In theory, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) exists to save lives and improve health outcomes. All too often, however, that goal is hindered by the agency’s highly bureaucratic, top-down, command-and-control orientation toward drug and medical device approval.

Today’s case in point involves families of children with diabetes, many of whom are increasingly frustrated with the FDA’s foot-dragging when it comes to approval of medical devices that could help their kids. Writing today in The Wall Street Journal, Kate Linebaugh discusses how “Tech-Savvy Families Use Home-Built Diabetes Device” to help their kids when FDA regulations limit the availability of commercial options. She documents how families of diabetic children are taking matters into their own hands and creating their own home-crafted insulin pumps, which can automatically dose the proper amount of proper amount of the hormone in response to their child’s blood-sugar levels. Families are building, calibrating, and troubleshooting these devices on their own. And the movement is growing. Linebaugh reports that:

More than 50 people have soldered, tinkered and written software to make such devices for themselves or their children. The systems—known in the industry as artificial pancreases or closed loop systems—have been studied for decades, but improvements to sensor technology for real-time glucose monitoring have made them possible. The Food and Drug Administration has made approving such devices a priority and several companies are working on them. But the yearslong process of commercial development and regulatory approval is longer than many patients want, and some are technologically savvy enough to do it on their own.

Linebaugh notes that this particular home-built medical project (known as OpenAPS), was created by Dana Lewis, a 27-year-old with Type 1 diabetes in Seattle. Linebaugh says that:

Ms. Lewis began using the system in December 2014 as a sort of self-experiment. After months of tweeting about it, she attracted others who wanted what she had. The only restriction of the project is users have to put the system together on their own. Ms. Lewis and other users offer advice, but it is each one’s responsibility to know how to troubleshoot. A Bay Area cardiologist is teaching himself software programming to build one for his 1-year-old daughter who was diagnosed in March.

In essence, these individuals and families are engaging in a variant of the sort of decentralized “biohacking” that is becoming increasingly prevalent in society today. As I discussed in a recent law review article, biohacking refers to the efforts of average citizens (often working together in a decentralized fashion) to enhance various human capabilities. This can include implanting things inside one’s body or using external devices to supplement one’s abilities or to address health-related issues.

I documented other examples of this trend in my essays on average citizens making 3D-printed prosthetics (The Right to Try, 3D Printing, the Costs of Technological Control & the Future of the FDA) as well as retainers (“In a World Where Kids Can 3D-Print Their Own Retainers, What Should Regulators Do?”) As “software eats the world” and allows for this sort of democratized medical self-experimentation, more and more citizens are likely going to be engaging in biohacking. In the process, they will often be doing an end-around the FDA and its complex maze of regulatory restrictions on health innovation.

Stated more provocatively, thanks to new technological capabilities and networking platforms, the public may increasingly enjoy a de facto “right to try” for many new medical devices and treatments. Technological innovation will decentralize and democratize medical decisions even when the legal status of such actions is unclear or even flatly illegal.

But is a world of increasingly decentralized, democratized, and such highly personalized medicine actually safe? Well, all risk is relative and as I discussed extensively in my recent book and other work on innovation policy, sometimes the greatest risk of all is the refusal to take any risk to begin with. If you disallow or limit efforts to engage in certain risky endeavours, ultimately, you could end up doing more harm because there can be no reward without a corresponding amount of risk-taking. It is only through constant trial and error experimentation that we find new and better ways of doing things. That is particularly true as it pertains to life-enriching or even life-saving medical treatments. While the FDA likes to think that its hyper-cautious approach to medical drug and device approval ultimately saves lives, in the aggregate, we have no idea how many lives are actually being lost (or how much pain and suffering is occurring) due to FDA prohibitions on our freedom to experiment with new products and services.

One of the parents Linebaugh interviewed for her story made the following remark: “Diabetes is dangerous anyway. Insulin is dangerous. I think what we are doing is actually improving that and lowering the risk.” That is exactly right. This father understands the reality of risk trade-offs. There are certainly risks associated with what these families are doing for their children. But these families also have a very palpable sense of the opposite problem: There is a profound and immediate risk of doing nothing and waiting for the FDA to finally get around to approving the devices that their children need  right now.

All this raises another interesting policy question: Why is it legal for these parents to engage in this sort of medical self-experimentation–experimentation on their children, no less!–while it remains flatly illegal for any commercial operator to offer similar products that could help these families? Many modern regulatory regimes accord differential treatment to commercial activities. Non-commercial versions of some activities are left alone, but as soon as commercial opportunities arise, policymakers seek to apply regulation.

Does this sort of commercial vs. non-commercial regulatory asymmetry make any sense? As far as I can tell, this regulatory distinction is mostly rooted in the fact that deep-pocked commercial operators make easier targets for regulators to go after when compared to harassing average citizens.  Going after average citizens would be bad PR and a serious legal hassle as well because issues pertaining to personal autonomy or parental rights would likely be raised both in the court of public opinion and courts of law.

Regardless, let’s not kid ourselves into thinking that this regulatory distinction is rooted in safety considerations. After all, it is almost certainly the case that those commercial medical innovators are likely building safer products, made by medical professionals with years of experience. Moreover, commercial operators are more likely to carry insurance to address any problems that may develop, and they possess strong reputational incentives to be good market actors. Commercial operators have to maintain brand loyalty to earn new or repeat business, or perhaps just to avoid stiff legal liability that non-commercial operators might not face. 

In any event, one thing should be abundantly clear: If the FDA doesn’t change its ways, we can expect an increasing number of citizens to begin pursuing medical treatments outside the boundaries of the law (and potentially outside the realm of common sense). Many people want a right to try new devices and therapies, and in our modern networked world, they are increasingly going to get it whether regulators like it or not.

Lawmakers in Congress need to exercise better oversight of rogue agencies like the FDA, which face no serious penalties for the sort of endless regulatory foot-dragging that threatens public welfare. If the agency was required by Congress to improve its drug and device approval process, then perhaps fewer Americans would be forced to take matters into their own hands to begin with. Down below, I’ve included a few reports suggesting how we might get this much-needed reform process started.

Additional reading from Mercatus Center scholars:

• white paper: “US Medical Devices: Choices and Consequences,” by Richard Williams, Robert Graboyes & Adam Thierer
• white paper: “The Proper Role of the FDA for the 21st Century,” by Joseph V. Gulfo, Jason Briggeman, Ethan Roberts
• white paper: “How Productive Is the FDA’s Devices Program?” by Richard Williams, Jason Briggeman, Ethan Roberts
• special report: “From Fortress to Frontier: How Innovation Can Save Health Care,” by Robert Graboyes
• blog post: “The Right to Try, 3D Printing, the Costs of Technological Control & the Future of the FDA,” by Adam Thierer
• blog post: “In a World Where Kids Can 3D-Print Their Own Retainers, What Should Regulators Do?” by Adam Thierer

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^[5]

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . .  In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7]  In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1]     See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2]     Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3]     Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets:  Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6]     Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7]     Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8]     Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9]     Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10]   See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name:  Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14]   Id.

[15]   Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16]   See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17]   See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20]  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases.  It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23]   FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24]   See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

Regular readers know that I can get a little feisty when it comes to the topic of “regulatory capture,” which occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies (regulatory agencies, in particular) to further their own ends. As I noted in my big compendium, “Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found“:

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.

Indeed, the more I highlight the problem of regulatory capture and offer concrete examples of it in practice, the more push-back I get from true believers in the idea of “independent” agencies. Even if I can get them to admit that history offers countless examples of capture in action, and that a huge number of scholars of all persuasions have documented this problem, they will continue to persist that, WE CAN DO BETTER! and that it is just a matter of having THE RIGHT PEOPLE! who will TRY HARDER!

