Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!

What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?

Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:

Matt Yglesias today responded with a post of his own to a NYT article about sports channels and cable pricing by Brian Stelter that Yglesias believed had “bad analysis.” I’m here to defend Stelter a little bit because I think Yglesias was too harsh and that Yglesias erred in his own post about the nature of cable bundling. Yglesias’ posts on cable bundling are good, and especially valuable because his Slate and ThinkProgress audiences are not the most receptive to economic justifications for perceived unfair corporate pricing schemes. In part due to him I suspect, you rarely hear econ and business bloggers calling for a la carte pricing of cable channels.

And Yglesias is certainly right that you can’t really complain about the price of your cable package, which includes the few channels you watch plus the sports channels you don’t watch, because you obviously value the channels more than the price you pay per month, even if the sports are a “waste.” He falters when he says

So since those channels are worth $60 to you, even if unbundling happens your cable provider is going to find a way to charge you approximately $60 for them. Because at the end of the day, you’re paying your cable provider for access to the channels you do watch—not for access to the channels you don’t watch. The channels you don’t watch are just there. If the channels you do watch are worth $60 to you, then $60 is what you’ll pay for them.

It would be an amazing price discrimination scheme if it were true cable operators can figure out how to charge each subscriber the approximate price the subscriber values his favorite channels. Cable companies don’t currently have that ability. Even a la carte distributors, like Amazon Prime with their video offerings, don’t charge you exactly what you value TV shows and movies at. The efficiency of bundling cable channels arises not because cable companies are pricing everyone their reservation price, as Yglesias suggests. Bundling is efficient because in a high fixed-cost industry, like cable, cable channel bundles provide cost savings that outweigh the costs of providing “wasted” channels consumers don’t watch.

I think the main point of Stelter’s article is right and Yglesias is incorrect. It’s conceivable that most customers would actually see sustained lower cable prices if sports channels were someday offered as premium channels, like Showtime and HBO. If Stelter is faulted for anything, it’s that he mentioned the phrase “a la carte,” since it seems like his sources only alluded to a partial breakup of the current bundle–making sports a premium offering–not a wholesale a la carte offering. Stelter quoted a former DOJ antitrust lawyer and anonymous cable executives who say that increasing sports channel prices may make the cable bundle so pricey that cable operators will be forced to break up the bundle, and I see no reason to question their assessments.

I’ll attempt to illustrate what the cable executives are trying to avoid. Bundling components like cable channels lowers costs for providers. If you imagine an a la carte world, it’s plain the costs escalate. Instead of everyone picking from a menu of 3 or 4 bundles from a cable provider, every single subscriber household would have a different customized selection. Cable companies would have to ensure everyone is receiving their requested channels, frequently make corrections and updates, and incur other costs.

Not to mention, a la carte would eliminate many channels currently in existence because there is a cross-subsidy business model in place that makes low-demand channels available in the first place. (A la carte would especially harm religious, African-American, and other niche programming. Currently, these niche content creators have to market their channels only to a few cable and satellite companies for carriage. With a la carte, they would have to engage in nationwide and expensive marketing campaigns to all their likely customers, which is why these smaller firms typically oppose a la carte.) A la carte, then, is costly to both cable and content providers. Offering only a few bundles eliminates many costs.

However, when the price of the bundle increases with more expensive sports programming, as the Stelter piece describes, you lose customers because the bundle has become too expensive. Eventually, it becomes more cost-effective to spin off some sports channels as premium channels, charge those sports customers more, and offer a lower-priced package to everyone else and gain customers. And I suspect sports viewers have relatively inelastic demand (nothing ruins my fall weekend like a Bears black-out on the East Coast), so the losses from a sports unbundling could be minimal.

If there’s a lesson, it’s that this all goes back to Coase and his tautological but helpful theory of the firm. We know where efficient firm boundaries are based on where firm boundaries are. That is, the current cable packages could be disintegrated if it’s too costly to maintain them. In a dynamic market like cable, it may one day be efficient to break up the current bundle, charge everyone less, and make some sports channels premium channels.

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

I’m pretty rough on all the Internet and info-tech policy books that I review. There are two reasons for that. First, the vast majority of tech policy books being written today should never have been books in the first place. Most of them would have worked just fine as long-form (magazine-length) essays. Too many authors stretch a promising thesis into a long-winded, highly repetitive narrative just to say they’ve written an entire book about a subject. Second, many info-tech policy books are poorly written or poorly argued. I’m not going to name names, but I am frequently unimpressed by the quality of many books being published today about digital technology and online policy issues.

The books of Harvard University cyberlaw scholars John Palfrey and Urs Gasser offer a welcome break from this mold. Their recent books, Born Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives, and Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems, are engaging and extremely well-written books that deserve to be books. There’s no wasted space or mindless filler. It’s all substantive and it’s all interesting. I encourage aspiring tech policy authors to examine their works for a model of how a book should be done.

In a 2008 review, I heaped praise on Born Digital and declared that this “fine early history of this generation serves as a starting point for any conversation about how to mentor the children of the Web.” I still recommend highly to others today. I’m going to be a bit more critical of their new book, Interop, but I assure you that it is a text you absolutely must have on your shelf if you follow digital policy debates. It’s a supremely balanced treatment of a complicated and sometimes quite contentious set of information policy issues.

In the end, however, I am concerned about the open-ended nature of the standard that Palfrey and Gasser develop to determine when government should intervene to manage or mandate interoperability between or among information systems. I’ll push back against their amorphous theory of “optimal interoperability” and offer an alternative framework that suggests patience, humility, and openness to ongoing marketplace experimentation as the primary public policy virtues that lawmakers should instead embrace.

Interop is Important, but Often Difficult & Filled with Trade-Offs

Palfrey and Gasser begin by noting that “there is no single, agreed-upon definition of interoperability” and that “there are even many views about what interop is and how it should be achieved” (p. 5). They set out to change that by developing “a normative theory identifying what we want out of all this interconnectivity” that the information age has brought us (p. 3).

Generally speaking, Palfrey and Gasser believe increased interoperability — especially among information networks and systems — is a good thing because it “provides consumers greater choice and autonomy” (p. 57), “is generally good for competition and innovation” (p. 90), and “can lead to systemic efficiencies” (p. 129).

But they wisely acknowledge that there are trade-offs, too, noting that “this growing level of interconnectedness comes at an increasingly high price” (p. 2). Whether we are talking about privacy, security, consumer choice, the state of competition, or anything else, Palfrey and Gasser argue that “the problems of too much interconnectivity present enormous challenges both for organizations and for society at large” (p. 2). Their chapter and privacy and security offers many examples, but one need only look around at their own digital existence to realize the truth of this paradox. The more interconnected our information systems become, and the more intertwined our social and economic lives become with those systems, the greater the possibility of spam, viruses, data breaches, and various types of privacy or reputational problems. Interoperability giveth and it taketh away.

When Does “the Public Interest” Demand Interoperability Regulation?

So, how do we know when increased interoperability is good for us or society? How do we strike a reasonable balance? And, most controversially, when should government intervene to tip the balance in one direction or another?

Palfrey and Gasser return to these questions repeatedly throughout the book but admit that their answers will be dissatisfying since “there is no single form or optimal amount of interoperability that will suit every circumstance” (p. 76). Thus, “most of the specifics of how to bring interop about [must] be determined on a case-by-case basis (p. 17). They elaborate:

That can feel unsatisfying. But it is an essential truth: the most interesting interop problems relate to society’s most complex and most fundamental systems. Their answers are never simple to come by, nor are they easy to implement. This characteristic of interop theory is a feature, not a bug. … The price to be paid for striving for a universal principle at the level of theory is that such a theory is full of nuances when it comes to application and practice (p. 17-18).

Fair enough. Yet, Palfrey and Gasser also make it clear they want government(s) to play an active role in ensuring optimal interoperability. They say they favor “blended approaches that draw upon the comparative advantages of the private and public sector” (p. 161), but they argue that government should feel free to tip or nudge interoperability determinations in superior directions. “If deployed with skill,” they argue, “the law can play a central role in ensuring that we get as close as possible to optimal levels of interoperability in complex systems” (p. 88).

That phrase — “optimal level of interoperability” — pops up repeatedly throughout the book. So, too, does the phrase “the public interest.” Palfrey and Gasser argue that governments must look out for “the public interest” and “optimal interoperability” since “market forces do not automatically lead to appropriate standards or to the adoption of the best available technology” (p. 167). Here they introduce two additional amorphous values that complicate the debate: “appropriate standards” and “best available technology.”

The fundamental problem this “public interest” approach to interoperability regulation is that it is no better than the “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” standard we sometimes at work in the realm of speech regulation. It’s an empty vessel, and if it is the lodestar by which policymakers make determinations about the optimal level of interoperability, then it leaves markets, innovators, and consumers subject to the arbitrary whims of what a handful of politicians or regulators think constitutes “optimal interoperability,” “appropriate standards,” and “best available technology.”

On the Limits of Knowledge

Palfrey and Gasser’s framework feels more than just “unsatisfying” in this regard; it feels downright insufficient. That’s because it is missing a major variable: the extent to which state actors are able to adequately define those terms or accurately forecast the future needs of markets or citizen-consumers.

