My friend Tim Lee has an article at Vox that argues that interconnection is the new frontier on which the battle for the future of the Internet is being waged. I think the article doesn’t really consider how interconnection has worked in the last few years, and consequently, it makes a big deal out of something that is pretty harmless.

How the Internet used to work

The Internet is a network of networks. Your ISP is a network. It connects to the other ISPs and exchanges traffic with them. Since connections between ISPs are about equally valuable to each other, this often happens through “settlement-free peering,” in which networks exchange traffic on an unpriced basis. The arrangement is equally valuable to both partners.

Not every ISP connects directly to every other ISP. For example, a local ISP in California probably doesn’t connect directly to a local ISP in New York. If you’re an ISP that wants to be sure your customer can reach every other network on the Internet, you have to purchase “transit” services from a bigger or more specialized ISP. This would allow ISPs to transmit data along what used to be called “the backbone” of the Internet. Transit providers that exchange roughly equally valued traffic with other networks themselves have settlement-free peering arrangements with those networks.

How the Internet works now

A few things have changed in the last several years. One major change is that most major ISPs have very large, geographically-dispersed networks. For example, Comcast serves customers in 40 states, and other networks can peer with them in 18 different locations across the US. These 18 locations are connected to each other through very fast cables that Comcast owns. In other words, Comcast is not just a residential ISP anymore. They are part of what used to be called “the backbone,” although it no longer makes sense to call it that since there are so many big pipes that cross the country and so much traffic is transmitted directly through ISP interconnection.

Another thing that has changed is that content providers are increasingly delivering a lot of a) traffic-intensive and b) time-sensitive content across the Internet. This has created the incentive to use what are known as content-delivery networks (CDNs). CDNs are specialized ISPs that locate servers right on the edge of all terminating ISPs’ networks. There are a lot of CDNs—here is one list.

By locating on the edge of each consumer ISP, CDNs are able to deliver content to end users with very low latency and at very fast speeds. For this service, they charge money to their customers. However, they also have to pay consumer ISPs for access to their networks, because the traffic flow is all going in one direction and otherwise CDNs would be making money by using up resources on the consumer ISP’s network.

CDNs’ payments to consumer ISPs are also a matter of equity between the ISP’s customers. Let’s suppose that Vox hires Amazon CloudFront to serve traffic to Comcast customers (they do). If the 50 percent of Comcast customers who wanted to read Vox suddenly started using up so many network resources that Comcast and CloudFront needed to upgrade their connection, who should pay for the upgrade? The naïve answer is to say that Comcast should, because that is what customers are paying them for. But the efficient answer is that the 50 percent who want to access Vox should pay for it, and the 50 percent who don’t want to access it shouldn’t. By Comcast charging CloudFront to access the Comcast network, and CloudFront passing along those costs to Vox, and Vox passing along those costs to customers in the form of advertising, the resource costs of using the network are being paid by those who are using them and not by those who aren’t.

What happened with the Netflix/Comcast dust-up?

Netflix used multiple CDNs to serve its content to subscribers. For example, it used a CDN provided by Cogent to serve content to Comcast customers. Cogent ran out of capacity and refused to upgrade its link to Comcast. As a result, some of Comcast’s customers experienced a decline in quality of Netflix streaming. However, Comcast customers who accessed Netflix with an Apple TV, which is served by CDNs from Level 3 and Limelight, never had any problems. Cogent has had peering disputes in the past with many other networks.

To solve the congestion problem, Netflix and Comcast negotiated a direct interconnection. Instead of Netflix paying Cogent and Cogent paying Comcast, Netflix is now paying Comcast directly. They signed a multi-year deal that is reported to reduce Netflix’s costs relative to what they would have paid through Cogent. Essentially, Netflix is vertically integrating into the CDN business. This makes sense. High-quality CDN service is essential to Netflix’s business; they can’t afford to experience the kind of incident that Cogent caused with Comcast. When a service is strategically important to your business, it’s often a good idea to vertically integrate.

It should be noted that what Comcast and Netflix negotiated was not a “fast lane”—Comcast is prohibited from offering prioritized traffic as a condition of its merger with NBC/Universal.

What about Comcast’s market power?

I think that one of Tim’s hangups is that Comcast has a lot of local market power. There are lots of barriers to creating a competing local ISP in Comcast’s territories. Doesn’t this mean that Comcast will abuse its market power and try to gouge CDNs?

