The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper on,”Permissionless Innovation and Immersive Technology: Public Policy for Virtual and Augmented Reality,” which I co-authored with Jonathan Camp. This 53-page paper can be downloaded via the Mercatus website, SSRN or Research Gate.

Here is the abstract for the paper:

Immersive technologies such as augmented reality, virtual reality, and mixed reality are finally taking off. As these technologies become more widespread, concerns will likely develop about their disruptive social and economic effects. This paper addresses such policy concerns and contrasts two different visions for governing immersive tech going forward. The paper makes the case for permissionless innovation, or the general freedom to innovate without prior constraint, as the optimal policy default to maximize the benefits associated with immersive technologies. The alternative vision — the so-called precautionary principle — would be an inappropriate policy default because it would greatly limit the potential for beneficial applications and uses of these new technologies to emerge rapidly. Public policy for immersive technology should not be based on hypothetical worst-case scenarios. Rather, policymakers should wait to see which concerns or harms emerge and then devise ex post solutions as needed.

To better explain why precautionary controls on these emerging technologies would be such a mistake, Camp and I provide an inventory of the many VR, AR, and mixed reality applications that are already on the market–or soon could be–and which could provide society with profound benefits. A few examples include: 

• Education and museums. Immersing users in virtual environments allows Google’s Expedition Pioneer Program to provide 360-degree video tours of famous landmarks and ruins, and museums are already using AR technology to provide interactive content.
• Worker training and systems monitoring. VR industrial simulators such as ForgeFX are being used to train workers to master a variety of complex tasks, while AR systems can be leveraged to help farmers with crop management from afar.
• Healthcare. CT scans and MRIs are being converted into 3-D models to perform surgery that was once thought impossible, and the world’s first VR medical training facility opened in London in November of 2016.
• Engineering. Virtual modeling technology is being combined with VR to allow touring of unbuilt vehicles and buildings, lowering the costs of construction and design.
• Military. The military has used VR for combat simulations, medic training, flight simulators, vehicle simulators, and even the treatment of PTSD.

And that just scratches the surface of some of the many exciting applications out there. The virtual sky is the limit with immersive tech — so long, that is, as we don’t derail these life-enriching technologies with misguided, fear-based public policy restrictions. Please read the paper for more details.

“First electricity, now telephones. Sometimes I feel as if I were living in an H.G. Wells novel.” –Dowager Countess, Downton Abbey

Every technology we take for granted was once new, different, disruptive, and often ridiculed and resisted as a result. Electricity, telephones, trains, and television all caused widespread fears once in the way robots, artificial intelligence, and the internet of things do today. Typically it is realized by most that these fears are misplaced and overly pessimistic, the technology gets diffused and we can barely remember our life without it. But in the recent technopanics, there has been a concern that the legal system is not properly equipped to handle the possible harms or concerns from these new technologies. As a result, there are often calls to regulate or rein in their use.

In the late 1980s, video cassette recorders (VCRs) caused a legal technopanic. The concerns were less that VCRs would lead to some bizarre human mutation as in many technopanics, but rather that the existing system of copyright infringement and vicarious liability could not adequately address the potential harm to the motion picture industry. The then president of the Motion Picture Association of America Jack Valenti famously told Congress, “I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman home alone.”

In the eyes of the film and television producers the legal system did not have the resources to protect their copyright or hold the manufacturers and distributors of these disruptive machines properly liable for their actions. The Ninth Circuit initially sided with the producers finding that recording of television programs for home-viewing was not part of a blanket fair use exception in copyright law and that the manufacturers and distributors of VCRs could be held vicariously liable for their actions. This was overturned at the Supreme Court by a single vote.

By denying the movie industry a victory, ironically, the courts actually handed them a much bigger one. By allowing for the widespread adoption of this technology, the courts actually provided a new line of profit for the studios in home video sales and did not cripple copyright law in the process. It also though shows that the process by and large works. Individuals who pirate or distributed copyrighted video material (remember the FBI warnings at the start of tapes) could still be held personally liable for their violations. If Congress had intervened, the actions would likely have been too broad or too narrow to give appropriate remedy as common law did. Similar concerns arise today with new creative techniques such as 3D printing, but typically it is best to at least let the common law attempt to address these concerns before deeming it incapable. This illustrates how liability norms can evolve naturally over time to strike a sensible balance.

This legal technopanic also emerged around the Internet. The global and anonymous nature of the Internet naturally make it more difficult to perceive the potential harms and to identify the perpetrators and gain jurisdiction over them. Or so the legal technopanic goes. Judge Easterbrook explained in his 1996 article Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, “the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules.” Intellectual property law and property rights more generally are relatively well defined general rules. The beauty of the common law is its ability to adapt to a specific situation. Still there are concerns which may require interventions to be made. When necessary these interventions are especially important because, as John Villasenor wrote, “While technology is usually described as an enabler … liability is often described as an impediment.”

For example, Congress preemptively limited the liability of internet service providers in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. While there always seem to be concerns over this immunity when bad things happen on the internet, by and large the courts have been able to determine when the ISP was actively contributing to the violations of state and federal laws. In fact the protection provided by Section 230 merely codified the same principles at common law which lead to the protection of the VCR.

A little protection via legislation was necessary to allow the internet to flourish, but that protection was needed in part because of a legal technopanic. Similarly, Congress intervened to establish a notice-and-takedown procedure through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), when it became apparent that existing copyright law was not evolving as quickly as technology to address both the internet host and the copyright holders concerns. While ideally the common law would have been allowed to evolve to a conclusion on the issue, the sudden rise of YouTube and other online services necessitated at least a temporary intervention. Such legislation represents a compromise that likely would have resulted in a winner or loser if it had played out in the courts. As a result, while the common law is typically preferable sometimes legislation is necessary to at least temporarily establish a norm and stem the prevention of innovation from a possible legal technopanic.

By and large the courts have adapted disruptive technology as quickly or even more so then society, and as a result allowed the common law to see reason. Perhaps the moral of the story is as Edward Coke wrote in 1642, “The common law itself is nothing else but reason.”

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my latest law review article, “Guns, Limbs, and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing?” The article, which appears in Vol. 17 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, was co-authored with Adam Marcus. Here’s the abstract:

We stand on the cusp of the next great industrial revolution thanks to technological innovations and developments that could significantly enhance the welfare of people across the world. This article will focus on how one of those modern inventions–3D printing–could offer the public significant benefits, but not without some serious economic, social, and legal disruptions along the way. We begin by explaining what 3D printing is and how it works. We also discuss specific applications of this technology and its potential benefits. We then turn to the policy frameworks that could govern 3D printing technologies and itemize a few of the major public policy issues that are either already being discussed, or which could become pertinent in the future. We offer some general guidance for policymakers who might be pondering the governance of 3D printing technologies going forward. Contra to the many other articles and position papers that have already been penned about 3D printing policy, which only selectively defend permissionless innovation in narrow circumstances, we endorse it as the default rule across all categories of 3D printing applications.

More specifically, we do a deep dive into 3 primary public policy “fault lines” for 3D printing: firearms, medical devices, and intellectual property concerns. Read the whole thing for more details.