Well, maybe. But I am a realist and a believer in historical evidence. And the evidence shows, again and again, that when Congress (a) delegates broad, ambiguous authority to regulatory agencies, (b) exercises very limited oversight over that agency, and then, worse yet, (c) allows that agency’s budget to grow without any meaningful constraint, then the situation is ripe for abuse. Specifically, where unchecked power exists, interests will look to exploit it for their own ends.

In any event, all I can do is to continue to document the problem of regulatory capture in action and try to bring it to the attention of pundits and policymakers in the hope that we can start the push for real agency oversight and reform. Today’s case in point comes from a field I have been covering here a lot over the past year: commercial drone innovation.

Yesterday, via his Twitter account, Wall Street Journal reporter Christopher Mims brought this doozy of an example of regulatory capture to my attention, which involves Federal Aviation Administration officials going to bat for the pilots who frequently lobby the agency and want commercial drone innovations constrained. Here’s how Jack Nicas begins the WSJ piece that Mims brought to my attention:

In an unfolding battle over U.S. skies, it’s man versus drone. Aerial surveyors, photographers and moviemaking pilots are increasingly losing business to robots that often can do their jobs faster, cheaper and better. That competition, paired with concerns about midair collisions with drones, has made commercial pilots some of the fiercest opponents to unmanned aircraft. And now these aviators are fighting back, lobbying regulators for strict rules for the devices and reporting unauthorized drone users to authorities. Jim Williams, head of the Federal Aviation Administration’s unmanned-aircraft office, said many FAA investigations into commercial-drone flights begin with tips from manned-aircraft pilots who compete with those drones. “They’ll let us know that, ’Hey, I’m losing all my business to these guys. They’re not approved. Go investigate,’” Mr. Williams said at a drone conference last year. “We will investigate those.”

Well, that pretty much says it all. If you’re losing business because an innovative new technology or pesky new entrant has the audacity to come onto your turf and compete, well then, just come on down to your friendly neighborhood regulator and get yourself a double serving of tasty industry protectionism!

And so the myth of “agency independence” continues, and perhaps it will never die. It reminds me of a line from those rock-and-roll sages in Guns N’ Roses: ” I’ve worked too hard for my illusions just to throw them all away!”

If you want a devastating portrait of how well-intentioned regulation sometimes has profoundly deleterious unintended consequences, look no further than the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) current ban on commercial drones in domestic airspace. As Jack Nicas reports in a story in today’s Wall Street Journal (“Regulation Clips Wings of U.S. Drone Makers“), the FAA’s heavy-handed regulatory regime is stifling America’s ability to innovate in this space and remain competitive internationally. As Nicas notes:

as unmanned aircraft enter private industry—for purposes as varied as filming movies, inspecting wind farms and herding cattle—many U.S. drone entrepreneurs are finding it hard to get off the ground, even as rivals in Europe, Canada, Australia and China are taking off. The reason, according to interviews with two-dozen drone makers, sellers and users across the world: regulation. The FAA has banned all but a handful of private-sector drones in the U.S. while it completes rules for them, expected in the next several years. That policy has stifled the U.S. drone market and driven operators underground, where it is difficult to find funding, insurance and customers. Outside the U.S., relatively accommodating policies have fueled a commercial-drone boom. Foreign drone makers have fed those markets, while U.S. export rules have generally kept many American manufacturers from serving them.

Of course, the FAA simply responds that they are looking out for the safety of the skies and that we shouldn’t blame them. Again, there’s no doubt that the agency’s hyper-cautious approach to commercial drone integration is based on the best of intentions. But as we’ve noted here again and again, all the best of intentions don’t count for much–or at least shouldn’t count for much–when stacked against real-world evidence and results. And the results in this case are quite troubling.

An article last week from Alan McQuinn of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (“Commercial Drone Companies Fly Away from FAA Regulations, Go Abroad“) documented how problematic this situation has become:

With no certainty surrounding a timeline, limited access to exemptions, and a dithering pace for setting its rules, the FAA is slowing innovation. . . .  These overbearing rules have pushed U.S. companies to move their drone research and development projects to more permissive nations, such as Australia, where Google chose to test its drones. Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the agency in charge of commercial drones, offers a great example of unrestrictive regulations. While it has not yet finalized its drone laws, it still allows companies and citizens to test and use these technologies under certain rules. Instead of forcing companies to reveal their technologies at government test sites, it allows them to test outdoors if they receive an operator’s certificate and submit their test area for approval. Australia’s more permissive nature shows how a country can allow innovation to thrive while simultaneously examining it for potential safety concerns.

The Wall Street Journal’s Nicas similarly observes that foreign innovators are already taking advantage of America’s regulatory mistakes to leapfrog us in drone innovation. He reports that Germany, Canada, Australia and China are starting to move ahead of us. Nicas quotes Steve Klindworth, head of a DJI drone retailer in Liberty Hill, Texas, who says that if the United States doesn’t move soon to adopt a more sensible policy position for drones that, “It’ll reach a point of no return where American companies won’t ever be able to catch up.”

In essence, the United States is adopting the exact opposite  approach we did a generation ago for the Internet and digital technology.  I’ve written recently about how “permissionless innovation” powered the Information Revolution and helped American companies become the envy of the globe. (See my essay, “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters,” for more details and data.) That happened because America got policy right, whereas other countries either tried to micromanage the Information Revolution into existence or they adopted policies that instead actively stifled it. (See my recent book on this subject for more discussion.)

In essence, we see this story playing out in reverse with commercial drones. The FAA is adopting a hyper-precautionary principle position that is holding back innovation based on worse-case scenarios. Certainly the safety of the national airspace is a vital matter. But to shut down all other aerial innovation in the meantime is completely unreasonable. As I wrote in a filing to the FAA with my Mercatus Center colleagues Eli Dourado and Jerry Brito last year:

Like the Internet, airspace is a platform for commercial and social innovation. We cannot accurately predict to what uses it will be put when restrictions on commercial use of UASs are lifted. Nevertheless, experience shows that it is vital that innovation and entrepreneurship be allowed to proceed without ex ante barriers imposed by regulators. We therefore urge the FAA not to impose  any  prospective restrictions on the use of commercial UASs without clear evidence of actual, not merely hypothesized, harm.

Countless life-enriching innovations are being sacrificed because of the FAA’s draconian policy. (Below I have embedded a video of me discussing those innovations with John Stossel, which was taped earlier this year.) New industry sectors and many jobs are also being forgone. It’s time for the FAA to get moving to open up the skies to drone innovation. Congress should be pushing the agency harder on this front since the agency seems determined to ignore the law, which requires the agency to integrate commercial drones into the nation’s airspace.

Additional  Reading

• Filing to FAA on Drones & “Model Aircraft”, Sept. 23, 2014
• Private Drones & the First Amendment, Sept. 19, 2014
• [TV interview] The Beneficial Uses of Private Drones, March 28, 2014
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FAA on integration of drones into the nation’s airspace, April 23, 2o13
• Eli Dourado, Deregulate the Skies: Why We Can’t Afford to Fear Drones, Wired, April 23, 2013
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)

The use of unmanned aircraft systems, or “drones,” for private and commercial uses remains the subject of much debate. The issue has been heating up lately after Congress ordered the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to integrate UASs into the nation’s airspace system by 2015 as part of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.