Let’s suppose that Comcast is a pure monopolist in a two-sided market. It’s already extracting the maximum amount of rent that it can on the consumer side. Now it turns to the upstream market and tries to extract rent. The problem with this is that it can only extract rents from upstream content producers insofar as it lowers the value of the rent it can collect from consumers. If customers have to pay higher Netflix bills, then they will be less willing to pay Comcast. The fact that the market is two-sided does not significantly increase the amount of monopoly rent that Comcast can collect.

Interconnection fees that are being paid to Comcast (and virtually all other major ISPs) have virtually nothing to do with Comcast’s market power and everything to do with the fact that the Internet has changed, both in structure and content. This is simply how the Internet works. I use CloudFront, the same CDN that Vox uses, to serve even a small site like my Bitcoin Volatility Index. CloudFront negotiates payments to Comcast and other ISPs on my and Vox’s behalf. There is nothing unseemly about Netflix making similar payments to Comcast, whether indirectly through Cogent or directly, nor is there anything about this arrangement that harms “the little guy” (like me!).

For more reading material on the Netflix/Comcast arrangement, I recommend Dan Rayburn’s posts here, here, and here. Interconnection is a very technical subject, and someone with very specialized expertise like Dan is invaluable in understanding this issue.

I spend a lot of time reading books and essays about technology; more specifically, books and essays about technology history and criticism. Yet, I am often struck by how few of the authors of these works even bother defining what they mean by “technology.” I find that frustrating because, if you are going to make an attempt to either study or critique a particular technology or technological practice or development, then you probably should take the time to tell us how broadly or narrowly you are defining the term “technology” or “technological process.”

Photo: David HartsteinOf course, it’s not easy. “In fact, technology is a word we use all of the time, and ordinarily it seems to work well enough as a shorthand, catch-all sort of word,” notes the always-insightful Michael Sacasas in his essay “Traditions of Technological Criticism.” “That same sometimes useful quality, however, makes it inadequate and counter-productive in situations that call for more precise terminology,” he says.

Quite right, and for a more detailed and critical discussion of how earlier scholars, historians, and intellectuals have defined or thought about the term “technology,” you’ll want to check out Michael’s other recent essay, “What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Technology?” which preceded the one cited above. We don’t always agree on things — in fact, I am quite certain that most of my comparatively amateurish work must make his blood boil at times! — but you won’t find a more thoughtful technology scholar alive today than Michael Sacasas. If you’re serious about studying technology history and criticism, you should follow his blog and check out his book, The Tourist and The Pilgrim: Essays on Life and Technology in the Digital Age, which is a collection of some of his finest essays.

Anyway, for what it’s worth, I figured I would create this post to list some of the more interesting definitions of “technology” that I have uncovered in my own research. I suspect I will add to it in coming months and years, so please feel free to suggest other additions since I would like this to be a useful resource to others. Continue reading →

This past week I posted two new essays related to my new book, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.” Just thought I would post quick links here.

First, my old colleague Dan Rothschild was kind enough to ask me to contribute a post to the R Street Blog entitled, “Bucking the ‘Mother, May I?’ Mentality.” In it, I offered this definition and defense of permissionless innovation as a policy norm:

Permissionless innovation is about the creativity of the human mind to run wild in its inherent curiosity and inventiveness, even when it disrupts certain cultural norms or economic business models. It is that unhindered freedom to experiment that ushered in many of the remarkable technological advances of modern times. In particular, all the digital devices, systems and networks that we now take for granted came about because innovators were at liberty to let their minds run wild.

Steve Jobs and Apple didn’t need a permit to produce the first iPhone. Jeff Bezos and Amazon didn’t need to ask anyone for the right to create a massive online marketplace. When Sergey Brin and Larry Page wanted to release Google’s innovative search engine into the wild, they didn’t need to get a license first. And Mark Zuckerberg never had to get anyone’s blessing to launch Facebook or let people freely create their own profile pages.

All of these digital tools and services were creatively disruptive technologies that altered the fortunes of existing companies and challenged various social norms. Luckily, however, nothing preemptively stopped that innovation from happening. Today, the world is better off because of it, with more and better information choices than ever before.