On the whiteboard that hangs in my office, I have a giant matrix of technology policy issues and the various policy “threat vectors” that might end up driving regulation of particular technologies or sectors. Along with my colleagues at the Mercatus Center’s Technology Policy Program, we constantly revise this list of policy priorities and simultaneously make an (obviously quite subjective) attempt to put some weights on the potential policy severity associated with each threat of intervention. The matrix looks like this: [Sorry about the small fonts. You can click on the image to make it easier to see.]

I use 5 general policy concerns when considering the likelihood of regulatory intervention in any given area. Those policy concerns are:

1. privacy (reputation issues, fear of “profiling” & “discrimination,” amorphous psychological / cognitive harms);
2. safety (health & physical safety or, alternatively, child safety and speech / cultural concerns);
3. security (hacking, cybersecurity, law enforcement issues);
4. economic disruption (automation, job dislocation, sectoral disruptions); and,
5. intellectual property (copyright and patent issues).

I realize that some of these five categories could be sub-divided and refined. I also understand that these five groupings may not encapsulate the full range of potential policy issues out there, but I’ve tried to avoid having too many categories to keep this as conceptually tidy as is possible. However, I might need to add a separate category for civil rights and disabilities-related policy issues eventually. Likewise, “psychological considerations” might deserve its own category because they do not necessarily perfectly fit into either the privacy or safety buckets right now, even though that’s where I have them currently. For example, some privacy activists call for regulation of “big data” and large databases based on fears about how all that data collection makes people feel about themselves. I consider that a privacy-related concern now, but you could imagine that being in a separate category. Meanwhile, there’s long been calls to regulate various types of media content (music, movies, video games, online porn, etc) based on the psychological impact they have on children. Those “media effects” theories have always been considered a child safety issue, which is where I currently have them slotted, but they could probably be its own category that also included concerns about distraction and addiction (which could come to haunt VR technologies in the future).

Anyway, my colleagues and I use this current matrix to help us determine what we should be paying more attention to and what sort of scholarly outputs are needed to address regulatory threats on each front. Generally speaking, this is the portfolio of issues I try to stay on top of full-time at Mercatus as part of our ongoing “Permissionless Innovation” project.

Several people who have seen that matrix in my office tell me I should do something more with it, but I’m not really sure what that something would be. In any event, I thought it might make sense to post it here to give others a feel for the current set of emerging tech policy issues that interest us at Mercatus. I will try to upload new versions of the matrix as that giant whiteboard in my office morphs over time and the list of technologies and regulatory threats changes or grows.

Incidentally, I am often asked to explain the relative weights I’ve assigned to each potential regulatory threat, so I will try to justify some of those rankings here briefly. (Again, it’s all quite subjective and I’m always open to hearing the case for tweaking the rankings.)

• Big Data / Online Marketing / the Internet of Things (IoT): Privacy is the #1 policy threat for these sectors. From a public policy perspective, what unifies these technologies is a growing concern about how expanding private sector data collection efforts could affect our privacy or reputations. We’ve already seen a flurry of legislative and regulatory activity here in the U.S. aimed at placing restrictions on data collection or use. And it goes without saying that other countries, especially in Europe, already impose a wide variety of controls on data collection in the name of privacy protection. There also exists a variety of closely-related security concerns here. But the rise of IoT technologies have introduced safety concerns into the mix in a major way, too. That’s especially true because of the large number of Big Data services and IoT devices that are health and medical related.  Taken together, this is the issue set I spend the majority of my time covering because the privacy and security implications of a data-driven economy already occupies the attention of countless regulatory activists and public policymakers across the globe. I think that will continue to be the case for many years to come.
• Robotics: Safety concerns tend to be the biggest driver of calls for regulation of robotic and autonomous technology. For example, new laws and regulations are already being proposed for driverless cars based on fears about the hacking of connected vehicles. And commercial drones attract policy attention based on safety-related concerns such as whether a drone could strike an airplane, or even just fall on our heads. Proposals have been floated to mandate the equivalent of DRM for drones, which would force drone innovators to embed federally-approved technological controls into their systems designating where they are allowed to fly. Even if most of these concerns are overstated or are currently being dealt with, we can expect more safety-related policy proposals for robotic tech in coming years.  Economic concerns would be a close second here due to the increasing worry that robots will eat all our jobs. At least so far, however, that concern has tended to be more of an academic nature rather than a public policy consideration. And it remains unclear what the policy prescription would be in this regard without becoming a neo-Luddite, “smash-the-machines” sort of proposal. That could change in coming years, however. It all depends on the labor market situation over time. Meanwhile, academics are floating the idea of a Federal Robotics Commission to provide greater policy “expertise” in the form of yet another technocratic Beltway bureaucracy.
• Additive manufacturing / 3D printing: Safety is probably the #1 concern here, although depending on what type of 3D-printed object we are talking about, it could be the case that intellectual property concerns will be a bigger driver of calls for regulatory intervention. A lot of the policy-related concerns around 3D printing today are being driven by worries over things like 3D-printed guns. That’s mostly a safety concern, of course. But it we are talking about the replication of branded commercial objects (3D-printed toys or other things, for example), then IP tends to be the bigger concern. The question of product liability also looms large here and it remains unclear how claims might be sorted out when there are fewer large, deep-pocketed intermediaries to go after in a world of decentralized production. Hopefully, those liability norms will be left to the courts and common law to sort out over time, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see more calls for preemptive legislative interventions here in both directions: i.e., some will call legislators to impose greater liability on certain parties while others will push to immunize intermediaries from punishing forms of liability for the downstream actions of others (like a Sec. 230 norm for 3D printing).
• Medical tech innovation: It goes without saying that traditional safety concerns will drive policy for advanced medical technologies, just as they have for earlier drugs, devices, and treatments. As software continues to “eat the world” and invade the world of health and medicine, regulators are increasingly going to be trying to figure out how to pigeonhole new technologies into old regulatory constructs. That’s why I have been watching how the FDA continues to deal with 3D-printed prosthetics and mobile medical apps on our smartphones. Eventually, the continuing decentralized democratization of 3D printing (driven by rapidly falling costs) will collide with old medical device regulatory realities and a century’s worth of FDA command-and-control style regulation. Oh my, what a fight that will be! And then chemical printers will become more widespread and this issue will get even more intense. The policy fight here is even more interesting because of all the thorny ethical issues pertaining to the rise of embeddable technology, biohacking, and genome innovation. I have a feeling that my policy portfolio will shift rapidly in this direction in coming years as the modern info-tech revolution spreads to the world of medicine and health. I already have two new papers coming out on these issues in the next few weeks.
• Sharing economy: Economic disruption is clearly the big policy issue here. Specifically, many policymakers and incumbent industries aren’t very happy about new entrants coming into their sectors and offering consumers services without strictly complying with traditional regulations. But safety issues often pop up in these debates when regulators or advocates claim we can’t trust sharing economy operators. What’s particularly interesting about this space is how these policy battles are playing out at almost every level of government: federal, state, local, and international. At least thus far, sharing economy innovators tend to be winning most of those battles. But the fight continues.
• Crypto & Bitcoin: I think safety would probably be the biggest issue here, in the sense that policymakers fear a world of unregulated crypto and decentralized blockchain applications are a world in which the “bad guys” will be able to use those technologies to harm the public in some fashion. We’ve heard this all before, of course, but (going all the way back to the Clipper Chip wars) you can always bank on law enforcement officials resorting to Chicken Little claims about terrorists and child predators thriving in a world of unregulated crypto. In many ways, this is the most important of all these policy fights because if the government can regulate crypto and blockchain technologies, it severely undermines the fabric of almost all the other technologies and platforms discussed herein. This is why the current debate over government-mandated “backdoors” is so important; it has profound ramifications for every other tech regulation debate that follows.
• Immersive Tech (VR and augmented reality): This is an amorphous and evolving area that I am getting increasingly interested in, but the policy issues here have yet to come into clear focus. However, when Google Glass was launched, there was a brief technopanic of sorts over its privacy and security ramifications. Those concerns have subsided a bit as Google Glass has seemingly faded away (probably because of its high price point more than because of its privacy concerns), but I suspect that future iterations of augmented reality technologies will raise similar concerns. That will especially be true as more sophisticated biometric (and facial recognition) capabilities are integrated into them. Academics are already wondering how to enforce “notice and consent” privacy norms and rules in a world where everyone is wearing miniature body cams and heads-up displays in their sunglasses. I’m not sure it’s even possible, but that debate will continue and include all sorts of calls for technological controls. OK, that’s augmented reality, but what about virtual reality technologies? I think safety concerns could drive some policy proposals as critics grow concerned about the psychological implications of people (especially kids) spending more and more time in immersive virtual worlds. In that sense, we might see a replay of the earlier debate over violent video games and/or video game addition. But it remains to be seen.