The debate has thus far centered mostly around the safety and privacy-related concerns associated with private use of drones. The FAA continues to move slowly on this front based on a fear that private drones could jeopardize air safety or the safety of others on the ground. Meanwhile, some privacy advocates are worried that private drones might be used in ways that invade private spaces or even public areas where citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For these and other reasons, the FAA’s current ban on private operation of drones in the nation’s airspace remains in place.

But what about the speech-related implications of this debate? After all, private and commercial UASs can have many peaceful, speech-related uses. Indeed, to borrow Ithiel de Sola Pool’s term, private drones can be thought of as “technologies or freedom” that expand and enhance the ability of humans to gather and share information, thus in turn expanding the range of human knowledge and freedom.

A new Mercatus Center at George Mason University working paper, “News from Above: First Amendment Implications of the Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones,” deals with these questions.  This 59-page working paper was authored by Cynthia Love, Sean T. Lawson, and Avery Holton. (Love is currently a Law Clerk for Judge Carolyn B. McHugh in 10th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Lawson and Holton are affliated with the Department of Communication at the University of Utah.)

“To date, little attention has been paid to the First Amendment implications of the [FAA] ban,” note Love, Lawson, and Holton. Their article argues that “aerial photography with UASs, whether commercial or not, is protected First Amendment activity, particularly for news-gathering purposes. The FAA must take First Amendment-protected uses of this technology into account as it proceeds with meeting its congressional mandate to promulgate rules for domestic UASs.” They conclude by noting that “The dangers of [the FAA’s] regulatory approach are no mere matter of esoteric administrative law. Rather, as we have demonstrated, use of threats to enforce illegally promulgated rules, in particular a ban on journalistic use of UASs, infringes upon perhaps our most cherished constitutional right, that of free speech and a free press.”

The authors note that we already have a well-established set of principles that guide how government may set content-neutral regulations related to the time, place, or manner for how certain technologies can be used. Unfortunately, the FAA doesn’t seem to be paying any attention to this time-tested jurisprudence. As the authors note:

Because the airspace within a public forum should itself be considered a public forum, the government may only restrict the journalistic use of UAS technology with content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of such use. Such regulations must be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,” and “leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” The FAA’s blanket ban on commercial use fails to meet this test. The FAA’s ban is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.

This new paper by Love, Lawson, and Holton will hopefully inform future policymaking and judicial activity on this front and, if nothing else, make the FAA to realize that it is not above the law–and in this case the First Amendment–when it comes to drone policy. Please read the entire paper for more details. It is exceptionally well done and could be a real game-changer in these debates.

P.S. I plan on attaching Love, Lawson, and Holton’s paper to my filing to the FAA next week in its proceeding on model aircraft regulation. The filing date for that proceeding was extended this summer and comments are now due next week. I will post my filing here shortly. The Mercatus Center filed comments with the FAA earlier about the prompt integration of drones into the nation’s airspace. You can read those comments here. You can also read Eli Dourado’s excellent Wired editorial on the matter here and here’s a video of me talking about these issues on the Stossel show a few months ago.

I thought Todd Zywicki, a senior scholar with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, did a nice job on Judge Napolitano’s “Freedom Watch” show addressing the contentious question of whether government should be regulating food advertising in order to somehow make American kids healthier. Todd pointed out how the advertising guidelines currently being developed are anything but “voluntary” and noted that there are many causes of childhood obesity. Watch the clip here:

Importantly, Todd also notes that there are First Amendment issues in play here. Commercial free speech is not completely without constitutional protection, as I noted in my recent Charleston Law Review article on “Advertising, Commercial Speech & First Amendment Parity.”

Finally, as we always note here about regulation generally — especially restrictions on advertising — there is no free lunch (excuse the pun in this case!). Advertising has traditionally been the great subsidizer of media and information in America. It has also kept competitors on their toes and kept prices in check.  These benefits are lost when we regulate advertising. So, while some nanny state-ers would like to convince us that they simply have the best interests of our kids in mind, the reality is that the regulations they favor will likely drive up costs for families and limit their choices of both products and media platforms, both of which are subsidized by advertising.

Today the Mercatus Center has released a short new paper I have authored on “Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech.”  I begin the piece by noting that:

Federal policy makers, state legislators, and state attorneys general have recently shown interest in regulating commercial advertising and marketing. Several new regulatory initiatives are being proposed, or are already underway, that could severely curtail or restrict advertising or marketing on a variety of platforms. The consequences of these stepped-up regulatory efforts will be profound and will hurt consumer welfare both directly and indirectly.

I go on to note that “advertising can be an easy target for politicians or regulatory activist groups who make a variety of (typically unsubstantiated) claims about its negative impact on society,” but then continue on to explain how “the role of commercial speech in a free-market economy is often misunderstood or taken for granted.” I outline how, despite regulators’ concerns, consumers actually derive three important types of benefits from advertising and marketing: (1) Informational / Educational Benefits; (2) Market Choice / Pro-Competitive Benefits; and (3) Media Promotion / Cross-Subsidization.  After discussing each benefit, I conclude that:

For these reasons, a stepped-up regulatory crusade against advertising and marketing will hurt consumer welfare since it will raise prices, restrict choice, and diminish marketplace competition and innovation—both in ad-supported content and service markets, and throughout the economy at large.  Simply stated, there is no free lunch.

Read the entire 1,800-word essay here.  I have also embedded the document down below in a Scribd reader.

Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech (Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC essentially stands for the proposition that free speech is free speech regardless of the speaker. The 5-4 majority for the Court ruled that “We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.” (at 25)  Echoing its early decision in Bellotti, the Court noted that “Political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.’” (at 33) “All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s ideas.” (at 35) “There is simply no support for the view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations.” (at 37)

Somehow this has proven controversial, even radical, to some.  But, as George Will correctly notes, “This was radical only because after nearly four decades of such ‘reform’ the First Amendment has come to seem radical. Which, indeed, it is. The Supreme Court on Thursday restored First Amendment protection to the core speech that it was designed to protect — political speech.”  Essentially, the decision gets Congress out of the game of picking who, or what platform, deserves full First Amendment protection when it comes to uttering political speech. And there’s nothing radical about that.

Indeed, as Justice Kennedy noted for the majority, there is nothing surprising about this reasoning once you realize that almost every other type legislative or regulatory speech restriction has been struck down as a violation of the First Amendment. “The law before us is an outright ban [on political speech], backed by criminal sanctions,” Kennedy noted (at 20).  “If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech.” (at 33)  Think about this for a second: Criminal sanctions or jail time for political speech! How in the world did we get to the point in this nation where criminalizing political speech became acceptable to our legislators?  Ignoring the obvious answer—it’s all about protecting incumbents—what is really “radical” here is not that the Supreme Court setting us back on the right path, but that our legislative branch has veered so far off of it.

I also agree with Tim Lee and Eugene Volokh who note that corporate money has always been part of politics and it is silly to think the restrictions in play here would really do much to change things in Washington in terms of diminishing “corruption.” Frankly, if you want less corruption in government, you need to begin by shrinking the powers of government to a more sensible level.  Big government breeds corruption opportunities simply because the “return on investment” for dollars spent trying to influence politics depends on how much money politicians can control through spending and regulation.

And political advertising or “electioneering communications” in the days leading up to an election are about the last thing you should be worrying about if you really want to “clean up the system.”  You don’t strengthen democracy by stifling freedom of speech or issue advocacy. That’s the equivalent of burning the village in order to save it.

For technology policy, the most important part of the decision is probably the following passage:

Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers… Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message… Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues…The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech…[viii][viii]

As Seth Cooper correctly argues:

These passages… are clearly at odds with Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC’s assertion sixty years ago that “differences in the characteristics of news media justify different in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”

Eugene Volokh makes much the same point. Perhaps we are finally seeing an end to America’s “First Amendment Twilight Zone” as I have called it [see this video presentation] and, with any luck, a consistent First Amendment for the Information Age.

