James Pethokousis of AEI interviews me about the current miserable state of modern science fiction, which is just dripping with dystopian dread in every movie, show, and book plot. How does all the techno-apocalyptica affect societal and political attitudes about innovation broadly and emerging technologies in particular. Our discussion builds on my recent a recent Discourse article, “How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics.” [Pasted down below.] Swing on over to Jim’s “Faster, Please” newsletter and hear what Jim and I have to say. And, for a bonus question, Jim asked me is we doing a good job of inspiring kids to have a sense of wonder and to take risks. I have some serious concerns that we are falling short on that front.

How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics

[Originally ran on Discourse on July 26, 2022.]

George Jetson will be born this year. We don’t know the exact date of this fictional cartoon character’s birth, but thanks to some skillful Hanna-Barbera hermeneutics the consensus seems to be sometime in 2022.

In the same episode that we learn George’s approximate age, we’re also told the good news that his life expectancy in the future is 150 years old. It was one of the many ways The Jestons, though a cartoon for children, depicted a better future for humanity thanks to exciting innovations. Another was a helpful robot named Rosie, along with a host of other automated technologies—including a flying car—that made George and his family’s life easier.

Most fictional portrayals of technology today are not as optimistic as  The Jetsons, however. Indeed, public and political conceptions about artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics in particular are being strongly shaped by the relentless dystopianism of modern science fiction novels, movies and television shows. And we are worse off for it.

AI, machine learning, robotics and the power of computational science hold the potential to drive explosive economic growth and profoundly transform a diverse array of sectors, while providing humanity with countless technological improvements in medicine and healthcare, financial services, transportation, retail, agriculture, entertainment, energy, aviation, the automotive industry and many others. Indeed, these technologies are already deeply embedded in these and other industries and making a huge difference.

But that progress could be slowed and in many cases even halted if public policy is shaped by a precautionary-principle-based mindset that imposes heavy-handed regulation based on hypothetical worst-case scenarios. Unfortunately, the persistent dystopianism found in science fiction portrayals of AI and robotics conditions the ground for public policy debates, while also directing attention away from some of the more real and immediate issues surrounding these technologies.

Incessant Dystopianism Untethered from Reality

In his recent book Robots, Penn State business professor John Jordan observes how over the last century “science fiction set the boundaries of the conceptual playing field before the engineers did.” Pointing to the plethora of literature and film that depicts robots, he notes: “No technology has ever been so widely described and explored before its commercial introduction.” Not the internet, cell phones, atomic energy or any others.

Indeed, public conceptions of these technologies, and even the very vocabulary of the field, has been shaped heavily by sci-fi plots beginning a hundred years ago with the 1920 play  R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), which gave us the term “robot,” and Fritz Lang’s 1927 silent film Metropolis, with its memorable Maschinenmensch, or “machine-human.” There has been a deep and rich imagination surrounding AI and robotics since then, but it has tended to be mostly negative and has grown more hostile over time.

The result has been a public and policy dialogue about AI and robotics that is focused on an endless parade of horribles about these technologies. Not surprisingly, popular culture also affects journalistic framings of AI and robotics. Headlines breathlessly scream of how “Robots May Shatter the Global Economic Order Within a Decade,” but only if we’re not dead already because… “If Robots Kill Us, It’s Because It’s Their Job.”

Dark depictions of AI and robotics are ever-present in popular modern sci-fi movies and television shows. A short list includes:  2001: A Space Odyssey, Avengers: Age of Ultron, Battlestar Galactica (both the 1978 original and the 2004 reboot), Black Mirror, Blade Runner, Ex Machina, Her, The Matrix, Robocop, The Stepford Wives, Terminator, Transcendence, Tron, WALL-E, Wargames and Westworld, among countless others. The least nefarious plots among these films and television shows rest on the idea that AI and robotics are going to drive us to a life of distraction, addiction or sloth. In more extreme cases, we’re warned about a future in which we are either going to be enslaved or destroyed by our new robotic or algorithmic overlords.

Don’t get me wrong; the movies and shows on the above list are some of my favorites.  2001 and Blade Runner are both in my top 5 all-time flicks, and the reboot of Battlestar is one of my favorite TV shows. The plots of all these movies and shows are terrifically entertaining and raise many interesting issues that make for fun discussions.

But they are not representative of reality. In fact, the vast majority of computer scientists and academic experts on AI and robotics agree that claims about machine “superintelligence” are wildly overplayed and that there is no possibility of machines gaining human-equivalent knowledge any time soon—or perhaps ever. “In any ranking of near-term worries about AI, superintelligence should be far down the list,” argues Melanie Mitchell, author of Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans.

Contra the  Terminator-esque nightmares envisioned in so many sci-fi plots, MIT roboticist Rodney Brooks says that “fears of runaway AI systems either conquering humans or making them irrelevant aren’t even remotely well grounded.” John Jordan agrees, noting: “The fear and uncertainty generated by fictional representations far exceed human reactions to real robots, which are often reported to be ‘underwhelming.’”

The same is true for AI more generally. “A close inspection of AI reveals an embarrassing gap between actual progress by computer scientists working on AI and the futuristic visions they and others like to describe,” says Erik Larson, author of, The Myth of Artificial Intelligence: Why Computers Can’t Think the Way We Do. Larson refers to this extreme thinking about superintelligent AI as “technological kitsch,” or exaggerated sentimentality and melodrama that is untethered from reality. Yet, the public imagination remains captivated by tales of impending doom.

Seeding the Ground with Misery and Misguided Policy

But isn’t it all just harmless fun? After all, it’s just make believe. Moreover, can’t science fiction—no matter how full of techno-misery—help us think through morally weighty issues and potential ethical conundrums involving AI and robotics?

Yes and no. Titillating fiction has always had a cathartic element to it and helped us cope with the unknown and mysterious. Most historians believe it was Aristotle in his Poetics who first used the term katharsis when discussing how Greek tragedies helped the audience “through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.”

But are modern science fiction depictions of AI and robotics helping us cope with technological change, or instead just stoking a constant fear of it? Modern sci-fi isn’t so much purging negative emotion about the topic at hand as it is endlessly adding to the sense of dread surrounding these technologies. What are the societal and political ramifications of a cultural frame of reference that suggests an entire new class of computational technologies will undermine rather than enrich our human experiences and, possibly, our very existence?

The New Yorker’s Jill Lepore says we live in “A Golden Age for Dystopian Fiction,” but she worries that this body of work “cannot imagine a better future, and it doesn’t ask anyone to bother to make one.” She argues this “fiction of helplessness and hopelessness” instead “nurses grievances and indulges resentments” and that “[i]ts only admonition is: Despair more.” Lapore goes so far as to claim that, because “the radical pessimism of an unremitting dystopianism” has appeal to many on both the left and right, it “has itself contributed to the unravelling of the liberal state and the weakening of a commitment to political pluralism.”

I’m not sure dystopian fiction is driving the unravelling of pluralism, but Lapore is on to something when she notes how a fiction rooted in misery about the future will likely have political consequences at some point.

Techno-panic Thinking Shapes Policy Discussions

The ultimate question is whether public policy toward new AI and robotic technologies will be shaped by this hyperpessimistic thinking in the form of precautionary principle regulation, which essentially treats innovations as “guilty until proven innocent” and seeks to intentionally slow or retard their development.

If the extreme fears surrounding AI and robotics  do inspire precautionary controls—as they already have in the European Union—then we need to ask how the preservation of the technological status quo could undermine human well-being by denying society important new life-enriching and life-saving goods and services. Technological stasis does not provide a safer or healthier society, but instead holds back our collective ability to innovate, prosper and better our lives in meaningful ways.

Louis Anslow, curator of  Pessimists Archive calls this “the Black Mirror fallacy,” referencing the British television show that has enjoyed great success peddling tales of impending techno-disasters. Anslow defines the fallacy as follows: “When new technologies are treated as much more threatening and risky than old technologies with proven risks/harms. When technological progress is seen as a bigger threat than technological stagnation.”

Anslow’s Pessimists Archive collects real-world case studies of how moral panic and techno-panics have accompanied the introduction of new inventions throughout history. He notes, “Science fiction has conditioned us to be hypervigilant about avoiding dystopias born of technological acceleration and totally indifferent to avoiding dystopias born of technological stagnation.”

Techno-panics can have real-world consequences when they come to influence policymaking. Robert Atkinson, president of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), has documented the many ways that “the social and political commentary [about AI] has been hype, bordering on urban myth, and even apocalyptic.” The more these attitudes and arguments come to shape policy considerations, the more likely it is precautionary principle-based recommendations will drive AI and robotics policy, preemptively limiting their potential. ITIF has published a report documenting “Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence,” identifying how it will slow algorithmic advances in key sectors.

Similarly, in his important recent book Where Is My Flying Car ?, scientist J. Storrs Hall documents how “regulation clobbered the learning curve” for many important technologies in the U.S. over the last half century, especially nuclear, nanotech and advanced aviation. Society lost out on many important innovations due to endless bureaucratic delays, often thanks to opposition from special interests, anti-innovation activists, overzealous trial lawyers and a hostile media. Hall explained how this also sent a powerful signal to talented young people who might have been considering careers in those sectors. Why go into a field demonized by so many and where your creative abilities will be hamstrung by precautionary constraints?

Disincentivizing Talent

Hall argues that in those crucial sectors, this sort of mass talent migration “took our best and brightest away from improving our lives,” and he warns that those who still hope to make a career in such fields should be prepared to be “misconstrued and misrepresented by activists, demonized by ignorant journalists, and strangled by regulation.”

Is this what the future holds for AI and robotics? Hopefully not, and America continues to generate world-class talent on this front today in a diverse array of businesses and university programs. But if the waves of negativism about AI and robotics persist, we shouldn’t be surprised if it results in a talent shift away from building these technologies and toward fields that instead look to restrict them.

For example, Hall documents how, following the sudden shift in public attitudes surrounding nuclear power 50 years ago, “interests, and career prospects, in nuclear physics imploded” and “major discoveries stopped coming.” Meanwhile, enrollment in law schools and other soft sciences typically critical of technological innovation enjoyed greater success. Nobody writes any sci-fi stories about what a disaster that development has been for innovation in the energy sphere, even though it is now abundantly clear how precautionary principle policies have undermined environment goals and human welfare, with major geopolitical consequences for many nations.

If America loses the talent race on the AI front, it has ramifications for global competitive advantage going forward, especially as China races to catch up. In a world of global innovation arbitrage, talent and venture capital will flow to wherever it is treated most hospitably. Demonizing AI and robotics won’t help recruit or retain the next generation of talent and investors America needs to remain on top.

Flipping the Script

Some folks have had enough of the relentless pessimism surrounding technology and progress in modern science fiction and are trying to do something to reverse it. In a 2011  Wired essay decrying the dangers of “Innovation Starvation,” the acclaimed novelist Neal Stephenson decried the fact that “the techno-optimism of the Golden Age of [science fiction] has given way to fiction written in a generally darker, more skeptical and ambiguous tone.” While good science fiction, “supplies a plausible, fully thought-out picture of an alternate reality in which some sort of compelling innovation has taken place,” Stephenson said modern sci-fi was almost entirely focused on its potential downsides.

To help reverse this trend, Stephenson worked with the Center for Science and the Imagination at Arizona State University to launch Project Hieroglyph, an effort to support authors willing to take a more optimistic view of the future. It yielded a 2014 book, Hieroglyph: Stories and Visions for a Better Future that included almost 20 contributors. Later, in 2018, The Verge launched the “Better Worlds” project to support 10 writers of “stories that inspire hope” about innovation and the future. “Contemporary science fiction often feels fixated on a sort of pessimism that peers into the world of tomorrow and sees the apocalypse looming more often than not,” said Verge culture editor Laura Hudson when announcing the project.

Unfortunately, these efforts have not captured much public attention and that’s hardly surprising. “Pessimism has always been big box office,” says science writer Matt Ridley, primary because it really is more entertaining. Even though many of great sci-fi writers of the past, including Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, and Robert Heinlein, wrote positively about technology, they ultimately had more success selling stories with darker themes. It’s just the nature of things more generally, from the best of Greek tragedy to Shakespeare and on down the line. There’s a reason they’re still rebooting Beowulf all these years later, after all.

So, There’s Star Trek and What Else?

While technological innovation will never enjoy the respect it deserves for being the driving force behind human progress, one can at least hope that more pop culture treatments of it might give it a fair shake. When I ask crowds of people to name a popular movie or television show that includes mostly positive depictions of technology, Star Trek is usually the first (and sometimes the only) thing people mention. It’s true that, on balance, technology was treated as a positive force in the original series, although “V’Ger”—a defunct space probe that attains a level of consciousness—was the prime antagonist in Star Trek: The Motion Picture. Later, Star Trek: The Next Generation gave us the always helpful android Data, but also created the lasting mental image of the Borg, a terrifying race of cyborgs hell-bent on assimilating everyone into their hive mind.

The Borg provided some of The Next Generation’s most thrilling moments, but also created a new cultural meme, with tech critics often worrying about how today’s humans are being assimilated into the hive mind of modern information systems. Philosopher Michael Sacasas even coined the term “the Borg Complex,” to refer to a supposed tendency “exhibited by writers and pundits who explicitly assert or implicitly assume that resistance to technology is futile.” After years of a friendly back-and-forth with Sacasas, I felt compelled to even wrap up my book Permissionless Innovation with a warning to other techno-optimists not to fall prey to this deterministic trap when defending technological change. Regardless of where one falls on that issue, the fact that Sacasas and I were having a serious philosophical discussion premised on a famous TV plotline serves as another indication of how much science fiction shapes public and intellectual debate over progress and innovation.

And, truth be told, some movies know how to excite the senses without resorting to dystopianism.  Interstellar and The Martian are two recent examples that come to mind. Interestingly, space exploration technologies themselves usually get a fair shake in many sci-fi plots, often only to be undermined by onboard Ais or androids, as occurred not only in 2001 with the eerie HAL 9000, but also Alien.

There are some positive (and sometimes humorous) depictions of robots as in  Robot & Frank, or touching ones as in Bicentennial Man. Beyond The Jetsons, other cartoons like Iron Giant and Big Hero 6 offer more kindly visions of robots. KITT, a super-intelligent robot car, was Michael Knight’s dependable ally in NBC’s Knight Rider. And R2-D2 is always a friendly helper throughout the Star Wars franchise. But generally speaking, modern sci-fi continues to churn out far more negativism about AI and robotics.

What If We Took It All Seriously?

So long as the public and political imagination is spellbound by machine machinations that dystopian sci-fi produces, we’ll be at risk of being stuck with absurd debates that have no meaningful solution other than “Stop the clock!” or “Ban it all!” Are we really being assimilated into the Borg hive mind, or just buying time until a coming robopocalypse grinds us into dust (or dinner)?

If there was a kernel of truth to any of this, then we should adopt some of the extreme solutions, Nick Bostrom of Oxford suggests in his writing on these issues. Those radical steps include worldwide surveillance and enforcement mechanisms for scientists and researchers developing algorithmic and robotic systems, as well as some sort of global censorship of information about these capabilities to ensure the technology is not used by bad actors.

To Bostrom’s great credit, he is at least willing to tell us how far he’d go. Most of today’s tech critics prefer to just spread a gospel of gloom and doom and suggest  something must be done, without getting into the ugly details about what a global control regime for computational science and robotic engineering looks like. We should reject such extremist hypothesizing and understand that silly sci-fi plots, bombastic headlines and kooky academic writing should not be our baseline for serious discussions about the governance of artificial intelligence and robotics.

At the same time, we absolutely should consider what downsides any technology poses for individuals and society. And, yes, some precautions will be needed of a regulatory nature. But most of the problems envisioned by sci-fi writers are not what we should be concerned with. There are far more specific and nuanced problems AI and robotics confronts us with today that deserve more serious consideration and governance steps. How to program safer drones and driverless cars, improve the accuracy of algorithmic medical and financial technologies, and ensure better transparency for government uses of AI are all more mundane but very important issues that require reasoned discussion and balanced solutions today. Dystopian thinking gives us no roadmap to get there other than extreme solutions.

Imagining a Better Future

The way forward here is neither to indulge in apocalyptic fantasies nor pollyannaish techno-optimism, but to approach these technologies with reasoned risk analysis, sensible industry best practices, educational efforts and other agile governance steps. In a forthcoming book on flexible governance strategies for AI and robotics, I outline how these and other strategies are already being formulated to address real-world challenges in fields as diverse as driverless cars, drones, machine learning in medicine and much more.

A wide variety of ethical frameworks, offered by professional associations, academic groups and others, already exists to “bake in” best practices and align AI design with widely shared goals and values while also “keeping humans in the loop” at critical stages of the design process to ensure that they can continue to guide and occasionally realign those values and best practices as needed.

When things do go wrong, many existing remedies are available, including a wide variety of common law solutions (torts, class actions, contract law, etc.), recall authority possessed by many regulatory agencies, and various consumer protection policies and other existing laws. Moreover, the most effective solution to technological problems usually lies in more innovation, not less. It is only through constant trial and error that humanity discovers better  and safer ways of satisfying important wants and needs.

These are complicated and nuanced issues that demand tailored and iterative governance responses. But this should not be done using inflexible, innovation-limiting mandates. Concerns about AI dangers deserve serious consideration and appropriate governance steps to ensure that these systems are beneficial to society. However, there is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that AI innovations are developed and made widely available to help improve human well-being across many dimensions.

So, enjoy your next dopamine hit of sci-fi hysteria—I know I will, too. But don’t let that be your guide to the world that awaits us. Even if most sci-fi writers can’t imagine a better future, the rest of us can.

The endless apocalyptic rhetoric surrounding Net Neutrality and many other tech policy debates proves there’s no downside to gloom-and-doomism as a rhetorical strategy. Being a techno-Jeremiah nets one enormous media exposure and even when such a person has been shown to be laughably wrong, the press comes back for more. Not only is there is no penalty for hyper-pessimistic punditry, but the press actually furthers the cause of such “fear entrepreneurs” by repeatedly showering them with attention and letting them double-down on their doomsday-ism. Bad news sells, for both the pundit and the press.

But what is most remarkable is that the press continues to label these preachers of the techno-apocalypse as “experts” despite a track record of failed predictions. I suppose it’s because, despite all the failed predictions, they are viewed as thoughtful & well-intentioned. It is another reminder that John Stuart Mill’s 1828 observation still holds true today: “I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.”

Additional Reading:

• Regarding the Use of Apocalyptic Rhetoric in Policy Debates (10/29/14)
• The Problem with “Pessimism Porn” (5/23/14)
• Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum (7/15/12)
• How & Why the Press Sometimes “Sells Digital Fear” (4/8/12)
• law review article: “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle” (2013)

Originally published on the AIER blog on 9/8/19 as “The Worst Regulation Ever Proposed.”

Imagine a competition to design the most onerous and destructive economic regulation ever conceived. A mandate that would make all other mandates blush with embarrassment for not being burdensome or costly enough. What would that Worst Regulation Ever look like?

Taken together, these ideas represent one of the most radical regulatory plans any America politician has yet concocted.

Politicians, academics, and many others have been panicking over automation at least since the days when the Luddites were smashing machines in protest over growing factory mechanization. With the growth of more sophisticated forms of robotics, artificial intelligence, and workplace automation today, there has been a resurgence of these fears and a renewed push for sweeping regulations to throw a wrench in the gears of progress. Mayor de Blasio is looking to outflank his fellow Democratic candidates for president with an anti-automation plan that may be the most extreme proposal of its kind.

First, de Blasio proposes a new federal agency, the Federal Automation and Worker Protection Agency (FAWPA), to “oversee automation and safeguard jobs and communities.” He continues:

FAWPA would create a permitting process for any company seeking to increase automation that would displace workers. Approval of those plans would be conditioned on protecting workers; if their jobs are eliminated through automation, the company would be required to offer their workers new jobs with equal pay, or a severance package in line with their tenure at the company.

Second, de Blasio proposed a “robot tax” that would be imposed on large companies “that eliminate jobs through increased automation and fail to provide adequate replacement jobs.” Those firms would “be required to pay five years of payroll taxes up front for each employee eliminated” and that revenue would be used to fund new infrastructure projects or jobs in new areas, including health care and green energy. “Displaced workers would be guaranteed new jobs created in these fields at comparable salaries,” he says.

Mayor de Blasio’s first idea would be one of the most far-reaching and destructive regulations in American history. A federal agency with “a permitting process for any company seeking to increase automation that would displace workers,” is essentially a political veto over workplace innovations at nearly every business in America. The result would be a de facto ban on productivity improvements across all professions.

After all, there aren’t too many sectors in the modern economy where automation isn’t playing at least a limited role. Even the oldest agricultural and industrial sectors and professions have undergone a certain amount of automation over time, and continue to do so today. These automation improvements have been essential to growing businesses and the economy more generally.

These automation advancements also create new and better jobs. It isn’t always clear initially how automation will affect workers, but the evolution of markets and innovations always provides interesting, and usually beneficial, surprises.

For example, in the early 1980s, many feared ATMs would make all bank tellers irrelevant. Instead, we got more bank workers, but they are now doing different jobs. How would de Blasio’s plan have worked back then? Would his regulatory permitting process have vetoed banking innovations such as ATMs or online banking in the name of protecting workers from automation and potential job losses, which never even materialized?

Now magnify this challenge across the entire American economy and ask how these decisions will be made for every business that is considering some form of workplace automation that could theoretically affect workers, but in ways that are difficult to foresee.

This is one reason why de Blasio’s proposal would quality for the Worst Regulation prize. It would let bureaucrats at the new Federal Automation and Worker Protection Agency sit in judgment of what constitutes beneficial forms of innovation and ask them to predict or plan our technological future.

This is a recipe for economic stagnation because these new FAWPA regulators would, like most other regulators, be incentivized to play it safe and disallow more automations than they approve. The precautionary principle would triumph over permissionless innovation; innovators would be treated as guilty until proven innocent in the resulting political circus.

Mayor de Blasio’s proposed robot tax is equally misguided. Robert D. Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, and Robert Seamans, associate professor at NYU’s Stern School of Business, have both written about the dangers of the idea.

“The last thing policymakers should do is reduce the incentive for companies to invest in new machinery and equipment, as that would slow down needed productivity growth,” argues Atkinson in his study on, “The Case against Taxing Robots.” Likewise, Seamans notes that, in many cases, “robots are complements to labor, not substitutes for labor.” Therefore, “a robot tax would make it harder to achieve productivity growth,” and, he says, “may perversely lead to fewer rather than more jobs.”

Both scholars also point out the definitional difficulty associated with efforts to define what constitutes a “robot,” or “automation.” That problem will only be compounded once regulatory proceedings begin and various special interests begin lobbying lawmakers and regulators for favorable classifications and exemptions to avoid new rules and taxes—or get them imposed on potential competitors. Rather than helping consumers and workers, this will limit choices and drive up prices.

Importantly, regulating robots also means regulating their underlying software algorithms, which means Washington will need to send in teams of code cops to control programmers. At some point that could raise serious free speech issues since computer code can be a form of protected speech under the First Amendment. Practically speaking, however, we may not have to worry about that result because de Blasio’s command-and-control scheme would discourage many people from becoming programmers or roboticists in the first place. All those jobs and businesses would move offshore pretty quickly and America’s competitive standing would suffer globally.

It is tempting to dismiss Mayor de Blasio’s extreme proposals as a desperate move to appeal to the far-left wing of the Democratic Party base and win some more possible votes for the nomination. He likely won’t get the nomination, but his call for radical regulation of robotics in the name of protecting workers may move the party further toward the fringe by encouraging other candidates to concoct similar plans. Of course, it would be nearly impossible for any other candidate to outdo de Blasio’s plan without essentially just calling for an outright ban on robotics and all forms of automation altogether. Let’s hope that’s not next up in the competition for Worst Regulation Ever.

Over at the American Institute for Economic Research blog, I recently posted two new essays discussing increasing threats to innovation and discussing how to counter them. The first is on “The Radicalization of Modern Tech Criticism,” and the second discusses, “How To Defend a Culture of Innovation During the Technopanic.”