Incidentally, I use this matrix and provide more context to it in my big presentation on “Permissionless Innovation & the Clash of Visions over Emerging Technologies.” [It’s embedded below.] And I discuss most of these issues in more detail in my book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. I am in the process of finishing up the second edition of that book and will be expanding the case studies about the issues discussed above. Finally, I discussed many of these policy threats during my recent appearance on the Andreessen Horowitz podcast.

Update 10/2/15: For another take on various new technology trends and the potential policy issues they raise, check out this report from the World Economic Forum, Deep Shift: Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact. The WEF report identifies 21 technology “shifts” and then groups them into six “mega-trend” categories. Almost all these issues are on my matrix above, but the WEF report provides some nice additional context on why each technology trend will be so disruptive.

I’m pleased to announce that Alex Tabarrok and I have a new working paper out from the Mercatus Center today, “Public Choice and Bloomington School Perspectives on Intellectual Property.” The paper will appear in Public Choice in 2014.

Here’s the abstract:

We mine two underexplored traditions for insights into intellectual property: the public choice or Virginia school, centered on James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, and the Bloomington or Institutional Analysis and Development school, centered on Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom. We apply the perspectives of each school to issues of intellectual property and develop new insights, questions, and focuses of attention. We also explore tensions and synergies between the two schools on issues of intellectual property.

The gist of the paper is that the standard case for intellectual property—that a temporary monopoly is needed in order to recoup the sunk costs of innovation or creation—ignores issues raised by the two schools we investigate.

From a public choice perspective, a temporary monopoly provides enormous opportunities for rent seeking. Copyright and patent owners are constantly manipulating the political environment to expand either the duration of the monopoly or the scope of what can be monopolized. We document the evolution of intellectual property in the United States from its modest origins to its current strong and expansive state.

From a Bloomington perspective, the standard case for IP wrongly treats the commons as a kind of wasteland. In fact, numerous innovations and sprawling creative works occur without monopolization—just look at Wikipedia. Innovation occurs when the right institutional structures are in place, and intellectual property that is too severe can hamper the smooth operation of these institutions. Too much IP can harm as much as too little.

Read the whole thing, cite it copiously, etc.

The Hill is reporting that Rep. Goodlatte, under pressure from “companies like Microsoft, IBM and Apple,” is planning to drop the provision in his patent reform bill that expands the Covered Business Method (CBM) program. Mike Masnick also has commentary.

Julie Samuels explains CBM review:

The “Covered Business Method Review” (CBM) was first introduced in 2011’s America Invents Act. It created, for a limited time, an additional avenue of patent review at the Patent Office. Unfortunately, as drafted, it really was only intended to apply to patents that deal with financial institutions. CBM is a good program. First, we have long favored the use of Patent Office procedure to challenge patents; it is much cheaper and much quicker than going to court. Second, it allows for more ways to challenge patents than other types of Patent Office review—making it a more robust procedure that promises to knock out more improvidently granted patents. Third, it automatically puts concurrent patent litigation between the parties on hold. Putting ongoing litigation on hold is no small thing. Patent litigation often costs each side well into the millions of dollars, while CBMs cost just a fraction of that. This means that more people will be in a position to challenge bad patents and fight back against the trolls who wield those patents.

The original Goodlatte bill would have expanded CBM review to patents beyond the financial sector.

From a public choice perspective, it is unsurprising that finance would have better patent law than the rest of the economy: finance is a concentrated industry that can go up politically against and offset another concentrated industry, the patent bar. But non-finance covered business method patents are asserted against all kinds of companies, for practices as banal as retrieving data from a database (not joking: “A method of retrieving information from a database record having plural fields“) or selling things online (“An apparatus to market and/or sell goods and/or services over an electronic network“). The fact that the victims of these patent assertions are dispersed throughout the economy means that they are not organized enough to effectively oppose the patent interests that are lobbying against the CBM program expansion.

Still, it is very disappointing that Rep. Goodlatte is caving to such lobbying. I already thought that his bill did not go far enough; now it goes even less far.

The new discussion draft from Rep. Goodlatte is now circulating publicly. Here is a good summary from the EFF of what the legislation would do:

• Heightened Pleading: Requiring a patent holder to provide basic details (such as which patents and claims are at issue, as well as exactly what products allegedly infringe and how) when it files a lawsuit.
• Fee shifting: Requiring the loser in a patent case to pay attorney’s fees and costs. This would make it harder for trolls to use the extraordinary expense of patent litigation to force a settlement.
• Transparency: The draft includes strong language requiring patent trolls to reveal the parties that would actually benefit from the litigation (called the real party in interest).
• Joinder: If the plaintiff is a shell-company patent troll, the defendant could require the real party in interest to join the litigation. Even better, a prevailing defendant could collect attorney’s fees from the real party in interest if the patent troll can’t or won’t pay.
• Staying customer suits: Requiring courts to stay patent litigation against customers when there is parallel litigation against the manufacturer.
• Discovery reform: Shutting down expensive and often harassing discovery until the court has interpreted the patent. This should make it easier for defendants to dispose of frivolous cases early before the legal fees and court costs really add up.
• Post-grant review: The bill expands an important avenue to challenge a patent’s validity at the Patent Office (known as the transitional program for covered business method patents). While this procedure is still too expensive for many of the trolls’ smaller targets, we support efforts to make it easier to knock out bad patents.

These are excellent steps forward in the fight against patent trolls, but I’m still hoping for more. The explosion in patent litigation, both troll and non-troll, is due to the astonishing increase in the number of software patents. Software patents now make up over half of all patents! Software patents are more likely to be litigated than other kinds of patents, including four times more likely than a chemical patent.

Given the extent to which the problems with our patent system are caused by software patents, it is unfortunate that none of the patent reform bills under consideration in this Congress contemplate simply excluding software from the set of patentable subject matter. By all means, slay the trolls. But also go after the source of their power.