Surprisingly, Palfrey and Gasser don’t really spend much time discussing the specific remedies the state might impose to achieve optimal interoperability. I would have liked to have seen them develop a matrix of interop options and then outline the strengths and weaknesses of each. But even absent a more detailed discussion of possible regulatory remedies, I would have settled for more concrete answers to the following questions: Why are we to assume that regulators possess the requisite knowledge needed to know when it makes sense to foreclose ongoing marketplace experimentation? And why should we trust that, by substituting their own will for that of countless other actors in the information technology marketplace, we will be left better off?

The closest Palfrey and Gasser get to defining a firm standard for when and why such state intervention is warranted comes on page 173 when they are discussing the need for the state to establish sound reasons for intervention. They argue:

The objective should not be interoperability per se but, rather, one or more public policy goal to which interoperability can lead. The goals that usually make sense are innovation and competition, but other objectives might include consumer choice, ease of use of a technology or system, diversity, and so forth (p. 173).

This is a bit better, but it still doesn’t fully grapple with the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus for intervention. Palfrey and Gasser are willing to at least acknowledge some of those problems when they remark that “the state is rarely in a position to call a winner among competing technologies” (p. 174). Moreover,

Lawmakers need to keep in view the limits of their own effectiveness when it comes to accomplishing optimal levels of interoperability. Case studies of government intervention, especially where complex information technologies are involved, show that states tend to be ill suited to determine on their own what specific technology will be the best option for the future (p. 175)

Quite right! Yet, that insight does not seem to influence their calls elsewhere in the book for regulatory activism. That’s a shame since the admonition about policymakers recognizing the “limits of their own effectiveness” should be able to help us devise some limiting principles regarding the state’s role.

Toward an Alternative Theory: Experimental, Evolutionary Interoperability

Allow me to offer a different theory of optimal interoperability that flows from these previous insights. It’s based on a more dynamic view of markets and the central importance of experimentation in the face of uncertainty. Let me just go ahead and articulate the core principles of what I will refer to as  “experimental, evolutionary interoperability theory.” Then I’ll explain it in more detail

• Experimental, evolutionary interoperability : The theory that ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

Palfrey and Gasser would label this a “laissez-faire” theory of interoperability and oppose it since they believe “a pure laissez-faire approach to interop rarely works out well” (p. 160). But they are wrong, at least to the extent they include the sweeping modifier “rarely” to describe this model’s effectiveness. In reality, the vast majority of interoperability that occurs into today’s information economy happens in a completely natural, evolutionary fashion without any significant state intervention whatsoever. In countless small and big ways alike, interconnection and interoperability happens every day throughout society. Yes, it is true that interoperability often happens against the backdrop of a legal system that allows court action to enforce certain rights or address perceived harms, but I would not classify that as a significant direct state intervention to tip or nudge interconnection decisions in one direction or another. And when interoperability doesn’t happen naturally, there are often good reasons it doesn’t and, even if there aren’t, non-interop spawns beneficial marketplace reactions and innovations.

Experimental, evolutionary interoperability theory flows out of Schumpeterian competition theory and the related field of evolutionary economics, but it is also heavily influenced by public choice theory (which stresses the limitations of romanticized theories of politics, planning, and “public interest” regulation). This alternative theory begins by accepting the simple fact that, as Austrian economist F.A. Hayek taught us, “progress by its very nature cannot be planned.” The wiser man, Hayek noted, “is very much aware that we do not know all the answers and that he is not sure that the answers he has are certainly the right ones or even that we can find all the answers.”

Ongoing experimentation with varying business models and modalities of social and economic production allows us to see what consumer choice and trial and error experimentation yields naturally over time. Ongoing experiments with flexible, voluntary interop standards and negotiations also allows us to determine which technological standards seem to benefit consumers in the short-term while also encouraging innovators to leap-frog existing standards and platforms when they become locked-in for too long or seem sub-optimal.

In the short-term, it is entirely possible that such voluntary, evolutionary interop experiments “fail” in various ways. That is often a good thing. Failures are how individuals and a society learn to cope with change and devise systems and solutions to accommodate technological change. As Samuel Beckett once counseled: “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better.” Progress depends upon an embrace of this uncertainty and acceptance of a world of constant upheaval if we are to learn how to cope, adapt, and move forward.

In this model, technological innovation often springs from the quest for the prize of market power.  Palfrey and Gasser generally reject this Schumpeterian vision of dynamic competition, but they at least do a nice job of describing it:

firms may have a stronger incentive to be innovative when low levels of interoperability promise higher or even monopoly profits. This sort of competition… creates incentives for firms to come up with entirely new generations of technologies or business methods that are proprietary (p. 121).

They reject this approach based on (1) the mistaken notion that the quest of the prize of market power ends in the attainment and preservation of that market power; and (2) the belief that policymakers possess the ability to set us on a better course through wise interventions.

In a moment, I’ll prove why that is misguided by examining a few real-world cases studies. For now, however, let’s return to Palfrey & Gasser’s central operating principle and contrast it with the vision I’ve articulated here. Recall that they argue “it is important to maintain and facilitate diversity in the marketplace. We simply want systems to work together when we want them to and to not work together when we do not.” Again, there is no standard here if one is suggesting this as the principle by which to determine when state intervention is desirable . But if one is looking at that aspirational statement as a description of the natural order of things — namely, that we do indeed “want systems to work together when we want them to and to not work together when we do not” — then that is a perfectly sound principle for understanding why state intervention should be disfavored in all but the most extreme circumstances. To reiterate: We should not allow the state to foreclose interoperability experiments because (a) those experiments have value in and of themselves, and (b) state action is likely to have myriad unintended consequences and unforeseen costs that are not easily remedied or reversed.

There are moments in the book when Palfrey and Gasser appear somewhat sympathetic to the sort of alternative “evolutionary interop” theory I have articulated here. For example, they note that:

The web is a great equalizer for technology firms. As consumers, we have come to expect that everything will work together without incident or interruption. We think it bizarre when something in the digitally networked world does not mesh with something else, perceiving whatever it is to be broken, in need of repair. This high degree of expectation is a powerful driver of interoperability. Market players are increasingly responding to this consumer demand and making these invisible links work for their customers without any government intervention” (p. 28) [italics added]

You won’t be surprised to hear that I agree wholeheartedly! Moreover, what it really proves is that ongoing marketplace experimentation and the evolution of norms and standards generally solve interoperability problems as they develop. That doesn’t mean markets are perfectly competitive or always produce perfect interoperability. But, again, why should we believe state intervention will do a better job? And isn’t it possible that intervention could negatively counter those natural instincts that Palfrey and Gasser describe about how consumers and market actors interact to make those “invisible links” work out as nicely as they do today?

Interop, Competition & Innovation: Some Cases Studies of Evolutionary Interoperability in Action

To better explain experimental, evolutionary interop theory and how it plays out in the real-world, let’s examine the complex relationship between interoperability, competition, and innovation in the information economy through the prism of three case studies: AOL and instant messaging, video game consoles, and smartphones.

AOL

America Online’s (AOL) case study is probably the most profound example of Schumpeterian creative destruction rapidly eroding the market power of a once “dominant” digital giant. Not long ago, AOL was cast as the great villain of online openness and interoperability. In fact, when Lawrence Lessig penned his acclaimed book Code in the late 1990s, AOL was supposedly set to become the corporate enslaver of cyberspace.

For a time, it was easy to see why Lessig and others were worried. Twenty five million subscribers were willing to pay $20 per month to get a guided tour of AOL’s walled garden version of the Internet. Then AOL and media titan Time Warner announced a historic mega-merger that had some predicting the rise of “new totalitarianisms” and corporate “Big Brother.”

Fearing the worst, several conditions were placed on approval of the merger by both the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communication Commission. These included “open access” provisions that forced Time Warner to offer the competing ISP service from the second largest ISP at that time (Earthlink) before it made AOL’s service available across its largest cable divisions.  Another provision imposed by the FCC mandated interoperability of instant messaging systems based on the fear that AOL was poised to monopolize that emerging technology.

Palfrey and Gasser suggest this was a necessary and effective intervention. “The AOL IM case is another instance in which the role of government was key in establishing a more interoperable ecosystem” and they credit the FCC’s action with cutting AOL’s share of the IM (p. 68-9). That’s a huge stretch. The reality is that markets and technologies evolved around AOL’s walled garden and decimated whatever advantage the firm had in either the web portal business or instant messaging market.

First, despite all the hand-wringing and regulatory worry, AOL’s merger with Time Warner quickly went off the rails and AOL’s online “dominance” quickly evaporated. Looking back at the deal with TW, Fortune magazine senior editor Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade” since it cost shareholders hundreds of billions. Second, AOL’s attempt to construct the largest walled garden ever also failed miserably as organic search and social networking flourished. Consumers showed they demanded more than the hand-held tour of cyberspace.

Finally, the hysteria about AOL’s threat to monopolize instant messaging and deny interoperability proved particularly unwarranted and also serves as a cautionary tale for those who argue regulation is needed to solve interoperability problems. At the time, well-heeled major competitors like Yahoo and Microsoft already had significant competing IM platforms, and others were rapidly developing. Interoperability among those systems was also spontaneously developing as consumers demanded greater flexibility among and within their communications systems. The development of Trillian, which allowed IM users to see all their various IM feeds at once, was an early precursor of what was to come. Today, anyone can download a free chat client like Digsby or Adium to manage multiple IM and email services from Yahoo!, Google, Facebook and just about anyone else, all within a single interface, essentially making it irrelevant which chat service friends use.