“Technology critics have always been with us, and they have sometimes helped temper society’s occasional irrational exuberance about certain innovations,” I note in the opening of the first essay. The problem is that the “technology critics sometimes go much too far and overlook the importance of finding new and better ways of satisfying both basic and complex human needs and wants.” I continue on to highlight the growing “technopanic” rhetoric we sometimes hear today, including various claims that “it’s OK to be a Luddite” and push for a “degrowth movement” that would slow the wheels of progress. That would be a disaster for humanity because, as I note in concluding that first essay:

Through ongoing trial-and-error tool building, we discover new and better ways of satisfying human needs and wants to better our lives and the lives of those around us. Human flourishing is dependent upon our collective willingness to embrace and defend the creativity, risk-taking, and experimentation that produces the wisdom and growth that propel us forward. By contrast, today’s neo-Luddite tech critics suggest that we should just be content with the tools of the past and slow down the pace of technological innovation to supposedly save us from any number of dystopian futures they predict. If they succeed, it will leave us in a true dystopia that will foreclose the entrepreneurialism and innovation opportunities that are paramount to raising the standard of living for billions of people across the world.

In the second essay, I make an attempt to sketch out a more robust vision and set of principles to counter the tech critics. Building on my last book, as well as a forthcoming one, I outline a sort of “rational-optimist creed.” This vision is inspired by the important work of Matt Ridley and his excellent book, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. Generally speaking, rational optimists:

• believe there is a symbiotic relationship between innovation, economic growth, pluralism, and human betterment, but also acknowledge the various challenges sometimes associated with technological change;
• look forward to a better future and reject overly nostalgic accounts of some supposed “good ‘ol days” or bygone better eras;
• base our optimism on facts and historical analysis, not on blind faith in any particular viewpoint, ideology, or gut feeling;
• support practical, bottom-up solutions to hard problems through ongoing trial-and-error experimentation, but are not wedded to any one process to get the job done;
• appreciate entrepreneurs for their willingness to take risks and try new things, but do not engage in hero worship of any particular individual, organization, or particular technology.

Going further, I build on the excellent work of Robert D. Atkinson, founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, who in his 2005 book, The Past and Future of America’s Economy, identified the way “a political divide is emerging between preservationists who want to hold onto the past and modernizers who recognize that new times require new means.” I tried to provide a breakdown for how this conflict of visions plays out in various ways:

I also highlight some of my favorite works by other rational optimists, including, Steven Pinker ( Enlightenment Now), Deirdre McCloskey (Bourgeois Equality), Calestous Juma (Innovation and Its Enemies), Samuel Florman (The Existential Pleasures of Engineering), and Virginia Postrel (The Future and Its Enemies), and Joel Mokyr, (The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress).

I encourage you to jump over to the AIER blog and read both essays in full.

This week I will be traveling to Montreal to participate in the 2018 G7 Multistakeholder Conference on Artificial Intelligence. This conference follows the G7’s recent Ministerial Meeting on “Preparing for the Jobs of the Future” and will also build upon the  G7 Innovation Ministers’ Statement on Artificial Intelligence . The goal of Thursday’s conference is to, “focus on how to enable environments that foster societal trust and the responsible adoption of AI, and build upon a common vision of human-centric AI.” About 150 participants selected by G7 partners are expected to participate, and I was invited to attend as a U.S. expert, which is a great honor. 

I look forward to hearing and learning from other experts and policymakers who are attending this week’s conference. I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the future of AI policy in recent books, working papers, essays, and debates. My most recent essay concerning a vision for the future of AI policy was co-authored with Andrea O’Sullivan and it appeared as part of a point/counterpoint debate in the latest edition of the Communications of the ACM. The ACM is the Association for Computing Machinery, the world’s largest computing society, which “brings together computing educators, researchers, and professionals to inspire dialogue, share resources, and address the field’s challenges.” The latest edition of the magazine features about a dozen different essays on “Designing Emotionally Sentient Agents” and the future of AI and machine-learning more generally.

In our portion of the debate in the new issue, Andrea and I argue that “Regulators Should Allow the Greatest Space for AI Innovation.” “While AI-enabled technologies can pose some risks that should be taken seriously,” we note, “it is important that public policy not freeze the development of life-enriching innovations in this space based on speculative fears of an uncertain future.” We contrast two different policy worldviews — the precautionary principle versus permissionless innovation — and argue that:

artificial intelligence technologies should largely be governed by a policy regime of permissionless innovation so that humanity can best extract all of the opportunities and benefits they promise. A precautionary approach could, alternatively, rob us of these life-saving benefits and leave us all much worse off.

That’s not to say that AI won’t pose some serious policy challenges for us going forward that deserve serious attention. Rather, we are warning against the dangers of allowing worst-case thinking to be the default position in these discussions.

But what about some of the policy concerns regarding AI, including privacy, “algorithmic accountability,” or more traditional fears about automation leading to job displacement or industrial disruption. Some of the these issues deserve greater scrutiny, but as Andrea and I pointed out in a much longer paper with Raymond Russell, there often exists better ways of dealing with such issues before resorting to preemptive, top-down controls on fast-moving, hard-to-predict technologies.

“Soft law” options will often serve us better than old hard law approaches. Soft law mechanisms, as I write in my latest law review article with Jennifer Skees and Ryan Hagemann, are a useful way to bring diverse parties together to address pressing policy concerns without destroying the innovative promise of important new technologies. Among other things, soft law includes multistakeholder processes and ongoing efforts to craft flexible “best practices.” It can also include important collaborative efforts such as this recent IEEE “Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems,” which serves as “an incubation space for new standards and solutions, certifications and codes of conduct, and consensus building for ethical implementation of intelligent technologies.” This approach brings together diverse voices from across the globe to develop rough consensus on what “ethically-aligned design” looks like for AI and aims to establish a framework and set of best practices for the development of these technologies over time.

Others have developed similar frameworks, including the ACM itself. The ACM developed a Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct in the early 1970s and then refined it in the early 1990s and then again just recently in 2018. Each iteration of the ACM Code reflected ongoing technological developments from the mainframe era to the PC and Internet revolution and on through today’s machine-learning and AI era. The latest version of the Code “affirms an obligation of computing professionals, both individually and collectively, to use their skills for the benefit of society, its members, and the environment surrounding them,” and insists that computing professionals “should consider whether the results of their efforts will respect diversity, will be used in socially responsible ways, will meet social needs, and will be broadly accessible.” The document also stresses how, “[a]n essential aim of computing professionals is to minimize negative consequences of computing, including threats to health, safety, personal security, and privacy. When the interests of multiple groups conflict, the needs of those less advantaged should be given increased attention and priority.”

Of course, over time, more targeted or applied best practices and codes of conduct will be formulated as new technological developments make them necessary. It is impossible to perfectly anticipate and plan for all the challenges that we may face down the line. But we can establish some rough best practices and ethical guidelines to help us deal with some of them. As we do so, we need to think hard about how to craft those principles and policies in such a way so as to not undermine the potentially amazing, life-enriching — and potentially even life- saving — benefits that AI technologies could bring about.

You can hear more about these and other issues surrounding the future of AI in this 6-minute video that  Communications of the ACM put together to coincide with my debate with Oren Etzioni of the Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence. As you will probably notice, there’s actually a lot more common ground between us in this discussion that you might initially suspect. For example, we agree that it would be a serious mistake to regulate AI at the general-purpose level and that it instead makes more sense to zero-in on specific AI applications to determine where policy interventions might be needed.

Of course, things get more contentious when we consider  what kind of policy interventions we might want for specific AI applications, and also the much more challenging question about how to define and measure “harm” in this context. And this all assumes we can even come to some general consensus about how to first define what we even mean by “artificial intelligence” or “robotics” in general. That’s harder than many realize and it is important because it has a bearing on the overall scope and practicality of regulation in various contexts.

Another thing that seems to be the source of serious ongoing debate between people in this field concerns the wisdom of creating an entirely new agency or centralized authority of some sort to oversee or guide the development AI or robotics. I’ve debated that question many times with Ryan Calo, who first pitched the idea a few years back in a working paper for Brookings. In response, I noted that we already have quite a few “robot regulators” in existence today in the form of technocratic agencies that oversee the specific development of various types of robotic and AI-oriented applications. For example, NHTSA already oversees driverless cars, FAA regulates drones, and the FDA handles AI-based medical devices and applications. Will adding another big, over-arching Robotics Commission really add much value to the process? Or will it simply add another bureaucratic layer of red tape to the process of getting life-enriching services out to the public? I doubt, for example, that the Digital Revolution would have been somehow improved much had America created a Federal Computer Commission or Federal Internet Commission 25 years ago.

Moreover, had we adopted such entities, I worry about how the tech companies of an earlier generation might have utilized that process to keep new players and technologies from emerging. As I noted this week in a tweet that got a lot of attention, I used to have the adjoining poster from PC Computing magazine on my office wall over 20 years ago. It was entitled, “Roadmap to Top Online Services,” and showed how the powerful Big 4 online service providers — America Online, Prodigy, Compuserve, and Microsoft — were spreading their tentacles. People used to see this poster on my wall and ask me whether there was any hope of disrupting the perceived choke-hold that these companies had on the market at the time.

Of course, we now look back and laugh at the idea that these firms could have bottled up innovation and kept competition at bay. But ask yourself: When disruptive innovations appeared on the scene, what would those incumbent firms have done if they had regulators to run to for help down at a Federal Computer Commission or Federal Internet Commission? I think we know exactly what they would have done because the lamentable history of so much Federal Communication Commission regulation shows us that  the powerful will grab for the levers of power wherever they exist. Some critics don’t accept the idea that “rent-seeking” and regulatory capture are real problems, or they believe that we can find creative ways to avoid those problems. But history shows this has been a reoccurring problem in countless sectors and one that we should try to avoid as much as possible by not establishing mechanisms that could exclude beneficial forms of competition and innovation from coming about to begin with.

That could certainly happen right now with the regulatory mechanisms already in place. For example, just this week, Jennifer Huddleston Skees and I wrote about the dangers of “Emerging Tech Export Controls Run Amok,” as the Trump Administration ponders a potentially massive expansion of export restrictions on a wide variety of technologies. More than a dozen different AI or autonomous system technologies appear on the list for consideration. That could pose real trouble not just for commercial innovators in this space, but also for non-commercial research and collaborative open source efforts involving these technologies.

Again, that doesn’t mean AI and robotics should develop in a complete policy vacuum. We need “governance” but we don’t need the sort of heavy-handed, top-down, competition-killing, innovation-restricting sort of regulatory regimes of the past. I continue to believe that more flexible, adaptive “soft law” mechanisms provide the reasonable path forward for most of the concerns we hear about AI and robotics today. These are challenging issues, however, and I look forward to learning more from other experts in the field when I visit Montreal for this week’s G7 discussion.

Additional Reading:

• “Should the Government Regulate Artificial Intelligence?” Wall Street Journal debate between Ryan Calo, Julia Powles, and Adam Thierer, April 29, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, Andrea O’Sullivan & Raymond Russell, “Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy,” Research Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, August 23, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “Which Emerging Technologies are “Weapons of Mass Destruction”? Technology Liberation Front, August 26, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, ““Wendell Wallach on the Challenge of Engineering Better Technology Ethics“
• Adam Thierer, “Problems with Precautionary Principle-Minded Tech Regulation & a Federal Robotics Commission,” Technology Liberation Front, September 22, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “Are ‘Permissionless Innovation’ and ‘Responsible Innovation’ Compatible?” Technology Liberation Front, July 12, 2017.
• Adam Thierer & Jennifer Huddleston Skees, “Emerging Tech Export Controls Run Amok,” Technology Liberation Front, November 28, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom

Last week, science writer Michael Shermer tweeted out this old xkcd comic strip that I had somehow missed before. Shermer noted that it represented, “another reply to pessimists bemoaning modern technologies as soul-crushing and isolating.” Similarly, there’s this meme that has been making the rounds on Twitter and which jokes about how newspapers made us as antisocial in the past much as newer technologies supposedly do today.

Isolation and inattention panics are some of the most common “fear cycles” that we have seen repeatedly play out through the ages. Indeed, sociologist Frank Furedi reminds us that panics over isolation, distraction, or inattention have been quite common. Consistent with that xkcd comic, Furedi has documented how “inattention has served as a sublimated focus for apprehensions about moral authority” going back to at least the early 1700s and continuing on through the next two centuries. During those years, he notes:

Inattention was increasingly perceived as an obstacle to the socialisation of young people. Countering the habit of inattention among children and young people became the central concern of pedagogy in the 18th century […]  During the 19th century, the state of inattention became thoroughly moralised. Inattentiveness was perceived as a threat to industrial progress, scientific advance and prosperity.

Today, however, the panic over inattention has ramped up, Furedi argues:

Unlike in the 18th century when it was perceived as abnormal, today inattention is often presented as the normal state. The current era is frequently characterised as the Age of Distraction, and inattention is no longer depicted as a condition that afflicts a few. Nowadays, the erosion of humanity’s capacity for attention is portrayed as an existential problem, linked with the allegedly corrosive effects of digitally driven streams of information relentlessly flowing our way.

While I generally agree these panics are overblown, one must also admit that there is some degree of truth to  all of them in the sense that each new technology presents us with some added level of potential distraction. And today we have more of those potential distractions than ever before. So, something’s gotta give, right?

“What information consumes is rather obvious,” Nobel Prize-winning economist and psychologist Herbert Simon remarked in 1971: “the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it.” Almost a half century later, we are confronted with a “wealth of information” that Simon could not have imagined, and that’s what has many critics worried about the potentially socially-destructive consequences of new technologies.

But social critics who write about this supposed “poverty of attention” problem have taken matters to the extreme and concocted some entertaining rhetorical ploys in an attempt to one-up each other on the panic meter. In a 2005 book, I discussed dozens of colorful book and article titles and terms like: “information overload;” “cognitive overload;” “information anxiety;” “information fatigue syndrome;” “information paralysis;” “techno-stress;” “information pollution;” “data smog;” and even “data asphyxiation.”

And that was all pre-Facebook and pre-Twitter! A dozen years later, this isolation-is-killing-us theme is becoming even more prevalent in books and articles. There are far to many books of this ilk to list here, but a quick sampling of the most popular ones would include: Nick Carr ( The Shallows), Franklin Foer (World Without Mind), Maggie Jackson (Distracted), Sherry Turkle (Alone Together), Eli Pariser (The Filter Bubble), John Freeman (The Tyranny of E-Mail), and Cass Sunstein (Republic.com), among many others. I have an entire bookshelf in my office filled with nothing but books of this variety, all penned over just the past 20 years.

Perhaps the sheer volume of panicky tracts suggests that there must be something to these fears. Let’s be clear: isolation, distraction, or inattention  are problems. But to some extent, these are problems that have always been with us and are not going away any time soon.

Social critics and cranky intellectuals love to complain about new technologies, and that’s never going to end. The best of that criticism will incorporate practical strategies for living a better life and suggest steps for how we all can find a better balance with the technologies that dominate our lives–today, tomorrow, and on into the future.

Sadly, most critics take a different approach which implicitly suggests we have somehow departed a golden age of living and that only a dystopian hellscape awaits us from here on out (if we’re not already living in it). It’s utter poppycock. As I’ve written before, pastoral myths and public square fantasies about some supposedly glorious but no-lost “good old days” are a lot of fun right up until you realize that the old days were, in fact, eras of abject misery. By almost every meaningful metric, we are better today than we were in the past, and that is probably just as true for things that we don’t have metrics for, including “attentiveness” or “distractability.”

We’d all like to think that people–especially kids–were somehow more attentive, more social, and more civil in the past than they are in today’s seemingly more cluttered, cacophonous, hurly-burly modern era. But there is absolutely no concrete evidence suggesting that is true and, as Furedi shows, there exists plenty of anecdotal evidence that when it comes to inattention, things really haven’t changed that much at all. We can and should strive to do better and find constructive solutions to problems such as these, but we should not go overboard with rhetorical threat inflation about the nature or severity of this problem. Nor should we pursue impractical or highly destructive solutions that would undermine the many other benefits associated with our new technological capabilities.

Ironically, at their very worst, isolation or inattention panics accomplish the exact opposite of what some social critics suggest that they desire. The critics often claim that they are just looking out for the next generation and trying to chart a better path for them. In reality, however, those critics are often just engaging in the same sort of fear-mongering and youth-shaming that countless other generations have before with their “KIDS THESE DAYS!” complaints. It’s always easy for intellectuals to tap into the worst fears of parents and policymakers by suggesting that the younger generation has lost the ability to reason or communicate effectively. And yet, each generation somehow figures out how to muddle through. We are an imperfect species, but we are also a highly resilient one.

Of course, that won’t stop an entirely new generation of critics from panicking about whatever future technology is apparently distracting the next generation to death. Fear sells and panics get attention. The calmer truths that history teaches us take longer to appreciate.

Additional Reading:

• Is It “Techno-Chauvinist” & “Anti-Humanist” to Believe in the Transformative Potential of Technology? (9/18/18)
• How to Sell a Book about Tech Policy: Turn the Technopanic Dial Up to 11 (1/2/18)
• What a 1911 Silent Movie Tells Us about the Technopanic Mentality (6/21/17)
• Regarding the Use of Apocalyptic Rhetoric in Policy Debates (10/29/14)
• Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change (6/14/14)
• The Problem with “Pessimism Porn” (5/23/14)
• BOOK: “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom”
• What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology? (5/23/13)
• paper: Technopanics, Threat Inflation & an Info-Tech Precautionary Principle (2/28/12)
• Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short? (Forbes, 1/8/12)
• On Nostalgia (12/28/11)

Reason magazine recently published my review of Franklin Foer’s new book, World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech. My review begins as follows:

If you want to sell a book about tech policy these days, there’s an easy formula to follow. First you need a villain. Google and Facebook should suffice, but if you can throw in Apple, Amazon, or Twitter, that’s even better. Paint their CEOs as either James Bond baddies bent on world domination or naive do-gooders obsessed with the quixotic promise of innovation. Finally, come up with a juicy Chicken Little title. Maybe something like World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech. Wait—that one’s taken. It’s the title of Franklin Foer’s latest book, which follows this familiar techno-panic template almost perfectly.

The book doesn’t break a lot of new ground; it serves up the same old technopanicky tales of gloom-and-doom that many others have said will befall us unless  something is done to save us. But Foer’s unique contribution is to unify many diverse strands of modern tech criticism in one tome, and then amp up the volume of panic about it all. Hence, the “existential” threat in the book’s title. I bet you didn’t know the End Times were so near!

Read the rest of my review over at Reason. And, if you care to read some of my other essays on technopanics through the ages, here’s a compendium of them.

I’ve written here before about the problems associated with the “technopanic mentality,” especially when it comes to how technopanics sometimes come to shape public policy decisions and restict important new, life-enriching innovations. As I argued in a recent book, the problem with this sort Chicken Little thinking is that, “living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy on them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.”

Perhaps the worst thing about worst-case thinking is how short-sighted and hubristic it can be. The technopanic crowd often has an air of snooty-ness about them in that they ask us to largely ignore the generally positive long-run trends associated with technological innovation and instead focus on hypothetical fears about an uncertain future that apparently only they can foresee. This is the case whether they are predicting the destruction of jobs, economy, lifestyles, or culture. Techno-dystopia lies just around the corner, they say, but the rest of us ignorant sheep who just can’t see it coming!

In his wonderful 2013 book,  Smarter Than You Think: How Technology Is Changing Our Minds for the Better, Clive Thompson correctly noted that “dystopian predictions are easy to generate” and “doomsaying is emotionally self-protective: if you complain that today’s technology is wrecking the culture, you can tell yourself you’re a gimlet-eyed critic who isn’t hoodwinked by high-tech trends and silly, popular activities like social networking. You seem like someone who has a richer, deeper appreciation for the past and who stands above the triviality of today’s life.”

Stated differently, the doomsayers are guilty of a type of social and technical arrogance. They are almost always wrong on history, wrong on culture, and wrong on facts. Again and again, humans have proven remarkably resilient in the face of technological change and have overcome short-term adversity. Yet, the technopanic pundits are almost never called out for their elitist attitudes later when their prognostications are proven wildly off-base. And even more concerning is the fact that their Chicken Little antics lead them and others to ignore the more serious risks that could exist out there and which are worthy of our attention.

Here’s a nice example of that last point that comes from a silent film made all the way back in 1911! (Ironically, it was a tweet by Clive Thompson that brought this clip to my attention.) The short film is called The Automatic Motorist and here’s how Michael Waters summarizes the plot in a post over at Atlas Obscura: “In it, a robot chauffeur is developed to drive a newly wedded couple to their honeymoon destination. But this robot malfunctions, and all of a sudden the couple is marooned in outer space (and then sinking underwater, and then flying through the sky—it’s complicated).” In sum: don’t trust robots or autonomous systems or you will probably die.

Regardless of how silly the plot sounds or the film looks, what I really found interesting about it was the way that they film jumped right into the classic sci-fi dystopian scenario of ROBOTS GONE WILD. Countless other books, stories, movies, and TV shows would follow that same predictable plot line in subsequent decades. In one sense, it’s entirely logical why authors and screenwriters do this. Simply put, bad news sells, and that is especially true when the bad news is delivered in the form of robotic systems running amok and threatening the future of humanity.

But I wonder… did the creators of The Automatic Motorist ever consider the far more risky scenario surrounding automobiles? Specifically, isn’t it a shame that they didn’t foresee the millions upon millions of deaths that would occur due to human error behind the wheel?

The tale of automation-gone-wrong always makes for better box office and book sales, but fear-mongering about technologies can condition people (and policymakers) to think in fearful terms about those products and systems. Robotic cars would have been impossible in 1911, obviously, so perhaps this concern seems meaningless in this context. But it is indicative of the bigger problem of the technopanic crowd focusing on hypothetical worst-case scenarios and avoiding the more mundane — but ultimately far more concerning — real-world risks that might occur in the absence of ongoing technological innovation.

And in many ways this is still the debate we are having in 2017 as the discussion about robotic “driverless” cars has finally ripened. We stand on the brink of what may become one of the great public health success stories of our lifetime. With the roadway death toll climbing for the first time in decades (around 40,000 deaths last year; or over 100 people dying on the roads every day), and with 94 percent of accidents being attributable to human error, those facts alone should constitute the most powerful reason to give autonomous technology a chance to prove itself. If policymakers fail to do so, it could result in countless potential injuries and deaths that driverless cars probably could have prevented.

These “unseen” unintended consequences of misguided policies constitute as sort of hidden tax on humanity’s future. When the technopanic crowd that tells us we must live in fear of each and every new innovation, they are creating the riskiest future scenario of them all: one that is stagnant and backwards-looking. The burden of proof is on them to explain why we should be denied the benefits that accompany ongoing trial and error experimentation with new and better ways of doing things that could ensure us a safer and more prosperous future.

[originally posted on Medium ]

Today is the anniversary of the day the machines took over.

Exactly twenty years ago today, on May 11, 1997, the great chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov became the first chess world champion to lose a match to a supercomputer. His battle with IBM’s “Deep Blue” was a highly-publicized media spectacle, and when he lost Game 6 of his match against the machine, it shocked the world.

At the time, Kasparov was bitter about the loss and even expressed suspicions about how Deep Blue’s team of human programmers and chess consultants might have tipped the match in favor of machine over man. Although he still wonders about how things went down behind the scenes during the match, Kasparov is no longer as sore as he once was about losing to Deep Blue. Instead, Kasparov has built on his experience that fateful week in 1997 and learned how he and others can benefit from it.

The result of this evolution in his thinking is Deep Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins, a book which serves as a paean to human resiliency and our collective ability as a species to adapt in the face of technological disruption, no matter how turbulent.

Kasparov’s book serves as the perfect antidote to the prevailing gloom-and-doom narrative in modern writing about artificial intelligence (AI) and smart machines. His message is one of hope and rational optimism about future in which we won’t be racing against the machines but rather running alongside them and benefiting in the process.

Overcoming the Technopanic Mentality

There is certainly no shortage of books and articles being written today about AI, robotics, and intelligent machines. The tone of most of these tracts is extraordinarily pessimistic. Each page is usually dripping with dystopian dread and decrying a future in which humanity is essentially doomed.

As I noted in a recent essay about “The Growing AI Technopanic,” after reading through most of these books and articles, one is left to believe that in the future: “Either nefarious-minded robots enslave us or kill us, or AI systems treacherously trick us, or at a minimum turn our brains to mush.” These pessimistic perspectives are clearly on display within the realm of fiction, where every sci-fi book, movie, or TV show depicts humanity as certain losers in the proverbial “race” against machines. But such lugubrious lamentations are equally prevalent within the pages of many non-fiction books, academic papers, editorials, and journalistic articles.