Former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin used to refer to commercial alternatives to NASA’s Ares rockets as “Paper Rockets,” but commercial vehicles like Atlas V, Delta IV and Falcon 1 are quite real and available today, while Ares 1 and 5 are grossly over-budget and way behind-schedule:

http://www.youtube.com/v/VqR7IDzA5Xo NASA should buy commercial space services whenever possible from NewSpace companies like SpaceX, Virgin Galactic and Bigelow Aerospace. The Commercial Spaceflight Revolution is happening now!

What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation? [pdf]

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point No. 16.19

Anyone who has spent time following debates about speech and privacy regulation comes to recognize the striking parallels between these two policy arenas. In this paper we will highlight the common rhetoric, proposals, and tactics that unite these regulatory movements. Moreover, we will argue that, at root, what often animates calls for regulation of both speech and privacy are two remarkably elitist beliefs:

1. People are too ignorant (or simply too busy) to be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or,
2. All or most people share essentially the same values or concerns and, therefore, “community standards” should trump household (or individual) standards.

While our use of the term “elitism” may unduly offend some understandably sensitive to populist demagoguery, our aim here is not to launch a broadside against elitism as Time magazine culture critic William H. Henry once defined it: “The willingness to assert unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”^[1] Rather, our aim here is to critique that elitism which rises to the level of political condescension and legal sanction. We attack not so much the beliefs of some leaders, activists, or intellectuals that they have a better idea of what it in the public’s best interest than the public itself does, but rather the imposition of those beliefs through coercive, top-down mandates.

That sort of elitism—elitism enforced by law—is often the objective of speech and privacy regulatory advocates. Our goal is to identify the common themes that unite these regulatory movements, explain why such political elitism is unwarranted, and make it clear how it threatens individual liberty as well as the future of free and open Internet. As an alternative to this elitist vision, we advocate an empowerment agenda: fostering an environment in which users have the tools and information they need to make decisions for themselves and their families.

I. The Elitism of Speech Regulation

First, consider how those two elitist beliefs identified above are on display when lawmakers or regulatory advocates make efforts to control speech or content.^[2] Calls to regulate free speech are often premised on the belief that something must be done to “protect The Children.”^[3] Personal and parental responsibility ^[4] are regarded as inadequate safeguards ^[5] since some parents will inevitably fall down on the job by not adequately shielding their children’s eyes and ears from potentially objectionable (or supposedly harmful) speech. Therefore, government must regulate content that is indecent, profane, excessively violent, and so on. The definition of those things is then left to unelected bureaucrats and judges to make on our behalf.

But it’s not just about “The Children.” Some regulatory advocates believe that even the choices made by consenting adults must be disregarded because some people fail to understand the supposedly destructive nature of the speech they are consuming. Government must act to protect people from making what some regulatory advocates regard as destructive or even immoral choices that could bring harm to them or their loved ones.

In sum, regulatory advocates are essentially saying that people cannot be trusted or left to their own devices and, therefore, government must intervene and establish a baseline “community standard” on behalf of the entire citizenry to tell them what‘s best for them.^[6] Even if those citizens have tools and information at their disposal to make sensible decisions about objectionable content, that’s not good enough because they might not do the job properly. Government must do it for them!

II. The Elitism of Privacy Regulation

This same mentality motivates calls for privacy regulations. Those who call for government interventions to “protect privacy” often claim that people too willingly surrender personal information about themselves and that they don’t understand the adverse consequences of those actions.^[7] Alternatively, regulatory advocates claim that advertising and marketing efforts are inherently “manipulative” and that people do not realize they are being duped into surrendering personal information or into buying products or services they supposedly don’t need.^[8] Of course, those regulatory advocates rarely pause to explain to us how it is that they were not also duped and manipulated by the same things—again revealing their deeply-rooted elitism! (As discussed below, this makes it clear how the psychological phenomenon of “third-person effect hypothesis” is driving much of this debate.)

“Protecting The Children” is also used as a rhetorical cover for regulation here, but not as often in debates over speech controls.^[9] Instead, regulatory advocates mostly focus on adults who are presumed not to know what is in their own best interest—necessitating paternalistic government intervention on their behalf.

III. Intellectual Schizophrenia on Both the Left & Right

What is particularly interesting about all this is the way these two issues expose a sort of intellectual schizophrenia at work on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum. Left-leaning policymakers and intellectuals typically decry censorship efforts (except where “commercial speech,” “hate speech” and “bias” are at issue), but are quick to rally around proposals to layer privacy regulations on the Internet. The opposite is often true of many on the Right of the political spectrum: They typically declare privacy regulations to be paternalistic and antithetical to free enterprise (or perhaps just erosive of efforts to legislate morality),^[10] but in the next breath advocate controls on content they find objectionable.

Few on either side stop to consider the relationship between speech and privacy. In fact, they are but two sides of the same coin. After all, what is your “right to privacy” but a right to stop me from observing you and speaking about you?^[11] “Protecting privacy,” therefore, typically means restricting speech rights in the process. Advocates of privacy regulation often insist that the use, processing and collection of information are “conduct” unprotected by the First Amendment, but in fact, the First Amendment broadly protects the gathering and distribution of information as part of the process of communication (“speech”).^[12] Similarly, attempts to “clean up” speech or “protect The Children,” often require regulations that would betray the privacy of adults by expanding the role of government, and impose serious burdens on businesses and markets—such as age verification mandates ^[13] or extensive data retention requirements.^[14]

IV. Common Tactics & Regulatory Mechanisms

The two movements also share common political tactics and regulatory approaches. Privacy advocates generally favor “opt-in” mandates as the federal “baseline standard” for any website collecting information about users, especially their browsing habits (regardless of whether the information is “personally identifiable”). In other words, the law would create a property right in such “personal information” (ironically, many advocates of this approach criticize or reject intellectual property.) In a similar vein, many advocates of speech controls push for mandatory parental control tools or restrictive default settings.^[15] That is, if government won’t censor speech outright, regulatory advocates want lawmakers to at least (1) require that media, computing and communications devices be shipped to market with parental controls embedded or included (as proposed in Australia and with China’s “Green Dam” filter),^[16] and possibly, (2) that such controls be defaulted to their most restrictive position—forcing users to opt-out of the controls later if they want to consume media rated above a certain threshold.

More sophisticated advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation will likely argue that their paternalism is less elitist or intrusive because they merely want to “nudge” the public into making “better” decisions. Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein (director of President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, responsible for analyzing most new federal regulations) popularized this approach with their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Based on behavioral economics studies, they argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve decision-making without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[17]

In this regard, Sunstein and Thaler’s approach parallels the work of Lawrence Lessig, one of the most influential Internet policy thinkers. Lessig has argued that the “architecture” of “code” (how software is written) “regulates” all online activities and requires government oversight and intervention to keep in check. Otherwise, he warned ominously a decade ago, “Left to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control.”^[18] Lessig’s hyper-pessimistic predictions have proven unwarranted, however. Far from fostering a world of “perfect control,” code and cyberspace have proven remarkably difficult to regulate, but nonetheless has generally benefited consumers and citizens without centralized direction.^[19] Still, Lessig, Sunstein, and others of this ilk persist in their advocacy of “nudges” of many varieties to impose their will on cyberspace through mandates from above.