In a truly Schumpetrian sense, innovators came in and disrupted AOL’s plans to dominate instant messaging with innovative offerings that few critics or regulators would have believed possible just a decade ago. Progress happened, and nobody planned it from above. The FCC’s IM interoperability provision was quietly sunset less than three years after its inception since the evolution of technology and markets had rapidly eliminated the perceived problem. That mandate, as it turned out, wasn’t needed at all, and all it probably accomplished during its short life span was to hobble AOL’s ability to find a way to remain relevant in the increasingly competitive Web. 2.0 world.

Video game consoles

At first blush, the video game console wars might seem like the ideal case study for those who favor greater interoperability regulation. After all, in a static sense, why do we really need several competing video game platforms that prevent consumers from playing their games on more than one system? The lack of console interoperability also drives up development costs for game makers. Many of those developers would prefer to just code games for a single, universal gaming platform. Therefore, isn’t this the perfect excuse for state intervention to ensure “optimal interoperability”?

To the contrary, this is another example of why government should generally avoid intervening to try to achieve some sort of artificial optimal interoperability. This market has undergone continuous, turbulent change and witnessed remarkable pro-consumer innovation despite a lack of interoperability.

The video game console wars have raged since the late 1970s. The first generation of consoles was dominated Atari (2600), Mattel (Intellivision), and Coleco (ColecoVision). By the mid-1980s, the industry saw a new cast of characters displace the old players. Nintendo (NES), and Sega (Genesis) took the lead. Atari attempted a rebirth with its “Jaguar” console but failed miserably.

The demise of Atari’s 2600 console was particularly notable. When it debuted in 1977, the system revolutionized the home game market on its way to selling more than 30 million units.  For a few years, it utterly dominated the console market and the company “rushed out games, assuming that its customers would play whatever it released,” notes New York Times reporters Sam Grobart and Ian Austen. But demand rapidly dried up as other consoles and personal computers took the lead with more powerful, flexible platforms and games. In the end, “millions of unsold games and consoles were buried in a New Mexico landfill in 1983. Warner Communications, which bought Atari in 1976 for $28 million, sold it in 1984 for no cash.”

The next generation of machines was dominated by Nintendo and Sega. But by the turn of the century, more new faces appeared and disrupted the second generation of market leaders. Sony (PlayStation) and Microsoft (Xbox) introduced powerful new consoles that continue to evolve to this day. Both consoles have already cycled through three iterations, each increasingly powerful and more functional. Sega dropped out of the console business and refocused on game development. Nintendo managed to survive with its innovative “Wii” system, but has fallen from its perch as king of the console market. Many also forget Apple’s failed run at the console business with its “Pippin” system in the late 1990s. Steve Jobs killed off the console when he returned to once again lead Apple in 1997. Ironically, just a decade later, with the rise of the iPhone and the Apple App Store, the company would emerge as a major player in the gaming market as smartphone gaming exploded.

Of course, PC gaming existed across these generations and handheld gaming devices and now smartphones are also providing competition to traditional consoles. Arcade games also existed both then and now. Thus, the video game market has always been broader than just home gaming consoles.

Nonetheless, at no time during the turbulent history of this sector have major consoles interoperated. The result has been a constant effort by major console developers to leap-frog the competition with increasingly innovative and powerful consoles and peripherals. Would Microsoft have developed the Kinect motion-sensing device if Nintendo had not previously developed their game-changing Wii motion controllers? It’s impossible to know but it would seem that non-interoperability had something to do with that beneficial development. Microsoft needed a game-changing peripheral of its own to meet the Nintendo challenge since Nintendo was not about to share its innovations with the competition. Meanwhile, Sony has developed its own motion-based “Move” system to compete Microsoft and Nintendo.

This is a highly dynamic marketplace at work. Could policymakers have determined that 3 major non-interoperable home consoles would have produced so much innovation? Would they have judged that to be too much or too little competition?  Would they have been able to foresee or help bring about the disruptive competition from portable gaming devices or smartphones? What sort of interop regulation would have made that happen?

As Palfrey and Gasser suggest in their book, there really “is no single form or optimal amount of interoperability that will suit every circumstance.” The video game case study seems to prove that. Yet, their framework leaves the door open a bit wider for state meddling to determine “optimal interop.” I have little faith that state planners could have given us a more innovative video game marketplace through interop nudging. And I also worry that if the door had been open for regulators at the FCC or elsewhere to influence interoperability decisions, it might have also opened to the door to content regulation since many lawmakers have long had an appetite for video game censorship.

Smartphones

The mobile phone handset and operating system marketplace has undergone continuous change over the past 15 years and is still evolving rapidly. There are some interoperable elements, such as the ability to make connecting calls and send texts and IMs. But other parts of the smartphone ecosystem are not interoperable, such as underlying operating systems or apps and app stores.

In the midst of this mixed system of interoperable and non-interoperable elements, innovation and cut-throat competition have flourished.

When cellular telephone service first started taking off in the mid-1990s, handsets and mobile operating systems were essentially one in the same, and Nokia and Motorola dominated the sector with fairly rudimentary devices. The era of personal digital assistants (PDAs) dawned during this period, but mostly saw a series of overhyped devices, including Apple’s “Newton,” that failed to catch on. In the early 2000s, however, a host of new players and devices entered the market, many of which are still on the scene today, including LG, Sony, Samsung, Siemens, and HTC. Importantly, the sector began splitting into handsets versus operating systems (OS). Leading mobile OS makers have included: Microsoft, Palm, Symbian, BlackBerry (RIM), Apple, and Android (Google).

The sector continues to undergo rapid change and interoperability norms have evolved at the same time. Looking back, it’s hard to know whether increased interoperability would have helped or hurt the state of competition and innovation.

Consider Palm, Blackberry, and Microsoft which all limited interoperability with other systems in various ways. Palm smartphones were wildly popular for a brief time and brought many innovations to the marketplace, for example. Palm underwent many ownership and management changes, however, and rapidly faded from the scene.  After buying Palm in 2010, HP announced it would use its webOS platform in a variety of new products.  That effort failed, however, and HP instead announced it would transition webOS to an open source software development mode.

Similarly, RIM’s BlackBerry was thought to be the dominant smartphone device for a time, but it has recently been decimated. BlackBerry’s rollercoaster ride has left it “trying to avoid the hall of fallen giants” in the words of an early 2012 New York Times headline.  The company once commanded more than half of the American smartphone market but now has under 10 percent, and that number continues to fall.

Microsoft also had a huge lead in licensing its Windows Mobile OS to high-end smartphone handset makers until Apple and Android disrupted its business. It’s hard to believe now, but just a few years ago the idea of Apple or Google being serious contenders in the smartphone business was greeted with suspicion, even scorn by popular handset makers such as Nokia and Motorola. This serves as another classic example of those with a static snapshot mentality disregarding the potential for new entry and technological disruption. Just a few years later, Nokia’s profits and market share have plummeted and a struggling Motorola was purchased by Google. Meanwhile, again, Palm seems dead, BlackBerry is dying, and Microsoft is struggling to win back market share it has lost to Apple and Google in this arena.

It would seem logical to conclude that the ebbs and flows of interoperable and non-interoperable elements of the smartphone world have created a turbulent but vibrantly innovative sector. Has the lack of interoperable operating systems or apps and apps stores hurt smartphone consumers? It’s hard to see how. Mandating interoperability at either level could lead to an OS or app store monopoly, most likely for Apple if such a policy were pursued today.

While Apple has had great success and earned endless kudos for their slick, user-friendly innovations from consumers and tech wonks alike, some critics decry their proprietary business model and more “controlled” user experience. Apple tightly controls almost every level of production of its iPhone smartphone and iPad tablet. Interoperability with competing systems, standards, or technologies is limited in many ways. Is that bad? Some critics think so, suggesting that greater “openness” — presumably in the form of greater device or program interoperability — is needed. But so what? Consumers seem extremely happy with Apple devices. Moreover, well-heeled rivals like Google (Android) and Microsoft continue to innovate at a healthy clip and offer consumers a decidedly different user experience. As with video games consoles, non-interop has had some important dynamic effects and advantages for consumers. It’s hard to know what “optimal interoperability” would even look like in the modern smartphone marketplace and how it would be achieved, but it’s equally hard to believe that consumers would be significantly better off if regulators were trying to achieve it through top-down mandates on such a dynamic, fast-moving market.  [For more on this topic, see my 2011 book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters,” from the book, The Next Digital Decade.]

Case Study Summary & Analysis

These case studies suggest that defining “optimal interoperability” is a pipe dream. In some cases, consumers demanded a certain amount interoperability and they got it. But it seems equally obvious that they did not demand perfect interoperability in every case. Few consumers are tripping over their own feet in a mad rush to toss out their XBoxs or iPhones just because they are not perfectly interoperable. On the other hand, since the days of the old “walled garden” hell of AOL, CompuServe, Prodigy, and so on, it would seem that information technology markets are growing more “open” in other ways. You can’t completely lock-down a user’s online experience and expect to win their business over the long haul.

Palfrey and Gasser make that point quite nicely in the book:

Increasingly, though, businesses are seeing the merits of strategies based on openness. A growing number of businesses are pursuing models that incorporate interoperability as a core principle. More and more firms, especially in the information business, are shedding their proprietary approaches in favor of interoperability at multiple levels. The goal is not to be charitable to competitors or customers, of course, but to maximize returns over time by building an ecosystem with others that holds greater promise than the go-it-alone approach (p. 149).