Given the predominantly panicky narrative surrounding the age of smart machines, Kasparov’s Deep Thinking serves as a welcome breath of fresh air. The aim of his book is finding ways of “doing a smarter job of humans and machines working together” to improve well-being.

Chess fans will enjoy Kasparov’s overview of the history of the game as well as his discussion of how the development of computing and smart machines has been intermingled with chess for many decades now. They will also appreciate his detailed postmortem of his losing battle with Deep Blue, which makes up the meat of the middle of the book. But what is important about the book is the way Kasparov draws out lessons about how the game of chess and chess players themselves have adapted to the rise of smart machines over time — just as he had to following his historic loss to Deep Blue.

Kasparov begins by noting that the growing panic over machine-learning and AI is unwarranted, but in another sense entirely unsurprising. He correctly observes that, “doomsaying has always been a popular pastime when it comes to new technology” and that, “With every new encroachment of machines, the voices of panic and doubt are heard, and they are only getting louder today.”

Fears of sectoral disruptions and job displacements are nothing new, of course, and many of them have even proven legitimate, Kasparov notes. He discusses “a pattern that has repeated over and over for centuries,” in which humans initially scoffed at the idea of machines being able to compete with them. “Eventually we have had to concede that there is no physical labor that couldn’t be replicated, or mechanically surpassed.” That includes the game of chess, where smart machines are now superior to the world’s best players.

But that doesn’t mean we can or should stop the progression of machine intelligence, he says, because the history of humanity is fundamentally tied up with the never-ending process of technological improvements and the gradual assimilation of new tools into our lives, jobs, and economy. He argues:

“Every profession will eventually feel this pressure, and it must, or else it will mean humanity has ceased to make progress. We can either see these changes as a robotic hand closing around our necks or one that can lift us up higher than we can reach on our own, as has always been the case. Romanticizing the loss of jobs to technology is little better than complaining that antibiotics put too many grave diggers out of work.”

That is why it is essential, Kasparov argues, that we not waste time trying to avoid these changes altogether. He regards the very idea of it as an exercise in futility. “Fighting to thwart the impact of machine intelligence is like lobbying against electricity or rockets,” he says. Instead, he argues, we must look to adapt, and do so quickly.

Adaptation, Resiliency & Risk-Taking

In that sense, Kasparov suggests that there are lessons for us in the history of chess as well as from his own experience competing against Deep Blue. He notes that his match against IBM’s supercomputer, “was symbolic of how we are in a strange competition both with and against our creation in more ways every day.”

Instead of just throwing our hands up in the air in frustration, we must be willing to embrace the new and unknown — especially AI and machine-learning. “Each of us has a choice to make: to embrace these new challenges, or to resist them.” His consistent plea throughout the book is to not give into to our worst fears, but instead to embrace these new technological challenges with a willingness to try new ways of doing things. “No matter how many people are worried about jobs, or the social structure, or killer machines, we can never go back,” he concludes.

On that point, my favorite passage in his book comes early in a short chapter about the history of chess. Kasparov’s sagacious advice is worth quoting at length:

“The willingness to keep trying new things — different methods, uncomfortable tasks — when you are already an expert at something is what separates good from great. Focusing on your strengths is required for peak performance, but improving your weaknesses has the potential for the greatest gains. This is true for athletes, executives, and entire companies. Leaving your comfort zone involves risk, however, and when you are already doing well the temptation to stick with the status quo can be overwhelming, leading to stagnation.”

Societal attitudes toward risk-taking and disruption matter profoundly in this regard because “our perspective on disruption affects how well prepared for it we will be” for the future. Again, the lessons from the world of chess are clear: “How professional chess changed when computers and databases arrived is a useful metaphor for how new technology is adopted across industries and societies in general.” For modern chess players, “it was a matter of adapting to survive,” he argues. “Those who quickly mastered the new methods thrived; the few who didn’t mostly dropped down the rating lists.”

 

Disrupting Education

Kasparov is particularly concerned about how a deep underlying conservatism and resistance to experimentation has become a chronic problem within the traditional educational system. “The prevailing attitude is that education is too important to take risks. My response is that education is too important not to take risks,” he says.

He again returns to the world of chess and he speaks with excitement about the ways in which young chess prodigies are tapping computers and sophisticated programs to supplement their skill-building. They do this, Kasparov says, even though they often receive little encouragement from the older guard, who often still resist the new methods of learning. “We need to find out what works and the only way to do that is to experiment,” he argues. “The kids can handle it. They are already doing it on their own. It’s the adults who are afraid.”

He’s also bullish on the globalization of these trends and the way in which “technology will enable people from all over the world to become entrepreneurs, or scientists, or anything they want despite where they live.” Kasparov believes this is already happening within the global chess community as new computing technologies help players everywhere raise the level of their skills. “Kids are capable of learning far more, far faster, than tradition educational methods allow for,” he argues. “They are already doing it mostly on their own, living and playing in a far more complex environment than the one their parents grew up in.”

Problems Ahead

Kasparov isn’t blind to the potential problems associated with new technologies, including AI and algorithmic systems. The potential for privacy violations represents one of the major concerns related to our powerful new technological capabilities. “There are countless privacy issues to be negotiated anytime [personal] data is accessed, of course, and that trade-off will continue to be one of the main battlefields of the AI revolution.”

Kasparov says he is “glad privacy advocates are on the job, especially regarding the powers of the government,” yet he also senses that we are our own worst enemies because new digital technologies and AI-enabled systems “will continue to make the benefits of sharing our data practically irresistible.” “Utility always wins,” he argues, and even if one country seeks to clamp down on innovation, others will welcome it. “When the results come back and show that the economic and health benefits are tremendous, the floodgates will open everywhere.”

He is probably right. After all, as I have noted in recent essays, we increasingly live in a world where “global innovation arbitrage” — i.e., the increasingly frictionless movement of innovations to jurisdictions that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity — is increasingly easy. We already know how challenging it is to control data flows in the age of the Internet, smartphones, and social media. But the combination of more sophisticated forms of machine-learning and the rise of innovation arbitrage opportunities means that formidable challenges lie ahead in terms of digital privacy and cybersecurity.

Other ethical issues will need to be worked out over time, but it is important not to imbue new AI technologies or automated systems with too much moral weight right out of the gates. “Our technology is not concerned about good or evil. It is agnostic,” Kasparov correctly notes. The real question, he says, is how we ourselves put our tools to use. “The ethics are in how we humans use it, not whether we should build it.”

Humility about the Future

Despite some concerns such as these, Kasparov is generally quite bullish about the future of humanity in an age of smart machines. Again, his core message is that, “going backwards isn’t an option” and that “it is almost always better to start looking for alternatives and how to advance the change into something better instead of trying to fight it and hold on to the dying status quo.”

He agrees with many other pundits that new skills and jobs will be needed going forward, but admits they aren’t always easy to plan for in advance. As Yogi Berra once famously said, “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Indeed, as I pointed out in the most recent edition of my book Permissionless Innovation, when one looks back at official government labor market studies and forecasts from the 1970s and 1980s, you are struck by the way in which policymakers didn’t even have a vocabulary to describe the jobs and skills of the present. For example, you find no mention in past reports of some of today’s hottest jobs, such as software engineers and architects, UX designers, database scientists and administrators, and so on.

On one hand, therefore, pessimistic pundits and policymakers regularly underestimate the adaptability of workers and the evolution of new skills and professions. On the other hand, they make an equally egregious mistake when they overestimate the impact of technological change on many sectors and professions, or suggest that mass unemployment is just around the corner unless we slow automation down.

Just this week, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation released a new report on the impact of technological disruption in the U.S. labor market from 1850 to present and decried the “false alarmism” often on display in debates about current and future skills and professions. “Labor market disruption is not abnormally high,” conclude authors Robert D. Atkinson and John Wu, but instead, “it’s occurring at its lowest rate since the Civil War.”

We’ve been through more turbulent labor market disruptions in the past and weathered the storm. Chances are we will do so again, so long as we embrace the potential for that change to improve our lives and economy in the long-term. “In fact,” conclude Atkinson and Wu, “the single biggest economic challenge facing advanced economies today is not too much labor market churn, but too little, and thus too little productivity growth.” This is consistent with Kasparov’s repeated call in Deep Thinking for us not to give in to our fears about a highly uncertain future but to instead embrace its potential. “Our machines will continue to make us healthier and richer as we use them wisely,” he says, while adding, “They will also make us smarter.”

Learning by Doing

What Kasparov is really doing throughout the book is making the case for building human and institutional resiliency through a constant willingness to experiment and learn through trial and error. It is certainly true that many of today’s skillsets, professions, and business models will be challenged by the rise of smarter machines and algorithmic learning. Defeatism in the face of that prospect, however, isn’t the answer; adaptation is.

Boston University economist James Bessen wrote about this process in his new book, Learning by Doing. Bessen argued that periods of profound technological change require a willingness by workers, businesses, and other institutions to adjust to new marketplace realities. For progress to occur, large numbers of ordinary workers must acquire new knowledge and skills. However, “that is a slow and difficult process, and history suggests that it often requires social changes supported by accommodating institutions and culture,” Bessen notes.

Luckily, history also suggests that we have been through this process many times before and can get through it again — and raise the standard of living for workers and average citizens alike over the long-run. The crucial part of that process is a general willingness to continue to experiment with new ways of doing things — i.e., learning by doing — and understanding that new skills and professions will emerge from all that process.

That is essentially the same point Kasparov makes in Deep Thinking. As he summarized in a new podcast conversation with Tyler Cowen:

“There will be redistribution of jobs. Many jobs today — like drone operators or 3D printer managers or social media managers — they didn’t exist 10 years ago, 15 years ago. No doubt in 10, 15 years, there will be many jobs, maybe the best-paid jobs, that don’t exist today, and we don’t even know how these jobs will look. I think that’s natural. All we have to do is realize that this process is inevitable, and we have to prepare us mentally, but also to have some sort of safety cushions to help people that will have great difficulty in adjusting.”

What about more specific public policy solutions? Considering the unclear future that lies ahead, flexibility and plenty of policy experimentation will be crucial to finding and unlocking new methods that could help us cope and adapt in the new world. “The problem comes when the government is inhibiting innovation with overregulation and short-sighted policy,” Kasparov says. Trade wars and restrictive immigration policies won’t help matters either, he argues, because they “will limit America’s ability to attract the best and brightest minds.” Hopefully the Trump Administration is listening to his advice in this regard.

AI skeptics and other technology critics will lament Kasparov’s lack of greater detail and the absence of a more precise blueprint for helping workers and institutions navigate an uncertain future. But, again, the entire point of Kasparov’s book is that there is enormous value in the very act of confronting those new challenges, learning through trial-and-error(including the many accompanying failures), and “muddling through” over time.

Much like looking out over the chessboard and pondering the wisdom of our next move, we cannot be frozen into inaction because of fear. We must be willing to make that next move. And then another, and another. And then we must learn from our experiences, and especially our mistakes, if we hope to prosper. “To keep ahead of the machines, we must not try to slow them down because that slows us down as well,” Kasparov concludes in his closing chapter. “We must speed them up. We must give them, and ourselves, plenty of room to grow. We must go forward, outward, and upward.”

Wise advice from the greatest of all grandmasters.

By Jordan Reimschisel & Adam Thierer

[Originally published on Medium on May 2, 2017.]

Americans have schizophrenic opinions about artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Ask the average American what they think of AI and they will often respond with a combination of fear, loathing, and dread. Yet, the very same AI applications they claim to be so anxious about are already benefiting their lives in profound ways.

Last week, we posted complementary essays about the growing “technopanic” over artificial intelligence and the potential for that panic to undermine many important life-enriching medical innovations or healthcare-related applications. We were inspired to write those essays after reading the results of a recent poll conducted by Morning Consult, which suggested that the public was very uncomfortable with AI technologies. “A large majority of both Republicans and Democrats believe there should be national and international regulations on artificial intelligence,” the poll found, Of the 2,200 American adults surveyed, the poll revealed that “73 percent of Democrats said there should be U.S. regulations on artificial intelligence, as did 74 percent of Republicans and 65 percent of independents.”

We noted that there were reasons to question the significance of those in light of the binary way in which the questions were asked. Nonetheless, there are clearly some serious concerns among the public about AI and robotics. You see that when you read deeper into the poll results for specific questions and find respondents saying that they are “somewhat” to “very uncomfortable” about a wide range of specific AI applications.

Yet, in each case, Americans are already deriving significant benefits from each of the AI applications they claim to be so uncomfortable with.

Flying an Airplane

Consider the poll result that 70% of respondents are somewhat to very uncomfortable with AI flying a plane. That’s strange because it is already the case today that the vast majority of functions on commercial aircraft are automated. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), automation is already used about 90% of the time in flight. And the number isn’t higher because the FAA has several restrictions on when the autopilot can be engaged. Despite, or perhaps because, the vast majority of aircraft functions being automated, flying is one of the safest forms of travel, enjoyed by over two million passengers every single day.

Driving a Car

It’s also interesting that 65% of poll respondents said they were uncomfortable with AI driving a car considering how humans have been gradually welcoming more and more automation into the driving experience over the years. Cruise control and anti-lock brakes were early examples of this trend that we now take for granted in our vehicles. Today the list of tasks and features in our cars that are being automated or supplemented with AI continues to grow rapidly: rear view “backup” cameras, parking assist functions, automatic emergency braking, lane-departure warnings and lane-keeping assistance, blind spot monitoring, collision avoidance systems, pedestrian detection warnings, voice-activated safety applications, and more. Increasingly, vehicles are essentially rolling computers that do an increasing amount of vehicle operations for us.

Of course, fully autonomous “driverless” cars could be right around the proverbial corner, and rather than fear this technology, Americans ought to embrace it. Driverless cars could offer significant improvements not only in convenience but, more importantly, the potential for significant reductionsin the growing roadway accident and death toll.

Picking a Romantic Partner

Then there’s the poll result revealing that 68% of American don’t like the idea of AI algorithms helping to pick a romantic partner. Yet, that hasn’t stopped millions of Americans from signing up for services like Match.com, eHarmony, OKCupid, or the dozens of other online dating sites or mobile dating apps. “The share of 18- to 24-year-olds who use online dating has roughly tripled from 10% in 2013 to 27%” by early 2016, according to the Pew Research Center. Overall, 15% of U.S. adults reported using online dating sites or mobile dating apps to find a romantic partner, and 59% agree with the statement that “online dating is a good way to meet people.”

Performing Surgery & Making a Medical Diagnosis

Similarly, 69% of people say they are not comfortable with AI helping to perform surgery, and 65% don’t like the sound of AI making a medical diagnosis. That’s surprising considering that, as Jordan pointed out in his earlier essay, several startups and hospitals are already doing just that with promising results. In New York, Memorial Sloan Kettering is already usingIBM’s Watson to review stacks and stacks of clinical data on cancer and provide doctors with advice on treatment options for unique cases. Moorfields Eye Hospital in London partnered with Google’s Deep Mind AI platform to help physicians plan the treatment “map” for radiation therapy patients. The amazing, and perhaps counter intuitive, part of these efforts is that they have actually enhanced the human side of medicine. By allowing AI to assist with data processing and diagnoses, doctors have more time to focus on patient-oriented tasks.

Perhaps those 65% of people are concerned about the accuracy of diagnoses made by AI? Doctors at University of North Carolina School of Medicine are using IBM’s Watson to review cancer data and recommend treatment to the oncologists on staff. In the one thousand cases that the physicians tested, Watson recommended the same course of treatment as experienced oncologists 99% of the time. And earlier this year, in a study published in Nature, scientists at Stanford University demonstrated that AI was capable of identifying potentially cancerous skin lesions just as accurately as a trained dermatologist. AI has demonstrated in numerous situations that it can rival, and even surpass, human ability to correctly diagnose disease.

People should be more concerned about not letting AI help with medical diagnoses. Traditionally, diagnoses have been driven by an examination of a disease’s symptoms. But at that point, it is already too late to prevent sickness and the suffering that comes with it. AI makes it possible to detect traces of a disease before it begins to do irreparable harm to a person’s internal organs and overall well-being. Using AI to catch conditions like Alzheimer’s and cancer years in advance of actually developing symptoms could increase the probability of survival by up to 90%.

Efforts to incorporate AI into the surgical room have also already begun. Researchers from the Sheikh Zayed Institute for Pediatric Surgical Innovation demonstrated that a robotic surgeon controlled by AI could stitch a severed pig’s intestine back together just as well as, or better than, the humans who were given the same task. The study, published in a medical journal last year, notes that “Autonomous robotic surgery … promises enhanced efficacy, safety, and improved access to optimized surgical techniques.” One of the study’s authors, surgeon Peter Kim, said that being able to work with a machine during operations would improve safety and efficiency and be a “tremendous benefit.”

Running a Factory

A narrow majority of those surveyed (53%) also don’t approve of AI running a factory. Yet, the entire history of manufacturing and distribution is one of constant productivity improvements, most of which have been brought on through increased automation of various tasks. “Economists have shown time and again that automation helps overall standards of living rise, literacy rates improve, average life span lengthen and crime rates fall,” notes Kevin Maney in a recent Newsweek feature on AI and robotics. “After waves of automation — the Industrial Revolution, mechanization, computerization — we’re way better off in almost every way.”

With the rise of the Internet and the digital revolution, this process has sped up and now countless factory processes are run by algorithms and robotic processes. In a recent report, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence, Daniel Castro and Joshua New of the Center for Data Innovation identified many of the ways that AI will help improve industrial operations across the economy by monitoring critical systems and preventing breakdowns before they happen; better managing supply chains and improving delivery times; and designing smarter industrial facilities to improve productivity and efficiency. These AI-enabled improvements help both the companies and their customers.

Making Financial Investments

Finally, 60% of those surveyed say they don’t want AI making financial investments. According to a Business Insider article written earlier this year, “machine learning and intelligent systems are already a part of the industry, encompassing everything from virtual customer assistants to complex functions that can find patterns in unstructured data.”

One of the most promising applications of AI is in the detection of fraud. Last year, MasterCard announced that it will employ AI to improve real-time approvals and reduce false declines. Javelin Strategy & Review estimatedthat the value of false-declines is thirteen times greater than the amount lost in actual credit card fraud and is a major source of frustration for customers. Using AI to lower the number of false-declines would be a major benefit for many card users.

AI is also being used to help everyday investors earn more money. Automated investment service Betterment uses AI to reduce “tax drag” and boost users’ earnings an estimated 15% over 30 years. The service constantly calculates the most tax-efficient ratio of stocks and bonds, as well as the most advantageous taxable account (traditional IRA vs. Roth IRA, etc) in which to put those investments. The AI makes adjustments in real-time in order to maximize users’ returns, allowing people to retire with more money in their bank accounts.

We Love AI, Even If We Don’t Know It!

The contrast between attitudes about AI versus real-world use of it suggests that many Americans neither fully understand nor appreciate how AI technologies already improve their lives. That’s not entirely surprisingly because, as Adam explained in his earlier essay:

AI works its magic behind the scenes. AI increasingly powers all the other gadgets and services that we do see around us: smartphones, smart cars, smart health devices, and more. We tend to appreciate those devices and applications more because they are tangible manifestations of technological innovation. But without artificial intelligence, machine-learning, and “big data,” these devices and services would be largely worthless to us.

Think about the many mundane, everyday examples of how automation, AI, and machine-learning currently benefit us by saving us money or making our lives more productive or convenient: bank ATMs, voice-activated apps and devices, language translation tools, sophisticated mapping services, tailored shopping recommendations, quickly finding travel accommodations, and so on. We already take most of these services for granted.

It is also worth noting that younger generations are much more accepting of AI in each of the categories that we have discussed. Survey respondents in the 55–64 years of age category reported being about 20% more uncomfortable with AI performing each of these tasks compared to respondents in the 18–29 years of age category.

It may simply be the case that a period of acclimation will be needed before many Americans accept or appreciate AI based technologies. Of course, that sort of adaptation process is nothing new. It’s similar to what we witnessed for cameras and cars a century ago. At first we feared and loathed them, but very quickly we came to accept and then demand them. In light of that, government ought to take special care not to enact prohibitory policies that prematurely quash AI development.

Generally speaking, despite the initial resistance we often witness toward new types of technological innovation, over time we gradually assimilate new devices and services into our lives and economy. It isn’t always easy or comfortable, and sometimes social norms and various institutions are forced to go through difficult periods of adaptation, but somehow we always “muddle through” and become more resilient and prosperous in the process.

As that process continues, AI technologies will continue to take root in our economy and our lives and improve them in ways both big and small, even when we may not fully realize or appreciate it.

I wanted to draw your attention to yet another spectacular speech by Maureen K. Ohlhausen, a Commissioner with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). I have written here before about Commissioner Ohlhausen’s outstanding speeches, but this latest one might be her best yet.

On Tuesday, Ohlhausen was speaking at U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation day-long event on “The Internet of Everything: Data, Networks and Opportunities.” The conference featured various keynote speakers and panels discussing, “the many ways that data and Internet connectiviting is changing the face of business and society.” (It was my honor to also be invited to deliver an address to the crowd that day.)

As with many of her other recent addresses, Commissioner Ohlhausen stressed why it is so important that policymakers “approach new technologies and new business models with regulatory humility.” Building on the work of the great Austrian economist F.A. Hayek, who won a Nobel prize in part for his work explaining the limits of our knowledge to plan societies and economies, Ohlhausen argues that:

regulators face a fundamental knowledge problem that limits the effective reach of regulation. A regulator must acquire knowledge about the present state and future trends of the industry being regulated. The more prescriptive the regulation, and the more complex the industry, the more detailed knowledge the regulator must collect. But, regulators simply cannot gather all the information relevant to every problem. Such information is widely distributed and therefore very expensive to collect. Even when a regulator manages to collect information, it quickly becomes out of date as a regulated industry continues to evolve. Obsolete data is a particular concern for regulators of fast-changing technological fields like the Internet of Things. This knowledge problem means that centralized problem solving cannot make full use of the available knowledge about a problem. Therefore, centralized regulation generally offers worse solutions when compared to distributed or emergent constraints such as social norms.

She continued on to explain the dangers of “precautionary principle” thinking as applied to new technologies, noting that, far too often, policymakers seek to impose preemptive, top-down controls on new sectors and technologies based on “concern over largely hypothetical future harms.” That’s a point I have stressed repeatedly in my own work on the importance of “permissionless innovation.” As I note in my book of the same title, living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.

What’s the better alternative to precautionary controls to address potential risks? As Commissioner Ohlhausen noted in her speech to the Chamber of Commerce, regulators should “focus on identifying and addressing real, not speculative, consumer harm.” She explains how the FTC already has the tools to do so:

At the FTC, this focus is part of our statute. Congress charged us in Section 5 of the FTC Act with preventing deceptive or unfair acts and practices. Deceptive acts violate Section 5 only if they are material – that is, if they actually harm consumers. And practices are only unfair if there is a substantial harm that consumers cannot avoid and that outweighs any benefits to consumers or competition. In both cases, the law concerns itself with addressing actual consumer harms. Likewise the FTC carefully evaluates consumer welfare (or, its corollary, consumer harm) when it exercises its antitrust authority.

Importantly, she noted, the focus in this regard is on  ex post enforcement, not highly prescriptive ex ante regulation. “This incremental approach, which we have been using for nearly 100 years, has significant benefits,” Ohlhausen argued, and it is “consistent with Hayek’s thesis about the knowledge problem.” Namely, regulators should not be acting based on limited knowledge to address hypothetical future threats. Doing so derails opportunities for innovation and leads to myriad unintended consequences.

But the best part of Commissioner Ohlhausen’s speech was her embrace of what author Matt Ridley calls “rational optimism”:

Over the past two centuries, humankind has proven its ability to transform innovation into widespread prosperity. Fueled by supportive social attitudes and free market institutions, businesses have been the engines of this prosperity. Regulators who don’t want to stall these engines of innovation should remember the long history of beneficial innovation, remain humble about what they can know and accomplish, focus on addressing real consumer harm, and apply tools appropriate to the harms that do arise.

