(In addition to my crankiness about the metaphysics behind that theory, I also reject “moral rights” as an idiotically bad translation of “les droites morales.”)

(In addition to my crankiness about the metaphysics behind that theory, I also reject “moral rights” as an idiotically bad translation of “les droites morales.”)

PS: We should have a contest: Will Tom's prediction of a new extension of copyright by 2023 prove accurate? If he “wins”, you heard it here first on the TLF and Tom can treat us to some (non-alcoholic) drinks!

Looking at those who pushed for the copyright extension, (Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, for example) it seems that Hollywood was always very close to that action, and I doubt that Czeslaw Milosz, for example had anything much to do with the extension of the copyright term.

Economist had an interesting graphic several years back–starting with the “Queen Anne's Laws” which I believe were even shorter than the term Congress initially proscribed.

Recall that Congress is under no affirmative duty to establish copyright laws; if they choose to do so, they have the power, but not a duty.

I find the Daystar case deeply troubling. In Europe there exists the moral right of the author to be credited with his or her work. Apparently,the Daystar ruling does away with this?

I can understand that things go into the public domain, but what Daystar seems to imply, is that Tom Bell could sell the book Great Expectations with Charles Dicken's name removed? Please tell me that is not allowed….

I can understand the arguments for trying to enforce copyright law, and the arguments that it plays an important function in incentivizing creative work. But those are both very separate arguments from the critical question of copyright's term.

I think the Framers of the Constitution were pretty smart guys, and the first Congress was on to something with the Copyright Act of 1790. A 14 year term + a 14 year renewal (if the copyright holder was still alive) seems like a decent balance to me. What would be so wrong with that kind of term?

I had long assumed that it was the Disneys of the world that drove extension of copyright's term as in your example, Tom. But I've since gathered that in fact there was another force at work at least as powerful: pressure from the Europeans to make the term essentially life of the author plus two subsequent generations (70 years), and that this reflects a “human dignity” rationale for copyright: the idea that copyright is justified not by a utilitarian benefit, but by the moral rights of the author, and the concept (which Mark Helperin raises in his new book Digital Barbarism) that the author should stand in “equal stature” with other economic actors who create an asset like a business from which their children can benefit. Is this incorrect?

Of course, an economist might well point out that whether one's heirs will benefit doesn't really depend on how long the asset continues to produce a revenue stream, since at least in liquid markets where the values of works are assessed with reasonable accuracy during the initial term of copyright, an author could simply sell the rights to their work for an amount roughly equivalent to the asset's net present value (NPV). Part of the argument in Eldred for striking down extensions-unto-permanence was that, because of the time value of money, the difference in NPV between an asset with an exclusive term of X years and one with an infinite term quickly approaches zero once one passes some rather low number (like 30-50 years).
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvash...

So, once again, I don't know what the right balance is, but in the utilitarian calculus required by the Constitution, I don't see any justification for infinite terms and a much shorter term than we presently have seems reasonable to me. Of course, that doesn't mean the Supreme Court was wrong: In general, Congress, not the courts, should be responsible for policy decisions like how long is hard enough. As I said in my first post, this is a legitimately hard question—which is largely why I stay away from copyright issues to focus on areas where the answers are clearer and more philosophically satisfying.

For example, initially creators could purchase up to n years of protection at $x per year.

Indefinite renewals for up to n years could follow suit, but the price per year would increase with successive renewals, perhaps exponentially.

By making the price of copyright protection increase in line with the term of protection, only those works where the protection is worth more will be protected for longer periods of time. Once a work's future value is underestimated by the copyright-holder to be below the price of renewal, then it will fall into the public domain.

AlexHarris: Uh, oh. I think I missed that “truce” memo. Did I say something wrong?

Unfortunately, those who promote “strong”copyright seem to have successfully captured the moral high ground in the name of protecting “their” so-called property. The fact that the “strong” copyright advocates are “stealing” from the public does not yet seem to have truly surfaced as a concern. So in terms of Berin's balance question, how can a valid balance be established if one party is perceived as the victim when they are actually the perpetrator?

Additionally, the concept of copyright seems to have morphed into another “entitlement” (welfare) program. As many people have noted, the purpose of copyright is to provide the creator with a limited monopoly before the work is passed into the public domain. It was never meant to operate as an eternal toll-booth for the benefit of the author. Once, again, I have to acknowledge that those who advocate a “strong” copyright seem to have snatched the moral high ground with the concept that the starving artists and their heirs should be continuously compensated for a creation no matter how many years may have passed. Again, how can one achieve a rationale balance to copyright if the expected response is that this would put a starving widow with X kids into the street?

Finally, I think respect for the law itself is at stake in this discussion. When society perceives a law to be onerous people will ignore the law and may even take part in civil disobedience. One would hope that those who advocate a “strong” copyright would perceive this trend and accept the logic that real balanced solution must be reached for the sake of society and our legal system. I, for one, would like to see rationality restored to both copyright law and patent law.

Long story short: You could not only reproduce and distribute Steamboat Willie freely, you could make a movie of Mickey flying a blimp, snorting coke, break dancing, expounding on copyright . . . . He'd become just another malleable public domain icon, like Santa Clause or Peter Rabbit.

Aren't we really just talking about the copyright status of a few specific animated shorts of limited commercial value (“Mickey Mouse in Plane Crazy,” “The Gallopin' Gaucho,” and “Steamboat Willie”) and not the iconic characters themselves?