Today, the Obama administration announced 5 executive actions it is taking and 7 legislative proposals it is making to address the problem of patent trolls. While these are incremental steps in the right direction, they are still pretty weak sauce. The reforms could alleviate some of the litigation pressure on Silicon Valley firms, but there’s a long way to go if we want to have a patent system that maximized innovation.

The proposals aim to reduce anonymity in patent litigation, improve review at the USPTO, give more protection to downstream users, and improve standards at the International Trade Commission, a venue which has been gamed by patent plaintiffs. These are all steps worth taking. But they’re not enough. The White House’s press release quotes the president as saying that “our efforts at patent reform [i.e. the America Invents Act, passed in 2011] only went about halfway to where we need to go.” Presumably the White House believes these steps will take us the rest of the way there.

But the problem with computer-enabled patents isn’t merely that they result in a lot of opportunistic litigation, though they do. The problem is that almost every new idea is actually pretty obvious, in the sense that it is “invented” at the same time by lots of companies that are innovating in the same space. Granting patents in a field where everyone is innovating in the same way at the same time is a recipe for slowing down, not speeding up, innovation. Instead of just getting on with the process of building great new products, companies have to file for patents, assemble patent portfolios, license patents from competitors who “invented” certain software techniques a few months earlier, deal with litigation, and so on. A device like a smartphone requires thousands of patents to be filed, licensed, or litigated.

If we really want to speed up innovation, we need to take bolder steps. New Zealand recently abolished software patents by declaring that software is not an invention at all. It would be terrific if the White House would get behind that kind of bold thinking. In the meantime, we’ll have to watch closely as the Obama administration’s executive actions are implemented and its legislative recommendations move through Congress. I hope for the best, but for now I’m not too impressed.

Alex Tabarrok, author of the ebook Launching The Innovation Renaissance: A New Path to Bring Smart Ideas to Market Fast discusses America’s declining growth rate in total factor productivity, what this means for the future of innovation, and what can be done to improve the situation.

Accroding to Tabarrok, patents, which were designed to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, have instead become weapons in a war for competitive advantage with innovation as collateral damage. College, once a foundation for innovation, has been oversold. And regulations, passed with the best of intentions, have spread like kudzu and now impede progress to everyone’s detriment. Tabarrok outs forth simple reforms in each of these areas and also explains the role immigration plays in innovation and national productivity.

Download

Related Links

• Launching The Innovation Renaissance: A New Path to Bring Smart Ideas to Market Fast, Tabarrok
• VIDEO: Innovations in Most Fields Are Not Patented, Tabarrok
• VIDEO: End Software Patents, Tabarrok
• Patent Policy on the Back of a Napkin, Tabarrok

Paul J. Heald, professor of law at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, discusses his new paper “Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain? Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension.”

The international debate over copyright term extension for existing works turns on the validity of three empirical assertions about what happens to works when they fall into the public domain. Heald discusses a study he carried out with Christopher Buccafusco that found that all three assertions are suspect. In the study, they show that audio books made from public domain bestsellers are significantly more available than those made from copyrighted bestsellers. They also demonstrate that recordings of public domain and copyrighted books are of equal quality.

Since copyrighted works will once again begin to fall into the public domain starting in 2018, Heald says, it’s likely that content owners will ask Congress for yet another term extension. He argues that his empirical findings suggest it should not be granted.

Download

Related Links

• Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, Heald and Buccafusco
• More Music in Movies: What Box Office Data Reveals About the Availability of Public Domain Songs in Movies from 1968-2008, Heald, Shi, Stoiber, and Zheng
• Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best Sellers, Heald

Joshua Gans, professor of Strategic Management at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management and author of the new book Information Wants to be Shared, discusses modern media economics, including how books, movies, music, and news will be supported in the future.

Gans argues that sharing enhances most information’s value. He also explains that the business models of traditional media companies, gatekeepers who have relied on scarcity and control, have collapsed in the face of new technologies. Equally important, he argues that sharing can revive moribund, threatened industries even as he examines platforms that have, almost accidentally, thrived in this new environment.

Download

Related Links

• Information Wants to be Shared, Gans
• Is There a Market for Ideas?, Gans and Scott Stern
• The Product Market and the Market for ‘Ideas’: Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, Gans and Stern
• The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays, Gans, Stern, and David H. Hsu

Last week I attended an event on software patents at GW Law School. The event made me uncomfortable because it was—as one would expect at a law school event—dominated by lawyers. The concerns of the legal academics, practitioners, and lobbyists participating in the round table discussion were very different from those one would expect for a policy audience. For example, the participants agreed that there is no elegant way to partition software patents from other patents under current law and that current Supreme Court jurisprudence is unsophisticated, relying on the wrong sections of the U.S. Code.

Missing from the discussion was the single most important fact about patents: that they are negatively correlated with economic growth.

It is pretty easy to eyeball this relationship using data from the USPTO on number of patents granted and from the BLS on real GDP per capita.

Patent grants have exploded in the past two decades or so, and real GDP per capita growth has declined over the same period. Now, patent proponents can argue (rightly) that correlation is not causation—growth could have been  even worse over the past few decades had we not had strong patent protection. But correlation is correlated with causation, so proponents of strong patent laws should have to explicitly make that argument using real evidence.

In addition to U.S. time-series data, we can examine the international cross-sectional evidence. As Petra Moser concludes in her recent JEP article:

Overall, the weight of the existing historical evidence suggests that patent policies, which grant strong intellectual property rights to early generations of inventors, may discourage innovation. On the contrary, policies that encourage the diffusion of ideas and modify patent laws to facilitate entry and encourage competition may be an effective mechanism to encourage innovation.

Taken together, absent some additional evidence from patent proponents, this time-series and cross-sectional evidence suggests we are on the wrong side of the Tabarrok Curve.

If there is any evidence that software patents in particular have a positive effect on innovation or growth, I have yet to see it. Here’s hoping proponents of the current system will take up the challenge and respond with such evidence. But if they do not, then we should abolish software patents even if it means adopting some relatively bizarre legal formulations as the lawyers fear.

Register here now for next Wednesday’s Cato book forum on Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas.

In the book, Ronald A. Cass and Keith Hylton reject the idea that changing technology undermines the case for intellectual property rights. They argue that making the work of inventors and creators free would be a costly mistake.

That cuts against the bulk of academic opinion today, which is critical of the broad scope and length of intellectual property protections today. The book has qualities that many libertarians will enjoy because it starts with first principles: the theoretical underpinnings and practical benefits of property rights.

By no means does the book answer all the questions, and we’ll have TLF’s own Jerry Brito, the editor of Copyright Unbalanced, on hand to provide commentary.

That’s Wednesday (3/20) at noon in the Cato Institute’s F.A. Hayek auditorium. There’s no such thing as a free lunch, but the sandwiches provided afterwards come at the low cost of learning more dimensions of the intellectual property debate. Register now!

Joe Karaganis, vice president at The American Assembly at Columbia University, discusses the relationship between digital convergence and cultural production in the realm of online piracy.

Karaganis’s work at American Assembly arose from a frustration with the one-sided way in which industry research was framing the discourse around global copyright policy. He shares the results of Copy Culture in the US & Germany, a recent survey he helped conduct that distinguishes between attitudes towards piracy in the two countries. It found that nearly half of adults in the U.S. and Germany participate in a broad, informal “copy culture,” characterized by the copying, sharing, and downloading of music, movies, TV shows, and other digital media. And while citizens support laws against piracy, they don’t support outsized penalties.