Critics will protest that innovation can just be too darn disruptive and that we have to preemptively legislate or regulate to counter those effects. But Ohlhausen has a powerful response to those critics:

innovation can, and will, be unnerving or unsettling. By its very nature, innovation changes things. Change is uncomfortable. That is why, as long as there has been innovation, there have been detractors and doomsayers. William Petty, the economist and doctor, said, “When a new invention is first propounded, in the beginning every man objects and the poor inventor runs the gauntloop of all petulant wits.” And he was talking in 1679! Pessimism about innovation sells newspapers and books. It also has a surprising intellectual caché. “The man who despairs when others hope is admired by a large class of persons as a sage,” said John Stuart Mill. But if the past 200 years of innovation have any lesson, it is this: society has repeatedly and quickly integrated and greatly benefited from innovation. The somber doomsday “sages” – from the Luddites in 19th century England to critics of credit card technology in the 1970s – have been wrong about the general effects of innovation. The many benefits have far outweighed the few costs. I am quite optimistic that the disruption of the Internet of Everything will continue the trend and greatly promote our prosperity.

Preach it, sister! That is exactly right.

Anyway, make sure to read Commissioner Ohlhausen’s entire speech. It is absolutely spectacular. I wish every regulatory approached their jobs with the same degree of humility, patience, and “rational optimism” that Commissioner Ohlhausen does.

It was my pleasure this week to be invited to deliver some comments at an event hosted by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) to coincide with the release of their latest study, “The Privacy Panic Cycle: A Guide to Public Fears About New Technologies.” The goal of the new ITIF report, which was co-authored by Daniel Castro and Alan McQuinn, is to highlight the dangers associated with “the cycle of panic that occurs when privacy advocates make outsized claims about the privacy risks associated with new technologies. Those claims then filter through the news media to policymakers and the public, causing frenzies of consternation before cooler heads prevail, people come to understand and appreciate innovative new products and services, and everyone moves on.” (p. 1)

As Castro and McQuinn describe it, the privacy panic cycle “charts how perceived privacy fears about a technology grow rapidly at the beginning, but eventually decline over time.” They divide this cycle into four phases: Trusting Beginnings, Rising Panic, Deflating Fears, and Moving On. Here’s how they depict it in an image:

The report can be seen as an extension of the literature on “moral panics” and “techno-panics.” Some relevant texts in this field include Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda’s Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance, Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear, and Barry Glassner’s Culture of Fear. But there’s a rich body of academic writing on this topic and I’ve tried to make a small contribution to this literature in recent years, most notably with a lengthy 2013 law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” In that paper, I try to connect the literature on moral panic theory (which mostly focuses on panics about speech and cultural changes) to other scholarship about how panics and threat inflation are used in many other contexts, including the fields of national security policy, cybersecurity, and more.

I define “technopanic,” as “intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence or use of media or technologies, especially by the young.”  “Threat inflation” has been defined by national security policy experts Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall as “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.”

Castro and McQuinn’s new study on privacy panic cycles fits neatly within this analytical framework and makes an important contribution to the literature. They warn of the real dangers associated with these privacy panics, especially in terms of lost opportunities for innovation. “Policymakers should not get caught up in the panics that follow in the wake of new technologies,” they argue, “and they should not allow hypothetical, speculative, or unverified claims to color the policies they put in place. Similarly, they should not allow unsubstantiated claims put forth by privacy fundamentalists to derail legitimate public sector efforts to use technology to improve society,” they say. (p. 28)

I think one of the most important takeaways from the study is that, as Castro and McQuinn note, “history has shown, many of the overinflated claims about loss of privacy have never materialized.” (p. 28) They identify many reasons why that may be the case but, most notably, they explain how societal attitudes often quickly adjust and also that “social norms dissuade many practices that are feasible but undesirable.” (p. 28) I have spent a lot of time thinking through this process of individual and social acclimation to new technologies and, most recently, wrote an essay on this topic entitled, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change.”

Castro and McQuinn highlight several historical case studies that illustrate how privacy panics play out in practice. They include studies of photography, the transistor, and RFID tags. They also continue on to map out how various new technologies are currently—or might soon be—experiencing a privacy panic. Those include drones, facial recognition, connected cars, behavioral advertising, the Internet of Things and wearable tech. Here’s where Castro and McQuinn believe each of those technologies falls currently on the privacy panic curve.

One problem with the ITIF report, however, is that it avoids the question of what constitutes a serious enough privacy “harm” that might be worth actually panicking over. Certainly there must be something that deserves special concern – perhaps even a little bit of panic. Of course, as I noted in my remarks at the event, this is problem with a great deal of literature in this field due to the challenge associated with defining what we even mean by “privacy” or “privacy harm.” Nonetheless, while some privacy fundamentalists are far too aggressive in using amorphous conceptions of privacy harms to fuel privacy panics, it can also be the case that others (like Castro, McQuinn, and myself) don’t do enough to specify when extremely serious privacy problems exist that warrant heightened concern.

The ITIF report rightly singles out the many groups that all too often use fear tactics and threat inflation to advance their own agendas. In the academic literature on moral panics, these people or groups are referred to as “fear entrepreneurs.” They hope to create and then take advantage of a state of fear to demand that “something must be done” about supposed problems that are often either greatly overstated or which will be solved (or just go away) over time. (For more on “fear entrepreneurs,” see Frank Furedi’s outstanding 2009 article on “Precautionary Culture and the Rise of Probabilistic Risk Assessment.”) These individuals and groups often end up having a disproportionate impact on policy debates and, through their vociferous activism, threaten to achieve a sort of “heckler’s veto” over digital innovation.

However, as I stressed in my remarks at ITIF’s launch event for the study, I believe that Castro and McQuinn were wrong to single out the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) as one of these troublemakers. Castro and McQuinn claim that “there is now a professional class of people whose job is to manage privacy risks and promote the idea that technology is becoming more invasive. These privacy professionals have a vested interest in inflating the perceived privacy risk of new technologies as their livelihood depends on businesses’ willingness to pay them to address these concerns.” (8)

I think that mischaracterizes the role that most IAPP-trained privacy professionals play today. I have done a lot of work with IAPP itself and many of the privacy professionals they have trained. In my experience, these folks aren’t trying to fan the flames of “privacy panics.” To the contrary, many (perhaps most) IAPP professionals are actively involved in putting out those fires or making sure that they do not start raging in the first place. This is particularly true of the huge number of IAPP-trained privacy professionals who work for major technology companies and who work hard every day to find practical solutions to real-world privacy and security-related concerns.

Of course, as with any large membership organization, one can find some IAPP-trained privacy professionals who may indeed be guilty of fueling privacy panics for personal or organizational purposes. After all, some IAPP-trained folks work for privacy advocacy organizations which could be classified as “privacy fundamentalists” in their philosophical orientation. But just because some IAPP-trained people play techno-panic games, it certainly doesn’t mean that most of them do.

Relatedly, another small nitpick I have with the ITIF study is that it groups together a large number of privacy and security-focused tech policy groups and implies that they are all equally guilty of fueling privacy panics. In reality, there is a small core group of individuals and advocacy organizations who are far more vociferous and extreme in their privacy panic rhetoric. Others may be guilty of that at times, but not nearly to the same extent as the most panicky Chicken Littles.

The only other problem I had with the study, and this is really quite a small matter, is that I would have liked to have seen some discussion about some strategies we might be able to employ to help counter privacy panics, or lessen the likelihood that they develop at all. In my own work, I have tried to develop constructive solutions to privacy and security-related concerns that might give rise to panics. Those solutions include things like education and tech literacy efforts, empowerment tools, transparency efforts, and so on. It’s also worth reminding concerned critics that there exists a broad range of existing legal remedies that can help address privacy concerns after the fact. These include torts and common law solutions, contractual remedies, class actions, other targeted legal solutions, and enforcement of “unfair and deceptive practices” by the Federal Trade Commission or state attorneys general. And there’s also important industry self-regulatory efforts and best practices that can help alleviate many of these privacy concerns. I would have liked to have seen the ITIF study address these or other potential solutions to privacy panics.

Overall, however, I thought that the ITIF report makes an important contribution to the literature in this field and provides us with a useful analytic framework to help us evaluate and critique privacy-related technopanics in the future.

The video of the launch event is below and the full paper can be found here. Also, for further reading on technopanics, see my compendium of 40 essays I have written on the topic.

Last Wednesday, it was my great pleasure to testify at a Senate Commerce Committee hearing entitled, “The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things.” The hearing focused “on how devices… will be made smarter and more dynamic through Internet technologies. Government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, however, are already considering possible changes to the law that could have the unintended consequence of slowing innovation.”

But the session went well beyond the Internet of Things and became a much more wide-ranging discussion about how America can maintain its global leadership for the next-generation of Internet-enabled, data-driven innovation. On both sides of the aisle at last week’s hearing, one Senator after another made impassioned remarks about the enormous innovation opportunities that were out there. While doing so, they highlighted not just the opportunities emanating out of the IoT and wearable device space, but also many other areas, such as connected cars, commercial drones, and next-generation spectrum.

I was impressed by the energy and nonpartisan vision that the Senators brought to these issues, but I wanted to single out the passionate statement that Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) delivered when it came his turn to speak because he very eloquently articulated what’s at stake in the battle for global innovation supremacy in the modern economy. (Sen. Booker’s remarks were not published, but you can watch them starting at the 1:34:00 mark of the hearing video.)

Embrace the Opportunity

First, Sen. Booker stressed the enormous opportunity with the Internet of Things. “ This is a phenomenal opportunity for a bipartisan, profoundly patriotic approach to an issue that can explode our economy. I think that there are trillions of dollars, creating countless jobs, improving quality of life, [and] democratizing our society,” he said. “We can’t even imagine the future that this portends of, and we should be embracing that.”

Sen. Booker has it exactly right. And for more details about the enormous innovation opportunities associated with the Internet of Things, see Section 2 of my new law review article, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” which provides concrete evidence.

Protect America’s Competitive Advantage in the Innovation Age

Second, Sen. Booker highlighted the importance of getting our policy vision right to achieve those opportunities. He noted that “a lot of my concerns are what my Republican colleagues also echoed, which is we should be doing everything possible to encourage this and nothing to restrict it.”

“ America right now is the net exporter of technology and innovation in the globe, and we can’t lose that advantage,” he said and “we should continue to be the global innovators on these areas.” He continued on to say:

And so, from copyright issues, security issues, privacy issues… all of these things are worthy of us wrestling and grappling with, but to me we cannot stop human innovation and we can’t give advantages in human innovation to other nations that we don’t have. America should continue to lead.

This is something I have been writing actively about now for many years and I agree with Sen. Booker that America needs to get our policy vision right to ensure we don’t lose ground in the international competition to see who will lead the next wave of Internet-enabled innovation. As I noted in my testimony, “If America hopes to be a global leader in the Internet of Things, as it has been for the Internet more generally over the past two decades, then we first have to get public policy right. America took a commanding lead in the digital economy because, in the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton administration crafted a nonpartisan vision for the Internet that protected “permissionless innovation”—the idea that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted without prior approval.”

Meanwhile, as I documented in my longer essay, “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters: Why does economic growth occur in some societies & not in others?” our international rivals languished on this front because they strapped their tech sectors with layers of regulatory red tape that thwarted digital innovation.

Reject Fear-Based Policymaking

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Sen. Booker stressed how essential it was that we reject a fear-based approach to public policymaking. As he noted at the hearing about these new information technologies, “ there’s a lot of legitimate fears, but in the same way of every technological era, there must have been incredible fears.”

He cited, for example, the rise of air travel and the onset of humans taking flight. Sen. Booker correctly noted that while that must have been quite jarring at first, we quickly came to realize the benefits of that new innovation. The same will be true for new technologies such as the Internet of Things, connected cars, and private drones, Booker argued. In each case, some early fears about these technologies could lead to overly-precautionary approach to policy. “ But for us to do anything to inhibit that leap in humanity to me seems unfortunate,” he said.

Once again, the Senator has it exactly right. As I noted in my law review article on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” as well as my recent essay, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change,” humans have exhibited the uncanny ability to adapt to changes in their environment, bounce back from adversity, and learn to be resilient over time. A great deal of wisdom is born of experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures while both developing new technologies and learning how to live with them. More often than not, citizens have found ways to adapt to technological change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms, new norms, or other creative fixes.

Booker gets that and understands why we need to be patient to allow that process to unfold once again so that we can enjoy the abundance of riches that will accompany a more innovative economy.

Avoiding Global Innovation Arbitrage

Sen. Booker also highlighted how some existing government legal and regulatory barriers could hold back progress. On the wireless spectrum front he noted that “ the government hoards too much spectrum and there is a need for more spectrum out there. Everything we are talking about,” he argued, “is going to necessitate more spectrum.” Again, 100% correct. Although some spectrum reform proposals (licensed vs. unlicensed, for example) will still prove contentious, we can at least all agree that we have to work together to find ways to open up more spectrum since the coming Internet of Things universe of technologies is going to demand lots of it.

Booker also noted that another area where fear undermines American leadership is the issue of private drone use. He noted that, “ the potential possibilities for drone technology to alleviate burdens on our infrastructure, to empower commerce, innovation, jobs… to really open up unlimited opportunities in this country is pretty incredible to me.”

The problem is that existing government policies, enforced by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), have been holding back progress. And that has had consequences in terms of global competitiveness. “As I watch our government go slow in promulgating rules holding back American innovation,” Booker said, “what happened as a result of that is that innovation has spread to other countries that don’t have these rules (or have) put in place sensible regulations. But now we seeing technology exported from America and going other places.”

Correct again! I wrote about this problem in a recent essay on “global innovation arbitrage,” in which I noted how “Capital moves like quicksilver around the globe today as investors and entrepreneurs look for more hospitable tax and regulatory environments. The same is increasingly true for innovation. Innovators can, and increasingly will, move to those countries and continents that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity.”

That’s already happening with drone innovation, as I documented in that piece. Evidence suggests that the FAA’s heavy-handed and overly-precautionary approach to drones has encouraged some innovators to flock overseas in search of more hospitable regulatory environment.

Luckily, just this weekend, the FAA finally announced its (much-delayed) rules for private drone operations. (Here’s a summary of those rules.) Unfortunately, the rules are a bit of mixed bag, with some greater leeway being provided for very small drones, but the rules will still be too restrictive to allow for other innovative applications, such as widespread drone delivery (which has Amazon angry, among others.)

Bottom line: if our government doesn’t take a more flexible, light-touch approach to these and other cutting-edge technologies, than some of our most creative minds and companies are going to bolt.

I dealt with all of these innovation policy issues in far more detail in my latest little book Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, which I condensed further still into this essay on, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation.” But Sen. Booker has offered us an even more concise explanation of just what’s at stake in the battle for innovation leadership in the modern economy. His remarks point the way forward and illustrate, as I have noted before, that innovation policy can and should be a nonpartisan issue.

Additional Reading

• testimony: “My Testimony for Senate Internet of Things Hearing,” February 11, 2015.
• essay: “A Nonpartisan Policy Vision for the Internet of Things,” December 11, 2014.
• law review article: “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” November 2014.
• essay: “Don’t Hit the (Techno-)Panic Button on Connected Car Hacking & IoT Security,” February 10, 2015.
• essay: “Striking a Sensible Balance on the Internet of Things and Privacy,” January 16, 2015.
• essay: “Some Initial Thoughts on the FTC Internet of Things Report,” January 28, 2015.
• slide presentation: “Policy Issues Surrounding the Internet of Things & Wearable Technology,” September 12, 2014.
• essay: “CES 2014 Report: The Internet of Things Arrives, but Will Washington Welcome It?” January 8, 2014.

Claire Cain Miller of The New York Times posted an interesting story yesterday noting how, “Technology Has Made Life Different, but Not Necessarily More Stressful.” Her essay builds on a new study by researchers at the Pew Research Center and Rutgers University on “Social Media and the Cost of Caring.” Miller’s essay and this new Pew/Rutgers study indirectly make a point that I am always discussing in my own work, but that is often ignored or downplayed by many technological critics, namely: We humans have repeatedly proven quite good at adapting to technological change, even when it entails some heartburn along the way.

The major takeaway of the Pew/Rutgers study was that, “social media users are not any more likely to feel stress than others, but there is a subgroup of social media users who are more aware of stressful events in their friends’ lives and this subgroup of social media users does feel more stress.” Commenting on the study, Miller of the Times notes:

Fear of technology is nothing new. Telephones, watches and televisions were similarly believed to interrupt people’s lives and pressure them to be more productive. In some ways they did, but the benefits offset the stressors. New technology is making our lives different, but not necessarily more stressful than they would have been otherwise. “It’s yet another example of how we overestimate the effect these technologies are having in our lives,” said Keith Hampton, a sociologist at Rutgers and an author of the study.  . . .  Just as the telephone made it easier to maintain in-person relationships but neither replaced nor ruined them, this recent research suggests that digital technology can become a tool to augment the relationships humans already have.

I found this of great interest because I have written about how humans assimilate new technologies into their lives and become more resilient in the process as they learn various coping techniques. I elaborated on these issues in a lengthy essay last summer entitled,  “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change.” I borrowed the term “muddling through” from Joel Garreau’s terrific 2005 book, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies — and What It Means to Be Human.  Garreau argued that history can be viewed “as a remarkably effective paean to the power of humans to muddle through extraordinary circumstances.”

Garreau associated this with what he called the “Prevail” scenario and he contrasted it with the “Heaven” scenario, which believes that technology drives history relentlessly, and in almost every way for the better, and the “Hell” scenario, which always worries that “technology is used for extreme evil, threatening humanity with extinction.” Under the “Prevail” scenario, Garreau argued, “humans shape and adapt [technology] in entirely new directions.” (p. 95) “Just because the problems are increasing doesn’t mean solutions might not also be increasing to match them,” he concluded. (p. 154) Or, as John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid noted in their excellent 2001, “Response to Bill Joy and the Doom-and-Gloom Technofuturists”:

technological and social systems shape each other. The same is true on a larger scale. […] Technology and society are constantly forming and reforming new dynamic equilibriums with far-reaching implications. The challenge for futurology (and for all of us) is to see beyond the hype and past the over-simplifications to the full import of these new sociotechnical formations.  Social and technological systems do not develop independently; the two evolve together in complex feedback loops, wherein each drives, restrains and accelerates change in the other.

In my essay last summer, I sketched out the reasons why I think this “prevail” or “muddling through” scenario offers the best explanation for how we learn to cope with technological disruption and prosper in the process. Again, it comes down to the fact that people and institutions learned to cope with technological change and become more resilient over time. It’s a learning process, and we humans are good at rolling with the punches and finding new baselines along the way. While “muddling through” can sometimes be quite difficult and messy, we adjust to most of the new technological realities we face and, over time, find constructive solutions to the really hard problems.

So, while it’s always good to reflect on the challenges of life in an age of never-ending, rapid-fire technological change, there’s almost never cause for panic. Read my old essay for more discussion on why I remain so optimistic about the human condition.

Writing last week in The Wall Street Journal, Matt Moffett noted how many European countries continue to struggle with chronic unemployment and general economic malaise.  (“New Entrepreneurs Find Pain in Spain“) It’s a dismal but highly instructive tale about how much policy incentives matter when it comes to innovation and job creation–especially the sort of entrepreneurial activity from small start-ups that is so essential for economic growth. Here’s the key takeaway:

Scarce capital, dense bureaucracy, a culture deeply averse to risk and a cratered consumer market all suppress startups in Europe. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, a survey of startup activity, found the percentage of the adult population involved in early stage entrepreneurial activity last year was just 5% in Germany, 4.6% in France and 3.4% in Italy. That compares with 12.7% in the U.S. Even once they are established, European businesses are, on average, smaller and slower growing than those in the U.S.  The problems of entrepreneurs are one reason Europe’s economy continues to struggle after six years of crisis. The European Union this month cut its growth forecasts for the region for this year and next, citing weaker than expected performance in the eurozone’s biggest economies, Germany, France and Italy. This week, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development delivered its own pessimistic appraisal, with chief economist Catherine Mann saying, “The eurozone is the locus of the weakness in the global economy.” […] Europe’s unemployment crisis may be eroding a deeply ingrained fear of failure that is a bigger impediment to entrepreneurship on the Continent than in other regions, according to academic surveys. “Fear of failure is less of an issue because the whole country is a failure, and most of us are out of business or have a hard time paying our bills,” said Nick Drandakis of Athens, who in 2011 founded Taxibeat, an app that provides passenger ratings on taxi drivers.

I found Moffett’s article interesting because I write a lot about entrepreneurialism, innovation, long-term economic growth, and the public policies that facilitate all these things. This has also been the subject of an excellent Cato Institute online forum about “Reviving Economic Growth,” which asked leading economists and policy experts to answer the following question: “If you could wave a magic wand and make one or two policy or institutional changes to brighten the U.S. economy’s long-term growth prospects, what would you change and why?”

Many of the entries in that forum dealt with the importance of removing barriers to new start-ups so that entrepreneurs can help spark new innovations and spur economic growth. My entry, which was entitled, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation,” kicked off with a quote from the great Joel Mokyr: “Why does economic growth… occur in some societies and not in others?” I noted that “debate has raged among generations of economists, historians, and business theorists about that question and the specific forces and policies that prompt long-term growth.” Generally speaking, however, there actually exists a great deal of consensus about the importance of small business entrepreneurship and the need for openness to change if an economy is going to grow. (See the studies from Ian Hathaway and Robert E. Litan that I cite in my essay among many others.)

Which brings us back to the situation in Europe. It seems clear that strong cultural and legal impediments to change exist in many European countries and that they discourage risk-taking and prevent the formation of new ventures. Many of us here in the United States worry about similar impediments and their impact on entrepreneurialism, but as those statistics in Moffett’s article make clear, the situation in Europe is far more grim. While some European policymakers seem willing to acknowledge that the deck has been stacked against innovators across the continent, few seem willing to embrace a comprehensive liberalization agenda to begin clearing away the legal and regulatory impediments that are negatively affecting startups and creating economic stagnation there. The primary reason for that goes back to the values and attitudes problem that Moffett highlighted in his article: When a country or continent’s culture is so deeply averse to risk and the possibility of disruptions or failures, then the exact sort of risk-taking that is so essential to economic growth will become increasingly difficult.

This was the focus of my Cato essay and it is what I meant by embracing a culture of permissionless innovation. As I noted in my essay, “many scholars and policymakers [often] speak of innovation policy as if it is simply a Goldilocks-like formula that entails tweaking various policy dials to get innovation just right,” which leads them to propose an endless litany of programs and policies to jump-start innovation and economic growth. But this puts the cart before the horse. Getting values right first is what really matters. Here is how I put it in my essay:

For innovation and growth to blossom, entrepreneurs need a clear green light from policymakers that signals a general acceptance of risk-taking—especially risk-taking that challenges existing business models and traditional ways of doing things. We can think of this disposition as permissionless innovation and if there was one thing every policymaker could do to help advance long-term growth, it is to first commit themselves to advancing this ethic and making it the lodestar for all their future policy pronouncements and decisions.

While there are limits to how much policymakers can influence these attitudes and values, any serious effort to foster the positive factors that give rise to expanded entrepreneurial opportunities must begin with an appreciation of how growth-oriented innovation policy begins with the proper policy disposition toward risk-taking and the possibility of significant economic and cultural disruption. As I put it in my recent book on the importance  Permissionless Innovation as a vision for innovation and growth, “living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.”

But let’s be clear about what the “permissionless innovation” vision is all about, because it is not the same as anarchy. As I noted in the Cato essay:

Permissionless innovation is not an absolutist position that rejects any role for government. Rather, it is an aspirational goal that stresses the benefit of “innovation allowed” as the default position to begin policy debates. It switches the burden of proof to those who favor preemptive regulation and asks them to explain why ongoing trial-and-error experimentation with new technologies or business models should be disallowed.

Again, it’s about getting attitudes and incentives right. Specifically, it’s about being willing to embrace risk-taking and even failure, because that is the only way you get growth. As the old adage goes, “Nothing ventured, nothing gained.”  And our recent experience with the Internet and the Information Revolution offers the perfect case study of why getting values right and embracing a culture of permissionless innovation matters so much. As I noted in my Cato essay,

permissionless innovation powered the explosive growth of the Internet and America’s information technology sectors (computing, software, Internet services, etc.) over the past two decades. Those sectors have ushered in a generation of innovations and innovators that are now the envy of the world. This happened because the default position for the digital economy was permissionless innovation. No one had to ask anyone for the right to develop these new technologies and platforms.

The U.S. got policy right by getting our values right first. Thanks to a series of very smart pronouncements and decisions in the early and mid-1990s (all detailed in my essay and this Medium essay), digital age entrepreneurs were given a clear green light to take risks without fear of a political backlash.

