PFF has just published the transcript for an event we hosted last month asking “What Should the Next Communications Act Look Like?”  The event featured (in order of appearance) Link Hoewing of Verizon, Walter McCormick of US Telecom, Peter Pitsch of Intel, Barbara Esbin, Ray Gifford of Wilkinson, Barker, Knauer, and Michael Calabrese of the New America Foundation. It was a terrific discussion and it couldn’t have been more timely in light of recent regulatory developments at the FCC.  The folks at NextGenWeb were kind enough to make a video of the event and post it online along with a writeup, so I’ve included that video along with the event transcript down below the fold.

What Should the Next Coummunications Act Look Like [PFF Event Transcript] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

I know, I know… do we really need to listen to another debate over Net neutrality?!   I too have grown a bit tired of the issue, which has crowded out so many other important issues in the Internet policy world these days. Net neutrality simply sucks all the oxygen out of the room no matter what topic is being discussed. And it is so highly charged that it has become the equivalent of the abortion issue of the high-tech world; intellectual combatants can get so worked up over the topic that seemingly no rational debate can take place at times.

That being said, I do want to encourage everyone to check out this dynamite debate about “Demystifying Net Neutrality,” a Diffusion Group webinar which took place last week. It’s a very level-headed discussion of the issue that features my colleague Barbara Esbin, a PFF Senior Fellow and the Director of PFF’s Center for Communications and Competition Policy, and Chris Riley, a Policy Counsel at Free Press.  You can now download and listen to the debate now from the Diffusion Group website. Barbara also wrote about the discussion over the PFF blog and walks the reader through the discussion. And you won’t be surprised to hear me say I think Barbara gets the better of Chris Riley in the debate!

One thing I found quite interesting in the debate was how Riley struggled to distinguish between “the Internet” versus “Internet access services” for purposes of delineating the proper confines of Net neutrality regulation. Like many other defenders of Net neutrality regulation, (see, most recently, for example, Rob Frieden, “Why the FCC’s Proposed Openness Principles Cannot and Should Not Apply to Internet Application and Content Providers“), Riley and Free Press want us to believe that this distinction is clear-cut and that regulation won’t have unintended consequences.  Of course, such distinctions are always easier in theory than reality, and as Berin Szoka and I argued in our recently paper on “high-tech mutually assured destruction,” regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract.

Anyway, listen to the entire webinar discussion. It’s worth your time.

Northwestern Law Prof. James Speta has a new paper out that touches on many of the themes that Barbara Esbin, my colleague at The Progress & Freedom Foundation, has been covering in her excellent work explaining why the FCC doesn’t actually have have the vast, essentially unlimited authority over the Internet that it has asserted in its recent effort to enforce its non-binding 2005 net neutrality policy statement and its ongoing net neutrality rulemaking. (See her FCC comments on that issue here and Adam’s thoughts on this here.) Speta’s thesis also seems to parallel the approach taken under PFF’s 2005 Digital Age Communications Act (DACA), which emphasized focusing on on unfair practices and relying on a standard of consumer harm as in antitrust rather than trying to enshrine abstract principles like “neutrality” into law.

Anyway, here’s the abstract for Speta’s paper:

The Federal Communications Commission’s order directing Comcast to cease certain traffic management techniques in the name of network neutrality adopted a very strong theory of the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction over the Internet. This article offers three responses: (1) Briefly reviewing the theory of the FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction” and the theory offered in the Comcast order, the article concludes that the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction cannot be as broad as the agency asserted – for the agency claimed the power to regulate any aspect of Internet service, including price and quality of service. Because “ancillary jurisdiction,” however broad, simply cannot be as broad as the FCC’s nearly plenary authority over common carriers (as the FCC itself had previously recognized), the Comcast order states an untenable theory of regulatory power. (2) Although a rigorous administrative law analysis would conclude that the FCC does not have any “ancillary jurisdiction,” that conclusion is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, both generally and by a specific dicta that the FCC has some ancillary authority over the Internet. The article concludes that the FCC’s ancillary authority can be reasonably interpreted and rationally cabined – giving the FCC jurisdiction over Internet carriage of Title II and Title III services, meaning, for example, that the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate Internet carriers’ treatment of “interconnected VOIP,” as in fact the FCC has done. (3) Finally, the article offers a structure for conferring on the FCC an appropriate degree of regulatory authority over the Internet, through appropriate legislation. Because current antitrust doctrine struggles with the sorts of issues that might arise in the Internet, the FCC should have authority to enjoin unfair competition practices, when committed by Internet carriers offering public services (and at the retail level). This authority would be broad enough to cover the practices alleged in the Comcast case, but only if the FCC were to follow the substantive requirements of an unfair competition analysis (as it did not).

Can the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) just do anything it wants? If it wants to bring the entire Internet under its thumb, or regulate any speech uttered over electronic media, can it just do so on a whim? The agency’s recent actions on the Net neutrality and free speech fronts seems to suggest that the agency thinks so.

I don’t need to rehash here what the FCC has been up to on the Net neutrality front.  Most everyone is familiar with how the agency has essentially been trying to invent its authority to regulate out of thin air.  If you want the whole ugly history of how this charade has unfolded over past few years, I encourage you to read these amazing comments filed today in the FCC’s net neutrality NPRM proceeding by my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin.  Barbara simply demolishes the FCC’s argument that it can do anything it wants under the guise of its “ancillary jurisdiction.” As Barbara argues in her comments, the FCC’s position “is akin to saying that the FCC can regulate if its actions are ancillary to its ancillary jurisdiction, and that is one ancillary too many.”  She notes that:

The proposed rules regulating the services and network management practices of broadband Internet providers must rest, if at all, on the Commission‘s implied or ancillary jurisdiction and the NPRM fails to provide a basis upon which the exercise of such jurisdiction can be considered lawful.

She shows how farcical it is for the FCC to concoct its supposed authority to regulate from provisions of the Communications Act that have nothing whatsoever to do with Net neutrality or even expanding regulation in general. Specifically, the agency’s reliance on sections 230(b) and 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is completely outlandish.  Anyone who knows a lick about telecom law and the nature of those two sections understands they were never intended to serve as the basis of an expansive new regulatory regime for the Internet. As Barbara puts it:

This exercise—searching for snippets and threads of regulatory authority over a communications medium as significant as the Internet in multiple, unrelated statutory provisions—should signal to the Commission that no credible source of authority to regulate Internet services exists.

All I have to say is, thank God for checks and balances. I believe the courts will put a stop to this nonsense, but it will take some time.  Until then, I suppose the FCC will continue to act like a rogue agency, hell-bent and tossing the constitution to the wind and concocting asinine theories about why they should be allowed to do anything they want. But there are signs that the courts are ready to start holding the FCC more accountable.