Quite right, but let’s not pretend that any mass market information platforms or systems will ever be perfectly “open” or interoperable. There will always be some limitations on how such systems are used or shared. And that’s just fine once you embrace a more flexible theory of evolutionary interoperability.  Ongoing experiments will get us to a better place.

Conclusion: Let Interop Experiments Continue!

So, let me wrap up by restating my alternative theory of optimal interoperability as succinctly as possible: When in doubt, ongoing, bottom-up, dynamic experimentation will almost always yield better answers than arbitrary intervention and top-down planning. Again, that is not to say that all interoperability experiments will leave society better off in the short-term. Some interoperability experiments and resulting market norms or outcomes can create challenging dilemmas for individuals and institutions. There may be short-term spells of “market power,” for example, and some standards may get locked in longer than some of us think makes sense. If, however, we have faith in humans to solve problems with information and technology, then still more experimentation — not state intervention — is the answer. And that is especially true once you accept the fact that those seeking to intervene have very limited knowledge of all the relevant facts needed to even make wise decisions about the future course of technology markets or information systems.

Some will find my alternative theory of optimal interoperability no more satisfying than Palfrey and Gasser’s since they may find the experimental interop framework too inflexible when it comes to state action. Whereas the frustration with Palfrey and Gasser’s theory will likely flow from their failure to define a coherent standard for when intervention is warranted, my approach solves that problem by suggesting we should largely abandon the endeavor and instead let ongoing market experiments solve interop problems over time. For me, we would need to find ourselves in a veritable whole-world-is-about-to-go-to-hell sort of moment before I could go along with state intervention to tip the interop scales in one direction or another. And, generally speaking, this is exactly the sort of thing that antitrust laws are supposed to address after a clear showing of harm to consumer welfare. Stated differently, to the extent any state intervention to address interoperability can be justified, ex post antitrust remedies should almost always trump ex ante regulatory meddling.

This alternative vision of evolutionary, experimental interoperability will be rejected by those who believe the state has the ability to wisely intervene and nudge markets to achieve “optimal interoperability” through some sort of Goldilocks principle that can supposedly get it just right. For those of us who have doubts about the likelihood of such sagacious state action — especially for fast-paced information sectors — the benefits of ongoing marketplace experimentation far outweigh the costs of letting those experiments run their course.

Regardless, we should be thankful that John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have provided us with a book that so perfectly frames what should be a very interesting ongoing debate over these issues. I encourage everyone to pick up a copy of Interop so you can join us in this important discussion.

Additional Reading:

• the official book site
• buy the book on Amazon or Barnes & Noble
• Follow the authors on Twitter: @JPalfrey & @UGasser
• a video of their Harvard book launch follows:

“It was then, and is now, the largest merger in American business history,” notes Tim Arango of the New York Times about the AOL-Time Warner mega-merger, which happen ten years this month. And yet, as he points out in his essay, “How the AOL-Time Warner Merger Went So Wrong,” things didn’t end up going so well for this marriage:

The trail of despair in subsequent years included countless job losses, the decimation of retirement accounts, investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department, and countless executive upheavals. Today, the combined values of the companies, which have been separated, is about one-seventh of their worth on the day of the merger. To call the transaction the worst in history, as it is now taught in business schools, does not begin to tell the story of how some of the brightest minds in technology and media collaborated to produce a deal now regarded by many as a colossal mistake.

Arango goes on to interview several of the principals involved in the deal to get their take on why things unfolded so miserably and, ultimately, came to an end this year. I highly recommend the essay because it should serve as a cautionary tale to those worrywarts who are constantly predicting that the sky is going to fall if we allow a truly free media marketplace–including freedom for firms to structure themselves as they wish.  Reality usually plays out quite differently.  As I argued in my recent paper, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC,”

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed.. mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders. But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence… Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy.

I just finished Ken Auletta’s latest book, Googled: The End of the World As We Know It, and I highly recommend it. Auletta is an amazingly gifted journalist and knows how put together a hell of good story.  It helps in this case that he was granted unprecedented access to the Google team and their day-to-day workings at the Googleplex. I’m really shocked by the level of access he was granted to important meetings and officials–over 150 interviews with Googlers, including 11 with CEO Eric Schmidt and several with founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page.  That’s impressive.

The book shares much in common with Randall Stross’s excellent Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know, which I reviewed here earlier this year.  Both books recount the history of Google from its early origins to present. And both survey a great deal of ground in terms of the challenges that Google faces as it matures and the policy issues that are relevant to the company (privacy, free speech, copyright law, etc).

What makes Auletta’s book unique is the way we taps his extensive “old media” world contacts and integrates such a diverse cast of characters into the narrative — Mel Karmazin (former Viacom, now Sirius XM), Bob Iger (Disney), Howard Stringer (Sony), Martin Sorrrell (WPP), Irwin Gotlieb (Group M), and even the Internet’s “inventor”–Al Gore!   Auletta interviews them or recounts stories about their interactions with Google to show the growing tensions being created by this disruptive company and its highly disruptive technologies.  There are some terrifically entertaining anecdotes in the book, but the bottom line is clear: Google has made a lot of enemies in a very short time.

Indeed, the book is as much about the decline of old media as it is about Google’s ascendancy.  What Auletta has done so brilliantly here is to tell their stories together and ask how much old media’s recent woes can be blamed on Google and digital disintermediation in general. “If Google is destroying or weakening old business models,” Auletta argues, “it is because the Internet inevitably destroys old ways of doing things, spurs ‘creative destruction.’ This does not mean that Google is not ambitious to grow, and will not grow at the expense of others. But the rewards, and the pain, are unavoidable,” he concludes. Google is essentially just the tip of a giant wave of digital disintermediation that is tearing through the media landscape, Auletta argues. But because it is the biggest and most visible part of this wave, it invites greater scrutiny and scorn.  And then there are more profound questions about Google and the digital disintermediators: “What we don’t know is whether the new digital distribution systems will generate sufficient revenue to adequately pay content providers.”  Auletta isn’t just talking about old media giants, but about content creators in general. It’s the “digital sharecropper” concern that Nick Carr has articulated in his book about cloud computing, The Big Switch. [reviewed here]  In the relentless pursuit of greater efficiencies, do digital disintermediators destroy the cross-subsidization methods that have traditionally funded the creation of news, information, and entertainment? If so, are we better off because older, “less efficient” ways of doing business are replaced with better ones. Or are we instead left with less high-quality journalism and entertainment because of funding streams are drying up or being siphoned off by the new digital disintermediators?

Those are heated question frequently debated by Internet optimists and pessimists. It’s a great debate, and one that will no doubt continue to rage for many years to come. The problem for Google — as the interviews Auletta conducts with others in the book makes clear — is that it will increasingly become the scapegoat for every problem under the digital sun. “To blame Google is to prescribe a cure from the wrong illness,” Auletta notes.  Nonetheless, as the biggest and most visible of the digital disruptors, it’s clear the company will have a target on its back for many years to come.

Worse yet for Google, Aulleta states, is that the company is “waking the government bear,” not just because of its growing size but also because of the sheer amount of information it collects and puts at the world’s disposal.  Privacy, child safety, defamation, and copyright are just a few of the concerns raised by Google’s mission “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”  Google has gone to great pains to address these concerns, but it’s unlikely to ever be enough to satisfy government officials, who will be fielding increasing complaints from disgruntled competitors and activist groups at the same time.

These concerns could play into the hands of those who think antitrust action against Google is needed. Indeed, I fear that’s on the way given the myopia of Washington. As I pointed out in my lengthy review of Gary Reback’s ode to antitrust regulation, Free the Market: Why Only Government Can Keep the Marketplace Competitive, the static competition, fixed-pie mindset that rules Washington leads many to support antitrust crusades against the tech giants of the day.  In the 70s it was IBM. In the 90s it was Microsoft.  In the next decade it will likely be Google.

“Today, Google appears impregnable,” Auletta notes, “But a decade ago so did AOL, and so did the combination of AOL Time Warner.”  Indeed, I have written extensively about that deal and many others that critics predicted would bring on a techno-apocalypse.  Of course, we know how the story ended in those cases. Markets and technologies evolved while the old giants rested on their laurels. Dynamic competition and innovation are the rule; the static mindset crowd that pretends today’s giants are the end of the story just don’t have history on their side.

But that doesn’t mean Google will be able to avoid a massive regulatory onslaught. In fact, I have pending bets going right now with several friends that, before the Obama Administration leaves office, it will launch the biggest, most costly antitrust jihad in U.S. history against Google.  I can’t tell you how much I am hoping to lose those bets.

P.S. I have enjoyed many of Auletta’s earlier articles and books, especially Backstory: Inside the Business of News (2003),  but I highly recommend that you check out the latest essay he posted on his blog about “Media Maxims.”  Outstanding insights.

As I noted in my recent paper, “A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC,” every time a media merger is proposed we hear all sorts of silly Chicken Little predictions of impending doom. Among the more entertaining claims we hear are conspiracy theories about supposed nefarious schemes to take over the media universe and control our minds,  predictions of the death of journalism or democracy, or just good ol’ fashion screw-the-consumer price hikes. But, as I showed in my paper, those predictions have always proven to be bunk once the historical record is in–which usually only takes a few years. While most media mergers do end in misery–it’s for the merging firms and their shareholders, not the public. Unforeseen technological innovations and expanding media marketplace options typically doom most media mergers, while the viewing and listening public enjoys the fruits of continued marketplace evolution.