Unfortunately for European innovators, a different message was sent from the start, with layers of “data directives” and other red tape encumbering new ventures. As a result, it’s hard today to name many innovators in this arena which originated in Europe. Instead, Europe’s household Internet names are mostly American companies. Europe is hoping to reverse that with the rise of the Internet of Things, since many European companies appear poised to become global leaders on that front. For that happen, however, the continent’s attitudes toward risk-taking will have to evolve to accommodate these highly disruptive technologies.

In particular, the Internet of Things will raise a variety of privacy and security-related concern (see my new 93-page paper on this), as well as economic-related fears associated with automation and job disruption. These are serious issues that deserve serious consideration and constructive solutions. But if Europe decides to put the Internet of Things revolution on hold in an attempt to preemptively plan for every theoretical downside, then they will miss the boat again and potentially lose many of the amazing benefits that will accompany these new innovations. Again, if you live in fear of the future, then an innovative future won’t happen. And looking backwards and holding onto the past is no way to grow an economy or achieve long-term prosperity.

How is it that we humans have again and again figured out how to assimilate new technologies into our lives despite how much those technologies “unsettled” so many well-established personal, social, cultural, and legal norms?

In recent years, I’ve spent a fair amount of time thinking through that question in a variety of blog posts (“Are You An Internet Optimist or Pessimist? The Great Debate over Technology’s Impact on Society”), law review articles (“Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle”), opeds (“Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?”), and books (See chapter 4 of my new book, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom”).

It’s fair to say that this issue — how individuals, institutions, and cultures adjust to technological change — has become a personal obsession of mine and it is increasingly the unifying theme of much of my ongoing research agenda. The economic ramifications of technological change are part of this inquiry, of course, but those economic concerns have already been the subject of countless books and essays both today and throughout history. I find that the social issues associated with technological change — including safety, security, and privacy considerations — typically get somewhat less attention, but are equally interesting. That’s why my recent work and my new book narrow the focus to those issues.

Optimistic (“Heaven”) vs. Pessimistic (“Hell”) Scenarios

Modern thinking and scholarship on the impact of technological change on societies has been largely dominated by skeptics and critics.

In the past century, for example, French philosopher Jacques Ellul ( The Technological Society), German historian Oswald Spengler (Man and Technics), and American historian Lewis Mumford (Technics and Civilization) penned critiques of modern technological processes that took a dour view of technological innovation and our collective ability to adapt positively to it. (Concise summaries of their thinking can be found in Christopher May’s edited collection of essays, Key Thinkers for the Information Society.)

These critics worried about the subjugation of humans to “technique” or “technics” and feared that technology and technological processes would come to control us before we learned how to control them. Media theorist Neil Postman was the most notable of the modern information technology critics and served as the bridge between the industrial era critics (like Ellul, Spengler, and Mumford) and some of today’s digital age skeptics (like Evgeny Morozov and Nick Carr). Postman decried the rise of a “technopoly” — “the submission of all forms of cultural life to the sovereignty of technique and technology” — that would destroy “the vital sources of our humanity” and lead to “a culture without a moral foundation” by undermining “certain mental processes and social relations that make human life worth living.” We see that attitude on display in countless works of technological criticism since then.

Of course, there’s been some pushback from some futurists and technological enthusiasts. But there’s often a fair amount of irrational exuberance at work in their tracts and punditry. Many self-proclaimed “futurists” have predicted that various new technologies would produce a nirvana that would overcome human want, suffering, ignorance, and more.

In a 2010 essay, I labeled these two camps technological “pessimists” and “optimists.” It was a crude and overly-simplistic dichotomy, but it was an attempt to begin sketching out a rough taxonomy of the personalities and perspectives that we often seen pitted against each other in debates about the impact of technology on culture and humanity.

Sadly, when I wrote that earlier piece, I was not aware of a similar (and much better) framing of this divide that was developed by science writer Joel Garreau in his terrific 2005 book, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies — and What It Means to Be Human. In that book, Garreau is thinking in much grander terms about technology and the future than I was in my earlier essay. He was focused on how various emerging technologies might be changing our very humanity and he notes that narratives about these issues are typically framed in “Heaven” versus “Hell” scenarios.

Under the “Heaven” scenario, technology drives history relentlessly, and in almost every way for the better. As Garreau describes the beliefs of the Heaven crowd, they believe that going forward, “almost unimaginably good things are happening, including the conquering of disease and poverty, but also an increase in beauty, wisdom, love, truth, and peace.” (p. 130) By contrast, under the “Hell” scenario, “technology is used for extreme evil, threatening humanity with extinction.” (p. 95) Garreau notes that what unifies the Hell scenario theorists is the sense that in “wresting power from the gods and seeking to transcend the human condition,” we end up instead creating a monster — or maybe many different monsters — that threatens our very existence. Garreau says this “Frankenstein Principle” can be seen in countless works of literature and technological criticism throughout history, and it is still very much with us today. (p. 108)

Theories of Collapse: Why Does Doomsaying Dominate Discussions about New Technologies?

Indeed, in examining the way new technologies and inventions have long divided philosophers, scientists, pundits, and the general public, one can find countless examples of that sort of fear and loathing at work. “Armageddon has a long and distinguished history,” Garreau notes. “Theories of progress are mirrored by theories of collapse.” (p. 149)

In that regard, Garreau rightly cites Arthur Herman’s magisterial history of apocalyptic theories, The Idea of Decline in Western History, which documents “declinism” over time. The irony of much of this pessimistic declinist thinking, Herman notes, is that:

In effect, the very things modern society does best — providing increasing economic affluence, equality of opportunity, and social and geographic mobility — are systematically deprecated and vilified by its direct beneficiaries. None of this is new or even remarkable.” (p. 442)

Why is that? Why has the “Hell” scenario been such a dominant reoccurring theme in past writing and commentary throughout history, even though the general trend has been steady improvements in human health, welfare, and convenience?

There must be something deeply rooted in the human psyche that accounts for this tendency. As I have discussed in my new book as well as my big “Technopanics” law review article, our innate tendency to be pessimistic but also want to be certain about the future means that “the gloom-mongers have it easy,” as author Dan Gardner argues in his book, Future Babble: Why Expert Predictions Are Next to Worthless, and You Can Do Better. He continues on to note of the techno-doomsday pundits:

Their predictions are supported by our intuitive pessimism, so they feel right to us. And that conclusion is bolstered by our attraction to certainty. As strange as it sounds, we want to believe the expert predicting a dark future is exactly right, because knowing that the future will be dark is less tormenting than suspecting it. Certainty is always preferable to uncertainty, even when what’s certain is disaster. (p. 140-1)

Similarly, in his new book, Smarter Than You Think: How Technology Is Changing Our Minds for the Better, Clive Thompson notes that “dystopian predictions are easy to generate” and “doomsaying is emotionally self-protective: if you complain that today’s technology is wrecking the culture, you can tell yourself you’re a gimlet-eyed critic who isn’t hoodwinked by high-tech trends and silly, popular activities like social networking. You seem like someone who has a richer, deeper appreciation for the past and who stands above the triviality of today’s life.” (p. 283)

Another explanation is that humans are sometimes very poor judges of the relative risks to themselves or those close to them. Harvard University psychology professor Steven Pinker, author of The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, notes:

The mind is more comfortable in reckoning probabilities in terms of the relative frequency of remembered or imagined events. That can make recent and memorable events—a plane crash, a shark attack, an anthrax infection—loom larger in one’s worry list than more frequent and boring events, such as the car crashes and ladder falls that get printed beneath the fold on page B14. And it can lead risk experts to speak one language and ordinary people to hear another. (p. 232)

Put simply, there exists a wide variety of explanations for why our collective first reaction to new technologies often is one of dystopian dread. In my work, I have identified several other factors, including: generational differences; hyper-nostalgia; media sensationalism; special interest pandering to stoke fears and sell products or services; elitist attitudes among intellectuals; and the so-called “third-person effect hypothesis,” which posits that when some people encounter perspectives or preferences at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and to call on government to “do something” to correct or counter those perspectives or preferences.

Some combination of these factors ends up driving the initial resistance we have see to new technologies that disrupted long-standing social norms, traditions, and institutions. In the extreme, it results in that gloom-and-doom, sky-is-falling disposition in which we are repeatedly told how humanity is about to be steam-rolled by some new invention or technological development.

The “Prevail” (or “Muddling Through”) Scenario

“The good news is that end-of-the-world predictions have been around for a very long time, and none of them has yet borne fruit,” Garreau reminds us. (p. 148) Why not? Let’s get back to his framework for the answer. After discussing the “Heaven” (optimistic) and “Hell” (skeptical or pessimistic) scenarios cast about by countless tech writers throughout history, Garreau outlines a third, and more pragmatic “Prevail” option, which views history “as a remarkably effective paean to the power of humans to muddle through extraordinary circumstances.”

That pretty much sums up my own perspective on things, and in the remainder of this essay I want sketch out the reasons why I think the “prevail” or “muddling through” scenario offers the best explanation for how we learn to cope with technological disruption and prosper in the process.

As Garreau explains it, under the “Prevail” scenario, “humans shape and adapt [technology] in entirely new directions.” (p. 95) “Just because the problems are increasing doesn’t mean solutions might not also be increasing to match them,” he rightly notes. (p. 154) As John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid noted in their excellent 2001, “ Response to Bill Joy and the Doom-and-Gloom Technofuturists”:

technological and social systems shape each other. The same is true on a larger scale. […] Technology and society are constantly forming and reforming new dynamic equilibriums with far-reaching implications. The challenge for futurology (and for all of us) is to see beyond the hype and past the over-simplifications to the full import of these new sociotechnical formations.  Social and technological systems do not develop independently; the two evolve together in complex feedback loops, wherein each drives, restrains and accelerates change in the other.

It is this process of “constantly forming and reforming new dynamic equilibriums” that interests me most. In a recent exchange with Michael Sacasas – one of the most thoughtful modern technology critics I’ve come across — I noted that the nature of individual and societal acclimation to technological change is worthy of serious investigation if for no other reason that it has continuously happened! What I hope to better understand is the process by which we humans have again and again figured out how to assimilate new technologies into their lives despite how much those technologies disrupted our personal, social, economic, cultural, and legal norms.

In a response to me, Sacasas put forth the following admonition: “That people eventually acclimate to changes precipitated by the advent of a new technology does not prove that the changes were inconsequential or benign.” This is undoubtedly true, but it does not undermine the reality of societal adaptation. What can we learn from this? What were the mechanics of that adaptive process? As social norms, personal habits, and human relationships were disrupted, what helped us muddle through and find a way of coping with new technologies? Likewise, as existing markets and business models were disrupted, how were new ones formulated in response to the given technological disruption? Finally, how did legal norms and institutions adjust to those same changes?

Of course, this raises an entirely different issue: What metrics are we using to judge whether “the changes were inconsequential or benign”? As I noted in my exchange with Sacasas, at the end of the day, it may be that we won’t be able to even agree on a standard by which to make that judgment and will instead have to settle for a rough truce about what history has to teach us that might be summed up by the phrase: “something gained, something lost.”

Resiliency: Why Do the Skeptics Never Address It (and Its Benefits)?

Nonetheless, I believe that while technological change often brings sweeping and quite consequential change, there is great value in the very act of living through it.

In my work, including my latest little book, I argue that humans have exhibited the uncanny ability to adapt to changes in their environment, bounce back from adversity, and learn to be resilient over time. A great deal of wisdom is born of experience, including experiences that involve risk and the possibility of occasional mistakes and failures while both developing new technologies and learning how to live with them. I believe it wise to continue to be open to new forms of innovation and technological change, not only because it provides breathing space for future entrepreneurialism and invention, but also because it provides an opportunity to see how societal attitudes toward new technologies evolve — and to learn from it. More often than not, I argue, citizens have found ways to adapt to technological change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms, new norms, or other creative fixes.

What we’re talking about here is resiliency. Andrew Zolli and Ann Marie Healy, authors of Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back, define resilience as “the capacity of a system, enterprise, or a person to maintain its core purpose and integrity in the face of dramatically changed circumstances.” (p. 7) “To improve your resilience,” they note, “is to enhance your ability to resist being pushed from your preferred valley, while expanding the range of alternatives that you can embrace if you need to. This is what researchers call preserving adaptive capacity—the ability to adapt to changed circumstances while fulfilling once core purpose—and it’s an essential skill in an age of unforeseeable disruption and volatility.” (p. 7-8, emphasis in original) Moreover, they note, “by encouraging adaptation, agility, cooperation, connectivity, and diversity, resilience-thinking can bring us to a different way of being in the world, and to a deeper engagement with it.” (p. 16)

Even if you one doesn’t agree with all of that, again, I would think one would find great value in studying the process by which such adaptation happens precisely because it does happen so regularly. And then we could argue about whether it was all really worth it! Specially, was it worth whatever we lost in the process (i.e., a change in our old moral norms, our old privacy norms, our old institutions, our old business models, our old laws, or whatever else)?

As Sacasas correctly argues, “That people before us experienced similar problems does not mean that they magically cease being problems today.” Again, quite right. On the other hand, the fact that people and institutions learned to cope with those concerns and become more resilient over time is worthy of serious investigation because somehow we “muddled through” before and we’ll have to muddle through again. And, again, what we learned from living through that process may be extremely valuable in its own right.

Of Course, Muddling Through Isn’t Always Easy

Now, let’s be honest about this process of “muddling through”: it isn’t always neat or pretty. To put it crudely, sometimes muddling through really sucks! Think about the modern technologies that violate our visceral sense of privacy and personal space today. I am an intensely private person and if I had a life motto it would probably be: “ Leave Me Alone!” Yet, sometimes there’s just no escaping the pervasive reach of modern technologies and processes. On the other hand, I know that, like so many others, I derive amazing benefits from all these new technologies, too. So, like most everyone else I put up with the downsides because, on net, there are generally more upsides.

Almost every digital service that we use today presents us with these trade-offs. For example, email has allowed us to connect with a constantly growing universe of our fellow humans and organizations. Yet, spam clutters our mailboxes and the sheer volume of email we get sometimes overwhelms us. Likewise, in just the past five years, smartphones have transformed our lives in so many ways for the better in terms of not just personal convenience but also personal safety. On the other hand, smartphones have become more than a bit of nuisance in certain environments (theaters, restaurants, and other closed spaces.) And they also put our safety at risk when we use them while driving automobiles.

But, again, we adjust to most of these new realities and then we find constructive solutions to the really hard problems – yes, and that sometimes includes legal remedies to rectify serious harms. But a certain amount of social adaptation will, nonetheless, be required. Law can only slightly slow that inevitability; it can’t stop it entirely. And as messy and uncomfortable as muddling through can be, we have to (a) be aware of what we gain in the process and (b) ask ourselves what the cost of taking the alternative path would be. Attempts to through a wrench in the works and derail new innovations or delay various types of technological change are always going to be tempting, but such interventions will come at a very steep cost: less entreprenurialism, diminished competition, stagnant markets, higher prices, and fewer choices for citizens. As I note in my new book, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon such fears — it means that many best-case scenarios will never come about.

Social Resistance / Pressure Dynamics

There’s another part to this story that often gets overlooked. “Muddling through” isn’t just some sort of passive process where individuals and institutions have to figure out how to cope with technological change. Rather, there is an active dynamic at work, too. Individuals and institutions push back and actively shape their tools and systems.

In a recent Wired essay on public attitudes about emerging technologies such as the controversial Google Glass, Issie Lapowsky noted that:

If the stigma surrounding Google Glass (or, perhaps more specifically, “Glassholes”) has taught us anything, it’s that no matter how revolutionary technology may be, ultimately its success or failure ride on public perception. Many promising technological developments have died because they were ahead of their times. During a cultural moment when the alleged arrogance of some tech companies is creating a serious image problem, the risk of pushing new tech on a public that isn’t ready could have real bottom-line consequences.

In my new book, I spend some time think about this process of “norm-shaping” through social pressure, activist efforts, educational steps, and even public shaming. A recent Ars Technica essay by Joe Silver offered some powerful examples of how when “shamed on Twitter, corporations do an about-face.” Silver notes that “A few recent case-study examples of individuals who felt they were wronged by corporations and then took to the Twitterverse to air their grievances show how a properly placed tweet can be a powerful weapon for consumers to combat corporate malfeasance.” In my book and in recent law review articles, I have provided other examples how this works at both a corporate and individual level to constrain improper behavior and protect various social norms.

Edmund Burke once noted that, “Manners are of more importance than laws. Manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe in.” Cristina Bicchieri, a leading behavioral ethicist, calls social norms “the grammar of society” because,

like a collection of linguistic rules that are implicit in a language and define it, social norms are implicit in the operations of a society and make it what it is. Like a grammar, a system of norms specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a social group. And analogously to a grammar, a system of norms is not the product of human design and planning.

Put simply, more than law can regulate behavior — whether it is organizational behavior or individual behavior. It’s yet another way we learn to cope and “muddle through” over time. Again, check out my book for several other examples.

A Case Study: The Long-Standing “Problem” of Photography

Let’s bring all this together and be more concrete about it by using a case study: photography. With all the talk of how unsettling various modern technological developments are, they really pale in comparison to just how jarring the advent of widespread public photography must have been in the late 1800s and beyond. “For the first time photographs of people could be taken without their permission—perhaps even without their knowledge,” notes Lawrence M. Friedman in his 2007 book, Guiding Life’s Dark Secrets: Legal and Social Controls over Reputation, Propriety, and Privacy.

Thus, the camera was viewed as a highly disruptive force as photography became more widespread. In fact, the most important essay ever written on privacy law, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’s famous 1890 Harvard Law Review essay on “The Right to Privacy,” decried the spread of public photography. The authors lamented that “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” and claimed that “numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”

Warren and Brandeis weren’t alone. Plenty of other critics existed and many average citizens were probably outraged by the rise of cameras and public photography. Yet, personal norms and cultural attitudes toward cameras and public photography evolved quite rapidly and they became ingrained in human experience. At the same time, social norms and etiquette evolved to address those who would use cameras in inappropriate, privacy-invasive ways.

Again, we muddled through. And we’ve had to continuously muddle through in this regard because photography presents us with a seemingly endless set of new challenges. As cameras grow still smaller and get integrated into other technologies (most recently, smartphones, wearable technologies, and private drones), we’ve had to learn to adjust and accommodate. With wearables technologies (check out Narrative, Butterflye, and Autographer, for example), personal drones (see “Drones are the future of selfies,”) and other forms of microphotography all coming online now, we’ll have to adjust still more and develop new norms and coping mechanisms. There’s never going to be an end to this adjustment process.

Toward Pragmatic Optimism

Should we really remain bullish about humanity’s prospects in the midst of all this turbulent change? I think so.

Again, long before the information revolution took hold, the industrial revolution produced its share of cultural and economic backlashes, and it is still doing so today. Most notably, many Malthusian skeptics and environmental critics lamented the supposed strain of population growth and industrialization on social and economic life. Catastrophic predictions followed.

In his 2007 book, Prophecies of Doom and Scenarios of Progress, Paul Dragos Aligicia, a colleague of mine at the Mercatus Center, documented many of these industrial era “prophecies of doom” and described how this “doomsday ideology” was powerfully critiqued by a handful of scholars — most notably Herman Kahn and Julian Simon. Aligicia explains that Kahn and Simon argued for, “the alternative paradigm, the pro-growth intellectual tradition that rejected the prophecies of doom and called for realism and pragmatism in dealing with the challenge of the future.”

Kahn and Simon were pragmatic optimists or what author Matt Ridley calls “rational optimists.” They were bullish about the future and the prospects for humanity, but they were not naive regarding the many economic and scosial challenges associated with technological change. Like Kahn and Simon, we should embrace the amazing technological changes at work in today’s information age but with a healthy dose of humility and appreciation for the disruptive impact and pace of that change.

But the rational optimists never get as much attention as the critics and catastrophists. “For 200 years pessimists have had all the headlines even though optimists have far more often been right,” observes Ridley. “Arch-pessimists are feted, showered with honors and rarely challenged, let alone confronted with their past mistakes.” At least part of the reason for that, as already noted, goes back to the amazing rhetorical power of good intentions. Techno-pessimists often exhibit a deep passion about their particular cause and are typically given more than just the benefit of doubt in debates about progress and the future; they are treated as superior to opponents who challenge their perspectives or proposals. When a privacy advocate says they are just looking out consumers, or an online safety claims they have the best interests of children in mind, or a consumer advocate argues that regulation is needed to protect certain people from some amorphous harm, they are assuming the moral high ground through the assertion of noble-minded intentions. Even if their proposals will often fail to bring about the better state of affairs they claim or derail life-enriching innovations, they are more easily forgiven for those mistakes precisely because of their fervent claim of noble-minded intentions.

If intentions are allowed to trump empiricism and a general openness to change, however, the results for a free society and for human progress will be profoundly deleterious. That is why, when confronted with pessimistic, fear-based arguments, the pragmatic optimist must begin by granting that the critics clearly have the best of intentions, but then point out how intentions can only get us so far in the real-world, which is full of complex trade-offs.

The pragmatic optimist must next meticulously and dispassionately outline the many reasons why restricting progress or allowing planning to enter the picture will have many unintended consequences and hidden costs. The trade-offs must be explained in clear terms. Examples of previous interventions that went wrong must be proffered.

The Evidence Speaks for Itself

Luckily, we pragmatic optimists have plenty of evidence working in our favor when making this case. As Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Richard Rhodes noted in his 1999 book, Visions of Technology: A Century of Vital Debate About Machines Systems And The Human World:

it’s surprising that [many intellectual] don’t value technology; by any fair assessment, it has reduced suffering and improved welfare across the past hundred years. Why doesn’t this net balance of benevolence inspire at least grudging enthusiasm for technology among intellectuals? (p. 23)

Great question, and one that we should never stop asking the techno-critics to answer. After all, as Joel Mokyr notes in his wonderful 1990 book, Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, “Without [technological creativity], we would all still live nasty and short lives of toil, drudgery, and discomfort.” (p. viii) “Technological progress, in that sense, is worthy of its name,” he says. “It has led to something that we may call an ‘achievement,’ namely the liberation of a substantial portion of humanity from the shackles of subsistence living.” (p. 288) Specifically,

The riches of the post-industrial society have meant longer and healthier lives, liberation from the pains of hunger, from the fears of infant mortality, from the unrelenting deprivation that were the part of all but a very few in preindustrial society. The luxuries and extravagances of the very rich in medieval society pale compared to the diet, comforts, and entertainment available to the average person in Western economies today. (p. 303)

In his new book, Smaller Faster Lighter Denser Cheaper: How Innovation Keeps Proving the Catastrophists Wrong, Robert Bryce hammers this point home when he observes that:

The pessimistic worldview ignores an undeniable truth: more people are living longer, healthier, freer, more peaceful, lives than at any time in human history… the plain reality is that things are getting better, a lot better, for tens of millions of people around the world. Dozens of factors can be cited for the improving conditions of humankind. But the simplest explanation is that innovation is allowing us to do more with less.

This is framework Herman Kahn, Julian Simon, and the other champions of progress used to deconstruct and refute the pessimists of previous eras. In line with that approach, we modern pragmatic optimists must continuously point to the unappreciated but unambiguous benefits of technological innovation and dynamic change. But we should also continue to remind the skeptics of the amazing adaptability of the human species in the face of adversity. As Kahn taught us long ago, is that when it comes to technological progress and humanity’s ingenious responses to it, “we should expect to go on being surprised” — and in mostly positive ways. Humans have consistently responded to technological change in creative, and sometimes completely unexpected ways. There’s no reason to think we can’t get through modern technological disruptions using similar coping and adaptation strategies. As Mokyr noted in his recent City Journal essay on “The Next Age of Invention”:

Much like medication, technological progress almost always has side effects, but bad side effects are rarely a good reason not to take medication and a very good reason to invest in the search for second-generation drugs. To a large extent, technical innovation is a form of adaptation—not only to externally changing circumstances but also to previous adaptations.

In sum, we need to have a little faith in the ability of humanity to adjust to an uncertain future, no matter what it throws at us. We’ll muddle through and come out better because of what we have learned in the process, just as we have so many times before.

I’ll give venture capitalist Marc Andreessen the last word on this since he’s been on an absolute tear on Twitter lately when discussing many of the issues I’ve raised in this essay. While addressing the particular fear that automation is running amuck and that robots will eat all our jobs, Andreessen eloquently noted:

We have no idea what the fields, industries, businesses, and jobs of the future will be. We just know we will create an enormous number of them. Because if robots and AI replace people for many of the things we do today, the new fields we create will be built on the huge number of people those robots and AI systems made available. To argue that huge numbers of people will be available but we will find nothing for them (us) to do is to dramatically short human creativity. And I am way long human creativity.