If you want some concrete proof, Exhibit A would be the recent D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals oral arguments in the Comcast v. FCC case, which involves the FCC’s assertion of Net neutrality authority from vague “principles” it laid down a few years back. The headline from Wired about the court arguments really says all you need to know: “Court to FCC: You Don’t Have Power to Enforce Net Neutrality.”  Indeed, by all accounts, things did not go well for the agency. “No decision has been made yet,” reports Tony Bradley of PC World, ” but, if Friday’s arguments… are any indication, it doesn’t appear that the FCC will prevail in exerting its authority over Comcast.”

Exhibit B would be the stunning oral arguments that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York heard this week in the remand hearing of the case Fox Television v. FCC. You have to watch this video of the arguments to appreciate just how fed up some judges are with this agency.  It is like nothing else I have ever seen.  Andy Schwartzman of Media Access Project described it as “a slaughter,” and an unnamed source told John Eggerton of Broadcasting & Cable, “To say that the justices were extremely skeptical of the FCC’s application of the indecency law from a constitutional perspective in this case is an understatement.”  I’ll say.  Watch it yourself to see.

Meanwhile, as I’ve been writing here lately, the FCC is busy trying to expand or invent new authority to regulate digital media and online safety issues in its “Child Safe Viewing Act” and “Empowering Parents and Protecting Children” proceedings. The agency also recently began looking at cloud computing, forcing me to wonder, “Is the FCC Becoming the Federal Cloud Commission?”  And then there was the Commission strong-arming of Apple about the iPhone app store process. Who knows where that authority came from.  Finally, just yesterday, the FCC launched a new inquiry into privacy issues — get this — as part of its National Broadband Plan! The agency is asking for public comment about “the use of personal information and privacy in an online, broadband world.” (Someone should probably call the Federal Trade Commission and let them know that that there is a new sheriff in town!) Again, no word where the FCC’s authority to do any of this comes from.  When it comes to statutory authority, it’s an ‘anything-goes’ world over at the FCC these days. They just make it up as they go along.

Simply put, the FCC is out of control and I sincerely hope the courts rope it back in soon. If the agency wants the authority to regulate in any of these areas, it should go to Congress and ask for it.  That’s how things are suppose to work in a constitutional republic.  Until then, FCC officials should stop behaving as if they are above the law.

One of the more troubling aspects of the contentious debate over Net neutrality regulation is the way some proponents have sought to cast Net neutrality as “the Internet’s First Amendment.” As a die-hard free speech advocate, I find this truly outrageous and a complete contortion of the true purpose of the First Amendment.  As I have argued here before, it is incredibly dangerous thinking that puts our real First Amendment liberties at stake by empowering a regulatory agency with more means of controlling online speech and expression. Simply stated, the Internet’s First Amendment is the First Amendment, not some new, top-down, heavy-handed regulatory regime that puts the Federal Communications Commission in control of the Digital Economy.

On this point, I wanted to bring two things to your attention. The first is an outstanding address delivered today by Kyle McSlarrow, President & CEO of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, at a Media Institute event here in Washington, DC.  And the second is this new paper by my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin.

McSlarrow’s speech was entitled, “Net Neutrality: First Amendment Rhetoric in Search of the Constitution” and it squarely addressed the fundamental fallacy set forth by the Net neutralitistas when it comes to the First Amendment. “Whatever our present-day policy disagreements about net neutrality, or even differing politics, let’s not forget that the First Amendment is framed as a shield for citizens, not a sword for government,” he argued. “By its plain terms and history, the First Amendment is a limitation on government power, not an empowerment of government,” McSlarrow said. “And… if there’s one thing the Supreme Court has made clear, it’s that rules that directly restrict protected speech cannot be justified by a government interest that is merely hypothetical.”

Absolutely correct. And these views are buttressed by the comments of Barbara Esbin in her new paper, in which she argues that “Net Neutrality is not the First Amendment for the Internet.”  She continues:

Today we live in a world with no FCC-imposed network neutrality rules. Can anyone seriously maintain that the Internet’s potential for commercial, political, artistic, and social expression has been hobbled in this country? Or that diversity is lacking? It is far more likely that the Internet has thrived, as Congress has stated, in the absence of federal or state regulation.

“Nor has the evidence, amassed after years of trying, painted a picture of persistent market failure or consumer harms,” she argues.

Turning the First Amendment on Its Head

Both she and McSlarrow note that twisted rationales for Net neutrality “turn First Amendment protections on their head” by making private platforms and actors in the enemies of speech instead of the government, which has traditionally acted to curtail speech liberties and freedom of expression. And it has succeeded at times because the government has the coercive ability to imprison, fine or otherwise punish speakers in ways that no private media or communications platform can.

There’s also the question of whether Net neutrality regulation might constitute a form of “compelled speech.” As Barbara notes, “Under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, the government compelling a speaker to speak or transmit a message that it does not wish to transmit is just as much a free speech infringement as it is to prevent a speaker from transmitting or posting messages it wishes to transmit or post.” She cites remarks delivered at a 2007 Progress & Freedom Foundation event by noted First Amendment scholar Lawrence Tribe on this issue, in response to a question about broadband ISP control of content delivered over their networks:

The general question that raises is the extent to which the government can, in effect, force media to act as common carriers, to be transparent, to force them simply to convey whatever content comes along. To the extent that someone, or an entity, is a content provider engaging in discretion is not simply an empty pipeline. It has the fundamental right of editorial discretion. For the government to tell that entity that it cannot exercise that right in a certain way, that it must allow the projection of what it doesn’t want to include, is a violation of its First Amendment rights.

The Madness of “Media Access” Theory

All this should seem logical to anyone who has taken a look at the plain language of the First Amendment. It could not be more clear when it says, “Congress shall make no law…”  There aren’t any caveats or footnotes. And the First Amendment most certainly was not intended as a tool for government to control the editorial discretion of private individuals or institutions. It was about restricting the power of the government to curtail speech and expression.

So how did this twisted theory of the First Amendment gain currency in Net neutrality circles? To answer that you need to go back to the 1960’s when a handful of liberal legal scholars began concocting a new theory of the First Amendment that eventually came to be known as the “media access” school of thinking. George Washington University law professor Jerome A. Barron’s 1967 Harvard Law Review article, “Access to the Press — a New First Amendment Right,” as well as the work of Yale University law professor Owen Fiss, gave rise to this new intellectual movement. Its goal, in essence, was to convert the First Amendment into a club to beat demands out of private media providers. Basically, these theorists wanted to expand “Fairness Doctrine”-like right-of-reply notions to newspapers, and simultaneously grant the government more leeway to use the First Amendment to alter media structures and outputs. As Fiss argued in a 1986 law review article, under the “media access” approach, a proper reading of the First Amendment requires “a change in our attitude about the state” such that we learn “to recognize the state not only as an enemy, but also as a friend of speech… [that should act] to enhance the quality of public debate.” (Iowa Law Review, Vol. 71, 1986, p. 1416).