Karaganis also discuses the new “six-strike” Copyright Alert System in the U.S., of which he is skeptical. He also talks about the politics of copyright reform and notes that there is a window of opportunity for the Republican Party to take up the issue before demography gives the advantage to the much younger Democratic Party. 

Download

Related Links

• “Copy Culture in the US and Germany”, The American Assembly
• Presenting ‘Copy Culture in the US and Germany’, Karagenis
• Copy Culture by Race and Ethnicity, Karagenis
• Unauthorized File Sharing: Is It Wrong?, Karagenis

Ronald A. Cass, Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Law, discusses his new book, Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas, which he co-authored with Boston University colleague Keith Hylton. Written as a primer for understanding intellectual property law and a defense of intellectual property, Laws of Creation explains the basis of IP and its justification. 

According to Cass, not all would-be reformers share a similar guiding philosophy, distinguishing between those who support property rights but nevertheless have specific critiques of the intellectual property system as it currently stands, and reformers who do not see a place for property.

Cass explains that the current intellectual property system is neither wholly good nor wholly bad, but is a matter of weighing tradeoffs. On the whole, he argues, intellectual property benefits society. Cass also argues that intellectual property law in the U.S. is still more functional than that in other countries, such as Italy, and that, while it would benefit from some reform, it is fundamentally a workable system.

Download

Related Links

• Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas, Cass and Hylton
• Property Rights Systems and the Rule of Law, Cass
• Tom W. Bell on Laws of Creation, Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog
• Book Talk: Law of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas, The Cato Institute

Brookings has a new report out by Jonathan Rothwell, José Lobo, Deborah Strumsky, and Mark Muro that “examines the importance of patents as a measure of invention to economic growth and explores why some areas are more inventive than others.” (p. 4) Since I doubt that non-molecule patents have a substantial effect on growth, I was curious to examine the paper’s methodology. So I skimmed through the study, which referred me to a technical appendix, which referred me to the authors’ working paper on SSRN.

The authors are basically regressing log output per worker on 10-year-lagged measures of patenting in a fixed effects model using metropolitan areas in the United States.

Continue reading on elidourado.com…

In last week’s episode of Surprisingly Free, Tom Bell introduced his chapter in Copyright Unbalanced, a new book on the conservative and libertarian case for copyright reform, edited by Jerry Brito. This week, Geoff Manne, lecturer in law at Lewis & Clark Law School and Executive Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, explains how, while also working from libertarian principles, he arrived at a very different view of copyright than either Brito or Bell.

Taking an economic approach to property rights, Manne argues that there is a necessary tradeoff between incentive to create and widespread access. While Manne does recognize the value of widespread use, he says that its benefits must be weighed against the potential breakdown in specialization of labor and the value added by commercialization.

According to Manne, just because someone has exclusive rights to something, doesn’t mean that it won’t be optimally distributed, and, in fact, the highest value ownership right tends to transfer from the creator to the users over time.

Manne concludes that if the government can have any important role, it’s the creation and enforcement of property rights, including copyright, and that that may necessitate new copyright laws.

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Related Links

• Copyright Unbalanced: From Incentive to Excess, by Brito, et al
• Intellectual Privilege: A Libertarian View of Copyright, by Bell
• On Copyright, Conservatives and Libertarians Should Focus on What Unites Us, Tech Liberation Front

Tom W. Bell, professor of law at Chapman University and author of the concluding essay in Copyright Unbalanced, a new book edited by Surprisingly Free’s own Jerry Brito, discusses the ways in which copyright has evolved over time and why reform is vital.

Bell differentiates copyright from other types of property, arguing that conflating the two terms causes great confusion amongst laypeople and, over time, corrodes the value placed in tangible property rights. According to Bell, copyright is a privilege created by statute that doesn’t exist in a state of nature and is not recognized by common law.

As a special type of economic good, copyright must be treated differently than tangible property rights, according to Bell, who outlines five proposals for copyright reform.

While Bell is not opposed to copyright, he argues that copyright enforcement has gone too far, and lawmakers should structure policies to lead us towards a world in which we conceivably do without it.

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Related Links

• Copyright Unbalanced: From Incentive to Excess, by Brito, et al
• Intellectual Privilege: A Libertarian View of Copyright, Bell
• Copyright Duration and the Mickey Mouse Curve, Tech Liberation Front

Stan Liebowitz on copyright and incentivesStan Liebowitz, Ashbel Smith Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Dallas, discusses his paper, “Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?” According to Leibowitz, economists could hypothetically calculate the exact copyright terms necessary to incentivize creators to make new works without allowing them to capture “rents,” or profits above the bare minimum necessary. However, he argues, efficiency might not be the best goal for copyright.

Liebowitz argues from a fairness or justice perspective that society should not favor an economically efficient copyright law, but one that treats creators of copyrighted works the same as workers in other types of industries. In other industries, he argues, workers are allowed to capture and keep rents.

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Related Links

• Is Efficient Copyright a Reasonable Goal?, by Liebowitz
• TSeventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, by by Liebowitz
• How copyright is like Solyndra, by Jerry Brito

Christopher Sprigman, professor of law at the University of Virginia discusses his upcoming book the Knockoff Economy: How Imitation sparks Innovation co authored with Kal Raustiala. The book is an accessible look at how industries that do not have heavily enforced copyright law, such as the fashion and culinary industries, are still thriving and innovative. Sprigman explains how copyright was not able to be litigated heavily in these cases and what the results could teach us about what other industries that do have extensive copyright enforcement, such as the music and movie industries, could look like without it.

Download

• “The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks Innovation”, Sprigman and Raustiala
• “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design”, by Sprigman and Raustiala
• “Standup comedy and the rise of an informal intellectual property regime”, Bloomberg BNA
• “Why There Are Too Many Patents in America”, Posner Article

The English language is public domain (the language itself, not everything said with it). So it’s worthless, right? No dollars change hands when people use it. Perhaps it could be made worth something if someone were to own it. The owner could charge a license fee to people who use English, making substantial revenue on this suddenly valuable language.

Congress can take works in the public domain and make intellectual property of them according to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case that approved Congress “restoring” public domain works to copyrighted status. (The case is Golan v. Holder, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.)

But would we really be better off if the English language were given a dollar value through the mechanism of ownership and licensing? No. What is now a costless positive-externality machine would turn into a profit-center for one lucky owner. The society would not be better off, just that owner. If we had to pay for a language, we would regard that as a cost.

In a similar vein, Mike Masnick at TechDirt indulges the somewhat tongue-in-cheek observation that Microsoft costs the world economy $500 billion by accumulating to itself that would have gone to other things. It’s a sort of Broken Window fallacy for intellectual property: the idea that creating ownership of intellectual goods creates value. What is not seen when intellectual property is withheld from the public domain is the unpaid uses that might have been made of it.

Now, Microsoft has reaped wonderful benefits from its intellectual creations because it has bestowed wonderful benefits on societies across the globe. But might it have provided all these benefits for slightly less reward, leaving more money with consumers for their preferred uses?