Me too, buddy. Me too.

Additional Reading:

Journal articles & book chapters:

• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 14 (2013): 309–86.
• “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 1: Saving the Net from Its Detractors,” in The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet, ed.Berin Szoka and Adam Marcus (Washington, DC:Tech Freedom, 2010), 57–87.
• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36 (2013): 409–55.
• “Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem,” Maine Law Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2014): 467-86.

Blog posts:

• “Are You An Internet Optimist or Pessimist? The Great Debate over Technology’s Impact on Society,” Technology Liberation Front, January 31, 2010.
• “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” Technology Liberation Front, March 4, 2013.
• “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• “Planning for Hypothetical Horribles in Tech Policy Debates,” Technology Liberation Front, August 6, 2013.
• “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013.
• “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?” Forbes, January 8, 2012.
• “The Six Things That Drive ‘Technopanics,’” Forbes, March 4, 2012.
• “10 Things Our Kids Will Never Worry about Thanks to the Information Revolution,” Forbes, December 18, 2011.

I’ve spent a lot of time here through the years trying to identify the factors that fuel moral panics and “technopanics.” (Here’s a compendium of the dozens of essays I’ve written here on this topic.) I brought all this thinking together in a big law review article (“Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle”) and then also in my new booklet, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.”

One factor I identify as contributing to panics is the fact that “bad news sells.” As I noted in the book, “Many media outlets and sensationalist authors sometimes use fear-based tactics to gain influence or sell books. Fear mongering and prophecies of doom are always effective media tactics; alarmism helps break through all the noise and get heard.”

In line with that, I want to highly recommend you check out this excellent new oped by John Stossel of Fox Business Network on “Good News vs. ‘Pessimism Porn‘.”  Stossel correctly notes that “the media win by selling pessimism porn.” He says:

Are you worried about the future? It’s hard not to be. If you watch the news, you mostly see violence, disasters, danger. Some in my business call it “fear porn” or “pessimism porn.” People like the stuff; it makes them feel alive and informed. Of course, it’s our job to tell you about problems. If a plane crashes — or disappears — that’s news. The fact that millions of planes arrive safely is a miracle, but it’s not news. So we soak in disasters — and warnings about the next one: bird flu, global warming, potential terrorism. I won Emmys hyping risks but stopped winning them when I wised up and started reporting on the overhyping of risks. My colleagues didn’t like that as much.

He continues on to note how, even though all the data clearly proves that humanity’s lot is improving, the press relentlessly push the “pessimism porn.” He argues that “time and again, humanity survived doomsday. Not just survived, we flourish.” But that doesn’t stop the doomsayers from predicting that the sky is always set to fall. In particular, the press knows they can easily gin up more readers and viewers by amping up the fear-mongering and featuring loonies who will be all too happy to play the roles of pessimism porn stars. Of course, plenty of academics, activists, non-profit organizations and even companies are all too eager to contribute to this gloom-and-doom game since they benefit from the exposure or money it generates.

The problem with all this, of course, is that it perpetuates societal fears and distrust. It also sometimes leads to misguided policies based on hypothetical worst-case thinking. As I argue in my new book, which Stossel was kind enough to cite in his essay, if we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about.

Facts, not fear, should guide our thinking about the future.

______________________

Related Reading:

• Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum (July 15, 2012)
• How & Why the Press Sometimes “Sells Digital Fear” (April 8, 2012)
• danah boyd’s “Culture of Fear” Talk (March 26, 2012)
• Prophecies of Doom & the Politics of Fear in Cybersecurity Debates (Aug. 8., 2011)
• Cybersecurity Threat Inflation Watch: Blood-Sucking Weapons! (March 22, 2012)

Tomorrow, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will host an all-day workshop entitled, “Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World.” [Detailed agenda here.] According to the FTC: “The workshop will focus on privacy and security issues related to increased connectivity for consumers, both in the home (including home automation, smart home appliances and connected devices), and when consumers are on the move (including health and fitness devices, personal devices, and cars).”

Where is the FTC heading on this front? This Politico story by Erin Mershon from last week offers some possible ideas. Yet, it still remains unclear whether this is just another inquiry into an exciting set of new technologies or if it is, as I worried in my recent comments to the FTC on this matter, “the beginning of a regulatory regime for a new set of information technologies that are still in their infancy.”

First, for those not familiar with the “Internet of Things,” this short new report from Daniel Castro & Jordan Misra of the Center for Data Innovation offers a good definition:

The “Internet of Things” refers to the concept that the Internet is no longer just a global network for people to communicate with one another using computers, but it is also a platform or devices to communicate electronically with the world around them. The result is a world that is alive with information as data flows from one device to another and is shared and reused for a multitude of purposes. Harnessing the potential of all of this data for economic and social good will be one of the primary challenges and opportunities of the coming decades.

The report continues on to offer a wide range of examples of new products and services that could fulfill this promise.

What I find somewhat worrying about the FTC’s sudden interest in the Internet of Things is that it opens to the door for some regulatory-minded critics to encourage preemptive controls on this exciting new wave of digital age innovation, based almost entirely on hypothetical worst-case scenarios they have conjured up. And plenty of those boogeyman scenarios are floating around already because the Internet of Things has created a potential perfect storm of four major information policy concerns: online safety, privacy, security, and even intellectual property issues. You can find concerned critics from each of those quarters already wringing their hands about what the Internet of Things means for their pet issues.

This is why in both my filing to the agency and in an upcoming eBook, I discuss the danger of letting “precautionary principle” reasoning trump the alternative paradigm of “permissionless innovation.” As I’ve explained here before as well in this longer law review article, the precautionary principle generally holds that, because a given new technology could pose some theoretical danger or risk in the future, public policies should control or limit the development of such innovations until their creators can prove that they won’t cause any harms.

The problem with letting such precautionary thinking guide policy is that it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, and human prosperity. Under an information policy regime guided at every turn by a precautionary principle, technological innovation would be impossible because of fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios would trump all other considerations. Social learning and economic opportunities become far less likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

For these reasons, to the maximum extent possible, the default position toward new forms of technological innovation should be innovation allowed. This policy norm is better captured in the well-known Internet ideal of “permissionless innovation,” or the general freedom to experiment and learn through trial-and-error experimentation.

Which leads back to the FTC workshop tomorrow. Which path will the agency head down? If the recent comments of FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez are any indication, there is certainly a healthy appetite for precautionary principle policymaking, at least as it pertains to “big data.” As I noted here in a critique of one of her recent speeches, Chairwoman Ramirez has offered “a rather succinct articulation of precautionary principle thinking as applied to modern data collection practices.”

She worried that “‘big data’ leads to the indiscriminate collection of personal information,” and that “the indiscriminate collection of data violates the First Commandment of data hygiene: Thou shall not collect and hold onto personal information unnecessary to an identified purpose. Keeping data on the offchance that it might prove useful is not consistent with privacy best practices,” she continued, and she went on to argue that “Information that is not collected in the first place can’t be misused” and then suggests a parade of horribles that will befall if such data collection is allowed at all.  So, it would not be surprising to see her extend that sort of precautionary reasoning to the Internet of Things since all those fears would apply equally to it.

A better approach can be found in some remarks delivered by Ramirez’s fellow FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen. In an important speech last month entitled, “The Internet of Things and the FTC: Does Innovation Require Intervention?” Ohlhausen noted that, “The success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the freedom to experiment with different business models, the best of which have survived and thrived, even in the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and competitors.” This reflects Ohlhausen’s general embrace of permissionless innovation reasoning and a rejection of the precautionary principle mindset articulated by FTC Chairwoman Ramirez.

More importantly, in her speech, Commissioner Ohlhausen went on to highlight another crucial point about why the precautionary mindset is dangerous when enshrined into laws or regulations. Put simply, many elites and regulatory advocates ignore regulator irrationality or regulatory ignorance. That is, they spend so much time focused on the supposed irrationality of consumers and their openness to persuasion or “manipulation” that they ignore the more concerning problem of the  irrationality or ignorance of those who (incorrectly) believe they are always in the best position to solve every complex problem. Regulators simply do not possess the requisite knowledge to perfectly plan for every conceivable outcome. This is particularly true for information technology markets, which generally evolve much more rapidly than other sectors, and especially more rapidly that law itself.

That insight leads Ohlhausen to issue a wise word of caution to her fellow regulators:

It is [] vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technologies with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and others about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the marketplace, identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider whether existing laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before assuming that new rules are required.

That is absolutely right and this again makes it clears how Commissioner Ohlhausen’s approach to technological innovation is consistent with the permissionless innovation approach while Chairwoman Ramirez’s is based on precautionary principle thinking. This conflict of visions dominates almost all policy debates over new technology today, even if it is not always on such vivid display as it is in this case.

This also makes it abundantly clear just what is at stake as the FTC embarks on its exploration of the Internet of Things. Will we continue to embrace and defend the philosophy that made America’s digital economy the envy of the world (i.e., “permissionless innovation”), or will we be paralyzed by fear of the unknown and hypothetical worst-case scenarios.  As I have said here many times before, living in constant fear of such worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon them — means that best-cast scenarios will never come about.

So, stay tuned. The fight over the Internet of Things promises to be one of the most important public policy battles in the technology policy arena for many years to come.

This issue will be the focus of my forthcoming eBook, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom,” but until that is released, here are a few other recommended readings on the topic:

Blog posts:

• “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” Technology Liberation Front, March 4, 2013.
• “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• “Planning for Hypothetical Horribles in Tech Policy Debates,” Technology Liberation Front, August 6, 2013.
• “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.
• “Edith Ramirez’s ‘Big Data’ Speech: Privacy Concerns Prompt Precautionary Principle Thinking,” Technology Liberation Front, August 29, 2013.
• “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed,” Technology Liberation Front, April 29, 2011.
• “Copyright, Privacy, Property Rights & Information Control: Common Themes, Common Challenges,” Technology Liberation Front, April 10, 2012.
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013.

Testimony / Filings:

• Senate Testimony on Privacy, Data Collection & Do Not Track, April 24, 2013
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FTC in Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things, May 31, 2013.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to FAA on commercial domestic drones (with Jerry Brito and Eli Dourado) , April 23, 2013.

Journal articles & book chapters:

• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, (2013): 309-386.
• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36, (2013): 409-455.
• “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates ,” George Mason University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 2013): 1055-1105.

Christopher Wolf, director of the law firm Hogan Lovells’ Privacy and Information Management group, addresses his new book with co-author Abraham Foxman, Viral Hate: Containing Its Spread on the Internet. To what extent do hateful or mean-spirited Internet users hide behind anonymity? How do we balance the protection of the First Amendment online while addressing the spread of hate speech? Wolf discusses how to define hate speech on the Internet; whether online hate speech leads to real-world violence; how news sites like the Huffington Post and New York Times have dealt with anonymity; lessons we should impart on the next generation of Internet users to discourage hate speech; and cases where anonymity has proved particularly beneficial or valuable.

Download

Related Links

• Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet, Amazon
• About Christopher Wolf, Future of Privacy
• Christopher Wolf Biography, Huffington Post

In a recent essay here “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” I made the argument that “We cannot possibly plan for all the ‘bad butterfly-effects’ that might occur, and attempts to do so will result in significant sacrifices in terms of social and economic liberty.” It was a response to a problem I see at work in many tech policy debates today: With increasing regularity, scholars, activists, and policymakers are conjuring up a seemingly endless parade of horribles that will befall humanity unless “steps are taken” to preemptive head-off all the hypothetical harms they can imagine. (This week’s latest examples involve the two hottest technopanic topics du jour: the Internet of Things and commercial delivery drones. Fear and loathing, and plenty of “threat inflation,” are on vivid display.)

I’ve written about this phenomenon at even greater length in my recent law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” as well as in two lengthy blog posts asking the questions, “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” and “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” The key point I try to get across in those essays is that letting such “precautionary principle” thinking guide policy poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity. If public policy is guided at every turn by the precautionary mindset then innovation becomes impossible because of fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios trump all other considerations. Social learning and economic opportunities become far less likely under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Indeed, if we live in constant fear of the future and become paralyzed by every boogeyman scenario that our creative little heads can conjure up, then we’re bound to end up looking as silly as this classic 2005 parody from The Onion, “Everything That Can Go Wrong Listed.” It joked that “A worldwide consortium of scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers is nearing the completion of the ambitious, decade-long project of cataloging everything that can go wrong.” The goal of the project was to create a “catalog of every possible unfortunate scenario” such that, “every hazardous possibility will be known to man.” Here was the hilarious fake snippet of the imaginary page 55,623 of the project:

I loved the story’s concluding quote from obviously fake Popular Science writer Brian Dyce, who said:

“Within a decade, laypeople might be able to log onto the Internet or go to their public library and consult volumes listing the myriad things that could go wrong,” Dyce said. “It could prove a very valuable research tool or preventative stopgap. For example, if you’re shopping for a car, you can prepare yourself by boning up on the 98,627 bad things that could happen during the purchasing process. This project could have deep repercussions on the way people make decisions, and also the amount of time they spend locked in their bedrooms.”

So, in the spirit of keeping people locked in their bedrooms, cowering in fear of hypothetical horribles, I have started a list of things we must all live in fear of and plan for! (I actually pulled most of these from articles and essays in my Evernote files that I tagged with the words “fear,” “panic.” and “dread.” I have collected more things than I can count.)  Anyway, please feel free to add your own suggestions down below in the comments.

• Without beefed-up cybersecurity regulations, we’ll face an “electronic Pearl Harbor.”
• Without pervasive NSA & law enforcement snooping, we face “the next 9/11.”
• An unfiltered Internet experience will lead the next generation to become nymphomaniacs and sex-starved freaks.
• Social networking sites are a “predators’ playground” where sex perverts prey on children.
• Twitter and texting will lead to the end of reading and/or long-form writing.
• Personalized digital services will lead to an online echo-chamber (“filter bubbles”) and potentially even the death of deliberative democracy.
• Robots are going to take all our jobs and then turn us into their slaves.
• 3D printing will destroy manufacturing jobs and innovation.
• Strong crypto will just let the bad guys hide their secrets and nefarious plots from us.
• Bitcoin will just lead to every teenager buying illegal drugs online.
• Hackers will hijack my car’s electronic systems and force it to drive off a bridge with me inside.
• Hackers are just going to remotely hack all those new medical devices I might use and give me a heart attack or aneurism.
• Hackers are just going to remotely hack my home and all its “smart devices” and then shut down all my stuff or spy on me.
• Geolocation technology is only going to empower perverts and stalkers to harass women.
• Targeted online ads just brainwash us into buying things we don’t need and will lead to massive discrimination.
• Big Data and the “quantified self” movement are just going to lead to massive social and economic discrimination.
• Violent video games are teaching our kids to be killers and will lead to a massive spike in murders and violent crime.
• Facebook is a “monopoly” and “public utility” from which there is no escape if you want to have an online existence.
• Google Glass will mean everybody will just take pictures of me naked in the gym locker room.
• Wearable technology will lead to a massive peer-to-peer Panopticon.
• Commercial drones are going to fall from the sky and kill us (if they don’t zap us with lasers or death rays first).

Hey, it could all happen, right?!  Therefore, as The Onion proposed, we must “catalog every possible unfortunate scenario” such that “every hazardous possibility will be known to man” and then plan, plan, PLAN, P-L-A-N accordingly!

Alternatively, we could realize that, again and again, humans have shown the remarkable ability to gradually adapt to new technologies and assimilate them into their lives through trial-and-error experimentation, the evolution of norms, and the development of coping mechanisms. It’s called resiliency. It happens. We live, we learn, we move on.

Washington Post columnist Robert J. Samuelson published an astonishing essay today entitled, “Beware the Internet and the Danger of Cyberattacks.” In the print edition of today’s Post, the essay actually carries a different title: “Is the Internet Worth It?” Samuelson’s answer is clear: It isn’t. He begins his breathless attack on the Internet by proclaiming:

If I could, I would repeal the Internet. It is the technological marvel of the age, but it is not — as most people imagine — a symbol of progress. Just the opposite. We would be better off without it. I grant its astonishing capabilities: the instant access to vast amounts of information, the pleasures of YouTube and iTunes, the convenience of GPS and much more. But the Internet’s benefits are relatively modest compared with previous transformative technologies, and it brings with it a terrifying danger: cyberwar.

And then, after walking through a couple of worst-case hypothetical scenarios, he concludes the piece by saying:

the Internet’s social impact is shallow. Imagine life without it. Would the loss of e-mail, Facebook or Wikipedia inflict fundamental change? Now imagine life without some earlier breakthroughs: electricity, cars, antibiotics. Life would be radically different. The Internet’s virtues are overstated, its vices understated. It’s a mixed blessing — and the mix may be moving against us.

What I found most troubling about this is that Samuelson has serious intellectual chops and usually sweats the details in his analysis of other issues. He understands economic and social trade-offs and usually does a nice job weighing the facts on the ground instead of engaging in the sort of shallow navel-gazing and anecdotal reasoning that many other weekly newspaper columnist engage in on a regular basis.

But that’s not what he does here. His essay comes across as a poorly researched, angry-old-man-shouting-at-the-sky sort of rant. There’s no serious cost-benefit analysis at work here; just the banal assertion that a new technology has created new vulnerabilities.  Really, that’s the extent of the logic at work here. Samuelson could have just as well substituted the automobile, airplanes, or any other modern technology for the Internet and drawn the same conclusion: It opens the door to new vulnerabilities (especially national security vulnerabilities) and, therefore, we would be better off without it in our lives.

Samuelson does admit that “Life would be radically different… without some earlier breakthroughs: electricity, cars, antibiotics,” so it is obvious he thinks their benefits outweigh their costs. But I could just as well say that new technologies such as cars and planes bring death and destruction, both in the theater of war and in everyday life. So, one might conclude of modern transportation technology that the “virtues are overstated, its vices understated. It’s a mixed blessing — and the mix may be moving against us,” just as Samuelson concludes of the Net.  Of course, such an assertion would be absurd without reference to the many benefits that accrue to us from these technologies. I don’t think I need to cite them all here. But Samuelson is certainly a sharp enough guy that he would engage in such a cost-benefit analysis if someone made such an assertion about other technologies.

When it comes to the Internet, however, all he can say about benefits is that “the instant access to vast amounts of information, the pleasures of YouTube and iTunes, the convenience of GPS and much more.” (GPS? Really? Strictly speaking, that’s not an Internet technology, Bob. But perhaps you have something against satellite technology, too! Looking forward to your column, “Is Satellite Communication Worth It?”)

Of course the first benefit of the Internet that Samuelson cites — “instant access to vast amounts of information” — is nothing to sneeze at! The fact that he so casually dismisses that benefit is rather troubling. For the vast majority of civilization, humans have lived in a what we might think of as a state of extreme information poverty. Today, by contrast, we are blessed to live in amazing times. An entire planet of ubiquitous, instantly accessible media and information is now at our fingertips. We are able to share culture and engage with others — both socially and commercially — in ways that were unthinkable and impossible even just a few decades ago.

It’s hard to quantify the benefits associated with these facts, but I would think most of us would agree they are enormous. But it’s hardly the only sort of benefit that comes from the Internet and modern digital communications technologies. The fact that Samuelson can’t think of anything more is either a serious failure of imagination or, more troubling, an intentional effort to minimize and ignore those benefits in order to prey on people’s worst fears.

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about “technopanics” and the role that journalists sometimes play in hyping them. See, for example, my essay last summer, “Journalists, Technopanics & the Risk Response Continuum,” which is based on my Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” As I explain in that article, the model for what Samuelson has done in his essay is actually a very old logical fallacy: a so-called “appeal to fear.” Here’s how I explain it in my law review article:

Rhetoricians employ several closely related types of “appeals to fear.” Douglas Walton, author of Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation, outlines the argumentation scheme for “fear appeal arguments” as follows:

• Fearful Situational Premise: Here is a situation that is fearful to you.
• Conditional Premise: If you carry out A, then the negative consequences portrayed in the fearful situation will happen to you.
• Conclusion: You should not carry out A.

This logic pattern here is referred to as argumentum in terrorem or argumentum ad metum. A closely related variant of this argumentation scheme is known as argumentum ad baculum, or an argument based on a threat. Argumentum ad baculum literally means “argument to the stick,” an appeal to force. Walton outlines the argumentum ad baculum argumentation scheme as follows:

• Conditional Premise: If you do not bring about A, then consequence B will occur.
• Commitment Premise: I commit myself to seeing to it that B comes about.
• Conclusion: You should bring about A.

As will be shown, these argumentation devices are at work in many information technology policy debates today even though they are logical fallacies or based on outright myths. They tend to lead to unnecessary calls for anticipatory regulation of information or information technology.

I continue on in that article to provide several examples of how ” argumentum in cyber-terrorem ” logic is at work in several digital policy arenas today, especially as it pertains to cybersecurity and cyberwar fears. My Mercatus Center colleagues Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins have warned of the dangers of “threat inflation” in cybersecurity policy in their important paper, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy.” The rhetoric of cybersecurity debates illustrates how threat inflation is a crucial part of “argumentum in cyber-terrorem ” logic. Frequent allusions are made in cybersecurity debates to the potential for a “Digital Pearl Harbor,”  a “cyber cold war,”  a “cyber Katrina,”  or even a “cyber 9/11.”  These analogies are made even though these historical incidents resulted in death and destruction of a sort not comparable to attacks on digital networks. Others refer to “cyber bombs” even though no one can be “bombed” with binary code. A rush to judgment often follows inflated threats.

And that’s exactly what Samuelson has done in his essay. He’s rushed to an illogical, sweeping conclusion — namely, that we would be better off just bottling up the Net, or “repealing” it (whatever that means) — and he hasn’t even bothered considering the costs of such action. Worse yet, even though he admits that, “I don’t know the odds of this technological Armageddon. I doubt anyone does. The fears may be wildly exaggerated,” that doesn’t stop him from suggesting that we should live in fear of worst case hypothetical scenarios and take radical steps based upon them.

Again, it is certainly true that the Internet creates new vulnerabilities, including national security vulnerabilities, but that simply cannot be the end of the story. Those vulnerabilities need to be carefully evaluated and measured and, before we rush to panicked conclusions and advocate sweeping policy solutions, the corresponding benefits of the Internet must be taken into consideration.

Instead, Samuelson has engaged in the worst sort of fear-based, factually-challenged reasoning in his essay. It’s a model for how not to think or write about Internet policy. A more thoughtful analysis would acknowledge that the Internet is more than just “a symbol of progress;” it constitutes real progress and an improvement of the human condition.  And while it’s all too easy for newspaper columnists to suggest “we would be better off without it” and that it should be “repealed,” there are all too many government goons out there who would like to do just that since the Net has empowered the masses and given them a voice like no other technology in history.

Shame on Robert Samuelson for dismissing these realities — and the Internet’s many benefits — so lightly.

[ Note: See all my essays on “technopanics” here.]

In mid-April, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requested comments regarding “the consumer privacy and security issues posed by the growing connectivity of consumer devices, such as cars, appliances, and medical devices” or the so-called “Internet of Things.” This is in anticipation of a November 21 public workshop that the FTC will be hosting on the same issue.

These issues are finally starting to catch the attention of the public and policymakers alike with the rise of wearable computing, remote home automation and monitoring technologies, smart grids, autonomous vehicles and intelligent traffic systems, and so on. The Internet of Things represents the next great wave of Internet innovation, but it also represents the next great battleground in the field of Internet policy.

I filed comments with the FTC today in this proceeding and made a few simple points about why they should proceed cautiously here. A summary of my filing follows.

Avoiding a Precautionary Principle for the Internet of Things

First, while it is unclear where the FTC is heading with this proceeding—or for that matter, whether this even a formal proceeding at all—the danger exists that it represents the beginning of a regulatory regime for a new set of information technologies that are still in their infancy. Fearing hypothetical worst-case scenarios about the misuse of some IoT technologies, some policy activists and policymakers could seek to curb or control their development.

Policymakers should avoid acting on those impulses. Simply put, the Internet of Things—like the Internet itself—should not be subjected to a precautionary principle, which would impose preemptive, prophylactic restrictions on this rapidly evolving sector to guard against every theoretical harm that could develop. Preemptive restrictions on the development of the Internet of Things could retard technological innovation and limit the benefits that flow to consumers.