Other left-leaning intellectuals and activists groups would come to integrate that logic into their work and public policy proposals. Now you know, for example, where the Media Access Project gets their name!  But many other regulatory-minded groups — Free Press, Public Knowledge, the Center for Digital Democracy, MoveOn.org, New America Foundation, and others — trace much of their intellectual heritage back to Barron, Fiss, and the other media access theorists. [Read my lengthy debunking of media access theory here.]

And now we have books being written with titles like Virtual Freedom: Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age, by Dawn Nunziato of George Washington University. I’ll have a review of Nunziato’s disturbing new book up shortly, but suffice it to say, she has taken media access theory, put it on steroids, and brought it into the Information Age.  At least the media access old-timers could more reasonably use “media scarcity” as an excuse for their regulatory machinations. But Nunziato just dispenses with all that and instead conditions all the new regulation on “democratic participation” and other amorphous theories.

Will the Real Big Brother Please Stand Up

Indeed, with Nunziato’s book, we see how the seeds of misguided intellectual thinking sometimes spring into wild gardens in which the weeds slowly take over everything in sight.  This twisted conception of the First Amendment is so thoroughly ingrained in leftist media policy thinking today that even an abundant medium like the Internet is not exempt from potential regulations based on it despite the death of media scarcity. And that’s how we got to the point we are at today in the net neutrality regulatory debate, with many policymakers and activists groups painting private broadband operators as the supposed real Big Brother problem that the First Amendment must address.

Consider, for example, the comments then-Sen. Hillary Clinton made in 2006 regarding why she supports net neutrality regulation: “Each day on the Internet views are discussed and debated in an open forum without fear of censorship or reprisal.” As I noted at the time, when I read her statement I practically fell off my chair. It’s not just that Mrs. Clinton was asking us to believe in some asinine conspiracy theory about how broadband companies are supposedly out to censor our thoughts or engage in reprisals. (”Reprisals”? For what?) No, what really blew my mind here was the fact that Sen. Clinton had the chutzpah to declare that the private sector was somehow the real threat to online speech. After all, as I inventoried in that old essay, Sen. Clinton has led several notable efforts over the past decade to expand government regulation of television, video games, and even the Internet.

Where’s the Evidence? And How Would They Even Do It?

And yet Clinton and many other Net neutrality advocates continue to insist that it is the private sector, not the government, that is the real threat to our free speech rights. Practically speaking, these advocates of Net neutrality regulation have little to fear in this regard. It is almost impossible to believe that any Internet operator could limit speech or expression in the ways these regulatory advocates fear.  Unlike the government, which possesses the coercive power to completely foreclose all speech under threat of fine or imprisonment, the private sector lacks the ability to use force to bottle up speech or speakers. And even if private operators tried it, there would be hell for them to pay with the press, industry watchdogs, and their even subscribers. More importantly, there’s just no good business angle to censorship; they make more money by delivering more bits, not fewer. Finally, any attempt by one actor to stifle something becomes a prime incentive for another to offer it.

Tim Lee nailed all these points in an excellent paper from last year, “The Durable Internet: Preserving Network Neutrality without Regulation.” Tim noted:

Concerns that network owners will undermine free speech online are particularly misguided. Network owners have neither the technology nor the manpower to effectively filter online content based on the viewpoints being expressed, nor do profit-making businesses have any real incentive to do so. Should a network owner be foolish enough to attempt large-scale censorship of its customers, it would not only fail to suppress the disfavored speech, but the network would actually increase the visibility of the content as the effort at censorship attracted additional coverage of the material being censored.

I think that’s exactly right and, later in his paper (between pgs 22-3), Tim nicely elaborates about the “Herculean task” associated with any attempt by a broadband provider to “manipulate human communication.” Not only is it true, as Tim argues, that “no widescale manipulation would go unnoticed for very long,” but he is also correct in noting that the public and press backlash would be enormous.

Shield from Government or Sword for the Government?

But let’s get back to the principle of the matter at stake here because, for those of us who cherish the real First Amendment and seek to protect it, it is essential we not let regulatory advocates get away with their effort to convert it into something it isn’t and was never meant to be.  Jonathan Emord, author of the brilliant 1991 book, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment, put his thumb on the real threat here: “In short, the [media] access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model.” The ultimate danger of this twisted conception of the First Amendment, he noted, is that, “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.”  Or as Kyle McSlarrow noted in his speech today, these regulatory advocates are essentially saying that the First Amendment “a sword for government” instead of “a shield for citizens” from coercive government actions that would infringe our legitimate rights of free speech and expression.

In sum, “media access” philosophy and the regulatory approach its adherents counsel  is completely at odds with a proper understanding of the First Amendment.  Government — not the private sector — remains the true threat to our liberties.  And, most horrifyingly of all, empowering the state to use the First Amendment to regulate private actors will almost certainly backfire and result in more, not less, regulation of speech online.

My PFF colleague Barbara Esbin has a great piece about why “FCC Could Mess Up Internet With ‘Net Neutrality’ Rules No One Needs” in a USNews point/counterpoint debate with  Andrew Schwartzman of the Media Attack Access Project, who claims such rules “Would Keep the Web Free for Speech and Trade.” Here are her two best gems:

The FCC claims that broadband Internet markets are insufficiently competitive today to protect consumer interests. Yet a 2007 Federal Trade Commission report found no market failure and warned regulators to proceed with caution. The FCC acknowledges that broadband service providers face growing traffic volume demands that must be managed but claims that they have the potential—the opportunity, means, and motive—to act in an anticompetitive fashion when transporting Internet traffic across their networks. FCC detectives point to economic theory suggesting providers have incentives to act in an anticompetitive manner against competing providers of content, applications, or services. What is missing from this crime scene investigation is the body—the actual evidence that providers are behaving anticompetitively or are likely to.

And:

Lacking evidence that regulation is now necessary to combat either market failure or other consumer harms, the FCC is left to postulate a dystopian world without network neutrality rules. It claims that unless it acts now, we risk losing what we value most about the Internet. In other words, it creates what economists would call a “counterfactual.” But we don’t need economic theory to tell us what a world without network neutrality rules would look like because we already live in that world. And in the real world, the fact is that the Internet ecosystem we have is functioning quite well to satisfy customer needs without the ministrations of the FCC. In fact, one might go so far as to say it functions as well as it does because of that.