I also posted an essay over on Medium entitled, “Why Permissionless Innovation Matters.” It’s a longer essay that seeks to answer the question: Why does economic growth occur in some societies & not in others? I build on the recent comments of venture capitalist Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures noted during recent testimony: “If you look at the countries around the world where the most innovation happens, you will see a very high, I would argue a direct, correlation between innovation and freedom. They are two sides of the same coin.” Continue reading →

NETmundial wrap-up

by on April 25, 2014 · 0 comments

NETmundial is over; here’s how it went down. Previous installments (1, 2, 3).

  • The final output of the meeting is available here. It is being referred to as the Multistakeholder Statement of São Paulo. I think the name is designed to put the document in contention with the Tunis Agenda. Insofar as it displaces the Tunis Agenda, that is fine with me.
  • Most of the civil society participants are not happy. Contrary to my prediction, in a terrible PR move, the US government (among others) weakened the language on surveillance. A statement on net neutrality also did not make it into the final draft. These were the top two issues for most of civil society participants.
  • I of course oppose US surveillance, but I am not too upset about the watered down language since I don’t see this as an Internet governance issue. Also, unlike virtually all of the civil society people, I oppose net neutrality laws, so I’m pleased with that aspect of the document.
  • What bothers me most in the final output are two statements that seem to have been snuck in at the last moment by the drafters without approval from others. These are real shenanigans. The first is on multistakeholderism. The Tunis language said that stakeholders should participate according to their “respective roles and responsibilities.” The original draft of the NETmundial document used the same language, but participants agreed to remove it, indicating that all stakeholders should participate equally and that no stakeholders were more special than others. Somehow the final document contained the sentence, “The respective roles and responsibilities of stakeholders should be interpreted in a flexible manner with reference to the issue under discussion.” I have no idea how it got in there. I was in the room when the final draft was approved, and that text was not announced.
  • Similarly, language in the “roadmap” portion of the document now refers to non-state actors in the context of surveillance. “Collection and processing of personal data by state and non-state actors should be conducted in accordance with international human rights law.” The addition of non-state actors was also done without consulting anyone in the final drafting room.
  • Aside from the surveillance issue, the other big mistake by the US government was their demand to weaken the provision on intermediary liability. As I understand it, their argument was that they didn’t want to consider safe harbor for intermediaries without a concomitant recognition of the role of intermediaries in self-policing, as is done through the notice-and-takedown process in the US. I would have preferred a strong, free-standing statement on intermediary liability, but instead, the text was replaced with OECD language that the US had previously agreed to.
  • Overall, the meeting was highly imperfect—it was non-transparent, disorganized, inefficient in its use of time, and so on. I don’t think it was a rousing success, but it was nevertheless successful enough that the organizers were able to claim success, which I think was their original goal. Other than the two last-minute additions that I saw (I wonder if there are others), nothing in the document gives me major heartburn, so maybe that is actually a success. It will be interesting to see if the São Paulo Statement is cited in other fora, and if they decide to repeat this process again next year.

Some people believe that American broadband prices are too high. They claim that Europeans pay less for faster speeds. Frequently these assertions fail to standardize the comparisons, for example to compare similar networks and speeds. A higher speed, next generation network connection delivering more data generally costs more than a slower one. The challenge for measuring European and American prices is that networks are not uniform across the regions. The OECD comparisons are based on availability in at least one major city in each country, not the country as a whole.

As I describe in my report the EU Broadband Challenge, the EU’s next generation networks exist only in pockets of the EU. For example, 4G/LTE wireless networks are available to 97% of Americans but just 26% of Europeans. Thus it is difficult to prepare a fair assessment of mobile prices on the surface when Americans use 5 times as much voice and twice as much data as Europeans. Furthermore American networks are 75% faster when compared to the EU. The overall price may be higher in the US, but the unit cost is lower, and the quality is higher. This means Americans get value for money.

Another item rarely mentioned in international broadband comparisons is mandatory media license fees. These fees can add as much as $44 to the monthly cost of broadband. When these fees are included in comparisons, American prices are frequently an even better value. In two-thirds of European countries and half of Asian countries, households pay a media license fee on top of the subscription fees to information appliances such as connected computers and TVs. Historically nations needed a way to fund broadcasting, so they levied fees on the people.

Because the US took the route to fund broadcasting through advertising, these fees are rare in the US. State broadcasting has moved to the internet, and the media license fees are now applied to fixed line broadband subscriptions. In general in the applicable countries, all households that subscribe to information services (e.g. broadband) must register with the national broadcasting corporation, and an invoice is sent to the household once or twice year. The media fees are compulsory, and in some countries it is a criminal offense not to pay.