In other words, to the maximum extent possible, the default position toward new forms of technological innovation such as the Internet of Things should be innovation allowed, or what Paul Ohm, who recently joined the FTC as a Senior Policy Advisor, refers to as an “anti-Precautionary Principle.” This policy norm is better captured in the well-known Internet ideal of “permissionless innovation,” or the general freedom to experiment and learn through trial-and-error experimentation. As I noted in a recent essay here:

Wisdom is born of experience, including experiences involving risk and the possibility of mistakes and accidents. Patience and openness to permissionless innovation represent the wise disposition toward new technologies not only because it provides breathing space for future entrepreneurialism, but also because it provides an opportunity to observe both the evolution of societal attitudes toward new technologies and how citizens adapt to them.

Adaptation Is Not Just Possible but Likely

Which leads to the next major point I make in my filing: Humans adapt! The more I study the history of various technological innovations the more I find the same story unfolding: again and again society has found ways to adapt to new technological changes by employing a variety of coping mechanisms or new social norms. In fact, we see a common cycle of initial resistance, gradual adaptation, and then eventual assimilation of new technologies into society. (I previously outlined this cycle in my law review article, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”)

I offer several specific examples of this process in action—from the rise of the telephone and the camera to RFID and Gmail. I argue that these examples should give us hope that we will also find ways of adapting to the challenges presented by the rise of the Internet of Things.

Norms Evolve and “Regulate”

Third, my filing discusses how societal norms evolve in response to new technologies and even come to “regulate” acceptable use of those technologies. Law tends to regulate in sweeping ways and then get locked in. Social norms and technological etiquette, by contrast, flexibly evolve in unique ways over time.

Some of these norms or social constraints are more “top-down” and formal in nature in that they are imposed by establishments or organizations in the form of restrictions on technologies. In other cases, these norms or social constraints are purely bottom-up and group-driven. I offer examples of both types of norms in my filing.

Other Remedies Exist or Will Develop as Needed

Finally, I argue in my filing that policymakers should exercise restraint and humility in the face of uncertain change and address harms that develop—if they do at all—after careful benefit-cost analysis of various remedies. I note that many federal and state laws already exist that could address perceived harms associated with these technologies.

And let’s be clear: some misuses and harms will develop, just as they have for every other information technology ever invented. But, to reiterate, we have generally not preemptive applied precautionary regulation to each and every new information technology based on the potential threat of some misuses developing. Instead, we have allowed experimentation and innovation to take place largely unimpeded and then relied on a combination of education, user empowerment, various social norms and coping mechanisms, and then targeted laws as needed after serious harms were demonstrated. That same approach should govern the Internet of Things.

If we succumb to the opposite impulse and apply a “Mother May I?” permissioned approach to the Internet of Things—with innovation only being allowed after regulators deem those technologies “safe” or “acceptable”—then we risk derailing the next great wave of Internet-based innovation. The implications for America’s consumers and our global competitiveness could not be more profound. The result will be fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Hopefully the FTC is not going down that path with this proceeding or its forthcoming workshop on the Internet of Things. But stay tuned. This set of issues is expanding rapidly and promises to produce heated privacy, security, and safety debates for many years to come.

Please read my filing for more details. I’ve also embedded it below.

Comments of Adam Thierer Mercatus Center in FTC Internet of Things Proceeding (June 2013)

[Note: I later adapted this essay into a short book, which you can download for free here.]

Let’s talk about “permissionless innovation.” We all believe in it, right? Or do we? What does it really mean? How far are we willing to take it? What are its consequences? What is its opposite? How should we balance them?

What got me thinking about these questions was a recent essay over at The Umlaut by my Mercatus Center colleague Eli Dourado entitled, “‘Permissionless Innovation’ Offline as Well as On.” He opened by describing the notion of permissionless innovation as follows:

In Internet policy circles, one is frequently lectured about the wonders of “permissionless innovation,” that the Internet is a global platform on which college dropouts can try new, unorthodox methods without the need to secure authorization from anyone, and that this freedom to experiment has resulted in the flourishing of innovative online services that we have observed over the last decade.

Eli goes on to ask, “why it is that permissionless innovation should be restricted to the Internet. Can’t we have this kind of dynamism in the real world as well?”

That’s a great question, but let’s ponder an even more fundamental one: Does anyone really believe in the ideal of “permissionless innovation”? Is there anyone out there who makes a consistent case for permissionless innovation across the technological landscape, or is it the case that a fair degree of selective morality is at work here? That is, people love the idea of “permissionless innovation” until they find reasons to hate it — namely, when it somehow conflicts with certain values they hold dear.

I’ve written about this here before when referencing the selective morality we often see at work in debates over online safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. [See my essays: “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed;” “Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead,” and “And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars.“] In those essays, I’ve noted how ironic it is that the same crowd that preaches about how essential permissionless innovation is when it comes to overly-restrictive copyright laws are often among the first to advocate “permissioned” regulations for online data collection and advertising practices. I also noted how many conservatives who demand permissionless innovation on the economic / infrastructure front are quick to call for preemptive content controls to restrict objectionable online content, and a handful of them want “permissioned” cybersecurity rules.

Of course, it’s not really all that surprising that people wouldn’t hold true to the ideal of “permissionless innovation” across the board because at some theoretical point almost every technology has a use scenario that someone — perhaps many of us — would want to see restricted. How do we know when it makes sense to impose some restrictions on innovation to make it more “permissioned”?

The Range of Options

I spend a lot of time thinking about that question these days. The sheer volume and diversity of interesting innovations that surround us today — or that are just on the horizon — are forcing us to struggle both individually and collectively with our tolerance for unabated innovation. Here are just a few of the issues I’m thinking of (many of which I am currently writing about) where these questions come up constantly:

• Online data aggregation / targeted advertising
• Commercial drones
• 3D printing
• Facial recognition & biometrics
• Wearable computing
• Geolocation / Geotagging / RFID
• Robotics
• Nanotechnology

When thinking about innovation in these spaces, it is useful to consider a range of theoretical responses to new technological risks. I developed such a model in my new Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology article on, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” In that piece,  I identify four general responses and place them along a “risk response continuum”:

1. Prohibition: Prohibition attempts to eliminate potential risk through suppression of technology, product or service bans, information controls, or outright censorship.
2. Anticipatory Regulation: Anticipatory regulation controls potential risk through preemptive, precautionary safeguards, including administrative regulation, government ownership or licensing controls, or restrictive defaults. Anticipatory regulation can lead to prohibition, although that tends to be rare, at least in the United States.
3. Resiliency: Resiliency addresses risk through education, awareness building, transparency and labeling, and empowerment steps and tools.
4. Adaptation: Adaptation involves learning to live with risk through trial-and-error experimentation, experience, coping mechanisms, and social norms. Adaptation strategies often begin with, or evolve out of, resiliency-based efforts.

While these risk-response strategies could also describe the possible range of responses that individuals or families might employ to cope with technological change, generally speaking, I am here using this framework to consider the theoretical responses by society at large or governments. That allows us to bring three general policy concepts into the discussion:

1. “Permissionless Innovation“: Complete freedom to experiment and innovate.
2. “Permissioned Innovation“: General freedom to experiment and innovate, but with possibility that innovation might later be restricted in some fashion.
3. “The Precautionary Principle“: New innovations are discouraged or even disallowed until their developers can prove that they won’t cause any harms.

Here’s how I put all these concepts together in one image:

This gives us a framework to consider responses to various technological developments we are struggling with today. But how do we decide which response makes the most sense for any given technology? The answer will come down to a complicated (and often quite contentious) cost-benefit analysis that weighs the theoretical harms of technological innovation alongside the many potential benefits of ongoing experimentation.

The Case for Permissionless Innovation or an “Anti-Precautionary Principle”

I believe a strong case can be made that permissionless innovation should be our default position in public policy deliberations about technological change. Here’s how I put it in the conclusion of my “Technopanics” article:

Resiliency and adaption strategies are generally superior to more restrictive approaches because they leave more breathing room for continuous learning and innovation through trial-and-error experimentation. Even when that experimentation may involve risk and the chance of mistake or failure, the result of such experimentation is wisdom and progress. As Friedrich August Hayek concisely wrote, “Humiliating to human pride as it may be, we must recognize that the advance and even preservation of civilization are dependent upon a maximum of opportunity for accidents to happen.”

I believe this is the more sensible default position toward technological innovation because the opposite default — a technological Precautionary Principle — essentially holds the “anything new is guilty until proven innocent,” as journalist Ronald Bailey has noted in critiquing the notion. When the law mandates “play it safe” as the default policy toward technological progress, progress is far less likely to occur at all. Social learning and adaptation become less likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

Therefore, the default policy disposition toward innovation should be an ” anti-Precautionary Principle.” Paul Ohm outlined that concept in his 2008 article, “The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online.” Ohm, who recently joined the Federal Trade Commission as a Senior Policy Advisor, began his essay by noting that “Fear of the powerful computer user, the ‘Superuser,’ dominates debates about online conflict,” but that this superuser is generally “a mythical figure” concocted by those who are typically quick to set forth worst-case scenarios about the impact of digital technology on society. Fear of the “superuser” and hypothetical worst-case scenarios prompts policy action, since as Ohm notes: “Policymakers, fearful of his power, too often overreact by passing overbroad, ambiguous laws intended to ensnare the Superuser but which are instead used against inculpable, ordinary users.” “This response is unwarranted,” Ohm argues “because the Superuser is often a marginal figure whose power has been greatly exaggerated.” (at 1327).

Ohm correctly notes that Precautionary Principle policies are often the result. He prefers the “anti-Precautionary Principle” instead, which he summarized as follows: “when a conflict involves ordinary users in the main and Superusers only at the margins, the harms resulting from regulating the few cannot be justified.” (at 1394) In other words, policy should not be shaped by hypothetical fears and worst-case “boogeyman” scenarios. He elaborates as follows:

Even if Congress adopts the Anti-Precautionary Principle and begins to demand better empirical evidence, it may conclude that the Superuser threat outweighs the harm from regulating. I am not arguing that Superusers should never be regulated or pursued. But given the checkered history of the search for Superusers — the overbroad laws that have ensnared non-Superuser innocents; the amount of money, time, and effort that could have been used to find many more non-Superuser criminals; and the spotty record of law enforcement successes — the hunt for the Superuser should be narrowed and restricted. Policymakers seeking to regulate the Superuser can adopt a few strategies to narrowly target Superusers and minimally impact ordinary users. The chief evil of past efforts to regulate the Superuser has been the inexorable broadening of laws to cover metaphor-busting, impossible-to-predict future acts. To avoid the overbreadth trap, legislators should instead extend elements narrowly, focusing on that which separates the Superuser from the rest of us: his power over technology. They should, for example, write tightly constrained new elements that single out the use of power, or even, the use of unusual power. (at 1396-7)

To summarize, the Anti-Precautionary Principle generally holds that:

1. society is better off when innovation is not preemptively restricted;
2. accusations of harm and calls for policy responses should not be premised on worst-case scenarios;  and,
3. remedies to actual harms should be narrowly tailored so that beneficial uses of technology are not derailed.

Alternatives to Precaution / Permissioning

I don’t necessarily believe that the “anti-Precautionary Principle” or the norm of “permissionless innovation” should hold in every case.  Neither does Ohm. In fact, in his recent work on privacy and online data collection, Ohm betrays his own rule. He does so too casually, I think, and falls prey to the very “Superuser” boogeyman fears he lamented earlier.

For example, in his latest law review article on “Branding Privacy,” Ohm argues that “Change can be deeply unsettling. Human beings prefer predictability and stability, and abrupt change upsets those desires. . . . Rapid change causes harm by disrupting settled expectations” (at 924). His particular concern is the way that corporate privacy policies continue to evolve and generally in the direction of allowing more and more sharing of personal information. Ohm believes that this is a significant enough concern that, at a minimum, companies should be required to assign a new name to any service or product if a material change was made to its information-handling policies and procedures.  For example, if Facebook or Google wanted to make a major change to their services in the direction of greater information sharing, they have to change their names (at least for a time) to something like Facebook Public or Google Public.

Before joining the FTC, Ohm also authored a panicky piece for the Harvard Business Review that outlined a worst-case scenario “database of ruin” that will link our every past transgression and most intimate secret. This fear led him to argue that:

We need to slow things down, to give our institutions, individuals, and processes the time they need to find new and better solutions. The only way we will buy this time is if companies learn to say, “no” to some of the privacy-invading innovations they’re pursuing. Executives should require those who work for them to justify new invasions of privacy against a heavy burden, weighing them against not only the financial upside, but also against the potential costs to individuals, society, and the firm’s reputation.

Applying the Model to Online Safety & Digital Privacy

I’d argue that this “bottom-up” model of coping with technological change is already at work in many areas of modern society. In my “Technopanics” paper, I note that this pretty much the approach we’ve adopted for online safety concerns, at least here in the United States. Very little innovation (or content) is prohibited or even permissioned today. Instead, we rely on other mechanisms: User education and empowerment, informal household media rules, social pressure, societal norms, and so on. [I’ve documented this in greater detail in this booklet.]

Fifteen years ago, there were many policymakers and policy activists who advocated a very different approach: indecency rules for the Net, mandatory filtering schemes, mandatory age verification, and so on. But that prohibitionary and permission-based approach lost out to the resiliency and adaptation paradigm. As a result, innovation and freedom speech continues relatively unabated.  That doesn’t mean everything is sunshine and roses. The Web is full of filth, and hateful things are said every second of the day across digital networks. But we are finding other ways to deal with those problems — not always perfectly, but well enough to get by and allow innovation and speech to continue. When serious harms can be identified — such as persistent online bullying or predation of youth — targeted legal remedies have been utilized.

In two forthcoming law review articles (for the  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy and the George Mason Law Review), I apply this same framework to concerns about commercial data collection and digital privacy. I conclude the Harvard essay by noting that:

Many of the thorniest social problems citizens encounter in the information age will be better addressed through efforts that are bottom-up, evolutionary, education-based, empowerment-focused, and resiliency-centered. That framework is the best approach to address personal privacy protection. Evolving social and market norms will also play a role as citizens incorporate new technologies into their lives and business practices. What may seem like a privacy-invasive practice or technology one year might be considered an essential information resource the next. Public policy should embrace—or at least not unnecessarily disrupt—the highly dynamic nature of the modern digital economy.

Two additional factors shape my conclusion that this framework makes as much sense for privacy as it does for online child safety concerns. First, the effectiveness of law and regulation on this front is limited by the normative considerations. The inherent subjectivity of privacy as a personal and societal value is one reason why expanded regulation is not sensible. As with online safety, we have a rather formidable “eye of the beholder” problem at work here. What we need, therefore, are diverse solutions for a diverse citizenry, not one-size-fits-all top-down regulatory solutions that seek to apply to values of the few on the many.  Second, enforcement challenges must be taken into consideration. Most of the problems policymakers and average individuals face when it comes to controlling the flow of private information online are similar to the challenges they face when trying to control the free flow of digitalized bits in other information policy contexts, such as online safety, cybersecurity, and digital copyright. It will be increasingly difficult and costly to enforce top-down regulatory regimes (assuming we can even agree to common privacy standards), therefore, alternative approaches to privacy protection should be considered.

Of course, some alleged privacy harms involve highly sensitive forms of personal information and can do serious harm to person or property. Our legal regime has evolved to handle those harms. We have targeted legal remedies for health and financial privacy violations, for example, and state torts to fill other gaps. Meanwhile, the FTC has broad discretion under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to pursue “unfair and deceptive practices,” including those that implicate privacy. These remedies are more “bottom-up” in character in that they leave sufficient breathing room for ongoing experimentation and innovation but allow individuals to pursue remedies for egregious harms that can be proven.

Applying the Model Elsewhere

We can apply this model more broadly. Let’s pick an issue that’s been in the news recently: concerns about Google Glass and fears about “wearable computing” more generally, which Jerry Brito wrote about earlier today. Google Glass hasn’t even hit the market yet, but the privacy paranoia has already kicked into high gear. Andrew Keen argues that “Google Glass opens an entirely new front in the digital war against privacy” and that “It is the sort of radical transformation that may actually end up completely destroying our individual privacy in the digital 21st century.” His remedy: “I would make data privacy its default feature. Nobody else sees the data I see unless I explicitly say so. Not advertisers, nor the government, and certainly not those engineers of the human soul at the Googleplex. No, Google Glass must be opaque. For my eyes only.”

There’s even more fear and loathing to be found in this piece by Mark Hurst entitled, “The Google Glass feature no one is talking about.” That feature would be Glass’s ability to record massive amounts of video and audio in both public and private spaces. In reality, plenty of people are talking about that feature and wringing the hands about its implications for our collective privacy. Also see, for example, Gary Marshall’s essay, “Google Glass: Say Goodbye to Your Privacy.”

But Google Glass is just the beginning. For another example of a wearable computing technology that is bound to raise concern once it goes mainstream, check out the Memoto Lifelogging Camera. Here’s the description from the website:

The Memoto camera is a tiny camera and GPS that you clip on and wear. It’s an entirely new kind of digital camera with no controls. Instead, it automatically takes photos as you go. The Memoto app then seamlessly and effortlessly organizes them for you. . . . As long as you wear the camera, it is constantly taking pictures. It takes two geotagged photos a minute with recorded orientation so that the app can show them upright no matter how you are wearing the camera. . . . The camera and the app work together to give you pictures of every single moment of your life, complete with information on when you took it and where you were. This means that you can revisit any moment of your past.

Of course, that means you will also be able to revisit many moments from the lives of others who may have been around you while your Memoto Camera was logging your life. So, what are we going to do about Google Glass, Memoto, and wearable computing? Well, for now I hope that our answer is: nothing. This technology is not even out of the cradle yet and we have no idea how it will be put to use by most people. I certainly understand some of the privacy paranoia and worst-case scenarios that some people are circulating these days. As someone who deeply values their own privacy, and as the father of two digital natives who are already begging for more and more digital gadgets, I’ve already thought about a wide variety of worse-case scenarios for me and my kids.

But we’ve been here before. In my Harvard essay, I go back and track privacy panics from the rise of the camera and public photography in the late 1800s all the way down to Gmail in the mid-2000s and note that societal attitudes quickly adjusted to these initially unsettling technologies. That doesn’t mean that all the concerns raised by those technologies disappeared. A century after Warren and Brandeis railed against the camera and called for controls on public photography, many people are still complaining about what people can do with the devices. And although 425 million people now use Gmail and love the free service it provides, some vociferous privacy advocates are still concerned about how it might affect our privacy. And the same is true of a great many other technologies.

But here’s the key question: Are we not better off because we have allowed these technologies to develop in a relatively unfettered fashion? Would we have been better off imposing a Precautionary Principle on cameras and Gmail right out of the gates and then only allowing innovation once some techno-philosopher kings told us that all was safe? I would hope that the costs associated with such restrictions would be obvious. And I would hope that we might exercise similar policy restraint when it comes to new technologies, including Google Glass, Memoto, and other forms of wearable computing. After all, there are a a great many benefits that will come from such technologies and it is likely that many (perhaps most) of us will come to view these tools as an indispensable part of our lives despite the privacy fears of some academics and activists. As Brito notes in his essay on the topic, “in the long run, the public will get the technology it wants, despite the perennial squeamishness of some intellectuals.”

How will we learn to cope? Well, I already have a speech prepared for my kids about the proper use of such technologies that will build on the same sort of “responsible use” talk I have with them about all their other digital gadgets and the online services they love. It won’t be an easy talk because part of it will involve the inevitable chat about responsible use in very personal situations, including times when they may be involved in moments of intimacy with others. But this is the sort of uncomfortable talk we need to be having at the individual level, the family level, and the societal level. How can social norms and smart etiquette help us teach our children and each other responsible use of these new technologies? Such a dialogue is essential since, no matter how much we might hope for these new technologies and the problems they raise might just go away, they won’t.

In those cases where serious harms can be demonstrated — for example “peeping Toms” who use wearable computing to surreptitiously film unsuspecting victims — we can use targeted remedies already on the books to go after them. And I suspect that private contracts might play a stronger role here in the future as a remedy. Many organizations (corporations, restaurants, retail establishments, etc) will want nothing to do with wearable computing on their premises. I can imagine that they may be on the front line of finding creative contractual solutions to curb the use of such technologies.

Embracing Permissionless Innovation While Rejecting “The Borg Complex”

One final point. It is essential that advocates of the “anti-Precautionary Principle” and the ideal of “permissionless innovation” avoid falling prey to what philosopher Michael Sacasas refers to as “the Borg Complex“:

A Borg Complex is exhibited by writers and pundits who explicitly assert or implicitly assume that resistance to technology is futile. The name is derived from the Borg, a cybernetic alien race in the Star Trek universe that announces to their victims some variation of the following: “We will add your biological and technological distinctiveness to our own. Resistance is futile.”

Indeed, too often in digital policy texts and speeches these days, we hear pollyannish writers adopting a cavalier attitude about the impact of technological change on individuals and society. Some extreme technological optimists are highly deterministic about technology as an unstoppable force and its potential to transform man and society for the better. Such rigid technological determinism and wild-eyed varieties of cyber-utopianism should be rejected. For example, as I noted in my review of Kevin Kelly’s What Technology Wants, “Much of what Kelly sputters in the opening and closing sections of the book sounds like quasi-religious kookiness by a High Lord of the Noosphere” and that “at times, Kelly even seems to be longing for humanity’s assimilation into the machine or The Matrix.”

I discussed this problem in more detail in my chapter on “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 1,” which appeared in the book, The Next Digital Decade. I noted that technological optimists need to appreciate that, as Neil Postman argued, there are some moral dimensions to technological progress that deserve attention. Not all changes will have positive consequences for society. Those of us who espouse the benefits of permissionless innovation as the default rule must simultaneously be mature enough to understand and address the downsides of digital life without casually dismissing the critics.  A “just-get-over-it” attitude toward the challenges sometimes posed by technological change is never wise. In fact, it is downright insulting.

For example, when I am confronted with frustrated fellow parents who are irate about some of the objectionable content their kids sometimes discover online, I never say, “Well, just get over it!” Likewise, when I am debating advocates of increased privacy regulation who are troubled by data aggregation or targeted advertising, I listen to their concerns and try to offer constructive alternatives to their regulatory impulses. I also ask them to think through to consequences of prohibiting innovation and to realize that not everyone shares their same values when it comes to privacy. In other words, I do not dismiss their concerns, no matter how subjective, about the impact of technological change on their lives or the lives of their children. But I do ask them to be careful about imposing their value judgments on everyone else, especially by force of law. I am not harping at them about how “Resistance is futile,” but I am often explaining to them why a certain amount of societal and individual adaptation will be necessary and that building coping mechanisms and strategies will be absolutely essential. I also share tips about the tools and strategies they can tap to help protect their privacy and specifically how it is easier (and cheaper) than ever to find and use ad preference managers, private browsing tools, advertising blocking technologies, cookie-blockers, web script blockers, Do Not Track tools, and reputation protection services. This is all part of the resiliency and adaptation paradigm.

Conclusion

In closing, it should be clear by now that I am fairly bullish about humanity’s ability to adapt to technological change; even radical change. Such change can be messy, uncomfortable, and unsettling, but the amazing thing to me is how we humans have again and again and again found ways to assimilate new tools into our lives and marched boldly forward. On occasion, we may need to slow down that process a bit when it can be demonstrated that the harms associated with technological change are unambiguous and extreme in character. But I think a powerful case can be made that, more often than not, we can and do find ways to effectively adapt to most forms of change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms. We should continue to allow progress through trial-and-error experimentation — in other words, through permissionless innovation — so that we can enjoy the many benefits that accrue from this process, including the benefits of learning from the mistakes that we will sometimes along the way.

I’m excited to announce that the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology has just published the final version of my 78-page paper on, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” My thanks to the excellent team at the Journal, who made the final product a much better paper than the one I turned into them! I poured my heart and soul into this article and hope others find it useful. It’s the culmination of all my work on technopanics and threat inflation in information policy debates, much of which I originally developed here in various essays through the years. In coming weeks, I hope to elaborate on themes I develop in the paper in a couple of posts here.