Of course, regulatory advocates would insist that broadband providers aren’t really behaving themselves today, citing a handful of vastly exaggerated examples. But they would probably fall back on the argument that broadband service providers are just waiting to start behaving even more anti-competitively until the threat of net neutrality regulation has been removed.

It’s certainly true that government disciplines markets as much by the threat of regulation as the actual exercise thereof, but that’s especially true of antitrust laws: Even if we never see an antitrust suit brought against an ISP for anticompetitive behavior towards applications and content providers, antitrust laws would still play—indeed, have already played—a vital role in discouraging companies from engaging in the kind of behavior Andy Schwartzman worries about. That’s why PFF proposed relying on case-by-case antitrust enforcement rather than preemptive regulation with its 2005 DACA project.

Given the dangers of inviting further proscriptive government regulation of the Internet: “All we are saying, is give love antitrust a chance…”

Hmmm… What am I missing? I cannot lay my finger on a single line in the Communications Act of 1934, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, or any statute in between that gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the authority to regulate cloud computing.  And yet, like any good stickler for jurisdictional authority, my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin keeps bringing to my attention little FCC chirps here and there which suggest that the agency is slowly positioning itself to become the Federal Cloud Commission. For example, back in September, Barbara brought to my attention this passage in the Commission’s recent Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, (paragraph 60, pg. 21):

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

In my earlier essay about this, I noted that these questions should serve as a wake-up call for Google and other cloud-based providers who think that “neutrality” mandates will end at the infrastructure layer of the Net.  As Berin Szoka and I argued in our paper on “high-tech mutually assured destruction,” regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract.  And I’m even less optimistic about the FCC limiting its regulatory aspirations after the latest thing Barbara Esbin brought to my attention.

Today, as part of the Commission’s ongoing effort to develop a National Broadband Plan, the FCC released a request for information “on data portability and its relationship to broadband.”  (NBP Public Notice #21) “The Commission seeks tailored comment on broadband and portability of data and their relation to cloud computing, transparency, identity, and privacy,” the notice says.  Here was the second item on the list of things the Commission said it was investigating:

Cloud computing. When considering the portability of data, we also consider the processes through which data are moved. In this context, we seek comment on how to identify and understand cloud computing as a model for technology provisioning.

1. The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines cloud computing as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” Does this definition accurately capture the concept of cloud computing?
2. What types of cloud computing exist (e.g., public, hybrid, and internal) and what are the legal and regulatory implications of their use?
3. Can present broadband network configurations handle a large-scale shift in bandwidth usage that a rapid adoption of cloud computing might cause?
4. How does cloud computing affect the reliability, scalability, security, and sustainability of information and data?
5. To what extent can the federal government leverage cloud solutions to improve intra-agency processes, intergovernmental coordination, and civic participation?
6. What impact do developments in cloud computing have with respect to broadband deployment, adoption, and use?
7. How can various parties leverage cloud computing to obtain economic or social efficiencies? Is it possible to quantify the efficiencies gained?
8. To what extent are consumers protected by industry self-regulation (e.g., the Cloud Computing Manifesto), and to what extent might additional protections be needed?
9. What specific privacy concerns are there with user data and cloud computing?
10. What precautions should government agencies take to prevent disclosure of personal information when providing data?
11. Is the use of cloud computing a net positive to the environment? Are there specific studies that quantify the environmental impact of cloud computing?

I suppose some might claim there’s nothing wrong with the FCC looking into these issues, and that the agency’s interest in cloud computing is entirely benign.  But when it read all these questions about cloud computing in recent FCC notices, I can’t help but thinking about the potential for regulatory creep.  Eventually, when a regulatory agency asks enough questions — especially the sort of questions bolded above — it leads to more agency oversight.  And more agency oversight typically leads to some sort of agency regulation.

Or perhaps I’m just being paranoid.

Regardless, at a minimum, would someone at least tell me where the FCC gets the authority to even ask these questions?  Or do we live in such a Bold New World of progressive government that little encumbrances like statutory authority can be thrown to the wind?   Years from now, some might look back and ask the question that Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase asked 50 years ago about the FCC and spectrum regulation:  “How did the commission come to acquire this power?”  But I’d like to know the answer to that question right now regarding the FCC’s growing interest in cloud computing.

Along with my colleague Barbara Esbin, the Director of PFF’s Center for Communications and Competition Policy, I have just released a new paper on discussing the possibility of reallocating a portion of broadcast television spectrum for alternative purposes, namely, mobile broadband. As I discussed here before, Blair Levin, the Executive Director of the FCC’s Omnibus Broadband Initiative, has been suggesting that it might be possible to craft a grand bargain whereby broadcasters get cash for some (or all) of their current spectrum allocations if they return spectrum to the FCC for reallocation and re-auction, likely to mobile broadband services.

In our paper, “An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Spectrum Reallocation That Can Benefit Consumers, Broadcasters & the Mobile Broadband Sector,” [PDF] Barbara and I argue that:

the benefits of such a deal could be enormous for wireless broadband providers, developers of digital technologies, and consumers.  Expanding the pool of spectrum available for next-generation wireless broadband offerings will ensure that innovative new networks, devices, and services are made available to the public on a timely basis.  Ultimately, that will mean more high-speed choices for consumers, especially those in rural areas harder to reach with high-speed wireline networks.  Finally, more generally, anything that moves us in the direction of a freer market in spectrum is a good thing. But fairness to broadcasters lies at the heart of this spectrum reallocation plan. If a deal can’t be structured that broadcasters would find acceptable, they should not be forced to come to the table. When we speak of an offer they can’t refuse, we mean one so attractive that no rational businessperson or investor would pass it up. It is essential broadcasters be willing partners in the deal, and be full participants in the process of shaping its contours.

Read the entire thing here, or below the fold as a Scribd document.

Broadcast TV Spectrum Reallocation (Thierer & Esbin – PFF) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=22365493&access_key=key-2cs1sry5qv9xd3x6d5bv&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

Last summer, my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin and I explained that, while many consumers dislike not being able to get popular smartphones like the iPhone on the wireless network of their choice, such exclusive deals actually benefit consumers. Barbara summarizes her testimony (PDF) as follows:

the dynamic created by the exclusive arrangement between Apple and AT&T that produced the iPhone allowed the two companies to bridge the gap between the technologies of today and the disruptive innovations of tomorrow. Moreover, it is undeniable that the breakthrough success of the iPhone has spurred a wave of competitors. If every wireless carrier had been able to sell the iPhone when it was initially released, I noted, it seems unlikely there would have been as much carrier support for developing competing products like the Google G1, RIM Blackberry Storm, Samsung Instinct or Palm Pre.

