities to reduce construction costs, the company said. Tuesday, it said it would bring the high-speed service to Cupertino, Calif., close to Google’s headquarters. This approach “starts to make this business model look quite attractive,” John Stankey, AT&T’s chief strategy officer, said at an investor conference on Aug. 13.

Again, when you get the incentives right and give investors and innovators a green light, they will seize the opportunity. And that’s even true — actually, it is especially true — for high fixed-cost investments like fiber networks.

But wait, aren’t there some pockets of the population that will fall through the cracks under this alternative arrangement? In the short-term, potentially yes. But the right answer to that “digital divide” problem is never to restrict short-term investment and innovation opportunities just because you think you have a better, more “well intentioned” plan. That is the crucial mistake policymakers made in the past. Their desire to get everyone served at the exact same time with the exact same plain vanilla service meant we got sub-optimal technologies and stagnant markets with little hope of any new innovation or investment over the long-haul.

This is how “universal service” consistently fails us. Universal service sells us short. It sells human ingenuity short. The logic that motivates universal service regulation is that: ‘Well, this is about the best we can do. Let’s just get everyone some basic level of service and that will be just and good.’  Can you imagine if we would have applied this logic to other major markets and technologies?!

But what about the under-served communities? First, when you allow new innovation in networks, you never know how or where they might spread next. If you have more competitors offering unique networks architectures and services, there is a very good chance that entrepreneurial minds will figure out how to push out the boundaries of what is possible, especially in terms of how the service is delivered.

Consider this: Back in the old days, did it really make sense to try to stretch a thin copper wire way, way out into the middle of every valley, desert, farm field, and mountain? The myopic universal service mindset says: ‘Well, that’s all we had at the time.’ Perhaps for a time it really was. But how much quicker might we have seen some sort of alternative system if we hadn’t locked in those old assumptions as policy requirements? Is it impossible to believe that wireless technologies might have developed much more quickly if the incentives would have been right? Again, there was no reason for any innovators or investors to even consider the idea at a time when policymakers were mandating copper wires be stretched to every corner of the land, and as they were showering favored companies with subsidies to achieve that goal. That’s not something a new innovator could compete with, and so no one did. It would have been like policymakers saying we needed a “universal service” policy for cheap hamburgers for the masses and then showering McDonald’s with subsidies since they were the first one in many local markets who could deliver on that promise. Had we had such a universal cheap hamburger policy, do you think any other fast food places would have ever come to town and tried to compete against those subsidized burgers? Not likely.

The lesson for today’s policymakers is clear: Open up markets, relax regulatory burdens, eliminate discriminatory taxes and subsidies, and clear away other barriers to investment. Then see what happens. As the Google Fiber experience suggests, innovative minds can and will emerge to offer constructive solutions and slowly spread new networks and technologies.

OK, but won’t there still be some communities that are underserved, even with all that new innovation and investment. It’s certainly possible. And where those communities exist, some government action may be necessary to incentivize the spread of some sort of network to them, or even have the government build it for the community. I’m not opposed to that. (Have you ever driven through the hills of West Virginia or the mountains of rural Western states? Hard places to get wired networks out to!) I’m not very optimistic local governments will do a very good job of building sophisticated networks because they already have a horrible track record in this regard. But, again, I don’t oppose local action on this front if no other alternatives appear after a certain period of time.

But, again, the answer here is not crazy national and state-based universal service mandates that regulate everyone in every community as if they had the same problem. Let competition and innovation work its magic where it can and do not mess that up. Where it proves much harder for that network competition and innovation to take root, use smart incentives to get companies to build out their networks further, or offer alternative wireless infrastructure of some sort, or just have the government build the networks themselves. But we should always give competition and innovation the benefit of the doubt and see what happens first.