But the critics never acknowledge any of this. And, sadly, history repeats. The media worrywarts just keep mouthing the same lines and conveniently avoid any reference to their past predictions. No one bothers looking back and trying to match up those past predictions with present day facts. I’m out to change that.  I am going to attempt to keep a running inventory all the Chicken Little predictions about the Comcast-NBC Universal deal so that, a few years from now, we can look back and see how well those predictions match up with reality.  I suspect that, as was true of those earlier case studies, reality will look quite different than the rhetoric we are hearing today.

To kick things off, here are some rather outlandish comments from someone who should know better — Dan Gillmor, author of the excellent 2006 book, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People, which I have cited quite favorably in much of my own work through the years.  But when it comes to the Comcast-NBCU deal, Gillmor has gone off the deep end in an essay entitled, “Comcast-NBC: The Road Toward Control Over What We Create.” He argues:

A Comcast-NBC combination is brazenly anti-competitve and anti-democratic. It would give one company far too much ownership over not just professionally produced media but also the ways media consumers can receive it. Worse, if approved, it could mark the tipping point in Big Media’s push to take control over the Internet itself. That’s where we need to focus our attention.

But wait, there’s more…

it will be in Comcast’s financial interest to clamp down as much as possible on Internet data use when it conflicts with its cable-TV business, which is to say on a constant basis.

Oh my. This is quite a scary story. A Hollywood script could be born of all this! But, then again, Comcast-NBCU would quash that script and forever bury it from our sight, right?

I fear Gillmor has been drinking up some of the “perfect control” fantasies bandied about by his Harvard Berkman Center colleagues Lawrence Lessig and Jonathan Zittrain, which I have documented here before. These guys have claimed that a variety of digital players–AOL in the ’90s and Apple today–would crush our digital liberties and snuff out competition and dissent.

These tales are all fiction, of course. In my paper, I document just how quickly the much-ballyhooed AOL-Time Warner merger fell apart. When AOL-Time Warner announced their mega-merger, critics forecast “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.” Just two years after the deal was announced, AOL-Time Warner had lost over $100 billion in shareholder value and Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether. And AOL is now being spun off altogether. So much for “perfect control.”

But what about Gillmor’s claim that Comcast will clamp down on all content that conflicts with its cable TV business model?  Rubbish. If they were going to do that, wouldn’t we have seen some evidence by now? And good luck trying even if they really wanted to do so.  It’s impossible for them to lock down content flows. There’s always another way for information and content to flow in our modern media marketplace. Indeed, Gillmor completely undercuts his own argument on this point when noting:

Keep in mind that Comcast wouldn’t be the first company to have this kind of vertical content and distribution structure. Time Warner owns some cable franchises along with CNN and other media properties; Cablevision has its own content business. Phone companies have some projects under way, too.

Yes, Dan, and what do those experiments tell us?!   Have you been subjected to some sort of sadistic mind control by the nefarious media overlords who own both content and conduit?  Or did you somehow just avoid the brain-washing because you have access to super-secret information sources outside their control? Please, do tell us. I am dying to know the “truth” that our wicked media overlords are keeping from us!

Sorry to be so snarky, but I am just really tired of this nonsense.  There has been no “takeover” over the media marketplace or our minds by these media companies.  Hell, these media companies can’t even figure out how to tie their own digital shoelaces most days of the week. They are scrambling to find something– anything–that works to counter to tsunami of digital devices, online options, and so on, that they were largely unprepared for. Mergers and alliances are one response to this storm, but there is no guarantee they will pan out. Most don’t. But, again, they typically don’t work out for the companies and their shareholders; the public largely ignores their pain and continues to benefit from a marketplace of rapidly expanding options and alternatives.

Anyway, please help me continue to document claims such as these so I can build a record and then match it up with reality later down the road.  It’s important that public policy be based on facts, not fanaticism.

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

I was just digging through some old files and came across a quote that I found entertaining. Back in 2003, when he was still president and chief operating officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said with reference to Microsoft, AOL-Time Warner, and Comcast:  “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”  At the time, some media worrywarts made great hay of Mel’s quip and claimed, as Gene Kimmelman of Consumers Union argued at the time, that it proved how “Media moguls themselves admit their desire to avoid real competition within their industry.”

Utter rubbish. In fact, just six years after Karmazin spoke those words, Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has crumbled (even Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment got divorced!), and Comcast is now squaring off against telco and online video competitors that were unfathomable at the time (not to mention traditional satellite TV competitors.)  In the meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and today, as CEO of Sirius XM, is struggling to find a way to make the satellite radio universe survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath thanks to unforeseen competition from online music services and a little thing called the iPod!

It’s proof positive that media markets and digital technologies always evolve faster than most people — even smart industry titans like Karmazin — anticipate.

Holman Jenkins has a stinging editorial in today’s Wall Street Journal entitled, “Neutering the ‘Net,” which borrows a term that my friend Randy May coined long ago to describe what net neutrality regulation will ultimately accomplish. What I like best about the Jenkins essay was the way he exposed Free Press for their hypocrisy over metering as a possible alternative approach to network management, something I documented in this piece and this piece about their new-found love of Internet price controls.  Here’s how Jenkins puts it in his essay today:

The mask really slipped earlier this year when Time Warner Cable began experimenting with usage-based pricing to protect the average broadband customers from the 20% of users who create 80% of the traffic. A lobby called Free Press, the most extreme of the pro-net neutrality interests, went ballistic, calling metered pricing a “price-gouging scheme” and backing a bill in Congress to ban it. Never mind that Free Press had previously argued just the opposite, saying usage-based pricing was a fairer way to deal with congestion than, say, by selectively slowing down file-sharing sites that gobble up disproportionate broadband capacity. Never mind, too, the irony that the net-neut campaign against the selective slowing of non-urgent traffic has left only differential pricing as a way to bring a modicum of efficiency to network usage.

Indeed.  Of course, we should expect nothing less from the neo-Marxist media reformistas as the UnFree Press.

The D.C. Circuit has struck down as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s “cable cap.”  The cap prevented a single cable operator from serving more than 30% of U.S. homes—precisely the same percentage limit struck down by the court in 2001.  The court ruled that the FCC had failed to demonstrate that “allowing a cable operator to serve more than 30% of all cable subscribers would threaten to reduce either competition or diversity in programming.”

The court’s decision rested on the two critical charts (both generated by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer in his excellent Media Metrics special report) at the heart of the PFF amicus brief I wrote with our president, Ken Ferree:

First, the record is replete with evidence of ever increasing competition among video providers: Satellite and fiber optic video providers have entered the market and grown in market share since the Congress passed the 1992 Act, and particularly in recent years. Cable operators, therefore, no longer have the bottleneck power over programming that concerned the Congress in 1992.

Second, over the same period there has been a dramatic increase both in the number of cable networks and in the programming available to subscribers.

Our chart shows the explosion in the number of programmers (though not the total amount of programming), as well as the falling rate of affiliation between cable operators and programmers, which was among the prime factors motivating Congress when it authorized a cable cap in the 1992 Cable Act:

These two charts show how much less defensible the FCC’s 30% cap is now than it was back in 2001. If the Court had needed still more evidence, it could have cited the broader trend towards “Cutting the Video Cord.” As we explained in our amicus brief, viewers are shifting away from cable, satellite and fiber (“Multichannel Video Programming Distributors,” in FCC-speak) towards sites like Hulu and Netflix (which we dubbed “Internet Video Programming Distributors” in the hopes that a familiar-sounding acronym might resonate inside a regulatory agency that can’t even figure out how to stream its own meetings properly). Nothing better demonstrates how the Internet is revolutionizing video distribution than the fact that Hulu.com has actually overtaken TimeWarner cable in viewership:

The latest edition (Version 4.0) of my PFF special report on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now up.  For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education and media literacy efforts, and various other tools, methods, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety.  After evaluating that state of this market, I conclude: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”  Moreover, I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation.

Version 4.0 of the report is now over 250 pages long (up from 200 pages in Version 3.0) and it contains almost 70 exhibits (up from 50), 725 references (up from roughly 500), and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. Other new sections or appendices have also been added to the report, including:

• a new section examining how many households really need parental control tools;
• a new appendix on the downsides of mandatory parental controls and restrictive default settings;
• a new section on the dangers of “deputizing the online middleman” solution as an approach to solving child safety concerns;
• a new appendix reviewing the findings of 5 past online safety task forces;
• … and much more.

I issue major updates once a year and 1 or 2 minor tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety marketplace and debate. The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past couple of years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

Continuing the “Cutting the (Video) Cord” series started by my PFF colleague Adam Thierer:  The WSJ had two great pieces yesterday about the increasing competitive relevance of television distributed by Internet—a trend that was at the heart of an amicus brief PFF recently filed in support of C omcast’s challenge of the FCC’s 30% cap on cable ownership.  The first WSJ piece declares that:

After more than a decade of disappointment, the goal of marrying television and the Internet seems finally to be picking up steam. A key factor in the push are new TV sets that have networking connections built directly into them, requiring no additional set-top boxes for getting online. Meanwhile, many consumers are finding more attractive entertainment and information choices on the Internet — and have already set up data networks for their PCs and laptops that can also help move that content to their TV sets.