Speaking of transparency…  My colleague Barbara Esbin has a great piece on the PFF blog about changes being implemented by Acting Chairman Copps to make the agency less dysfunctional and more open to the public:

the new Acting Chairman has confirmed what FCC insiders, outside practitioners, and the House staff investigating former Chairman Kevin Martin’s management practices have long known: Commission staffers were not permitted to freely communicate either with one another, or with the other Commissioners. The liberation of the staff, together with changes concerning how the Bureaus and Offices work with each other and how the Commission communications with the public, certainly falls under the category of “change we can believe in…” Acting Chairman Copps has outlined other important changes in how the FCC does business, including establishing a calendar for regular open meetings in advance, and updating the FCC’s website to be more user-friendly, particularly its Digital TV Transition pages. These and other changes and commitments together constitute an extremely promising start for Acting Chairman Copps, and his commitment to transparency and order bode very well for the FCC, its staff, the companies the agency regulates, and the American public.

Great news.  Let’s hope the FCC also gets to work soon on updating its painfully antique website, with its proliferation of databases.

One of the reasons that so many of us here take issue with proposals to expand regulation of communications, broadband, and media markets is because we have studied the horrendous inefficiencies of economic regulation in practice. We oppose regulatory proposals not because of a “blind faith” in free markets, but because we understand that even when markets stumble they correct themselves quicker and more efficiently than regulatory systems do. One can profess the supposed theoretical benefits of enlightened “public interest” regulation all they want, but the facts are the facts. And the facts do not support the proposition that government regulation generally enhances consumer welfare.

In that regard, Tim Lee’s new Net neutrality report for Cato does a nice job of surveying some of the past unintended consequences of regulation. Also, even though it is now 10 years old, I highly recommend “Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice” by Jerry Ellig and Robert Crandall. It’s an outstanding overview of why economic regulation of various industries failed consumers so miserably in the past.

But if you want even more shocking proof of how horrendously inefficient communications regulation can be in practice, then you must read my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin’s two essays this week on the Universal Service Fund (USF): “The High Cost of USF Support,” and “More FCC Support Fund Follies.” In these two essays, Esbin walks the reader through various grim reports and statistics that have been released recently documenting the failures of the USF.

Her first essay notes how a recent FCC Inspector General report found that the USF “High Cost” fund is spiraling out of control. According to a FCC press release, that report found that “a program is at risk if the erroneous payment rate exceeds 2.5% and the amount of erroneous payments is greater than $10 million. The estimated erroneous payment rate for the High Cost Program (“HCP”) was 23.3%. The previous estimate was 16.6%. Total estimated erroneous payments were $ 971.2 million as compared with the previous estimate of erroneous payments of $617.8 million. Accordingly, the FCC-OIG concluded that the High Cost Fund program is “at risk” under applicable [..] criteria.”

Esbin puts these shocking results in perspective:

“At risk” is a surely a euphemism for a program that loses in “erroneous payments” nearly one out of every four dollars collected from telephone subscribers. In 2007, pursuant to FCC rules, telephone consumers were effectively taxed over $4 billion for the high-cost portion of the USF. Thus, nearly $1 billion dollars of subscriber money went out the door in “erroneous payments.” As the report makes clear, erroneous payments include both over- and underpayments, and also instances where the agency is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as a result of “lack of documentation.” The report’s conclusions state that the “rate of improper overpayments is 22.8%, and the proportion of improper overpayments out of total improper payments is 98.2%.” To be considered “erroneous,” an payment “need not be the result of fraudulent misrepresentation, or a corrupt administrative process.” “Nor does it necessarily exclude those factors as potential causes of erroneous payments.” Significantly, nor are “the erroneous payments . . . necessarily recoverable from recipients by process of law.” Fabulous. Not only has nearly $1 billion in erroneous overpayments gone missing, but even if final audits indicate where it has gone, it may not be recoverable! Among the interesting results of this preliminary report are the identified causes of erroneous payments. According to Table 2 of the report, 50% of the causes of erroneous payments can be attributed nearly equally to two factors: either “Inadequate Documentation” (25.3%) or “Inadequate Auditee Processes and/or Policies and Procedures” (24.6%). Another 10% “Disregarded FCC Rules” and 12% had “Applicant/Auditee Weak Internal Controls.” That is, roughly 75% of the erroneous overpayments can be attributed to poor bookkeeping, inadequate internal controls and “disregard” of FCC rules. This is stunning information. No wonder it made its appearance the day before Thanksgiving.

But wait, things get worse. So much worse. In Esbin’s second essay, she notes that:

On Monday, the OIG released its Semi-Annual Report to Congress, discussing the full range of audit activities conducted from April 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008. Thus we learn that in addition to the loss of nearly $1 billion in erroneous overpayments to the High Cost program, another fund the FCC is ultimately responsible for, the “Telecommunications Relay Service” (TRS) Fund, which provides funds for a variety of telephone transmission services for those with hearing and speech disabilities, also appears to be at risk for substantial overpayments due to the lack of adequate controls. Since 1993, according to the FCC’s website, the Commission’s rules have required that each common carrier providing voice transmission services provide TRS throughout its service area. All providers of interstate telecommunications services contribute to the TRS Fund, and TRS providers recover the costs of providing interstate services from the Fund on a minutes-of-use basis. Intrastate TRS funding is generally administered by the states, although some intrastate TRS offerings are supported by the interstate TRS Fund. The current TRS Fund Administrator is the National Exchange Carrier Association (NECA). Although NECA directly manages the Fund, the FCC sets the Fund size and carrier contribution factor annually and is ultimately responsible for Fund oversight. When the TRS Fund started, it disbursed about $31 million, growing to over $38 million by 1999. Since 1999, the OIG report states that the TRS Fund has increased approximately 50-80% each year, to reach $637 million for the Fund’s fiscal year from July, 2007 to June, 2008. The size of the fund for the current fiscal year is $850 million, a 26% increase over the previous fiscal year. That is, in roughly ten years the TRS Fund has ballooned from $38 million to $850 million! What, if any, other communications service has seen 50-80% growth in costs per year?

Indeed, that is a shocking degree of waste and inefficiency by just about any standard. And Esbin goes on to document specific examples of this waste and inefficiency in action within the TRS Fund. It’s shocking stuff and doesn’t make for pleasant reading if you care about good government.