But while it might be possible to define “better decisions” and argue that poor choice architecture leads people to choose things they clearly don’t want in contexts like investment decisions and mortgages, how can elites know what other people really want in highly subjective contexts like privacy and speech? Should they rely on opinion polls—the highly subjective results of which depend heavily on “choice architecture” of question-crafting—to guess what the right default should be?^[20] Was the Chinese proposal to mandate deployment of “Green Dam” just a harmless “nudge” because users weren’t barred from uninstalling the filtering software that must accompany their computers (i.e., “opting-out”)? The problem becomes even more difficult where trade-offs among competing values are inevitable. For example, data collection about Internet users raises privacy concerns for some but benefits all, creating more funding for “free” content (i.e., speech) and services users prefer by making more valuable the advertising that supports online publishers. In short, regulations of speech and privacy are likely to be pure paternalism, even when billed as “libertarian paternalism as Thaler and Sunstein label their approach.^[21]

What might be called “regulatory blackmail” is also a time-honored tradition among both advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation. When censorship advocates have previously been impeded by the First Amendment, they have worked behind the scenes with lawmakers or regulatory agencies to use indirect pressure and strong-arming tactics to extract “voluntary concessions” from companies or others.^[22] For example, in 2004, the FCC strong-armed radio giant Clear Channel into agreeing to a “voluntary” consent decree that involved taking Howard Stern off the air.^[23] Similarly, in 2008, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio finally agreed to set aside 4% of their system capacity for use by politically favored racial minorities (a kind of speech control) as a “voluntary condition” of their merger—after the FCC had sat on their application for nearly 16 months.^[24] This race-based preference would have been unconstitutional if the FCC had imposed it directly.^[25] While the FTC has been far less prone to such abuse and actually plays a key role in holding companies to their promises, its current Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, has hung the “regulatory sword of Damocles” over the heads of the online advertising industry, threatening them with a “day of reckoning” if he doesn’t get what he wants from industry self-regulatory efforts.”^[26] The sword could actually fall if the FTC turns self-regulation into the European model of “co-regulation,” where the government steers and industry simply rows.^[27]

V. The Crisis Mentality that Drives Regulation

Speech and privacy regulatory advocates share another trait in common: an affinity for the use of a crisis mentality as a method of spurring political action. In his 1995 book The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy, political philosopher and economist Thomas Sowell formulated a model that he argued drives ideological crusades to expand government power over our lives and economy. “The great ideological crusades of the twentieth-century intellectuals have ranged across the most disparate fields,” noted Sowell. But what they all had in common, he argued, was “their moral exaltation of the anointed above others, who are to have their different views nullified and superseded by the views of the anointed, imposed via the power of government.”^[28] These government-expanding crusades shared several key elements, which Sowell identified as follows:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society, a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many, in response to the prescient conclusions of the few.
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes.

We see this model at work on a daily basis today with our government’s various efforts to reshape our economy, but the model is equally applicable to debates over speech controls and privacy regulation. In particular, the various “technopanics”^[29] we have witnessed in recent years fit this model. For example, consider how this model plays out in the debate over online social networking:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [online sexual predators], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [such as mandatory online age verification ^[30] or the Deleting Online Predators Act ^[31]] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [must stop kids and adults from being online together on same sites], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [some state Attorneys General].^[32]
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [child safety researchers and others are told that their research is meaningless or offbase].^[33]

We also see this model in play in other debates, such as efforts to regulate “excessively violent” video games and television programming.^[34] And consider how this model plays out on the privacy front:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [amorphous privacy violations], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [“baseline federal privacy regulation”] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [anyone who shares information online], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [a handful of privacy advocacy groups].
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [any suggestion that privacy concerns are being overblown and that most information-sharing is socially beneficial is dismissed out-of-hand].

Worse yet, regulatory intervention in these cases simply begets more and more intervention to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions.^[35] Thus, the “crisis” cycle never ends.

VI. Third-Person Effect Hypothesis as an Explanation

Something more profound than simple political elitism seems to be at work here, however. A phenomenon psychologists refer to as the “third-person effect hypothesis” can explain many calls for government intervention, especially in the media world.^[36] Simply stated, speech and privacy critics sometimes seem to only see and hear in media or communications what they want to see and hear—or what they don’t want to see or hear. When they encounter perspectives or preferences that are at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and come to believe that government must “do something” to correct those perspectives. Many people desire regulation because they think it will be good for others, not necessarily for themselves. The regulation they desire has a very specific purpose in mind: “re-tilting” speech or market behavior in their desired direction.

The third-person effect hypothesis was first formulated by W. Phillips Davison in a seminal 1983 article:

In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.^[37]

Davison used this hypothesis to explain how media critics on both the Left and Right seemed to simultaneously find “bias” in the same content or reports when they couldn’t possibly both be correct. In reality, their own personal preferences were biasing their ability to fairly evaluate that content. Davison’s article prompted further research by many other psychologists, social scientists, and public opinion experts to test just how powerful this phenomenon was in explaining calls for censorship and other social phenomena.^[38] In these studies, third-person effect has been shown to be the primary explanation for why many people fear—or even want to ban—various types of speech or expression, including news,^[39] misogynistic rap lyrics,^[40] television violence,^[41] video games,^[42] and pornography.^[43] In each case, the subjects surveyed expressed strong misgivings about allowing others to see or hear too much of the speech or expression in question, but greatly discounted the impact of that speech on themselves. Such studies thus reveal the strong paternalistic instinct behind proposals to regulate speech. As Davison notes:

Insofar as faith and morals are concerned… it is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor’s friends are usually safe from the pollution. It is the general public that must be protected. Or else, it is youthful members of the general public, or those with impressionable minds.^[44]

It’s easy to see how this same phenomenon is at work in debates about privacy. Regulatory advocates imagine their preferences are “correct” (right for everyone) and that the masses are being duped by external forces beyond their control or comprehension, even though the advocates themselves are somehow immune from the brain-washing and privy to some higher truth that the hoi polloi simply cannot fathom. Again, this is Sowell’s “Vision of the Anointed” at work.

Consider the flare-up in 2004 over the introduction of Gmail, Google’s free email service. At a time when Yahoo! mail (then as now the leading webmail provider) offered customers less than 10 megabytes of email storage, Gmail offered an astounding gigabyte of storage that would grow over time (now over 7 GB). Rather than charging some users for more storage or special features, Google paid for the service by showing advertisements next to each email “contextually” targeted to keywords in that email—a far more profitable form of advertising than “dumb banner” ads previously used by other webmail providers.^[45] Self-appointed (or, to extend Sowell’s framework, “self-anointed”) privacy advocates howled that Google was going to “read users’ email,” and led a crusade to ban such algorithmic contextual targeting.^[46] Thierer responded to these critics by pointing out that the service was purely voluntary and noted:

you don’t speak for me and a lot of other people in this world who will be more than happy to cut this deal with Google. So do us a favor and don’t ask the government to shut down a service just because you don’t like it. Privacy is a subjective condition and your value preferences are not representative of everyone else’s values in our diverse nation. Stop trying to coercively force your values and choices on others. We can decide these things on our own, thank you very much.^[47]

Interestingly, however, the frenzy of hysterical indignation about Gmail was followed by a collective cyber-yawn: Users increasingly understood that algorithms, not humans, were doing the “reading” and that, if they didn’t like it, they didn’t have to use it. Today, nearly 150 million of people around the world use Gmail, and it has a steadily growing share of the webmail market. Even though cyber-consumers have embraced the service, some privacy advocates persist in their effort to shut down Gmail. They appear determined to stop at nothing to impose their will on others—the essence of political elitism—even if that means cutting off free email service for 150 million people!^[48]