The easier it is for consumers to receive traditional television programming (in addition to other kinds of video content) distributed over the Internet on their television, the less “gatekeeper” or “bottleneck” power cable distributors have over programming.  So the Netflix-capable and Yahoo-widget-capable televisions described by the WSJ piece go a long way to increasing the substitutability of what we call Internet Video Programming Distributors (IVPDs) for Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs), such as cable, satellite television and fiber services offered by telcos such as Verizon’s FiOS.  

While such televisions are only expected to reach 14% of all TV sales by 2012, one must remember that a growing number of set-top boxes ( e.g., the Roku Digitial Video Player, game consoles like the Microsoft XBox 360 and Sony PlayStation 3, and TiVo DVRs) allow users to users to receive IVPD programming on their existing televisions.  

As we argued in our amicus brief, the immense competitive importance of IVPDs lies not in the potential for some users to “cut the cord” to cable and other MVPDs (though that will surely happen), but in the immediate impact IVPDs have as an alternative distribution channel for programmers.  In the pending D.C. Circuit case, we argue that both the FCC’s 30% cap, issued in December 2007, and the underlying portions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing such a cap should be struck down as unconstitutional because the ready availability of IVPDs as an alternative distribution channel means that cable no longer has the “special characteristic” of gatekeeper/bottleneck power that would justify imposing such a unique burden on the audience size of cable operators.  (Of course, Direct Broadcast Satellite and Telco Fiber are also eating away at cable’s share of the MVPD marketplace.)

The second WSJ piece, an op/ed, illustrates beautifully how cable operators are already losing “market power” (or at least negotiating leverage) in a very tangible way:  they’re having to pay more for programming.  Specifically, the Journal describes how Viacom plaid chicken with Time Warner—and won.  

 The Viacom network had threatened to pull its 19 channels, including Nickelodeon with its “Dora the Explorer” and “SpongeBob SquarePants” cartoons, from the 13 million subscribers to the Time Warner Cable system…. The game of chicken included Viacom advertisements that unless Time Warner Cable agreed to pay more, it would pull the channels, encouraging viewers to call to say they wanted their MTV and other Viacom channels. One ad asked, “Why is Dora crying?” Time Warner countered that consumers would pay more if its costs rose. Bernstein Research analyst Michael Nathanson noted that neither party could afford “mutually assured destruction.” Viacom needs to find more subscription revenue as advertising revenues soften, while Time Warner Cable has to worry about satellite and telecom competitors. New media was the new factor. Many popular Viacom shows are widely available on the Web, including on its own sites. When it looked as if Comedy Central would be pulled, Wired magazine helpfully posted a guide for accessing the shows on the Web, pointing out that Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show” can be accessed on Hulu and that “South Park” episodes are on Fancast. The best parts of “The Colbert Report” are often viewed as email attachments or as snippets on mobile phones.

So, in a nutshell, the fact that consumers could get Viacom programming available through IVPDs gave Viacom more leverage against MVPD Time Warner because it increased the credibility of Viacom’s threat to simply shut off programming to Time Warner if the cable giant didn’t cough up more cash.  While this fact seems to have carried the day for Viacom, the availability of Viacom’s content through IVPDs did have some secondary effects that also are worth noting:

During the negotiations, Time Warner Cable threatened to make it easier for its subscribers to connect laptop computers to their televisions so that Viacom shows could stream directly onto subscribers’ televisions.

This is essentially a reversal of the tactic often employed by local broadcasters in their battles with cable operators:  give your customers a set of rabbit ears so they can still get your signal if you actually take your programming off the local cable network.  While this tactic doesn’t seem to have helped Time Warner here, it does point to a long-term trend that could fundamentally change the programming marketplace:

The cable company also argued that it shouldn’t have to pay more to distribute shows that Viacom made available free in other media.

I suspect that, as IVPDs further erode the viewership of cable and other MVPDs, the MVPDs will become more desperate for content—and therefore willing to pay more for it.  But it seems likely that both of the key revenue sources for MVPDs—subscriptions and advertising—will, at some point, begin to decline as Americans spend more time watching IVPD content and become less willing to pay for expensive MVPD plans.  As this happens, cable may have less revenue to share with programmers per subscriber, even as their need for that programming grows.

So how will this all end?  I doubt anyone really knows.  But I feel reasonably comfortable making two predictions.  

First, the overall health of the video programming content market will become increasingly dependent on the profitability of advertising—for MVPDs, IVPDs as well as programmers.  This will require technological innovation to produce smarter advertising.  The better advertising is targeted to a specific consumer’s interests, the more revenue it will produce for all concerned.  But if the government short-circuits this process by hindering the evolution of targeted advertising in the name of protecting consumers’ privacy (or simply to protect them from the supposed inherent unfairness of advertising—an old Marxist shibboleth), the total amount of funding available for content could plummet.  The dynamics described so well by Chris Anderson in “Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business” could drive video programmers to make their content available online for “free” (i.e., at no charge to the user) even if that content ends up producing (via advertising, etc.) significantly less revenue than it currently does on MVPDs (primarily from subscription revenue).  Plenty of smart people have explored this question and have far more intelligent things to say about it than I do.  But since the long-term trend seems to be that consumers are increasingly unwilling to pay even small sums for content, I just don’t see any alternative to increasing advertising revenues—other than public financing, which will necessarily bring with it government control and censorship.

Second, the other part of the solution to this problem will be business model innovation:  If individual consumers won’t pay for online video content, and if future ad revenues for online video content  don’t replace existing revenue streams, programmers are going to look for other sources of funding.  This dynamic seems to be on a collision course with net neutrality mandates.  The WSJ reported:

At one point, it looked as if Viacom might have escalated by trying to block Time Warner Cable broadband subscribers from accessing its Web sites to see its shows.

Whatever actually happened here, one can easily imagine a programmer like Viacom at some point in the future trying to get ISPs to start paying money per broadband subscriber for video content just as MVPDs currently pay per subscriber.  This is really the inverse of the fear generally expressed by net neutrality advocates that ISPs would try to charge programmers for the bandwidth used to transmit their content to an ISP’s subscribers.  If it’s true that programmers (the Viacoms of the world) and not distributors (Time Warner Cable the MVPD or Time Warner Cable the ISP) really have the market power, as this story suggests, then such arrangements might well be the economic salvation of content creators.  As with regulation of advertising, I only hope that government mandates against such innovation in the name of abstract “neutrality” principles don’t end up dooming us to a future where, with free market solutions (better advertising, revenue sharing with ISPs) rendered ineffective by government, government itself seems to be the only option left.

This is just a listing of the installments of my ongoing “Media Deconsolidation Series.” I needed to create a single repository of all the essays so I could point back to them in future articles and papers. For those not familiar with it, this series represents an effort to set the record straight regarding the many myths surrounding the media marketplace. These myths are usually propagated by a group of radical anti-media regulatory activists who I call the “media reformistas.” Sadly, however, many policymakers, journalists, and members of the public are buying into some of these myths, too.

In particular, I have spent much time here debunking the notion that rampant consolidation is taking place and that media operators are only growing larger and devouring more and more companies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. Over the past several years, traditional media operators and sectors have been coming apart at the seams in the face of unprecedented innovation and competition. The volume of divestiture activity has been quite intense, and most traditional media operators have been getting smaller, not bigger. As a result, America’s media marketplace is growing more fragmented and atomistic with each passing day.

Anyway, here’s the series so far…

• Media Deconsolidation (Part 24): I Read the News Today, Oh Boy
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 23): Cox Selling Most of its Newspapers
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 22): TW spin-off of cable unit
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 21): TW spin-off of AOL
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 20): News Corp spins off 8 TV stations
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 19): IAC/Interactive Corp. divides by 5
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 18): Scripps Splits
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 17): Clear Channel Station Sell-off
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 16): Clear Channel Crackup
• Media Deconsolidation (Part 15): AOL-TW Divorce Near?
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 14: Time Warner Without Time?
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 13: Tribune Considering Major Downsizing
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 12: Time Warner President Calls Synergy “Bull—t”
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 11: Knight Ridder’s Coming Crackup
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 10: Viacom’s Breakup Official
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 9: Viacom’s Split
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 8: Time Warner Spin Off of AOL Likely
• Media Deconsolidation, Parts 6 & 7: Emmis & Disney Divestitures
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 5: “Clear Channel to Dismantle Media Empire”
• Media Deconsolidation, Part 4: Is News Corp. Next to Downsize?
• Still More on Media Deconsolidation
• More on Media (De)Consolidation
• Stop This Insane Media De-Consolidation!

Related reading:

• What the Media Reformistas Really Want
• Your Soapbox is My Soapbox! Thoughts on the Media Access Movement
• BOOK: Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005)
• SPECIAL REPORT: Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace (2008)
• BOOK:  A Manifesto for Media Freedom (with Brian Anderson, 2008).

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Yoo explains that the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, “appeared to entertain the possibility of subjecting structural restrictions to strict scrutiny even in the absence of facial content discrimination or content-based motive.”  But in its 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision, the Court “foreclose[d] any prospect that Minneapolis Star and its progeny would serve as a check on architectural censorship” by limiting the Minneapolis Star line of precedents to cases where “a statute of general application affects a small number of speakers.”  The Court reaffirmed this position in its 1994 Turner I decision, when it applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to the Cable Act’s “must-carry provisions,” which require nearly all cable operators to carry certain television broadcast signals.  Intermediate scrutiny requires only that important governmental interests that are furthered by “substantially related means.”