This is all a way of challenging the mental habit of assuming that dollars are equal to value. In the area of intellectual property (whether or not protected by federal statutes), things that have no effect on the economy (because they’re in the public domain) may have huge value. Things privately owned because of intellectual property law may have less value than they should, even though their owners collect lots of money.

Should ISPs be barred under net neutrality from discriminating against illegal content? Not according to the FCC’s draft net neutrality rule, which defines efforts by ISPs to curb the “transfer of unlawful content” as reasonable network management. This exemption is meant to ensure providers have the freedom to filter or block unlawful content like malicious traffic, obscene files, and copyright-infringing data.

EFF and Public Knowledge (PK), both strong advocates of net neutrality, are not happy about the copyright infringement exemption. The groups have urged the FCC to reconsider what they describe as the “copyright loophole,” arguing that copyright filters amount to “poorly designed fishing nets.”

EFF’s and PK’s concerns about copyright filtering aren’t unreasonable. While filtering technology has come a long way over the last few years, it remains a fairly crude instrument for curbing piracy and suffers from false positives. That’s because it’s remarkably difficult to accurately distinguish between unauthorized copyrighted works and similar non-infringing files. And because filters generally flag unauthorized copies on an automated basis without human intervention, even when filters get it right, they often disrupt legal, non-infringing uses of copyrighted material like fair use.

Despite copyright filtering technology’s imperfections, however, outlawing it is the wrong approach. At its core, ISP copyright filtering represents a purely private, voluntary method of dealing with the great intellectual property challenge. This is exactly the sort of approach advocates of limited government should embrace. As Adam and Wayne argued back in 2001:

To lessen the reliance on traditional copyright protections, policymakers should ensure that government regulations don’t stand in the way of private efforts to protect intellectual property.

That’s exactly right. As digital technology evolves, effectively enforcing intellectual property privileges will grow increasingly difficult for content creators. The traditional model for financing content creation — direct payments from consumers to producers — will remain viable only if there’s an economic incentive for consumers to fork over money in exchange for content. Voluntary filtering arrangements between network providers and content owners may prove valuable to this end because they discourage the unauthorized transfer of copyrighted files.

The best part about copyright filtering? It doesn’t necessitate the exercise of the state’s coercive power. In this way, it has the potential to help us move gradually toward a regime of intellectual property protection that’s reliant on the force of the market rather than the force of government.

Of course, there’s no guarantee that attempts to filter copyrighted content at the ISP level will turn out to be effective. That’s because end-to-end encryption, which enjoys growing popularity among savvy users, renders traffic impossible to digitally “fingerprint.” It amounts to a near-perfect foil to deep-packet filtering technologies. There are alternative methods of identifying infringing files — IP address blacklisting, for instance — but such methods tend to be notoriously imprecise and as such are unlikely to be met with acceptance by consumers.

As with all kinds of unsavory ISP behavior, in the long run, overly blunt copyright filtering is simply not a sustainable business practice. Users tend to expect the Internet will “just work,” and attempts by providers to interfere with access to content are invariably met with swift resistance. Consider the recent 4chan blockages by AT&T and Verizon, both of which lasted for mere hours but immediately sparked outrage that reverberated throughout the tech world.

To be sure, some providers may experiment with ineffective, overly aggressive copyright filters. But this sort of experimentation, while painful for those involved, is crucial if providers are to learn the valuable lessons that will signal to the market how to properly balance consumer interests with content creators’ interests. And since ISP competition is on the rise, as Obama’s Department of Justice recently explained, even in relatively uncompetitive markets like Rochester, New York it’s only a matter of time before some 4G LTE carrier deploys residential-grade broadband and shakes things up.

As I’ve argued before, the best way government can serve consumers in DRM disputes is by steering clear of them entirely. Markets may not be perfect, but they tend to efficiently balance competing concerns in a way government regulators simply cannot. In the same way, network-level copyright filtering should succeed or fail based on its own merits and how it impacts consumer welfare, not on how well it meets the invariably vague criteria of the FCC. If net neutrality rules are enshrined into law — and for the record, I hope they aren’t — regulating ISP efforts to curb illegal content should be off the table.

According to the Threat Level blog, the Obama Administration has declared the text of a proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement a national security secret.

Thing is . . . it can’t be. And that would also be contrary to Obama administration policy.

I’ve been hammering Jonathan Zittrain pretty hard here over the past year for the thesis he sets forth in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It that digital “generativity” is at risk today. The reason I have been doing so is because all signs point in the exact opposite direction, and more so with each passing day. Contrary to Jonathan’s fear that the Internet and digital technologies are growing more closed, tethered, and sterile, I have argued that the facts on the ground show us how the world is actually becoming far more open, untethered, and innovative.  And that’s true even for the technology that Jonathan singles out in the book for special scorn — the iPhone.

Consider David Pogue’s post today on the New York Times‘ technology blog today entitled “So Many iPhone Apps, So Little Time.” Pogue reports that:

there are now 15,000 programs available on the App Store, and so many more are flooding in that Apple’s army of screeners can’t even keep up. I keep meaning to write a thoughtful, thorough roundup of the very best of these amazing programs, but every day that I don’t do it, the job becomes more daunting. […] Apple, which runs the store, keeps 30 percent of each sale. Even so, Ocarina [an application Pogue discusses in his essay] demonstrates that a programmer can make a staggering amount of money from the iPhone store. It’s a crazy new software model that I don’t remember seeing anywhere else. It’s not a boxed software program for $600, or even a shareware program you download for $25. It’s a buck a copy. The beauty here is that at these prices, there’s very little risk in trying something out. How many software programs have you bought for your Mac or PC? Two? Four? Well, the average iPhone owner may wind up installing 10, 20 or 30 programs. In all, according to Apple, iPhone owners have downloaded 500 million copies of these programs. Half a billion–since last July. There’s a lot of gloom in the tech industry (and every industry, for that matter). But even when the economy is crashing down around us, there’s still amazing power in a single good idea. And the one on display here–pricing software so low that millions of people buy it without batting an eye–is turning a few clever programmers into millionaires.

I ask you: Does this sound like a world that is growing less generative, as Zittrain argues? Because it sure doesn’t sound like it to me.  Moreover, if you still don’t think the iPhone is open enough, then there’s always a simple solution to that: just buy another phone!

I used to have a (semi-crazy) uncle who typically began conversations with lame jokes or bad riddles. This sounds like one he might have used had he lived long enough: What do Thomas Jefferson, a moose, and cyberspace have in common?

The answer to that question can be found in a new book, In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace, by David G. Post, a Professor of Law at Temple University. Post, who teaches IP and cyberspace law at Temple, is widely regarded as one of the intellectual fathers of the “Internet exceptionalist” school of thinking about cyberlaw.  Basically, Post sees this place we call “cyberspace” as something truly new, unique, and potentially worthy of some special consideration, or even somewhat different ground rules than we apply in meatspace. More on that in a bit.

[ Full disclosure: Post’s work was quite influential on my own thinking during the late 1990s, so much so that when I joined the Cato Institute in 2000, one of the first things I did was invite David to become an adjunct scholar with Cato. He graciously accepted and remains a Cato adjunct scholar today. Incidentally, Cato is hosting a book forum for him on February 4th that I encourage you to attend or watch online. Anyway, it’s always difficult to be perfectly objective when you know and admire someone, but I will try to do so here.]