So, let me perfectly clear what I am saying here: GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NEVER ENOUGH! [And yes, I am using all caps because I am shouting!] The next time somebody starts mouthing something about how they have the moral high ground in these debates because their intentions are supposedly pure as the driven snow, ask them to show you results. Tell them you want evidence that their intentions have actually produced something concrete and positive for society. If their answer is, in essence, ‘Well, with our regulatory mandates we can at least get everybody some basic level of really crappy monopoly service,’ then tell them that they can take their good intentions and shove them. We can do better.

Over at MediaFreedom.org, a new site devoted to fighting the fanaticism of radical anti-media freedom groups like Free Press and other “media reformistas,” I’ve started rolling out a 5-part series of essays about “The Battle for Media Freedom.” In Part 1 of the series, I defined what real media freedom is all about, and in Part 2 I discussed the rising “cyber-collectivist” threat to media freedom.  In my latest installment, I offer an analytical framework that better explains the major differences between the antagonists in the battle over media freedom.

Understanding the Origins of Political Struggles

In his many enlightening books, Thomas Sowell, a great economist and an even better political scientist, often warns of the triumph of good intentions over good economics. It’s a theme that F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman both developed extensively before him. But Sowell has taken this analysis to an entirely differently level in books like A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, and The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy . Sowell teaches us that no matter how noble one’s intentions might be, it does not mean that those ideas will translate into sound public policy. Nonetheless, since “the anointed” believe their own intentions are pure and their methods are sound, they see nothing wrong with substituting their will for the will of millions of individuals interacting spontaneously and voluntarily in the marketplace. The result is an expansion of the scope of public decision-making and a contraction of the scope of private, voluntary action. As a result, mandates replace markets, and freedom gives way central planning.

Sowell developed two useful paradigms to help us better understand “the origins of political struggles.” He refers to the “constrained” versus “unconstrained” vision and separates these two camps according to how they view the nature of man, society, economy, and politics:

The Unconstrained Nature of the Cyber-Collectivist Vision

Sowell’s taxonomy provides a useful frame of reference for today’s debate over communications and media policy. The unconstrained vision crowd here might best be labeled “cyber-collectivists.” This collectivism is not necessarily the hard-edged Marxist brand of collectivism of modern times. It is more the collectivism of Plato’s rule by “philosopher kings” as much as it is modern European “social democrat” collectivism. It generally rejects outright State ownership of the means of production, although there are some exceptions. (Free Press founder Robert McChesney, for example, would go much further than most other collectivists in having the State intervene and directly control or even own media and communications outlets and infrastructure).

Like their many “unconstrained” intellectual predecessors, what unifies the cyber-collectivists is the belief that the State should have a hand in guiding market outcomes toward a “fairer” end. The cyber-collectivists, for example, get indigestion over unequal patterns whether we are talking audience shares or technological diffusion. They are quick to allege “market failure” when some of their preferred media voices only capture miniscule audience shares (even when it’s just the result of consumer demand in action). And when some people or communities gain access to a network or new technology quicker than others, they are often quick to conclude some nefarious plot by greedy capitalists must be to blame.

Of course, in reality, this is just the way things in a free society have always worked. “Liberty upsets patterns” the late Harvard University philosopher Robert Nozick taught us in his 1974 masterpiece “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” What Nozick meant was that there is a fundamental tension between liberty and egalitarianism such that when people are left to their own devices, some forms of inequality would be inevitable and persistent throughout society. Correspondingly, any attempt to force patterns, or outcomes, upon society requires a surrender of liberty.

All of this is equally true for media and communications policy. Just as there will never be perfect equality of outcomes in the provision of homes, cars, or incomes, there will never be perfect equality of tech gadgets or audience shares for media speakers / outlets.

Speech Redistributionism

The cyber-collectivists are not content with that, however. Just as they call for a redistribution of wealth to rectify the supposed injustice of unequal incomes, so too they call for “something to be done” to “balance” outcomes and ensure “fairer” outcomes. We might call this “media redistributionism” or even “speech redistributionism.”