A similar debate has played out more recently regarding targeted online advertising in general. Advertising on search engines is, much like Gmail, targeted “contextually” based on search terms entered by users and most advertising on other websites is based on the nature of content on a site or page. But certain data is collected about users as they browse to make that advertising more effective—by measuring its performance, reducing fraud, preventing over-exposure, etc. Some privacy advocates have insisted that industry self-regulation of such practices (even if enforced by the FTC) is inadequate and have called for preemptive regulation. They are even more offended by “behavioral advertising” which allows publishers whose content would have little value as the basis for contextually targeting advertising on their own sites to compete for more highly valued advertising by showing ads to users based on other sites they’ve visited. In both cases, data collection can increase the funding available to publishers to produce more of the content and services preferred by users, thus conferring an enormous indirect benefit on users, but also directly benefits users by increasing the relevance of the advertising they see.^[49] For some of the more extreme advocates of privacy regulation, however, there are no trade-offs, only absolutist “solutions:” To them, privacy is so obviously desirable that they feel at ease in deciding what’s best for everyone else. Such absolutists often respond with righteous indignation and conspiratorial fulmination when challenged to identify the harm against which they’re protecting consumers, while disdainfully dismissing all talk of the benefits of online advertising as self-serving industry propaganda.^[50]

VII. The Principled Alternative: Trust People & Empower Them

There is an alternative to this elitist mentality: freedom and personal responsibility. Individuals should be permitted to live a life of their own, even if they sometimes make mistakes or choices that are at odds with what elites think is best for them. ^[51]

Of course, the world isn’t perfect. In an ideal world, adults would be fully empowered to tailor speech and privacy decisions to their own values and preferences. Specifically, in an ideal world, adults (and parents) would have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information. Importantly, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block the things they don’t like—objectionable content, annoying ads or the collection of data about them—while also finding the things they want.

Achieving that ideal is likely impossible, but the good news is that we are moving closer to it with each passing day. Citizens have more tools and methods at their disposal than ever before which enable them to make decisions for themselves and their families. And this is true for both parental controls ^[52] and privacy controls.^[53]

Of course, some speech and privacy elitists will argue that we can’t trust empowerment tools ( e.g., filters, rating systems, or other controls) that are created by companies or other affected parties. But rather than trying to enhance those tools and educate users about how to use them, these elitists skip right past user empowerment and channel their energies into regulations that would impose a top-down, one-size-fits all standard on all adults and families—or even into trying to craft the perfect “nudge” that will help users make what elites believe to be the “right” decisions. Of course, these tools can, and should, be improved. Those groups worried about speech/content and privacy issues should focus on how we might drive such protections from the bottom-up by empowering individuals instead of government bureaucrats. The goal in both cases should be a “let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom” approach, which offers diverse tools and strategies for our diverse citizenry.^[54] We need not accept “one-size-fits” all approaches, whether they be regulatory mandates or “nudges,” based on the presumption that elites know best.

Finally, it is vital not to lose sight of what’s ultimately at stake here. If regulatory approaches trump the empowerment agenda we have described, the future of a free and open Internet—indeed, as technology converges, the future of all media—is at risk.^[55] By imposing technological solutions from the top-down that can never keep pace with technological change, regulation necessarily forecloses freedom and innovation.^[56] By contrast, individual empowerment allows innovation to flourish. The better approach across the board is education, not regulation.^[57] Empowerment, not elitism, is the path forward. The digital elite should be leading this effort by developing and promoting technologies of empowerment, not crafting regulatory mandates to force their will upon us.^[58]

#

Adam Thierer is a Senior Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation and the director of its Center for Digital Media Freedom. Berin Szoka  is a Senior Fellow with PFF and the Director of PFF’s Center for Internet Freedom.

[1] . William A. Henry, In Defense of Elitism (1995) at 2-3.

[2] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Congress, Content Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, Progress Snapshot 4.4, Feb. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html. Like American courts, we use the term “speech” as a broad catch-all for communications, including both actual speaking as well as other forms of transmitting, as well as receiving, information (“content”).

[3] . See generally Adam Thierer, Don’t Scapegoat Media, USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.24scapegoatmedia.html; Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the Children, “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001); Karen Sternheimer, It’s Not the Media: The Truth about Pop Culture’s Influence on Children (2003); Karen Sternheimer, Kids These Days: Facts and Fictions about Today’s Youth (2006).

[4] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, FCC Violence Report Concludes that Parenting Doesn’t Work, PFF Blog, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2007/04/fcc_violence_re.html.

[5] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sen. Rockefeller Gives Up on Parenting at Senate Violence Hearing, PFF Blog, June 26, 2007, blog.pff.org/archives/2007/06/sen_rockefeller_1.html.

[6] . Adam Thierer, Conservatives, Porn, and “Community Standards,” The Technology Liberation Front, March 2, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/02/conservatives-porn-and-community-standards.

[7] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.19onlinetargeting.html.

[8] . Jeff Chester, for decades the great gadfly of American advertising, has decried “the system … developed to track each and every one of us and our behavior for one-on-one marketing efforts” as “manipulative, intrusive and un-democratic.” Wendy Melillo, Q&A: Chester Writes the Book on Privacy, Dec. 11, 2007, www.gfem.org/node/227. For instance, Chester and other leading “privacy advocates” ridicule the idea of smart phones as a “liberating technology” and insist that,

Despite the glowing words about customization and personalized service, what marketers and advertisers are increasingly offering consumers is merely the illusion of free choice. Mobile operators offer their various options and services, not on an individual basis, but preconfigured according to segmented demographic profiles.

Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Complaint and Request for Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Mobile Marketing Practices, Jan. 13, 2009 (emphasis original), www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCmobile_complaint0109.pdf. See generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?, Progress on Point 16.2, Feb. 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.

[9] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, Progress on Point 16.11, May 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf.

[10] . The Supreme Court has used a “right to privacy” to strike down laws against the use of contraception by married couples, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[11] . Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop7.15freedomofspeech.pdf.

[12] . See , Amicus Brief for Association Of National Advertisers, Cato Institute, Coalition For Healthcare Communication, Pacific Legal Foundation And The Progress & Freedom Foundation In Support Of Appellants, IMS Health v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv(L), 09-2056-cv(CON) (2nd Cir. 2009), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/071309-Brief-Amici-Curiae-ANA-et-al-Second-Circuit-(09-1913-cv).pdf.

[13] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No Easy Solutions, Progress on Point No. 14.5, March 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ pops/pop14.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdfAdam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Statement Regarding the Internet Safety Technical Task Force’s Final Report to the Attorneys General, Jan. 14, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/090114ISTTFthiererclosingstatement.pdf; Nancy Willard, Why Age and Identity Verification Will Not Work—And is a Really Bad Idea, Jan. 26, 2009, www.csriu.org/PDFs/digitalidnot.pdf; Jeff Schmidt, Online Child Safety: A Security Professional’s Take, The Guardian, Spring 2007, www.jschmidt.org/AgeVerification/Gardian_JSchmidt.pdf.

[14] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate, PFF Blog, June 26, 2006, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2006/06/mandatory_data.html

[15] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Perils of Mandatory Parental Controls and Restrictive Defaults, Progress on Point 14.4, Apr. 11, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.4defaultdanger.pdf.

[16] . Adam Thierer, China’s Green Dam Filter and the Threat of Rising Global Censorship, PFF Blog, June 17, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/06/chinas_green_dam_filter_and_threat_of_rising_globa.html

[17] . They define choice architecture as follows: “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.” Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[18] . Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 6.