Barbara is actually much more tempered and tolerant than me when it comes to what to do about all this. She recommends a lot more reform and oversight. If you ask me, however, then entire USF program should be dismantled immediately and any future support deemed necessary should be distributed directly to consumers at the state level in the form of a welfare payment. After all, at root, that’s what universal service is: a communications industry welfare program, but one in which most of the support flows to companies instead of individuals. And that makes it one of the most insanely misguided and inefficient regulatory / subsidization systems known to man. 13 years ago, in one of the very first things that PFF ever published ( The Telecom Revolution: An American Opportunity) I was advocating exactly this sort of a plan along with a dozen other think tank colleagues. (And we also set forth another, less radical reform plan than the “voucher-ize & devolve” plan I favored).

But no one listened. Business as usual continued. And so the endless waste and inefficiencies continue. Somebody will have to remind me how any of this benefits consumer welfare. I can’t see how anyone could make such a case, and I would hope the USF follies serve as a cautionary tale for how the best of intentions are meaningless when it comes to what regulation actually means in practice. Because it sure ain’t pretty.

But hey, it’ll all be different going forward right? We just need to have faith in the media reformistas and the Net neutralitistas.  If we click our heels together enough time and just wish hard enough, all our dreams can come true.

Sure.

Last week I discussed Barbara Esbin’s new PFF paper about the FCC’s absurd investigation into how the cable industry is transitioning analog customers over to digital. This is an essential transition is the cable industry is going to free up bandwidth to compete against telco-provided fiber offerings in the future. The faster the cable industry can migrate its old analog TV customers over to the digital platform, the more bandwidth they can re-deploy for high-speed Net access and services. Mark Cuban helps put things in perspective:

1. the only thing that cable companies, and satellite for that matter have to sell is bandwidth and the applications they can run on that bandwith. More bandwidth means more digital everything. 2. For Basic Cable subscribers that get say, 40 analog channels, they are consuming 40 x 38.6mbs or 1.54 Gbs. Let that sink in. 1.54 Gbs of bandwidth. Compare that to how fast your internet access is. That more bandwidth than your entire neighborhood consumes online, by a lot. Thats also the equivalent of 500 standard def digital channels. If you convert that to revenue per bit for cable companies, or cost per bit for basic cable consumers, the basic cable customers are getting the best deal in town. By a long shot. Digital cable customers, not so much. Digital customers are paying multiples of analog customers for bandwidth. In reality, analog customers are getting an amazing deal, and the cable companies have been hesitant to convert them only because of the potential FCC backlash. I’m as cynical as the next guy when it comes to cable rates and motivations, but the reality is that the longer analog remains, the fewer opportunities to leverage the freed up bandwidth to create next generation bandwidth hog applications. Will the cable companies charge us an a lot for that bandwidth, probably. But when we start to see applications built on top of 250mbs per second and more, it will have far more value to society than watching USA Network on your old analog TV. And Net Neutrality?  Well if everyone had that 1.54gbs available to them, net neutrality would be a non issue. We wouldn’t be arguing about access or pre-emption, we would be arguing about quality of service.

Once again we are reminded that all regulations have opportunity costs and in this case the FCC’s actions could cost consumers the loss (or at least delay) of higher-speed broadband offerings in the near-term.

I need not remind anyone here about FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s ongoing “war on cable.” Even if you hate the cable industry or capitalism in general, there’s just no way I can see how anyone who believes in the rule of law and good government can support Martin’s incessant abuse of power in his Moby Dick-like crusade against the cable industry. A crusade, incidentally, which happens to be motivated by Chairman Ahab’s desire to control speech on cable television, as I’ll note below.

Anyway, the latest chapter in this miserable saga of government-gone-mad is Martin’s recent effort to begin a far-ranging data gathering effort concerning cable prices and analog-to-digital channel movements under the guise of individual complaint enforcement. In a new paper entitled “Der Undue Prozess at the FCC: Part Deux,” my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin shows, once again, how the FCC’s regular processes and procedures are being perverted by Martin to achieve ends not within the agency’s delegated authority. And the results, in this case, will be profoundly anti-consumer.

Esbin documents the four flaws in the FCC’s investigation as follows:

(1) the FCC has very limited authority to regulate cable rate levels; (2) to the extent lack of advance notice of channel moves is at issue, local franchising authorities (LFAs), not the FCC, are statutorily empowered to carry out enforcement activities; (3) the FCC has no rules either prohibiting cable operators from migrating cable programming channels from analog to digital transmission or requiring corresponding per-channel rate reductions; and (4) to the extent the FCC is required by Congress to collect data on the multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) market and cable pricing generally, the agency is directed to do so by means of its annual video competition and price survey reports. Thus, not only is the digital cable probe being conducted in a manner that calls into question the fundamental fairness of agency processes (with guilt virtually presumed), it seems to be pursuing goals hard to fathom. What the cable industry is doing in migrating its legacy analog cable services to digital transmission is unambiguously pro-consumer, and the FCC’s probe will undoubtedly slow its progress. It is difficult to conceive of how consumers will benefit from this diversion of public and private resources as the nation approaches the critical switch-over from analog to digital television broadcasting just three short months from now. The public interest would be better served if the FCC would “stick to its knitting” and faithfully carry out its statutory mission. No more, and certainly no less.

Esbin goes on to note that, sadly, “this scenario is getting to be all too familiar: the FCC’s regular processes and procedures appear to have been perverted to achieve ends not within the agency’s delegated authority.” Of course, it’s obvious to anyone who has followed this war between Martin and the cable industry what this latest fiasco is really all about. Esbin explains:

So what is the agency really after? One of the first to report on the probe, Amy Schatz, identified its purpose as: “FCC Opens Investigation Into Cable-TV Pricing.” According to Todd Shields, Chairman Martin has said: “Listen, if I can think of anything that’ll help lower prices for cable customers, I would move forward on it.” But by seeking information concerning negotiated fees from wholesale programming suppliers, one suspects yet another back-door attempt to regulate such wholesale prices with an eye toward accomplishing the FCC Chairman’s cable Holy Grail: a la carte programming offerings.

I’ve discussed a la carte regulation ad nauseum here, so I will you spare you another rant. But let’s not forget what really motivates that crusade: Martin’s desire to “clean up” content on cable and satellite TV. A lot of “consumer advocates” are getting taken for a ride by Martin and his claim that he’s out to be Mr. Consumer Advocate and get our cable rates down. (Nevermind asking what the hell a Republican FCC Chairman is doing playing up price controls and getting in bed with the far left regulatory crowd). The fact is, this war has always been about speech control, not cable rates. The “consumer advocates” are just convenient pawns in a back-door censorship power grab.