Consider, for example, a proposal set forth by Cass Sunstein, the prolific University of Chicago law professor (and now Obama Administration official). In his 2001 book Republic.com, in which he suggests that government should consider requiring “electronic sidewalks” in cyberspace to encourage more balance on Internet websites. The state would impose the equivalent of “must carry” mandates on popular or partisan websites, forcing them to carry links to opposing viewpoints. In the name of “media access” or “fairness,” Sunstein and others are apparently willing to let the state impose tyrannical mandates on private website operators, forcing them to open their private property to use by others. Essentially it’s a Fairness Doctrine for the Internet Age.

Elsewhere Sunstein has argued in favor of greater “public interest” regulation to actually change public attitudes and tastes, claiming that there “is a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.” [See: Television and the Public Interest, 88 California Law Review 499, 501 (2000).] He and many other cyber-collectivist scholars claim that they have a better idea of what interests the public. Essentially, the public doesn’t know what’s best for them, so someone else must tell them—and potentially even force supposedly better choices upon them. For example, Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law, and currently an adviser to the Federal Communications Commission, believes that, “a proactive media policy must not only correct a poorly functioning market, but also provide diversions around existing media markets and tastes. Proactive media policy can do this by changing consumer wants.”

The thought of having government “change consumer wants” is positively Orwellian and raises the obvious question: according to who’s tastes and values? The viewing and listening public has a broad array of interests and desires that cannot be easily gauged by congressional lawmakers, and certainly not by five unelected bureaucrats at the FCC. As media scholar Benjamin Compaine has correctly noted, “[i]n democracies, there is no universal ‘public interest.’ Rather there are numerous and changing ‘interested publics.’”

And, more practically, how should such goals be accomplished in an age of information abundance? The sheer scale and volume of media activity taking place across an unprecedented variety of communications platforms makes it difficult to imagine how a scarcity-era regulatory regime will be applied going forward. Are we going to have speech patrols standing on every cyber-corner policing the Net for “fairness” violations or determining what is and isn’t “in the public interest”?

Opportunity, Not Outcome, Is What Matters Most

Those of us who subscribe to a more “constrained vision” understand that what is really important is equality of media opportunity, not equality of media outcomes. A focus on the latter is both foolish and destructive. It is foolish because media equality is an impossibility absent extreme measures, which in turn explains why it is destructive. We would need totalitarian government controls on media outputs and consumption in order to achieve anything remotely close to “balance” or “equality” in terms of media results. What counts most is that people have a chance to be heard, not whether millions are listening or whether there is a perfect distribution of digital technology.

Again, that is not enough for the unconstrained visionaries who guide the cyber-collectivist movement. They want action and they want results and they want them now! And, they will always remind us, they have the best of intentions, so we should just trust them. The problem is, intentions + action = control. When they say “something to be done” that is usually code (excuse the pun) for heavy-handed government action to control the messy, un-patterned outcomes of a free marketplace.

And so we arrive at the critical difference between the cyber-freedom and the cyber-collectivist movements: Those of us who adhere to a more constrained view of nature, society and economy (i.e., the cyber-freedom movement) believe that liberty is the default position and that it generally trumps other values. Supposed “market failures” (or “code failures,” as the case may be) are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by the coerced, top-down, governmental solutions that the cyber-collectivists call for. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s). Finally, and quite importantly, we in the cyber-freedom movement are not so quick to cry “market failure!” and call in the code cops. We understand that those messy, un-patterned market outcomes are the result of an evolutionary process or trial-and-error and that society and economy benefit from the resulting learning process.

Sure, there may be times when governments may need to intervene at the margins, but we would counsel against abrupt and incessant interventions to correct every supposed “market failure” or “unfair” outcome. After all, those interventions will simply beget more and more interventions to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions. There is simply no sugar-coating the reality that, no matter how well-intentioned, more and more media control is the inevitable prescription.

In my next installment in this series, I will detail the cyber-collectivist blueprint for radical media redistributionism by outlining this movement’s goals and its proposed methods of control.