[19] . See Adam Thierer, Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control,” Cato Unbound, May 2009, www.cato-unbound.org/2009/05/08/adam-thierer/code-pessimism-and-the-illusion-of-perfect-control

[20] . See Solveig Singleton & Jim Harper, With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us, 2001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299930.

[21] . As Cato Institute scholar Will Wilkinson has argued, the book’s “agreeably banal doctrine of choice-preserving helpfulness” blurs the lines between paternalism and libertarianism, and thus “the thrust of the conceptual renovation behind the term libertarian paternalism is to empower, not limit, political elites.” Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way,” Reason, October 2008, www.reason.com/news/show/128916.html. See also Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sunstein’s “Libertarian Paternalism” is Really Just Paternalism, PFF Blog, April 7, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/04/sunsteins_liber.html.

[22] . See Robert Corn-Revere, “’Voluntary’ Self-Regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism,” in Rationales & Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997), at 183-208.

[23] . Telecom Policy Report, Commission Settles Indecency Charges, But At What Cost?, June 30, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_25_2/ai_n6091525.

[24] . See Adam Thierer, XM-Sirius, Regulatory Blackmail, and Diversity, June 17, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/06/xmsirius_regula.html.

[25] . See Comments of W. Kenneth Ferree on Implementation of Sirius-XM Merger Condition, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, MB Docket No. 07-57, March 30, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/033009siriusXMconditionfiling.pdf.

[26] . See Szoka & Adam Thierer, supra note 8 at 3.

[27] . See id. at 2.

[28] . Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (1995) at 5.

[29] . Alice Marwick, To Catch a Predator? The MySpace Moral Panic, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6-2, June 2008, www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2152/1966; Wade Roush, The Moral Panic over Social Networking Sites, Technology Review, Aug. 7, 2006, www.technologyreview.com/communications/17266; Anne Collier, Why Techopanics are Bad, Net Family News, April 23, 2009, www.netfamilynews.org/2009/04/why-technopanics-are-bad.html; Adam Thierer, Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics,’ Inside ALEC, July 2009, at 16-17, www.alec.org/am/pdf/Inside_July09.pdf; Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare, PFF Blog, June 10, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/07/10/technopanics-and-the-great-social-networking-scare.

[30] . Supra note 13.

[31] . In the 109th Congress, former Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on social networking sites in public schools and libraries. DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a lopsided 410-15 vote, but failed to pass the Senate. The measure was reintroduced just a few weeks into the 110th Congress by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the ranking minority member and former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. It was section 2 of a bill that Sen. Stevens sponsored titled the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act” (S. 49), but was later removed from the bill. See Declan McCullagh, Chat Rooms Could Face Expulsion, CNet News.com, July 28, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6099414.html?part=rss&tag=6099414&subj=news.

[32] . See Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, MySpace Receives More Pressure to Limit Children’s Access to Site, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006, online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115102268445288250-YRxkt0rTsyyf1QiQf2EPBYSf7iU_20070624.html; Susan Haigh, Conn. Bill Would Force MySpace Age Check, Yahoo News.com, March 7, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17502005.

[33] . See, e.g., Letter of Henry McMaster, Attorney General, South Carolina to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Attorney General Roy Cooper Regarding Internet Safety Task Force (“ISTTF”) Report, January 14, 2009, www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/2009/internetsafetyreport.pdf

[34] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Games and “Moral Panic,” PFF Blog, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/01/video_games_and_moral_panic.html ; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Fact and Fiction in the Debate over Video Game Regulation, Progress Snapshot 13.7, March 2006, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.7videogames.pdf.

[35] . “All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, at 858 (3rd ed. 1963) (1949).

[36] . See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 119-123, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf (Explaining how the third-person effect serves as a powerful explanation for the heated backlash that followed an FCC effort to moderately liberalize media ownership rules in 2003-04).

[37] . W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, Spring 1983, at 3.

[38] . For the best overview of third-person effect research, see Douglas M. McLeod, Benjamin H. Detenber, and William P. Eveland., Jr., Behind the Third-Person Effect: Differentiating Perceptual Processes for Self and Other, 51 Journal of Communication, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2001, at 678-695.

[39] . Vincent Price, David H. Tewksbury & Li-Ning Huang, Third-person Effects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, Journalism & Mass Communications Quarterly, Vol. 74, at 525-540.

[40] . Douglas M. McLeod, William P. Eveland & Amy I. Nathanson, Support for Censorship of Violent and Misogynic Rap Lyrics: And Analysis of the Third-Person Effect, Communications Research, Vol. 24, 1997, at 153-174.

[41] . Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-Person Effect, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 8, 1996, at 163-186.

[42] . James D. Ivory, Addictive, But Not For Me: The Third-Person Effect and Electronic Game Players’ Views Toward the Medium’s Potential for Dependency and Addiction, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aug. 2002.

[43] . Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography, Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1995, at 27-38

[44] . Supra note 37 at 14. Along these lines, a December 2004 Washington Post article documented the process by which the Parents Television Council, a vociferous censorship advocacy group, screens various television programming. One of the PTC screeners interviewed for the story talked about the societal dangers of various broadcast and cable programs she rates, but then also noted how much she personally enjoys HBO’s “The Sopranos” and “Sex and the City,” as well as ABC’s “Desperate Housewives.” Apparently, in her opinion, what’s good for the goose is not good for the gander! See Bob Thompson, Fighting Indecency, One Bleep at a Time, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2004, at C1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49907-2004Dec8.html.

[45] . See Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price at 112-118 (2009).

[46] . See Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, to California Attorney General Lockyer, May 3, 2004, http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/agltr5.3.04.html.

[47] . See email from Adam Thierer to Declan McCullaugh on Politech Email discussion group, April 30, 2004, http://lists.jammed.com/politech/2004/04/0083.html (emphasis added).

[48] . See Complaint and Request for Injunction of the Electronic Privacy Information Center against Google, Inc., March 17, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf; see also Ryan Radia, Should the FTC Shut Down Gmail and Google Docs Because of an Already-Fixed Bug?, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 18, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/18/should-the-ftc-shut-down-gmail-and-google-docs-because-of-an-already-fixed-bug/.

[49] . See Berin Szoka & Mark Adams, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Benefits of Online Advertising & the Costs of Regulation, PFF Working Paper, forthcoming.

[50] . Anti-advertising crusader Jeff Chester often resorts to questioning the motives of those who question whether his regulatory prescriptions would actually benefit consumers, see, e.g., http://techliberation.com/2009/06/17/behavioral-advertising-industry-practices-hearing-some-issues-that-need-to-be-discussed/#comment-11698840. See generally Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (2007).

[51] . “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1859, 1986) at 72.

[52] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection, Special Report, Version 4.0, Summer 2009, www.pff.org/parentalcontrols.

[53] . Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Privacy Solutions, PFF Blog, Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/privacy_solutions.

[54] . Comments of Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, In the Matter of Implementation of the Child Save Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming; MB Docket No. 09-26, April 16, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/041509-%5bFCC-FILING%5d-Adam-Thierer-PFF-re-FCC-Child-Safe-Viewing-Act-NOI-(MB-09-26).pdf.

[55] . See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age, Engage, Feb. 20, 2009, www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_ThiererEngage101.pdf

[56] . “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich von Hayek, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Essence of Hayek, (Hoover Inst., 1984), at 276.

[57] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Two Sensible, Education-Based Legislative Approaches to Online Child safety, Progress Snapshot 3.10, Sept. 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.10safetyeducationbills.pdf.

[58] . See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Google, CDT, Online Advertising & Preserving Persistent User Choice Across Ad Networks Through Plug-ins, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 13, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/ 03/13/google-cdt-online-advertising-preserving-persistent-user-choice-across-ad-networks-through-plug-ins/.

The Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing yesterday where a number of Senators as well as Julius Genachowski, the new Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, did a lot of fretting about the state of the modern children’s television programming marketplace.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV):

suggested that a “little red button” be required on TVs so that a child could push the button to find out how a show is rated. Democratic Sen. Mark Pryor of Arkansas agreed that a red button might help since parents often have difficulties figuring out which shows are appropriate for their children to watch.

Well, I have some good news for the Senators: There are already quite a few little buttons on every remote control made today, and at least one of those buttons can pull up an on-screen guide to get more program info! (Another of them can turn the TV off!) Moreover, the ratings for just about every program already appear at the beginning of each show, and sometimes in between. And you can find out plenty more online about every TV show under the sun if you care to look.  So, I’m not sure what that fuss is all about, and we certainly don’t need to mandate “little red buttons” on every TV set when program information can be found in so many other ways.

What is more troubling about all the hand-wringing taking place at the hearing, as well as the talk of reopening the Children’s Television Act of 1990 to potentially impose more content mandates on video programmers and distributors, is that: (1) there doesn’t seem to be much appreciation for just how much wonderful children’s programming is out there today compared to the past, and (2) there doesn’t seem to be much recognition of the serious First Amendment issues at stake when government gets involved in the messy business of regulating video programming.

On that first point, let me just reiterate what I have found after conducting an exhaustive survey of the market for children’s programming in my ongoing PFF special report, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.  I found that the overall market for family and children’s programming options continues to expand quite rapidly. Thirty years ago, families had a limited number of children’s television programming options at their disposal on broadcast TV.  Today, by contrast, there exists a broad and growing diversity of children’s television options from which families can choose. The list below highlights just some of the more popular family- or child-oriented networks available on cable, telco, and satellite television today. And this list continues to grow rapidly.

• ABC Family Channel (http://abcfamily.go.com)
• Animal Planet (http://animal.discovery.com)
• Anime Network (www.theanimenetwork.com)
• Black Family Channel (www.blackfamilychannel.com)
• Boomerang (www.cartoonnetwork.com/tv_shows/boomerang)
• Cartoon Network (www.cartoonnetwork.com)
• Discovery Channel (www.discovery.com)
• Discovery Kids (http://kids.discovery.com)
• Disney Channel (www.disney.go.com/disneychannel)
• Encore WAM!
• Familyland Television Network (www.familyland.org/content/Content.aspx?CategoryID=51)
• FUNimation (www.funimation.com)
• Hallmark Channel (www.hallmarkchannel.com)
• Hallmark Movie Channel (www.hallmarkmoviechannel.com)
• HBO Family (www.hbofamily.com)
• History Channel (www.history.com)
• KTV – Kids & Teens Television (www.ktvzone.com)
• Learning Channel (http://tlc.discovery.com)
• National Geographic Channel (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel)
• Nickelodeon (www.nick.com)
• Nick 2
• Nick Toons (http://nicktoonsnetwork.nick.com/home.html)
• Noggin (www.noggin.com)
• N Channel (www.the-n.com)
• PBS (www.pbs.org)
• PBS Kids (http://pbskids.org/go)
• Science Channel (http://science.discovery.com)
• Showtime Family Zone
• Sprout (www.sproutonline.com)
• Starz! Kids and Family (http://www.starz.com/appmanager/seg/s?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=starz_kids_family)
• Toon Disney (http://psc.disney.go.com/abcnetworks/toondisney)
• Varsity World (www.varsityworld.com)

Importantly, this list does not include the growing universe of religious / spiritual television networks. Nor does it include the many family or educational programs that traditional TV broadcasters offer. Finally, the list does not include the massive market for interactive computer software or websites for children.  All of this begs the obvious question: What more is it that policymakers want?

More offerings are always welcome, of course.  But, on a personal note, as the parents of two young kids (ages 5 and 7), my wife and I regularly struggle to sort through all the wonderful video programming options at our disposal.  We often find ourselves swimming through an ocean of choices available from our local broadcasters and multichannel video provider. Moreover, our kids are spending an increasing amount of time watching snippets of video via kid-oriented online search portals like KidZui and Glubble. Such online walled gardens offer a safe place for parents to find terrific online content for their kids.

I have to admit, all the choices my kids have today have left me a bit jealous!  I grew up in small central Illinois town with a couple of crummy (Iowa-based!) broadcast stations that were barely visible on our TV (and usually only when my Dad made me hold the antenna and stick my arms up in the air to get reception!) There was also one local cinema in town that usually showed old movies from the ‘50s and ‘60s that few kids cared to see.  And that was generally the extent of video choices for kids in our town.  Sure, the 1970s brought us Sesame Street as well as Mister Rogers (if that was your cup of tea).  Today, however, we still have those shows and much, much more.  Our kids now enjoy an unprecedented cornucopia of media alternatives and, contrary to what some policymakers would have us believe, many of them are extremely high-quality in nature.  My parents would have likely given anything to just have even one network as incredibly enriching as Noggin at their disposal in the ‘60s and ‘70s.  Instead, on the occasions that the TV had to become a babysitter and nothing worthwhile was on the tube, I usually ended up watching trashy soap operas.  (Don’t even get me started on “Days of Our Lives.” I could write a short history of the show’s 1975-1982 seasons!)

Speaking of trashy shows, there was a lot of talk at yesterday’s hearing about the “need to protect our children from harmful content,” as Sen. Rockefeller began the hearing by arguing.  But as I have shown in my parental controls report, not only are there more and better quality options to steer your kids toward today, but it is easier than ever before to steer them right to those preferred options and lock down everything else in sight.  As I concluded in that report:

there has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children. […] parents now have [many tools and techniques] at their disposal to better control media content and raise their children as they see fit. That is not to say that media and communications technologies don’t continue to play a major role in our society and culture. But… parents have been empowered with tools, controls, strategies, and information, that can help them devise and then enforce a media plan for their families that is in line with their own values.

So, again, it must be asked: What is the problem here?

Finally, it should be noted that any effort by Congress or the FCC to tinker with video programming marketplace will eventually run up against serious First Amendment concerns and eventual court challenges.  In a previous session of Congress, before he became Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Sen. Rockefeller aggressively pushed for expanded content controls, not just for broadcast television, but for cable and satellite platforms as well.  In a 2005 PFF report on Sen. Rockefeller’s “Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of 2005,” First Amendment attorney Robert Corn-Revere of the law firm Davis Wright Tremaine argued that efforts to expand the horizons of FCC regulation to cover more content and platforms “would be almost certain to fail a constitutional challenge.”  Likewise, in a 2007 PFF white paper, constitutional law expert Laurence H. Tribe of the Harvard Law School, noted that the old “it’s-for-the-children” rationale for such content regulation is exactly backwards:

the malleability of children—how easy it is to mold their minds and to influence them—counts against and not in favor of centralized governmental controls. One of the arguments that you will often find is, yes, it’s all very well to believe in free speech between consenting adults but we’re talking about kids here and their minds are like plastic and they are being molded and shaped and, therefore, we have greater power to protect them. Therefore, you should keep your hands off them because they are so easy to shape. No, no, no. The argument is not that kids are malleable and therefore, Big Brother should be empowered. The argument is that kids are malleable and, therefore, families should be empowered. Parental authority should be at the center of decision making.

Indeed. And, as already noted, parents have more tools and strategies to exercise that authority than ever before, as well as more programming options to choose from. Policymakers should be celebrating these modern media marketplace developments, not bemoaning them.  We are blessed to be living in the Golden Age of children’s video programming.