Defenders of media license fees say that they are important way to provide commercial free broadcasting, and in countries which see the state’s role to preserve national culture and language, media license fees make this possible. Many countries maintain their commitment to such fees as a deterrent to what they consider American cultural imperialism.

Media license fees may seem foreign to Americans because there is not a tradition for receiving an annual bill for monthly broadcasting. Historically many associated television and radio as “free” because it was advertising supported. Moreover, the US content industry is the world’s largest and makes up a large part of America’s third largest category of export, that of digital goods and services, which totaled more than $350 billion in 2011.

When calculating the real cost of international broadband prices, one needs to take into account media license fees, taxation, and subsidies. This information is not provided through the Organization for Cooperation and Development’s Broadband Portal nor the International Telecommunication Union’s statistical database.  However, these inputs can have a material impact on the cost of broadband, especially in countries where broadband is subject to value added taxes as high as 27%, not to mention media license fees of hundreds of dollars per year.

In a forthcoming paper for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Michael James Horney, Casper Lundgreen, and I provide some insight to media license fees and their impact to broadband prices. We have collected the media license fees for the OECD countries, and where applicable, added them to prevailing broadband price comparisons. Following is an excerpt from our paper.

Here are the media license fees for the OECD countries.

Country Yearly (USD) Monthly (USD)
Australia $0,00 $0,00
Austria $459,10 $38,26
Belgium $236,15 $19,68
Canada $0,00 $0,00
Chile $0,00 $0,00
Czech Republic $90,33 $7,53
Denmark $443,75 $36,98
Estonia $0,00 $0,00
Finland $0,00 $0,00
France $179,45 $14,95
Germany $295,56 $24,63
Greece $70,68 $5,89
Hungary $0,00 $0,00
Iceland $0,00 $0,00
Ireland $219,18 $18,26
Israel $128,77 $10,73
Italy $155,48 $12,96
Japan $197,66 $16,47
Korea $28,32 $2,36
Luxembourg $0,00 $0,00
Mexico $0,00 $0,00
Netherlands $0,00 $0,00
New Zealand $0,00 $0,00
Norway $447,51 $37,29
Poland $72,01 $6,00
Portugal $0,00 $0,00
Slovenia $180,82 $15,07
Spain $0,00 $0,00
Sweden $318,45 $26,54
Switzerland $527,40 $43,95
Turkey $0,00 $0,00
United Kingdom $242,50 $20,21
United States $0,00 $0,00

Here is an example of the media license fee invoice from Denmark, which is levied semi-annually. The fee of 1218 Danish crowns ($225.79) includes tax.

 

Example of media license fee from Denmark, February 2014

 

We added the price of the media license fees to the OECD’s broadband price report. The data is taken from section 4c-4m of the OECD broadband pricing database. The OECD compiles prices for a set of 10 broadband baskets of different speeds ranging from 2 GB at 0.25 Mbit/s to 54 GB at 45 Mbit/s and above in at least 1 major city in each country. The prices are current as of September 2012.

For a graphical illustration, we provide a subset of countries to show the fluctuation of prices depending on the speed and data of each package. The data show that when compulsory media fees are added, US prices are commensurate with other OECD countries.

Broadband prices with media license fees

We also calculated the average broadband price for each basket for all of the OECD countries, adjusted for media license fees. Here we find that among the ten baskets, the US price is lower than the world average in 4 out of 10 baskets. In 5 baskets, the US price is within 1 standard deviation of the world average, and in two cases just $2-3 dollars more. In only one case is the US price outside one standard deviation of the world average, and that is for the penultimate basket of highest speed and data.

These data call into questions assertions that the US is out of line when it comes to broadband prices. Not only are US prices within a normal range, but the entry level prices for broadband are below many other countries.

The ITU has also recognized this. According to the ITU in its 2013 report Measuring the Information Society, broadband prices should be no more than 5% of income. The US scored #3 in the world in 2012 for entry level affordability of fixed line broadband. The country is tied with Kuwait for fixed line broadband prices being just 0.4% of gross national income per capita. This means for as little as $15 per month, Americans could get a basic broadband package at purchasing power parity in 2011 ($48,450 annual income).