Anyway, Esbin powerfully concludes here analysis with a summation of everything that is wrong with the way that Martin has conducted himself in this matter, and others:

What is disturbing is the process the FCC’s Chairman is using to pursue what might otherwise be a perfectly legitimate inquiry into a range of industry-wide practices in connection with the migration towards all-digital operations. This is no ordinary FCC enforcement action and it is difficult to conceive of how this use of agency resources will further two of the FCC’s most pressing current goals: ensuring a smooth transition to digital television transmission and encouraging the speedy deployment of ever higher-speed broadband Internet services. In fact, the probe is more likely to slow progress on each front as enormous resources are diverted to producing and reviewing information relevant mostly to activities that lie outside the scope of the FCC’s regulatory jurisdiction. More importantly, consumers cannot possibly benefit, in the long run, when the government conducts its business using questionable procedures in a manner that strongly suggests a lack of impartiality, fairness and predictability, because there can be no confidence that the results of such actions will be fair and reasonable. If the cause of this government investigation is just, its outcomes can only gain, not lose, by scrupulous adherence to the rule of law.

Amen. Hopefully the next FCC Chairman learns that lesson and behaves themselves appropriately.

I’ve been trying to catch up after a week-long cruise with my kids down in the Caribbean and as I was doing my best to sort through thousands of e-mails and articles in my RSS reader, I stopped and did a double-take when I saw some headlines from last week about how the Federal Communications Commission is spending $350,000 taxpayer dollars to sponsor a NASCAR team.  For that money, NASCAR driver David Gilliland “has agreed to use his No. 38 car as a high-speed billboard promoting the February 2009 national transition to digital television,” according to Multichannel News.

In the annuls of idiotic government spending initiatives this one has to be a potential hall of fame entry.  Over on the PFF Blog, my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin has a humorous piece explaining why:

what signal does FCC sponsorship of a stock car racer send to the beleaguered American public in this autumn of our discontent? The FCC Chairman claims that this sponsorship is an “extremely effective way for the FCC to raise DTV awareness among people of all ages and income levels across the United States who loyally follow one of the most popular sports in America.” Well, those loyal sports fans will have to be following No. 38 at the three sponsored races with some pretty high-speed binoculars to catch the DTV message. Although the $350,000 does get the government posting of its informational website URL, www.dtv.gov, along the track — doubtless not the only advertisement to lure spectator eyeballs — it is primarily receiving posting on the car’s sides and on the driver’s helmet and suit. Let’s just hope No. 38 has a large fan base, does exceeding well in the three races, and, more importantly, avoids accidents, injuries, and fleeting expletives. Maybe this is just another federal government bailout. On the same day that the FCC announced its investment in NASCAR, the Raleigh News & Observer ran an article entitled, “Global crisis threatens NASCAR.” It seems that “motor sport” team sponsorship has been down this year, “with sinking auto showroom sales, declining attendance and rising operating costs.” And let’s not even talk about the carbon footprint of stock car racing.

Of course, what’s even more pathetic about this move is that FCC Chairman Kevin Martin’s likely motivation for doing this is probably political:  He probably thinks this is a good way to win blue collar votes with all the NASCAR fans down in North Carolina for a future run for office. [It’s widely rumored that he will seek some office down in his home state after his tenure at the FCC is up.]  After all, NASCAR is hugely popular in that state.  I don’t know about you, but I’m none too happy subsidizing a get-out-the-NASCAR-vote effort for one of the most regulatory-minded FCC Chairmen in history.

My colleague Barbara Esbin, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Communications and Competition Policy at The Progress & Freedom Foundation, was asked to pen a short history of the net neutrality wars in the U.S. for a French publication, La Lettre de l’Autorité.  Her essay provides an excellent, concise overview of where we’ve come from and where we might be heading on this front.  I’ve pasted the entire essay down below, or you can download the PDF here.

Net Neutrality Regulation in the United States by Barbara Esbin

PFF Progress Snapshot Release 4.21 October 2008

The United States moved closer to “Net Neutrality” regulation this year when the Federal Communications Commission found that Comcast, a cable broadband Internet service provider, violated a set of Internet policy principles the FCC adopted in 2005 by limiting peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic. The ruling was the culmination of a ten-year effort that began as a call for wholesale “open access” to the cable platform for third-party Internet service providers. Requests for open access first emerged in 1998 when the FCC considered AT&T’s acquisition of cable operator TCI. The FCC rejected open access, but the issue quickly re-emerged in a subsequent proceeding to determine the appropriate regulatory classification of cable Internet service. Depending on how the FCC categorized cable Internet service, it would either be subject to telecommunications “common carrier” requirements, “cable service” requirements, or treated as a then-unregulated “information service.”

In 2002, the FCC classified cable Internet service as an “information service.” This meant that the telecommunications common carrier requirements — that service be provided upon request, without unreasonable discrimination as to rates, terms and conditions of service — would not apply to cable Internet services. The FCC’s decision was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in NCTA v. Brand X. Afterwards, advocates of open access re-directed their efforts away from advocating wholesale access for third-party ISPs, and towards rules aimed at consumer rights to a “neutral network” or “net neutrality.”

 In 2005 the FCC extended its deregulatory “information service” approach to wireline broadband Internet services provided, thus freeing telephone companies of traditional common carrier mandates for these services. The FCC’s decisions not to impose cable open access and to relieve telcos of common carrier obligations reflected a policy of fostering infrastructure deployment through market operations. Concurrently, the FCC released a “Policy Statement,” declaring four “entitlements” that Internet service consumers should enjoy: (1) access to lawful content of their choice; (2) ability to run chosen applications and services; (3) ability to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and (4) competition among network, application and content providers. The Policy Statement expressly stated that the FCC was not adopting rules and that the principles are subject to reasonable network management. The FCC subsequently stated that it would entertain complaints concerning violations of the principles, and in early 2007, the FCC opened an “Inquiry” into broadband industry practices, seeking information about network management and asking whether it should impose rules.

In late 2007, an advocacy group filed a Complaint alleging that Comcast had violated the FCC’s Policy Statement by “secretly degrading” BitTorrent traffic, thus interfering with the Internet rights of its subscribers, and that its practices did not constitute reasonable network management. Several months later, Comcast and BitTorrent agreed to work together to resolve network congestion issues through the use of protocol-agnostic network management. Yet on Aug. 20, 2008, the FCC released an Order purporting to rule on the Complaint, finding that Comcast had violated the Internet policy principles, and rejecting its defense that its practices were reasonable. The FCC ruled that Comcast’s network management practices: discriminated among Internet applications and protocols rather than treating all equally; effectively blocked Internet traffic; posed significant risks of anti-competitive abuse; were inconsistent with “an open and accessible Internet;” and that Comcast’s failure to disclose its practices compounded the harms. Alternative means of managing network congestion approved by the FCC include metered usage and throttling the connection speeds of excessive users.