Post’s book is essentially an extended love letter — to both cyberspace and Jefferson. Problem is, as Post even admits at the end, it’s tough to know which subject this book is suppose to teach us more about. The book loses focus at times — especially in the first 100 pages — as Post meanders between historical tidbits of Jefferson’s life and thinking and what it all means for cyberspace. But the early focus is on TJ.  Thus, those who pick up the book expecting to be immediately immersed in cyber-policy discussions may be a bit disappointed at first.  As a fellow Jefferson fanatic, however, I found all this history terrifically entertaining, whether it was the story of Jefferson’s Plow and his other agricultural inventions and insights, TJ’s unique interest in science (including cryptography), or that big moose of his.

OK, so what’s the deal with the moose? When TJ was serving as a minister to France in in the late 1780s, at considerable expense to himself, he had the complete skeleton, skin and horns of a massive American moose shipped to the lobby of his Paris hotel. Basically, Jefferson wanted to make a bold statement to his French hosts about this New World he came from and wake them up to the fact that some very exciting things were happening over there that they should be paying attention to. That’s one hell of way to make a statement!

Questions about Frontiers, Both Old and New

Now you see the connection to Post’s investigation into the state of cyberspace. Like Jefferson, Post is very excited about a new frontier and he wants to alert people to it. Importantly, however, Post isn’t at all ashamed to admit when he doesn’t understand why some things are the way they are in this new world.  And so Post begins asking questions — lots and lots of questions — to guide our investigation.

Thus, in much the same way that Jefferson penned Notes on the State of Virginia as guidebook for newcomers to the strange new world of his time, David Post has penned this slender volume as a guidebook to our modern cyber-frontier. If you’re looking for a book with concrete positions on all of cyberspace’s pressing policy problems, this book is not it. Instead, it is meant to help us frame the issues and questions properly and consider how this new frontier is unfolding in the early years of its existence. As Post puts it:

We are at the very beginning of what will become a centuries-long conversation about these questions, and my goal here was not to put anything to rest but to put everything in play, not to conclude any part of that conversation but to help you get started. We need, more than answers to today’s questions about law and policy on the network, new ways of thinking about the questions themselves, new vocabularies, new visions of the possible, new ways of identifying and organizing what we know and what we don’t know about the new place. (p. 209)

Post does a very nice job of giving us “new ways of thinking about questions” in his book. These questions generally fall into two categories.  First, Post wants to know why cyberspace works the way it does, or more profoundly, why it works at all. How did this little experiment with networking protocols turn into the most revolutionary global communications and information distribution system of modern times?  Second, Post wants to know “Who makes the rules ‘there’… and what should they be? What does the law look like there? How does it get made, and by whom? Who governs? By what means, and by what right?” (p. 4)

What Jefferson (and Hamilton) Can Teach Us

Post brings Jefferson into the story in the hope that TJ’s profound thinking on the issues of his time might help us getter a better handle on the cyber-controversies of our own time. After all, Jefferson was a man who spent much of his life thinking about uncharted subjects and frontiers. And law, of course!

Using this approach to help us explore cyberspace and cyberlaw works quite well in many cases. It works particularly well when Post brings TJ’s leading intellectual nemesis into the drama — Alexander Hamilton.  “Their feud the longest-running in American political history,” Post correctly notes, “for they stood on opposite shores of the great intellectual divide, a divide that encapsulates something fundamental in the way we think about society and government.” (p. 107). Jefferson desired liberty above all else; Hamilton stressed order and authority. Whereas Jefferson trusted decentralization and wanted diffuse communities making political decisions, Hamilton looked to a strong central authority to guide the nation.

Many modern cyberspace disputes, Post suggests, can be viewed through this same Jeffersonian vs. Hamiltonian philosophical dichotomy. Post continues:

Cyberspace is not the American West of 1787, of course. But like the American West of 1787, cyberspace is (or at least it has been) a Jeffersonian kind of place. Jeffersonians always predominate in new places, because new places attract people who find new places attractive and retell people who do not. […] Hamiltonians, though, inevitably make their way to Jeffersonian places (certainly once gold is discovered there!), claims of order and authority and power assert themselves, and struggles over the shape of the place begin in earnest. And like the West of 1787, cyberspace poses some hard questions, and could use some new ideas, about governance, and law, and order, and scale. The engineers have bequeathed to us a remarkable instrument, one that has managed to solve prodigious technical problems associated with communication on a global scale. The problem is the one that Jefferson and his contemporaries faced: How do you build “republican” institutions — institutions that respect the equal worth of all individuals and their right to participate in the formation of the rules under which they live — that scale? (p. 116-117)

Will Jeffersonian or Hamiltonian thinking prevail as this process unfolds? That remains to be seen, and although Post clearly falls in the Jeffersonian camp on these issues, he doesn’t really place odds on the outcome. Moreover, I would have liked to see Post offer a more full-throated defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism and Interent exceptionalism, or at least better explain to the reader how the debate between exceptionalism and unexceptionalism — or Jeffersonianism vs. Hamiltonianism — has progressed since the mid-1990s.

I think it’s clear that the cyber-Hamiltonians (i.e., the Internet unexceptionalists) are in the midst of a major “Empire Strikes Back” moment today as cyberspace is coming under increasing political pressure from many corners, and calls for more centralized authority abound — whether we are talking about domain name regulation, net neutrality mandates, speech controls, or whatever else. I just wish Post would have spent more time developing a “Return of the Jedi” defense of cyber-Jeffersonianism in this book.

Central Planning vs. Self-Governing Communities

Incidentally, Post has put forward such a defense elsewhere. Along with my former Cato colleague Wayne Crews, I co-edited a beefy book on Net governance issues back in 2003 entitled Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction. It contained some truly wonderful essays and they are all still quite relevant today. Jonathan Zittrain’s essay on “Reconciling a Global Internet and Local Law” remains one of the best primers on the subject you can find. But the exchange about Internet governance between David Post and Jack Goldsmith in that book is really a classic Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian debate about cyberlaw. [You can read their chapters at the link above.]

In Jefferson’s Moose, Post comes closest to developing a fuller theory of Internet exceptionalism in his excellent chapter “Governing Cyberspace III: Law.” In that chapter, he takes the unexceptionalists to task for their troubling logic, which “leads inexorably to the conclusion that (just about) everything you do on the Web may be subject to (just about) everybody’s law.” (p. 167). Indeed, the unexceptionalist vision is quite a miserable one when you get right down to it; one that treats this new frontier as a plaything in an endless power struggle between competing political bodies. Meanwhile, as Post points out, the rule of law loses its meaning and becomes less about the consent of the governed and more like a game of “Jurisdictional Whack-a-Mole,” with countless “sovereigns” asserting authority and trying to beat cyberspace and digital denizens into submission in one way or another.

Because Post believes that the unexceptionalists are wrong in their assertion that the Internet is merely the “functional equivalent of mail, or telephone, or smoke signals,” he offers — but does not fully develop — an alternative framework based on Jefferson’s vision for how to settle the Western frontier: Give settlers maximum flexibility to create free, independent, self-governing communities. In Jefferson’s words, “an empire of liberty.. built not on conquest, but on principles of compact and equality.” And this empire of liberty would be, in Post’s words, “held together by consensual bonds and adherence to republican principles, not coercive power, an ever-expanding union of self-governing commonwealths joined together as peers.”