The figures are higher for mobile broadband (based on a post-paid handset with 500 MB of data), 2.1% of gross national income per capita, equating to $85/month. However, using mobile broadband for a computer with 1 GB of data compares to just 0.5% of gross national income per capita, about $20 in 2011. The US scores in the top ten for entry level affordability in the world for both prepaid and postpaid mobile broadband for use with a computer.

If you believe that broadband prices should scale with consumption, then you will likely support such an analysis. However, there are those who simply say broadband should be the same price regardless of how much or how little data is used. In general, the price tiers favor a pay as you go approach (and is particularly better for people of lower income) while the one size fits all models increases the overall price, with the heaviest users paying less than their consumption.

Taking the highly digital nation of Denmark as an example, 80% of broadband subscriptions are under 30 mbps. That corresponds to baskets 1-4 in the chart. If we assume that most American households subscribe to 30 mbps or less, then American prices are in line with the rest of the OECD countries. Only subscribers who demand more than 30 mbps pay more than the OECD norm.

The assertion that Americans pay more for broadband than people in other countries is frequently supported by incomplete and inappropriate data. To have a more complete picture of the real price of broadband across countries, media license fees need to be included.

Aereo’s antenna system is frequently characterized perjoratively as a Rube Goldberg contraption, including in the Supreme Court oral arguments. Funny enough, Preston Padden, a veteran television executive, has characterized the legal system producing over-the-air broadcast television–Aereo’s chief legal opponents–precisely the same way. It’s also ironic that Aereo is in a fight for its life over alleged copyright violations since communications law diminishes the import of copyright law and makes copyright almost incomprehensible. Larry Downes calls the legal arguments for and against Aereo a “tangled mess.” David Post at the Volokh Conspiracy likewise concluded the situation is “pretty bizarre, when you think about it” after briefly exploring how copyright law interacts with communications law.

I agree, but Post actually understates how distorted the copyright law becomes when TV programs pass through a broadcaster’s towers, as opposed to a cable company’s headend. In particular, a broadcaster, which is mostly a passive transmitter of TV programs, gains more control over the programs than the copyright owners. It’s nearly impossible to separate the communications law distortions from the copyright issues, but the Aereo issue could be solved relatively painlessly by the FCC. It’s unfortunate copyright and television law intertwine like this because a ruling adverse to Aereo could potentially–and unnecessarily–upend copyright law.

This week I’ve seen many commentators, even Supreme Court justices, mischaracterize the state of television law when discussing the Aereo case. This is a very complex area and below is my attempt to lay out some of the deeper legal issues driving trends in the television industry that gave rise to the Aereo dispute. Crucially, the law is even more complex than most people realize, which benefits industry insiders and prevents sensible reforms. Continue reading →

Today is the second and final day of NETmundial and the third in my series (parts 1 and 2) of quick notes on the meeting.

  • Yesterday, Dilma Rousseff did indeed sign the Marco Civil into law as expected. Her appearance here began with the Brazilian national anthem, which is a very strange way to kick off a multistakeholder meeting.
  • The big bombshell in Rousseff’s speech was her insistence that the multilateral model can peacefully coexist with the multistakeholder model. Brazil had been making a lot of pro-multistakeholder statements, so many of us viewed this as something of a setback.
  • One thing I noticed during the speech was that the Portuguese word for “multistakeholder” actually literally translates as “multisectoral.” This goes a long way toward explaining some of the disconnect between Brazil and the liberals. Multisectoral means that representatives from all “sectors” are welcome, while multistakeholder implies that every stakeholder is welcome to participate, even if they sometimes organize into constituencies. This is a pretty major difference, and NETmundial has been organized on the former model.
  • The meeting yesterday got horribly behind schedule. There were so many welcome speeches, and they went so much over time, that we did not even begin the substantive work of the conference until 5:30pm. I know that sounds like a joke, but it’s not.
  • After three hours of substantive work, during which participants made 2-minute interventions suggesting changes to the text, a drafting group retreated to a separate room to work on the text of the document. The room was open to all participants, but only the drafting group was allowed to work on the drafting; everyone else could only watch (and drink).
  • As of this morning, we still don’t have the text that was negotiated last night. Hopefully it will appear online some time soon.
  • One thing to watch for is the status of the document. Will it be a “declaration” or a “chairman’s report” (or something else)? What I’m hearing is that most of the anti-multistakeholder governments like Russia and China want it to be a chairman’s report because that implies a lesser claim to legitimacy. Brazil, the hosts of the conference, presumably want to make a maximal claim to legitimacy. I tend to think that there’s enough wrong with the document that I’d prefer the outcome to be a chairman’s report, but I don’t feel too strongly.