Unfortunate as the Leathers/Turner I line of cases is for those concerned about architectural censorship, the cable cap is exactly the sort of regulation that falls within the reduced scope of Minneapolis Star as “affect[ing] a small number of speakers” because, unlike the Cable Act’s must-carry provisions, the cap limits the speech of only the very largest cable operators.  So the question of whether the Court should default to intermediate scrutiny as it did in its 2000 Time Warner I decision (when the cap was first challenged) should turn entirely on the question of whether cable still has the “special characteristic” of “bottleneck” or “gateekeeper” power despite all the changes in the media marketplace since 1992 and even in just the last eight years.

The Modern Media Marketplace.  The subscriber limitation provisions of the Cable Act were intended to prevent cable operators from “unfairly impeding the flow of video programming.”  Yet each of the key premises behind these provisions has been disproven:

1. Increased horizontal concentration of the cable industry has, far from reducing media choices, been accompanied by an explosive growth in the amount and diversity of video content available to consumers.
2. The rate of “vertical integration” (i.e., ownership of cable programmers by cable operators), which Congress feared would cause cable operators to discriminate against unaffiliated programmers, has plummeted.
3. Cable’s share of the MVPD market has also plummeted dramatically, with the two DBS providers now sharing 1/3 of the MVPD market and representing the second and third largest MVPDs

Two charts say it all.  First, from Adam Thierer’s excellent book Media Metrics, the number of programming services (cable channels) has grown by nearly six-fold by 1992, while the rate of vertical integration has plummeted:

(That chart stops in 2006 (based on 2005 data) because the FCC still has not released the 2007 Video Competition Report, which it approved in December 2007.  Since then, Time Warner Cable has been spun off of Time Warner’s content empire, so the actual affiliation rate today is likely less than 10%.)

Second, cable’s share of the MVPD market has fallen from 95% in 1992 to ~64% today:

In 1992, when consumers had only a single MVPD option, cable might fairly have been considered a “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper.”  But today, every American has at least three MVPD choices (their local cable franchisee + two DBS operators), and can also subscribe to a Telco video service such as Verizon’s FiOS.  (“Over-building” where two cable operators serve the same area is rare.)

Internet Video.  We also describe how the availability of TV content online provides yet another distribution channel for programmers:

The last two years have seen growing numbers of Americans increasingly substituting consumption of online video for MVPD video and the Internet driving popularity of MVPD content, rather than vice versa.  But only in the last year, since the adoption of the [FCC’s December 2007 order issuing the 30% cap], has the large-scale delivery of television  content online become a reality, as large numbers of programmers have begun distributing increasing numbers of complete episodes and entire series through their own websites and/or through a new class of rapidly-growing Internet Video Programming Distributor (IVPD) websites such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Video on Demand, iTunes, Vuze, Sony Playstation Store, the Microsoft Xbox 360 Marketplace, Joost and Veoh.  These IVPDs already offer a staggering, and growing, library of currently-airing and archived content—as much as 90% of broadcast shows and 20% of cable shows.  These sites are supported by a growing number of set-top devices (e.g., Netflix Player by Roku, TiVo) and wildly popular game consoles (e.g., Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PlayStation 3) that allow users to play IVPD content from broadcast and cable programmers on demand on their television, while TiVo allows users to seamlessly switch between IVPD, MVPD and OTA content.

The FCC’s decision to exclude Internet video from its analysis is hardly surprising when one considers that the economic model behind the new 30% cap comes from a 2005 study based on cable market data from 1984-2001 and that the last official data released by the agency about the video marketplace date to June 2005.  But nine months later, the agency waxed ecstatic about the promise of IVPDs when doing so supported Kevin Martin’s attempts to enforce the FCC’s non-binding 2005 “Net Neutrality” policy statement:

In August 2008, the FCC even cited [the rapid emergence of IVPDs] in support of its claim of jurisdiction over Comcast’s broadband network management practices (because of alleged harm to an IVPD that distributes content through peer-to-peer file sharing):  “consumers with [broadband] service will have available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could rapidly become an alternative to cable television.”  But the immediate competitive impact of IVPDs comes not from the fact that some IVPD users are already canceling their MVPD subscriptions, but in the ease with which IVPDs can supplement an MVPD subscription—because most IVPDs are free, while those that charge for content do so on a per-episode/show basis.  Furthermore, IVPDs have little—if any—incentive not to offer a particular program because they are not subject to the same capacity constraints as MVPDs.  Thus, even if IVPD video consumption remains relatively small in its early years, IVPDs already offer programmers a strong alternative distribution channel capable of reaching all broadband users.

Less Restrictive Means. Of course, the fact that cable no longer has a special characteristic of gateekeeper or bottleneck power does not automatically render the Cable Act’s subscriber limits provisions unconstitutional; this merely means that the government must show that no less restrictive means are available to satisfy a compelling government interest.  We suggest a variety less restrictive means that could ensure competitive video distribution and programming markets.  These include dispute resolution assisted by the FCC, enforcement of existing antitrust laws, and crafting “special obligations on cable operators with more than 30% of the MVPD market to ensure that they do not unfairly impede the flow of video programming.”

Challenging The FCC’s Rule. Besides attacking the statute, we argue that the 30% cap imposed by the FCC last year is even more obviously unconstitutional than when the D.C. Circuit struck down the same limit seven years ago in Time Warner II. To many lay observers, this argument may seem like a “no-brainer” given how much more competitive the video marketplace is than it was in 2001.  But one must understand that when the Court struck down the 30% cap the first time, it did so on the grounds that the FCC’s own rationale justified not a 30% cap but a 60% cap.  The FCC had decided that the average video programmer (network) needed an “open field” of 40% of the MVPD market to be viable.  The FCC leapt from that conclusion to a 30% cap so that even if the two largest cable companies denied carriage, the programmer would still have the required 40% “open field.”  The court found that there was no evidence that the leading two cable operators would collude to deny carriage and that the statute did not “protect programmers against the risk of completely independent rejections by two or more companies.”  In other words, the purpose of the statute was not to guarantee carriage even if, for example, a cable operator decided (exercising the same constitutionally-protected “editorial discretion” enjoyed by all media) spend part of its limited system capacity carrying a network with questionable appeal, or to raise subscription rates to cover the marginal cost of carrying the network.

But the FCC has since come up with a new “open field” model that the court must consider anew.  This time, the model more clearly supports a 30% cap–but only if one accepts the premises underlying the model and the accuracy of the data put into the model, which we do not.  We argue that their model is “based on flawed assumptions about the nature of competition for video programming” and is thus incapable of “accurately reflect[ing] cable’s present (or future) bottleneck power.”

Click the button at the top right of Scribd’s handy iPaper display to switch to full page display of the brief–or click on the top left to download the PDF itself.

PFF Amicus Brief – Cable Ownership Cap http://documents.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=8630011&access_key=key-2obr4z2ohtozi1gabbay&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Just FYI, the latest update of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now live. The new version, Version 3.1, provides minor updates to all sections of the book and a new appendix of relevant research in the field. I issue major updates early each year and 1 or 2 tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety market and debate.

For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past two years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

When the definitive history of Kevin Martin’s regulatory reign of terror against the cable industry is finally written, I have a feeling that Ted Hearn of Multichannel News will be the man who pens it. There is no one who has been reporting on these issues longer or with more investigative vigor than Ted. In an absolutely scathing piece today about a former Martin staffer, Ted does a nice job summarizing the major elements of Martin’s war on cable. It reads like the list of grievances against King George found in the Declaration. (Think: “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.”)  Anyway, I just thought I’d throw Ted’s list up here for those keeping score at home:

— He secretly rewrote an FCC study issued in November 2004 that had concluded that cable a la carte was a bad idea. — He walked away from a handshake agreement with NCTA, Comcast and Time Warner that the rollout of family programming packages would end his a la carte jihad. — He stripped cable’s control over critical wiring in apartment buildings, affirming the identical policy that a court had previously struck down. — He voided exclusive contracts between cable operators and apartment building owners just a few years after the FCC gave the green light to such deals. — He required cable operators to carry must carry TV stations in analog and digital for three years after voting against such a policy in February 2005. — He extended program access rules for five years, a gift to DirecTV and Dish Network even though the two satellite providers are larger than every cable company in the U.S. except Comcast and Time Warner. — He imposed expensive set-top box equipment mandates on cable, making it vastly more costly for Comcast and Time Warner to reach the goal of all-digital platforms. — He capped cable ownership at 30% of pay-TV subscribers nationally—the same limit that a federal court kicked back to the FCC as unlawful—while letting AT&T and Verizon basically divide the country’s phone market. — He slashed cable leased access rates to zero in an act of bureaucratic malice that a federal appeals court has now blocked and that the Office of Management and Budget has rejected as a violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act. — He decided to brand Comcast an Internet outlaw when all the company did was occasionally frustrate a tiny minority of customers whose massive consumption of Web porn and pirated Hollywood films was destroying the service for others.

PFF has just releasing an updated edition of my booklet on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.” The new version, Version 3.0, includes two new appendixes and updates to each section to reflect new parental control tools and programs developed in the last nine months.