The paper can be found on the Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. website or on SSRN. I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Here’s the executive summary:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivational force. In public policy debates, appeals to fear are often used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Such appeals are used to convince citizens that  threats to individual or social well-being may be avoided only if specific steps are taken. Often these steps take the form of anticipatory regulation based on the precautionary principle. Such “fear appeal arguments” are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and often take the form of a fullblown “moral panic” or “technopanic.”  These panics are intense public, political, and academic responses to the emergence oruse of media or technologies, especially by the young.  In the extreme, they result in regulation or censorship. While cyberspace has its fair share of troubles and troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society than previous technologies did. That has not stopped some from suggesting there are reasons to be particularly fearful of the Internet and new digital technologies. There are various individual and institutional factors at work that perpetuate fear-based reasoning and tactics.

This paper will consider the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates, and then outline how those arguments can be deconstructed  and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments will be offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The various factors contributing to “fear cycles” in these policy areas will be documented. To the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by ongoing societal learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation. If steps must be taken to address these concerns, education- and empowerment-based solutions represent superior approaches to dealing with them compared to a precautionary principle approach, which would limit beneficial learning opportunities and retard technological progress.

Technopanics and Threat Inflation [Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center]

Psychologists Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris had an interesting editorial in The Wall Street Journal this weekend asking, “Do Our Gadgets Really Threaten Planes?” They conducted an online survey of 492 American adults who have flown in the past year and found that “40% said they did not turn their phones off completely during takeoff and landing on their most recent flight; more than 7% left their phones on, with the Wi-Fi and cellular communications functions active. And 2% pulled a full Baldwin, actively using their phones when they weren’t supposed to.”

Despite the widespread prevalence of such law-breaking activity, planes aren’t falling from the sky and yet the Federal Aviation Administration continues to enforce the rule prohibiting the use of digital gadgets during certain times during flight. “Why has the regulation remained in force for so long despite the lack of solid evidence to support it?” Simons and Chabris ask. They note:

Human minds are notoriously overzealous “cause detectors.” When two events occur close in time, and one plausibly might have caused the other, we tend to assume it did. There is no reason to doubt the anecdotes told by airline personnel about glitches that have occurred on flights when they also have discovered someone illicitly using a device. But when thinking about these anecdotes, we don’t consider that glitches also occur in the absence of illicit gadget use. More important, we don’t consider how often gadgets have been in use when flights have been completed without a hitch. Our survey strongly suggests that there are multiple gadget violators on almost every flight.

That’s all certain true, but what actually motivated this ban — and has ensured its continuation despite a lack of evidence it is needed to diminish technological risk — is the precautionary principle. As the authors correct note:

Fear is a powerful motivator, and precaution is a natural response. Regulators are loath to make policies less restrictive, out of a justifiable concern for passenger safety. It is easy to visualize the horrific consequences should a phone cause a plane to crash, so the FAA imposes this inconvenience as a precaution. Once a restriction is in place, though, removing it becomes a challenge because every day without a gadget-induced accident cements our belief that the status quo is right and justified. Unfortunately, this logic is little better than that of Homer Simpson, who organized an elaborate Bear Patrol in the city of Springfield and exulted in the absence of bear sightings that ensued.

This is a prime example of the precautionary principle in action. In my recent 80-page paper entitled, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” I noted that how we might be witnessing the rise of a “precautionary principle” for some information technology policy matters. The adoption of an information precautionary principle would restrict progress in this arena until technology creators or proponents can demonstrate new tools are perfectly safe. That’s essentially what the FAA has done with its ban on digital gadgets during certain times of air travel.

Of course, it is easier to sympathize with the precautionary perspective in this case than others because the risks of digital gadgetry and wireless communications during flight really were unknown early on, and few wanted to conduct a real-time experiment when the potential downsides were so catastrophic. And yet, as Simons and Chabris observe, we’ve conducted that experiment anyway! Air travelers decided to ignore the ban and continue to use digital gadgets. And, luckily, the sky didn’t fall, or in this case planes didn’t fall out of the sky, at least.

What’s amazing about this case, however, is that the FAA has continued to enforce its precautionary-minded regulation long after it’s been shown to be needed and has been so widely ignored anyway. I suppose that, like Homer Simpson, some of these officials believe that their precautionary steps have led to greater safety, or don’t have any costs or trade-offs and, therefore, there’s nothing wrong with their “better to be safe than sorry” thinking. Of course, that’s the fatal flaw in all precautionary principle thinking, as I note in my paper. There most certainly are many costs and trade-offs associated with banning technology or its use. They may not be as profound in this case as in others, but that doesn’t mean that they do not exist.

Regardless, now that the FAA has finally decided to take a second look at their policy, perhaps they be willing to admit that there never really was much sense to this particular application of the precautionary principle and that the time has come to end this ban and let individual airlines experiment with different approaches.

[Based on forthcoming article in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14 Issue 1, Winter 2013, http://mjlst.umn.edu]

I hope everyone caught these recent articles by two of my favorite journalists, Kashmir Hill (“Do We Overestimate The Internet’s Danger For Kids?”) and Larry Magid (“Putting Techno-Panics into Perspective.”) In these and other essays, Hill and Magid do a nice job discussing how society responds to new Internet risks while also explaining how those risks are often blown out of proportion to begin with.

Both Hill and Magid are rarities among technology journalists in that they spend more time debunking fears rather than inflating them. Whether its online safety, cybersecurity, or digital privacy, we all too often see journalists distorting or ignoring how humans find constructive ways to cope with technological change. Why do journalists fail to make that point? I suppose it is because bad news sells–even when there isn’t much to substantiate it.

I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about “moral panics” and “technopanics” in recent years (here’s a compendium of roughly two dozen essays I’ve penned on the topic) and earlier this year I brought all my work together in an 80-page paper entitled, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.”

In that paper, I identified several reasons why pessimistic, fear-mongering attitudes often dominate discussions about the Internet and information technology. I began by noting that the biggest problem is that for a variety of reasons, humans are poor judges of risks to themselves or those close to them. But I identified other explanations for why human beings are predisposed toward pessimism and are risk-averse, including:

• Generational Differences
• Hyper-Nostalgia, Pessimistic Bias, and Soft Ludditism
• Bad News Sells: The Role of the Media, Advocates, and the Listener
• The Role of Special Interests and Industry Infighting
• Elitist Attitudes among Academics and Intellectuals
• The Role of “Third-Person-Effect Hypothesis”

You can read my paper for fuller descriptions of each point. But let me return to my primary concern here regarding the role that the media plays in the process. It seems logical why journalists inflate fears: In an increasingly crowded and cacophonous modern media environment, there’s a strong incentive for them to use fear to grab attention. But why are we, the public, such eager listeners and so willing to lap up bad news, even when it is overhyped, exaggerated, or misreported?

“Negativity bias” certainly must be part of the answer. Michael Shermer, author of The Believing Brain, notes that psychologists have identified “negativity bias” as “the tendency to pay closer attention and give more weight to negative events, beliefs, and information than to positive.” Negativity bias, which is closely related to the phenomenon of “pessimistic bias,” is frequently on display in debates over online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity.

But even with negativity bias at work, what I still cannot explain is why so many of these inflated fears exists when we have centuries of experience and empirical results that prove humans are able to again and again adapt to technological change. We are highly resilient, adaptable mammals. We learn to cope.

In my paper, I try to develop a model for how humans deal with new technological risks. I identify four general groups of responses and place them along a “risk response continuum”:

1. Prohibition: Prohibition attempts to eliminate potential risk through suppression of technology, product or service bans, information controls, or outright censorship.
2. Anticipatory Regulation: Anticipatory regulation controls potential risk through preemptive, precautionary safeguards, including administrative regulation, government ownership or licensing controls, or restrictive defaults. Anticipatory regulation can lead to prohibition, although that tends to be rare, at least in the United States.
3. Resiliency: Resiliency addresses risk through education, awareness building, transparency and labeling, and empowerment steps and tools.
4. Adaptation: Adaptation involves learning to live with risk through trial-and-error experimentation, experience, coping mechanisms, and social norms. Adaptation strategies often begin with, or evolve out of, resiliency-based efforts.

For reasons I outline in the paper, I believe that it almost always makes more sense to use bottom-up resiliency and adaptation solutions instead of top-down anticipatory regulation or prohibition strategies. And, more often than not, that’s what we eventually opt for as a society, at least when it comes to information technology. Sure, you can find plenty of examples of knee-jerk prohibition and regulatory strategies being proposed initially as a response to an emerging technology. In the long-run, however–and sometimes even in the short-run–we usually migrate down the risk response continuum and settle into resiliency and adaptation solutions. Sometimes we adopt those approaches because we come to understand they are more sensible or less costly. Other times we get there only after several failed experiments with prohibition and regulation strategies.

I know I am being a bit too black and white here. Sometimes we utilize hybrid approaches–a bit of anticipatory regulation with a bit of resiliency, for example. We use such an approach for both privacy and security matters, for example. But I have argued in my work that the sheer velocity of change in the information age makes it less and less likely that anticipatory regulation strategies–and certainly prohibition strategies–will work in the long-haul. In fact, they often break down very rapidly, making it all the more essential that we begin thinking seriously about resiliency strategies as soon as we are confronted with new technological risks. Adaptation isn’t usually the correct strategy right out of the gates, however. Just saying “learn to to live with it” or “get over it” won’t work as a short-term strategy, even if that’s exactly what will happen over the long-term. But resiliency strategies often help us get to adaption strategies and solutions more quickly.

Anyway, back to journalists and fear. It strikes me that sharp journalists like Hill and Magid just seem to get everything I’m saying here and they weave these insights into all their reporting. By why do so few others? Again, I suppose it is because the incentives are screwy here and make it so that even those reporters who know better will sometimes use fear-based tactics to sell copy. But I am still surprised by how often even respected mainstream media establishments play this game.

In any event, those others reporters need to learn to give humans a bit more credit and acknowledge that (a) we often learn to cope with technological risks quite rapidly and (b) sometimes those risks are greatly inflated to begin with.

Yesterday on TechCrunch, Josh Constine posted an interesting essay about how some in the press were “Selling Digital Fear” on the privacy front. His specific target was The Wall Street Journal, which has been running an ongoing investigation of online privacy issues with a particular focus on online apps. Much of the reporting in their “What They Know” series has been valuable in that it has helped shine light on some data collection practices and privacy concerns that deserve more scrutiny. But as Constine notes, sometimes the articles in the WSJ series lack sufficient context, fail to discuss trade-offs, or do not identify any concrete harm or risk to users. In other words, some of it is just simple fear-mongering. Constine argues:

Reality has yet to stop media outlets from yelling about privacy, and because the WSJ writers were on assignment, they wrote the “Selling You On Facebook” hit piece despite thin findings. These kind of articles can make mainstream users so worried about the worst-case scenario of what could happen to their data, they don’t see the value they get in exchange for it. “Selling You On Facebook” does bring up the important topic of how apps can utilize personal data granted to them by their users, but it overstates the risks. Yes, the business models of Facebook and the apps on its platform depend on your personal information, but so do the services they provide. That means each user needs to decide what information to grant to who, and Facebook has spent years making the terms of this value exchange as clear as possible.

“While sensationalizing the dangers of online privacy sure drives page views and ad revenue,” Constine also noted, “it also impedes innovation and harms the business of honest software developers.” These trade-offs are important because, to the extent policymakers get more interested in pursing privacy regulations based on these fears, they could force higher prices or less innovation upon us with very little benefit in exchange.

Of course, the press generating hypothetical fears or greatly inflating dangers is nothing new. We have seen it happen many times in the past and it can be seen at work in many other fields today (online child safety is a good example). In my recent 80-page paper on “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” I discussed how and why the press and other players inflate threats and sell fear. Here’s a passage from my paper:

“The most obvious reason that doomsday fears get disproportionate public attention is that bad news is newsworthy, and frightening forecasts cause people to sit up and take notice,” Julian Simon astutely observed in 1996.[1] That is equally true today.[2] Many media outlets and sensationalist authors sometimes use fear-based rhetorical devices to gain influence or sell books. “Opportunists will take advantage of this fear for personal and institutional gain,” notes University of Colorado Law School professor Paul Ohm.[3] Fear mongering and prophecies of doom have always been with us, since they represent easy ways to attract attention and get heard. “Pessimism has always been big box office,” notes [Matt] Ridley.[4] This is even more true in the midst of the modern information age cacophony. Breaking through all the noise is hard when competition for our eyes and ears is so intense. It should not be surprising, therefore, that sensationalism and alarmism are used as media differentiation tactics. This is particularly true as it relates to kids and online safety.[5] “Unbalanced headlines and confusion have contributed to the climate of anxiety that surrounds public discourse on children’s use of new technology,” argues Professor Sonia Livingstone of the London School Economics. “Panic and fear often drown out evidence.”[6] Sadly, most of us are eager listeners and lap up bad news, even when it is overhyped, exaggerated, or misreported. [Michael] Shermer notes that psychologists have identified this phenomenon as “negativity bias,” or “the tendency to pay closer attention and give more weight to negative events, beliefs, and information than to positive.”[7] Negativity bias, which is closely related to the phenomenon of “pessimistic bias” …  is frequently on display in debates over online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity.

I want to highly recommend everyone watch this interesting new talk by danah boyd on “Culture of Fear + Attention Economy = ?!?!” In her talk, danah discusses “how fear gets people into a frenzy” or panic about new technologies and new forms of culture. “The culture of fear is the idea that fear can be employed by marketers, politicians, the media, and the public to really regulate the public… such that they can be controlled,” she argues. “Fear isn’t simply the product of natural forces. It can systematically be generated to entice, motivate, or suppress. It can be leveraged as a political tool and those in power have long used fear for precisely these goals.”  I discuss many of these issues in my new 80-page white paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.“

Webstock ’12: danah boyd – Culture of Fear + Attention Economy = ?!?! from Webstock on Vimeo.

danah points out that new media is often leveraged to generate fear and so we should not be surprised when the Internet and digital technologies are used in much the same way. She also correctly notes that our cluttered, cacophonous information age might also be causing an escalation of fear-based tactics. “The more there are stimuli competing for your attention, the more likely it is that fear is going to be the thing that will drive your attention” to the things that some want you to notice or worry about.

I spent some time in my technopanics paper discussing this point in Section III.C (“Bad News Sells: The Role of the Media, Advocates, and the Listener.”) Here’s the relevant passage:

Fear mongering and prophecies of doom have always been with us, since they represent easy ways to attract attention and get heard. “Pessimism has always been big box office,” notes [Matt] Ridley. This is even more true in the midst of the modern information age cacophony. Breaking through all the noise is hard when competition for our eyes and ears is so intense. It should not be surprising, therefore, that sensationalism and alarmism are used as media differentiation tactics. This is particularly true as it relates to kids and online safety. “Unbalanced headlines and confusion have contributed to the climate of anxiety that surrounds public discourse on children’s use of new technology,” argues Professor Sonia Livingstone of the London School Economics. “Panic and fear often drown out evidence.” Sadly, most of us are eager listeners and lap up bad news, even when it is overhyped, exaggerated, or misreported. [Michael] Shermer notes that psychologists have identified this phenomenon as “negativity bias,” or “the tendency to pay closer attention and give more weight to negative events, beliefs, and information than to positive.” Negativity bias, which is closely related to the phenomenon of “pessimistic bias” … is frequently on display in debates over online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity.

Unfortunately, as danah correctly notes in her remarks, “it’s extremely difficult to combat fear [but] it’s extremely easy to ramp it up.” Worse yet,  “it’s impossible to combat fear with statistics.”  As I note in my paper, fear-tactics are remarkably powerful rhetorical devices that can be enormously challenging to overcome. However, I remain a bit more optimistic than danah that facts and common sense can prevail eventually. After all, most panics don’t last. They fizzle out after a time. I’d like to believe that part of the reason they do is because facts, education, awareness, and reasonable discussion all combine to debunk fears and help us cope with the realities of cultural or technological change.  On the other hand, as I note in the paper, it may instead simply be the case that one panic crowds out an older one! As I note in the paper (on pgs. 42-3):

Perhaps it is the case that the unique factors that combine to create technopanics tend to dissipate more rapidly over time precisely because technological changes continue to unfold at such a rapid clip. Maybe there is something about human psychology that “crowds out” one panic as new fears arise. Perhaps the media and elites lose interest in the panic du jour and move on to other issues. Finally, people may simply learn to accommodate cultural and economic changes. Indeed, some of things that evoke panic in one generation come to be worshiped (or at least respected) in another. As The Economist magazine recently noted, “There is a long tradition of dire warnings about new forms of media, from translations of the Bible into vernacular languages to cinema and rock music. But as time passes such novelties become uncontroversial, and eventually some of them are elevated into art forms.” These topics and explanations are ripe for future study.

danah also notes that “one of the frustrating thing about my job these days is that I’m dealing with the idea that ‘protect the kids’ becomes justification for regulating the Internet in any way you can possibly imagine.” Of course, that’s nothing new. “It’s for the children!” is the mantra we hear regularly in media and Internet policy debates. [Some of you might find my mock testimony on this front to be humorous: “It’s For the Children: A Template for Hill Testimony on Child Safety Issues.”] In my paper, I devote a great deal of time to explaining how generational differences and fears about the impact of technology on society–especially the young–accounts for a large part of the pessimism at work in debates over these issues.

Anyway, please listen to danah’s talk. It’s well worth your time. And I hope some of you will read my paper as well.

Note: All my TLF essays on moral panics and technopanics can be found here.

In their paper, “Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” my Mercatus Center colleagues Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins warned of the dangers of “threat inflation” in cybersecurity policy debates. In early 2011, Mercatus also published a paper by Sean Lawson, an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, entitled “Beyond Cyber Doom” that documented how fear-based tactics and cyber-doom scenarios and rhetoric increasingly were on display in cybersecurity policy debates.  Finally, in my recent Mercatus Center working paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” I extended their threat inflation analysis and developed a comprehensive framework offering additional examples of, and explanations for, threat inflation in technology policy debates.

These papers make it clear that a sort of hysteria has developed around cyberwar and cybersecurity issues. Frequent allusions are made in cybersecurity debates to the potential for a “Digital Pearl Harbor,” a “cyber cold war,” a “cyber Katrina,” or even a “cyber 9/11.” These analogies are made even though these historical incidents resulted in death and destruction of a sort not comparable to attacks on digital networks. Others refer to “cyber bombs” even though no one can be “bombed” with binary code. And new examples of such inflationary rhetoric seem to emerge each day. For example, today’s NPR’s Morning Edition program featured a segment by Tom Gjelten entitled, “Cybersecurity Bill: Vital Need Or Just More Rules?” that included the comments of Michael McConnell, a former director of National Intelligence, Here’s what McConnell said about cyberwar at the 6:30 mark of the show:

“this threat is so intrusive, it’s so serious, it could literally suck the life’s blood out of this country, and if we don’t address it, it’s going to be a severe impact and so I think we have no choice but to address it and some of that process will be regulatory.”

Wow, who knew the blood could literally be drained from our bodies by cyberattacks! Have the Chinese or Iranians developed a cyber-superweapon that can reach through our screens and suck the life right out of us? (Like a cross between Videodrome and Halloween III: Season of the Witch!)

I’m being silly, of course. And some might dismiss such rhetorical flourishes or even defend them in the name of “doing whatever it takes” to raise awareness about an important concern. But these fear-based tactics are dangerous. As Brito and Watkins note, “when a threat is inflated, the marketplace of ideas on which a democracy relies to make sound judgments—in particular, the media and popular debate—can become overwhelmed by fallacious information.” In my paper, I argue that technopanics and threat inflation can have many troubling ramifications. They can:

1. Foster animosities and suspicions among the citizenry;
2. Create distrust of many institutions, especially the press;
3. Often divert attention from actual, far more serious risks; and,
4. Lead to calls for information control.

But we shouldn’t expect such rhetorically tactics to subside any time soon. After all, bombastic predictions of an impending cyber-apocalypse are nothing new, especially because they are such an effective way to grab attention, headlines, and funding.

Back in January 1996, the conservative Weekly Standard magazine ran a truly over-the-top cover story by Charles J. Dunlap entitled “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007.” (The actual cover appears above and the whole outlandish article is worth reading for its comedic value if noting else.) It included a dramatic Tom Clancy-esque cover illustration of the U.S. Capitol building smoldering in flames after an apparent cyber-attack of some sort.  Of course, there was no High-Tech War of 2007. But talk is cheap and there are few downsides to using such alarmist tactics. Pessimistic critics who use threat inflation to advance their causes are rarely held accountable when their panicky predictions fail to come to pass. As journalist Matt Ridley correctly observes, “Pessimism has always been big box office.”  Bad news sells, and there are always plenty of buyers.

It’s a shame rational debate is increasing impossible in this and other Internet policy arenas.

Mark Thompson has a new essay up over at Time on “Cyber War Worrywarts” in which he argues that in debates about cybersecurity, “the ratio of scaremongers to calm logic [is] currently about a 2-to-1 edge in favor of the Jules Verne crowd.”  He’s right.  In fact, I used my latest Forbes essay to document some of the panicky rhetoric and examples of “threat inflation” we currently see at work in debates over cybersecurity policy. “Threat inflation” refers to the artificial escalation of dangers or harms to society or the economy and doom-and-gloom rhetoric is certainly on the rise in this arena.

I begin my essay by noting how “It has become virtually impossible to read an article about cybersecurity policy, or sit through any congressional hearing on the issue, without hearing prophecies of doom about an impending “Digital Pearl Harbor,” a “cyber Katrina,” or even a “cyber 9/11.”” Meanwhile, Gen. Michael Hayden, who led the National Security Administration and Central Intelligence Agency under president George W. Bush, recently argued that a “digital Blackwater” may be needed to combat the threat of cyberterrorism.

These rhetorical claims are troubling to me for several reasons. I build on the concerns raised originally in an important Mercatus Center paper by my colleagues Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins, which warns of the dangers of threat inflation in policy debates and the corresponding rise of the “cybersecurity industrial complex.” In my Forbes essay, I note that:

Panics and threat inflation can create distrust in many institutions, especially the press, and result in a “boy who cried wolf” problem. When panic becomes the norm, it becomes more difficult for the public to take seriously those who propagate such tall tales. “When a threat is inflated,” argue Brito and Watkins, “the marketplace of ideas on which a democracy relies to make sound judgments—in particular, the media and popular debate—can become overwhelmed by fallacious information.”

Moreover:

Apocalyptic rhetoric and prophecies of doom are also inappropriate—even offensive—when comparisons are made to horrific events that are not analogous to cybersecurity attacks. Thousands lost their lives or were injured in the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the World Trade Center during 9/11, and Hurricane Katrina also resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries in 2005. To compare cybersecurity attacks to those incidents is to insult the memories of those who lost their lives.

Finally, the technopanic mentality is also troubling because it can lead to calls for comprehensive regulation of the Internet or forms of information control. We are starting to hear calls by a variety of policymakers and cyberwar pundits for more “oversight” and “control.” In a National Journal essay last month, Michael Hirsh noted that “the cyberwar threat is being hyped because of a fear of unknown dangers [but] the biggest threat of all may come from our own overreaction.”  Hirsh documents how “a new multibillion-dollar military-industrial complex is emerging,” and billions are already being spent. In my Forbes piece, I note how in his recent book, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, cyberwar prophet of doom Richard A. Clarke, a former cybersecurity advisor in the Clinton and Bush Administrations, calls for government to impose a fairly sweeping set of new rules on Internet Service Providers to better secure their networks against potential attacks.  Clarke wants ISPs to engage in a great deal more network monitoring for digital dangers (using deep-packet inspection techniques) under threat of legal sanction if things go wrong. He admits there are corresponding costs and privacy concerns, but largely dismisses them in the name of a safer and more secure cyberspace. [See my review of his book here.]

My primary fear is that this panic is all prelude to a big push for a “precautionary principle” approach for cybersecurity. That is, progress in the digital technology arena will increasingly be subjected to preemptive prohibitions and ongoing “oversight” out of fear of any and all “worst case” risk scenarios that policymakers and cyberwar pundits can conjure up.

As I note in concluding my essay, the better approach to cybersecurity going forward is education and resiliency:

People and institutions can prepare for potential security problems in a rational fashion if given more information and tools to better secure their digital systems and understand how to cope when problems arise. Panic, by contrast, is never the right answer.

Yet, fear remains a remarkably powerful force in public policy debate and I am willing to bet that these threat inflation tactics will only increase in coming months and years. As I’ve noted here many times before, fear sells.

Related TLF Reading (all from Jerry Brito)

• Langevin: Panetta is cyberdoom certified
• Can cyber-kamikazes cyberbombard our cyberdefenses?
• Overclassification stifles the cybersecurity conversation