Now that is a beautiful vision for cyberspace!  And, in many ways, it partially explains why cyberspace has been such a special place — at least so far in its early history. But as more and more Hamiltonians assert the need for greater “order,” all that could change. Again, I wish Post would have put some more meat on the bones of his beautiful cyber-Jeffersonian framework to counter the increasing calls we hear for more cyber-Hamiltonianism.  Specifically, Post needs to better address the accusation made by the Digital Age Hamiltonians that Internet exceptionalism is little more than cyber-anarchism. In reality, Internet exceptionalism is essentially something akin to decentralized federalism for the Internet; a federalism that the Founders — or at least Jefferson — would have likely strongly supported.  As I wrote here recently, I like to think of Internet exceptionalism as a variation on Robert Nozick’s “utopia of utopias” vision of an ideal society: “a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others.” (Nozick, 1974)

Post begins a sketch of that Nozickian vision for cyberspace in Jefferson’s Moose, but he doesn’t really finish painting his masterpiece. To be fair, however, Post did make it clear right from the start of the book that it was going to be about asking the right questions, not necessarily providing all the answers.

Two Big Issues, Both Then and Now

Incidentally, using Jefferson as a guide to understanding modern cyberlaw controversies also works well when it comes to “the two issues [that] have been featured in virtually all of the Internet’s Big Cases” — free speech and intellectual property. As Post reminds us, Jefferson had a bit to say about those issues during his own lifetime.

“Jefferson was America’s first, and probably its greatest, First Amendment absolutist”  Post says, (p. 188), because Jefferson viewed free speech as part of a greater “interconnected whole”:

republican self-government, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech. You couldn’t have any without the others; they were inextricably bound together into a single system, and they would stand, or fall, together. (p. 189-190)

Consequently:

To a Jeffersonian, then, free speech questions are always simultaneously (a) of supreme importance and (b) pretty easy. The answer to free speech questions is always (or almost always) simple:  The more protection for, and the fewer the restrictions on, speech, the better. (p. 194)

And Jefferson held true to that principle throughout his life, most notably with his strenuous opposition to the horrendous Sedition Act of 1798.

But intellectual property is a far thornier issue — for both Jefferson and modern cyberlaw. Jefferson was a great inventor himself and keenly interested in the topic. But he also saw IP rights in a different light than speech rights.  Post explains Jefferson’s position:

Unlike free speech rights, intellectual property… cannot, in nature, be a subject of property; they do derive from the “social law,” from the laws of England, or Virginia, or whatever; they’re not antecedent to the law, but entirely dependent on it. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have intellectual property rights. It only means that we get to decide (and we have to decide) whether to have them or not, and how much of them to have. (p. 198) […] Intellectual property law in a Jeffersonian world, then, is always a matter of degree, of finding that balance, of drawing the line… Protection for intellectual property shouldn’t be too weak (or it won’t give creators enough of an incentive to create) or too strong (or it will choke off future creativity), but just right. We’ll never get it exactly right, but it is what we are always aiming for — in a Jeffersonian world, at least. (p. 201)

Of course, finding that “balance” is easier said than done and efforts to strike it engender even more controversy today in the digital world than they did during Jefferson’s time.

Conclusion

David Post has given us an enlightening map to help us navigate the new frontier of cyberspace and cyberlaw. I’m confident Jefferson’s Moose will be on my next end-of-year list of important tech policy books. And I hope my handful of small nitpicks here about the lack of details or answers regarding Post’s beautiful Jeffersonian vision for cyberspace will inspire him to pen yet another book on the subject! We need more friends of true cyber-freedom like David Post.

P.S. David Post is also the co-author of an outstanding treatise on cyberlaw with Patricia L. Bellia and Paul Schiff Berman: Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age. The text sits on top of my desk at all times, never far from reach when I need to a quick refresher on some arcane aspect of early Internet jurisprudence. A highly recommended resource.

My piece about the U.S. Chamber of Commerce event last Friday on U.S. intellectual property attachés giving a report, and taking a hard line, on the enforcement of U.S. intellectual property, overseas, is now live on ip-watch.org.

Here’s the first couple of paragraphs:

WASHINGTON, DC – Nations ranging from Brazil to Brunei to Russia are failing to properly protect the intellectual property assets of US companies and others, and international organisations are not doing enough to stop it, seven IP attachés to the US Foreign and Commercial Service lamented recently.

Meanwhile, an industry group issued detailed recommendations for the incoming Obama administration’s changes to the US Patent and Trademark Office.

The problems in other nations extend from Brazil’s failure to issue patents for commercially significant inventions by US inventors, to an almost-complete piracy-based economy in Brunei, to an only-modest drop in the rate of Russian piracy from 65 percent to 58 percent.

The attachés, speaking at an event organised by the US Chamber of Commerce and its recently beefed-up Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC), blasted the record of familiar intellectual property trouble zones like Brunei, Thailand and Russia.

But the problems extend to the attitudes and omissions of major trading partners like Brazil, India and even well-developed European nations, said the attachés.

[more at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1387….]

I attended the Federal Trade Commission hearing about the state of intellectual property on Friday, and wrote a piece about the event, “With US Patent Overhaul Dead, Agencies Ponder Changes As Industry Debates Role Of ‘Trolls’.”

The piece appeared in ip-watch.org, the excellent Geneva-based publication run by my friend and former colleague William New. Those of you who aren’t familiar yet with ip-watch.org should definitely begin following it: it’s a must-read for practitioners, advocates and activists concerned about all forms of intellectual property.

The Federal Trade Commission has announced that it will hold “a series of public hearings beginning on December 5, 2008, in Washington, D.C., to explore the evolving market for intellectual property (IP).”

It’s timely, then, that we will be having a forum Monday on a provocative book whose thesis is the title: Against Intellectual Monopoly. Co-author Michele Boldrin will present the book, and Rob Atkinson of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation will critique it.

Highlighting one of the issues at Monday’s forum, the Arts+Labs blog points to Atkinson’s testimony about the value of American intellectual property on the export market. Over 50 percent of U.S. exports depend on some form of IP protection, according to Rob Atkinson.

It’ll be a good, interesting discussion. Register here now.

Arts+Labs, a new coalition “committed to a better, safer internet that works for both artists and consumers,” has written up Friday’s Cato Institute book forum on The Crime of Reason on their ArtLab blog. Author Robert B. Laughlin of Stanford University will present his book, then we’ll have comments from Tom Sydnor of the Progress and Freedom Foundation.

I’ve gotten a glimpse at the slides Dr. Laughlin will be using, and this Nobel laureate in physics also turns out to be something of an artist.

Join us Friday to learn what this drawing is all about.

If you find the title of this post provocative, you’ll be interested in a Cato Institute book forum on Friday, October 10th.

In The Crime of Reason, Nobel laureate in physics Robert Laughlin argues that intellectual property laws and government security demands threaten the development of new knowledge. Without change, we risk bequeathing our heirs a world where knowledge is criminalized and our intellectual tradition of unfettered inquiry is lost.

The event should be a fascinating inquiry into the role of information and information rules in our society. Thomas Syndor of the Progress & Freedom Foundation will comment. I’ll be your humble moderator. It’s noon on Friday, October 10th, at the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. Luncheon to follow.

You can register for the event here.