The updated report is timely as it comes on the heels of the recently-announced Internet Safety Technical Task Force, which is being chaired by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School. I am privileged to serve as a member of the Task Force, which is evaluating various online safety technologies and strategies and then reporting back to state attorneys general with our findings.

Those issues and much more are covered in the latest edition of my report. The report explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education efforts, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety. I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation. As I conclude after evaluating that state of the market: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”

Version 3.0 of the special report, now over 200 pages, contains over fifty exhibits and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. A greatly expanded section on video empowerment technologies has also been included. Finally, two appendices have also been added: a comprehensive legislative index cataloging over thirty bills introduced in Congress on these issues (complied with John Morris of Center for Democracy & Technology), and a glossary of 35 relevant terms and cases.

The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, as are the previous editions. And I am happy to provide hard copies to those who are interested.

As I mentioned yesterday, James Gattuso and I penned an editorial for National Review this week about the growth of FCC regulation and spending in recent years. In the op-ed, we also noted that, “For whatever reason, a disproportionate number of these [new regulatory proposals] have been aimed at cable television, so much so that press and industry analysts now speak of Chairman Martin’s ongoing ‘war on cable.'”

Today, the editors at National Review have chimed in with an editorial of their own on the issue entitled, “Pulling the Cable on Martin’s Crusade.” Specifically, the editors address what most pundits believe really motivates the Chairman’s crusade against cable: His desire to force cable companies to offer consumers channels on “a la carte” basis in an effort to “clean up” cable TV. “Martin should abandon this particular crusade,” the NR editors argue. “While we are sympathetic to parents’ desire to get the channels they want without having to buy access to racier fare, using economic regulation to restructure an industry is the wrong approach.” They continue:

For TV programmers, the practice of bundling channels together works well. Religious and minority-oriented channels can piggyback on the popularity of the sports and news channels. This is why the Faith and Family Broadcasting Coalition, a group of the nation’s leading religious broadcasters, opposes efforts to impose à la carte programming. Not enough consumers who currently subscribe to the basic-cable bundle would buy religious programming under an à la carte model. All channels thus benefit from the bundling model, which allows them to access households that might not otherwise be interested in their programming. For this reason, TV programmers have signed contracts with cable companies that prohibit à la carte sales. Forcing the cable companies to ignore these agreements would amount to a wholesale overwriting of private contractual arrangements. Supporters of à la carte have failed to demonstrate a need for such dirigisme. If consumer demand for à la carte options is sufficiently strong, there is no structural impediment to the market’s satisfaction of it. Some social conservatives argue that parents should be able to buy the Disney Channel without having to let MTV’s 24-hour sleaze-a-thon into their homes. But parents who wish to shield their children from immoral influences are not without options. They can monitor their children’s viewing, block channels, or forgo cable (or television) altogether. We realize that the existence of these options falls short of a comprehensive solution to the difficulties of raising children in a culture that sometimes seems hostile to the enterprise. But the answer is not a mandate that would trample private contract rights and drive religious programming off the air. Nevertheless, Kevin Martin has pressed forward in his attempts either to force the cable companies to adopt an à la carte model or to scare them into doing so. At Tuesday’s meeting he tried to use an arcane provision of federal communications law to declare the cable market uncompetitive and subject to more FCC regulation. This would arguably give the FCC power to impose à la carte pricing, though it would be challenged in court. But even without that authority, the FCC would still have more power to make the cable companies miserable until they acceded to Martin’s demands. Fortunately, a majority of his fellow commissioners saw things differently and scuttled the plan. But Martin has signaled that he intends to persist. He does not seem to grasp that the government cannot just pick and choose, à la carte, which private contracts it intends to honor.

This gets it exactly right, and it closely tracks the argument I set forth originally in my PFF paper, “Moral and Philosophical Aspects of the Debate over A La Carte Regulation.”

PFF has just released my latest paper entitled “Parental Control Perfection? The Impact of the DVR and VOD Boom on the Debate over TV Content Regulation.” In the report, I focus on the extent to which new video technologies, such as digital video recorders (DVRs) and video on demand (VOD) services, are changing the way households consume media and are helping parents better tailor viewing experiences to their tastes and values. I provide evidence showing the rapid spread of these technologies and discuss how parents are using these tools in their homes. Finally, I argue that these developments will have profound implications for debates over the regulation of video programming. As parents are given the ability to more effectively manage their family’s viewing habits and experiences, it will lessen—if not completely undercut—the need for government intervention on their behalf.

This 16-page report can be found at: http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.20DVRboomcontentreg.pdf

With the release last month of its report on Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, the FCC teed up the issue of regulating televised violence and tossed it over to Congress with a recommendation that lawmakers go ahead and swing for the fences. And Congress appears ready to oblige, although not necessarily in the way some at the FCC had originally envisioned.

You will recall that FCC Chairman Kevin Martin used the FCC’s violence report as another opportunity to engage in his monomaniacal, Moby Dick-like quest to impose a la carte regulation on cable and satellite operators. Martin argued that “Requiring cable and satellite television providers to offer programming in a more a la carte manner would be a more content neutral means for Congress to regulate violent programming and therefore would raise fewer constitutional issues.” But it doesn’t appear that the chairman is going to get his whale this time around.

Ted Hearn of Multichannel News reported yesterday that the bill that Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) is ready to introduce in the Senate on this front will not include language imposing a la carte regulatory regime on cable and satellite operators. For reasons that remain unclear, Sen. Rockefeller is opposed to the concept.

But that doesn’t mean that cable and satellite operators are off the hook. Overall, the new bill is expected to look a lot like a similar measure that Rockefeller floated along with Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) in the last Congress. That bill, S. 616, the “Indecent and Gratuitous and Excessively Violent Programming Control Act of 2005,” proposed a significant expansion of the FCC’s powers in terms of regulating both “indecent” and “violent” programming. So much so that when I wrote about the proposal in this 2005 PFF white paper, I concluded that it represented “the most significant congressional effort to regulate speech since the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996.”

It appears that the new Senate measure will likely propose imposing a time-channeling mandate on cable and satellite operators similar to what broadcasters already face for indecent material. Under existing regulations, broadcasters have to channel such programming to the “safe harbor” hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Apparently, the new Senate bill will broaden that time-channeling mandate to include “excessively violent” programming and then extend the requirement to multichannel video distributors.

Ironically, Chairman Martin could actually be correct in assuming that a la carte regulation “would raise fewer constitutional issues” than the sort of time-channeling approach that Rockefeller and other Senators appear ready to endorse. Some scholars have noted that Congress and the FCC could try to sell the courts the notion that a la carte mandates represented pure economic regulation and, therefore, it would not raise serious constitutional / First Amendment scrutiny. That’s utter rubbish, of course, as Chairman Martin’s repeated comments about the issue have made clear. He and others argue that a la carte is the ideal regulatory instrument to “clean up” cable and satellite TV. So there are clearly some First Amendment issues at stake. (I wrote about all this in another white paper: “Moral and Philosophical Aspects of the Debate over A La Carte Regulation,”)

We may never know which argument the courts would accept about a la carte regulation if Congress doesn’t mandate it, and frankly I’m happy about that since a la carte represents one the most potentially destructive industrial policy schemes imaginable. While the courts were trying to determine its constitutionality, the wonderful diversity of programming on television could be decimated if the rules remained in effect while legal challenges were pending.

Regardless, with time channeling / safe harbor regs there’s just no way that Congress or the FCC can sell them to the courts as anything other than a direct effort to control content on television. Needless to say, proponents would have a huge constitutional challenge on their hands minutes after the bill was signed. I’d bet my house that the affected industries would seek an immediate injunction and get it. And then another long legal battle would ensue. If you want to see how that would play out, read this white paper I asked First Amendment expert Robert Corn-Revere to write for PFF two years ago: “Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to Cable Television and Satellite Radio?”

Bob knows a thing or two about this issue since he successfully litigated the case of United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000). In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a law that required cable companies to “fully scramble” video signals transmitted over their networks if those signals included any sexually explicit content. Echoing its earlier holding in Reno v. ACLU, the Court found that less restrictive means were available to parents looking to block those signals in the home. Specifically, the Court argued that:

[T]argeted blocking [by parents] enables the government to support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners—listeners for whom, if the speech is unpopular or indecent, the privacy of their own homes may be the optimal place of receipt. Simply put, targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot ban speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling interests.

More importantly, the Court held that:

It is no response that voluntary blocking requires a consumer to take action, or may be inconvenient, or may not go perfectly every time. A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective; and a court should not presume parents, given full information, will fail to act.

This is an extraordinarily high bar the Supreme Court has set for policymakers wishing to regulate modern media content. Not only is it clear that the Court is increasingly unlikely to allow the extension of broadcast-era content regulations to new media outlets and technologies, but it appears certain that judges will apply much stricter constitutional scrutiny to all efforts to regulate speech and media providers in the future, including broadcasting.

In sum, regulation can no longer be premised on the supposed helplessness of households to deal with content flows if families have been empowered and educated to make content determinations for themselves. That means that any legislative effort imposing time-channeling regulations on multichannel video providers is likely to be struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. Unfortunately, we’re probably going to be forced to endure a protracted, expensive, multi-year legal battle to get to that inevitable conclusion.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, our kids are watching video on the Internet, iPods, PlayStation Portables, DVD players, and cell phones. One wonders what Congress and the FCC think they are accomplishing when they propose “Leave It to Beaver”-era regulations like this.