This action was said to be an “adjudication,” although traditional agency complaint rules were not followed. Comcast was given 30 days to disclose to the FCC “the precise contours” of its network management practices and describe what it will do instead to address network congestion. The effect of the Order is to establish a fifth “non-discrimination” Internet policy principle, to be implemented by the FCC through case-by-case adjudication of individual complaints rather than ex ante rules. Thus, 10 years later, and without explicit acknowledgment, the FCC has effectively abandoned its “hands off” approach and imposed a form of common carrier regulation on ISPs.

I have written elsewhere on legal and procedural flaws that may doom the Network Management Order. In summary: (1) the FCC has not been granted explicit authority to regulate the provision of broadband “information services;” (2) the “ancillary jurisdiction” on which the FCC relied was not reasonably related to its other statutorily mandated responsibilities; (3) having failed to adopt enforceable rules concerning broadband network management, the FCC could not lawfully subject Comcast to an “adjudication” concerning its practices; and (4) the Complaint filed against Comcast was defective in several respects and should have been dismissed.

The Network Management Order has been appealed by Comcast and several advocacy groups. Comcast challenges the basis on which the FCC found that it had violated federal policy in the absence of pre-existing legally enforceable rules. The advocacy groups appealed the FCC’s failure to order Comcast to immediately cease and desist interfering with P2P traffic. The appeals have been consolidated and will be heard by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a court that has shown little patience for the FCC’s unusual procedures and the FCC’s use of the doctrine of “ancillary jurisdiction” to expand its reach. Meanwhile, several network operators have announced bandwidth caps or plans to implement them. In addition, there are renewed calls both for the FCC to establish ex ante rules and for legislative action to grant the FCC express regulatory authority over broadband Internet service providers. In short, the legal and policy debate over net neutrality continues.

• Barbara Esbin is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Communications and Competition Policy at The Progress & Freedom Foundation.

Well, another four months have passed since I last asked this question, but let me pose it again: Where exactly is the FCC’s Video Competition Report and why is it taking so long to get it out the door? It wouldn’t have anything to do with a certain Chairman Ahab still trying to get his cable whale, would it? No, of course not. I’m sure there’s a perfectly rational reason that this 13th Annual report is now something like 18 months past due altogether. Right.

And keep in mind that the data in the 13th report is for a period ending on June 30, 2006, so whenever the report finally comes out the data in it will be well over two years old! That won’t exactly reflect the true state of the video programming market considering the significant changes we have since that time, especially the continued explosive growth of online video, VOD, and DVRs.

The reason that I have been making a big deal out of this issue is because this gets to the question of just how “scientific” and “independent” of an agency the FCC really is. We are talking about facts here. Basic data. This is stuff the FCC should be routinely collecting and reporting on a timely basis — indeed that is what Congress requires the agency to do in this specific case. And yet the agency can’t do it because its Chairman is on this Moby Dick-like crusade against the cable industry. By the time this 13th annual report finally sees the light of day, the 15th annual report might be due! Outrageous. (And you wonder why many of us here are so skeptical about empowering the FCC regulating the Internet via Net neutrality mandates! If an over-zealous Chairman can politicize this issue, just think what might happen once we give the agency the authority to regulate the Net.)

Anyway, down below you will find the paper that Barbara Esbin and I wrote about the issue four months ago. Perhaps we should place a little ticker somewhere here on the site that counts each day that passes as we wait for the Commission to produce this report. We can take bets on when the agency’s data holdout will end.

In a new PFF essay, my colleague Barbara Esbin and I address a recent petition filed by the Rural Cellular Association (RCA) asking the FCC to prohibit exclusive arrangements between wireless handset producers and carriers. The RCA petition claims that large wireless companies have an unfair market advantage by giving their customers exclusive access to certain advanced smart phones, such as the Apple/AT&T iPhone—and that this anticompetitive practice is harmful to rural consumers served by RCA members.

In the piece, we debunk RCA’s arguments premised on a supposed lack of competition in wireless markets. RCA will likely now redouble these arguments by pointing to Verizon’s planned acquisition of Alltel (by far the smallest of the “Big 5” carriers), which was announced the day our piece was published. But even with four large carriers instead of five, the wireless market remains vibrantly competitive—especially as compared to 1992, when the FCC decided that even the two-carrier market was “extremely competitive,” and rejecting arguments that it ban exclusive handset arrangements.

In its last statistical report on competition in the mobile wireless marketplace, the FCC noted, “99.8 percent of the total U.S. population may obtain service from one or more CMRS providers; more than 95 percent live in areas with at least three CMRS providers competition to offer service; more than half the population lives in areas with at least five competing providers; and that 99.3 percent of consumers living in rural areas (approximately 60.6 million people) have a choice of one or more mobile carriers.” The elimination of the largest regional carrier (with fewer than a fifth as many customers as Verizon) should not appreciably reduce this wealth of choices available to consumers.

We also explain the virtues—or at least, the practical necessity—of exclusivity: such arrangements ultimately benefit all consumers by allowing handset manufacturers (i) to fund expensive development efforts for new mobile products through revenue-sharing and (ii) to develop truly innovative devices by ensuring that new services function properly on the provider’s network. We note that small carriers have been able to negotiate exclusive handset deals in the past by pooling their buying power and we suggest that RCA’s members should attempt to do the same today, rather than asking the FCC to ban exclusive arrangements. Also noteworthy is Apple’s movement away from exclusives elsewhere.

Ultimately, what enables technological innovations such as the iPhone are business model innovations such as Apple’s revolutionary partnership with AT&T. The ongoing evolution of that relationship demonstrates the dynamism of the wireless marketplace: Apple announced yesterday that it had extended its exclusive arrangement with AT&T, with AT&T now paying Apple more up front for the 3G HSDPA phones instead of sharing data plan revenue as with the EDGE iPhone. A $10/month increase in data plan rates will allow AT&T to reduce the price of new iPhones by $100, increasing AT&T’s subsidy to consumers.

Cynics will likely point out that an extra $10/month represents an effective increase of $140 for the total cost of AT&T’s minimum two-year contract (including the $100 price reduction but ignoring the time value of money). But then, someone has to pay for the cost of developing the 3G and upgrading AT&T’s 2.5G EDGE network to the higher-speed 3G HSDPA network. Yet despite the importance of experimentation with pricing and business models, RCA would have the government ban certain business models in favor of others. As we conclude: “the FCC should let the competitive forces of the wireless and handset markets continue to produce devices like the iPhone unhindered by intrusive and unnecessary government intervention.”