As I blogged last week, I am in São Paulo to attend NETmundial, the meeting on the future of Internet governance hosted by the Brazilian government. The opening ceremony is about to begin. A few more observations:

  • The Brazilian Senate passed the landmark Marco Civil bill last night, and Dilma Rousseff, the Brazilian president, may use here appearance here today to sign it into law. The bill subjects data stored on Brazilians anywhere in the world to Brazilian jurisdiction and imposes net neutrality domestically. It also provides a safe harbor for ISPs and creates a notice-and-takedown system for offensive content.
  • Some participants are framing aspects of the meeting, particularly the condemnation of mass surveillance in the draft outcome document, as civil society v. the US government. There is a lot of concern that the US will somehow water down the surveillance language so that it doesn’t apply to the NSA’s surveillance. WikiLeaks has stoked some of this concern with breathless tweets. I don’t see events playing out this way. I am as opposed to mass US surveillance as anyone, but I haven’t seen much resistance from the US government participants in this regard. Most of the comments by the US on the draft have been benign. For example, WikiLeaks claimed that the US “stripped” language referring to the UN Human Rights Council; in fact, the US hasn’t stripped anything because it is not in charge (it can only make suggestions), and eliminating the reference to the HRC is actually a good idea because the HRC is a multilateral, not a multistakeholder, body. I expect a strong anti-surveillance statement to be included in the final outcome document. If it is not, it will probably be other governments, not the US, that block it.
  • In my view, the privacy section of the draft still needs work, however. In particular, it is important to cabin the paragraph to address governmental surveillance, not to interfere with voluntary, private arrangements in which users disclose information to receive free services.
  • I expect discussions over net neutrality to be somewhat contentious. Civil society participants are generally for it, with some governments, businesses, parts of the technical community, and yours truly opposed.
  • Although surveillance and net neutrality have received a lot of attention, they are not the important issues at NETmundial. Instead, look for the language that will affect “the future of Internet governance,” which is after all what the meeting is about. For example, will the language on stakeholders’ “respective roles and responsibilities” be stricken? This is language held over from the Tunis Agenda and it has a lot of meaning. Do stakeholders participate as equals or do they, especially governments, have separate roles? There is also a paragraph on “enhanced cooperation,” which is a codeword for governments running the show. Look to see in the final draft if it is still there.
  • Speaking of the final draft, here is how it will be produced: During the meeting, participants will have opportunities to make 2-minute interventions on specific topics. The drafting group will make note of the comments and then retreat to a drafting room to make final edits to the draft. This is, of course, not really the open governance process that many of us want for the Internet, one where select, unaccountable participants have the final say. Yet two days is not a long enough time to really have an open, free-wheeling drafting conference. I think the structure of the conference, driven by the perceived need to produce an outcome document with certainty, is unfortunate and somewhat detracts from the legitimacy of whatever will be produced, even though I expect the final document to be OK on substance.

The Supreme Court hears oral arguments today in a case that will decide whether Aereo, an over-the-top video distributor, can retransmit broadcast television signals online without obtaining a copyright license. If the court rules in Aereo’s favor, national programming networks might stop distributing their programming for free over the air, and without prime time programming, local TV stations might go out of business across the country. It’s a make or break case for Aereo, but for broadcasters, it represents only one piece of a broader regulatory puzzle regarding the future of over-the-air television.

If the court rules in favor of the broadcasters, they could still lose at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). At a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) event earlier this month, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler focused on “the opportunity for broadcast licensees in the 21st century . . . to provide over-the-top services.” According to Chairman Wheeler, TV stations shouldn’t limit themselves to being in the “television” business, because their “business horizons are greater than [their] current product.” Wheeler wants TV stations to become over-the-top “information providers”, and he sees the FCC’s role as helping them redefine themselves as a “growing source of competition” in that market segment. Continue reading →

Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, discusses how Overstock.com became one of the first online retail stores to accept Bitcoin. Byrne provides insight into how Bitcoin lowers transaction costs, making it beneficial to both retailers and consumers, and how governments are attempting to limit access to Bitcoin. Byrne also discusses his project DeepCapture.com, which raises awareness for market manipulation and naked short selling, as well as his philanthropic work and support for education reform.

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