Brito Deconstructs Spectrum Commons Theory

by on February 20, 2007 · 10 comments

Fellow TLF-er Jerry Brito has just released an important new study on spectrum policy that is must-reading for those of you who monitor ongoing wireless policy battles. His new Stanford Technology Law Review article is entitled “The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice.” In it, he thoroughly deconstructs spectrum commons theory and debunks the myths propagated by Professors Lawrence Lessig, Yochai Benkler and others who believe that a spectrum commons offers us a “Third Way” approach to spectrum management that is both free of government control and highly efficient.

To the contrary, Brito argues, “A commons must be controlled either by private actors or by the government. There is no ‘third way.’” And “there is nothing that will make this new government regulation free from the same protracted and inefficient processes that have thus far plagued decisions about spectrum,” he finds. Brito pinpoints the fundamental flaw in the commons mindset in paragraph 28 of the paper:

Commons advocates suggest that the power to regulate communications equipment and mandate sharing rules is not the same as control over spectrum use. The definition of ‘control’ that they employ is limited to power over who may transmit over a certain band. But just as important as who may use spectrum is how they may use it. Indeed, current FCC licenses define not just who may transmit over a certain channel, but what technology they may use, what content they may transmit, and even what business model they may employ. Even if transmission were open, authority to set rules about what kind of equipment is allowed to transmit–in government or private hands–is control over how the spectrum may be used because any decision in favor of one type of equipment or technology necessarily excludes others. Whoever has the power to set and enforce rules stipulating how all or a portion of the radio spectrum can be used is the de facto, if not de jure, controller of that spectrum.

That really nails the problem with commons theory, in my opinion. Commons advocates have created a sort of techno-mythology about spectrum management that sounds more and more like utopian socialism when you get right down to it. They want us to believe that the state will gradually wither away under their scheme as spectrum users all voluntarily agree to abide by Romper Room rules (“sharing is good!”) and avoid disputes and conflicts that could lead to spectrum anarchy. Brito points out that even Lessig admits that “It is an iron law of modern democracy that when you create a regulator, you create a target for influence, and when you create a target for influence, those in the best position to influence will train their efforts upon that target.” But then Lessig inexplicably goes on to argue that a spectrum commons will largely be immune from such influences and inefficiencies. As Brito rightly asks: “[W]hat will now ensure the enlightenment that was unknown to the regulators of the past?”

Good question, and the commons crowd has no answer for us. That’s why property rights and market allocation of spectrum make more sense. They provide a more efficient, time-tested method of allocated scare resources.

Importantly, Brito also makes it clear why it is important that we not get sucked into believing that Wi-Fi and Bluetooth applications somehow provide a model for how all spectrum will work, or be allocated, in the future. In a nutshell, they don’t scale well. As Brito concludes in paragraph 83 of his study:

“Many unlicensed applications–such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth–are nonetheless viable because they are by and large deployed in relatively small spaces that are controlled privately by one party–whether it is a home, a coffee shop, or a university campus. Because these parties control their physical domains through private property rights, they can control and coordinate use of the unlicensed spectrum in their space so as to minimize interference. In this sense, users of unlicensed spectrum provide their own enforcement within their physical domains because they internalize the costs and benefits of that enforcement. When an unlicensed (or nonexclusive licensed) use of the band extends beyond a privately controlled domain, the benefits of enforcement are no longer internalized by one party.”

Brito also discuss the FCC’s recent 3650 MHz proceeding, which is an attempt to impose a commons model in one 50 MHz block of spectrum. I used to be open to this sort of experimentation and the idea of throwing the commons crowd a small bone at times to keep them happy. But after reading Jerry’s dissection of the 3650 mess, I’m now prepared to admit I was wrong. We are making a grave mistake if we start squandering more and more spectrum on such misguided commons experiments. Read Jerry’s entire study and you’ll understand why.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    I didn’t find Brito’s paper very illuminating, as there was too much talk about “command-and-control” and “rent-seeking” and not enough about the interaction of technology with regulatory schemes. I take it as given that the “commons model” is an example of government regulation, which isn’t necessarily a bad thing. I think the issue that underlies this debate is that the traditional rule-making system at the FCC follows an analog model of communications, and digital systems create opportunities for regulation that permits more flexible use.

    Lessig is typically dishonest about what this entails: his concept of “light regulation” is actually very intrusive regulation that intends to produce a result that might be expected from “light regulation” but doesn’t in practice.

    WiFi is a success, and there is much that regulators and policy geeks can learn from that success. WiFi would be even more successful if the rules for use of its semi-deregulated spectrum were more in tune with the underlying technology. The FCC limits transmit power level in the 2.4 and 5 GHz band used by WiFi, but it doesn’t mandate the use of the WiFi contention resolution protocols in devices operating in those bands. I’m not suggesting that it should, but the efficiency of WiFi use would improve if the other devices that use these bands – microwave ovens, mobile phones, garage door openers, mobile headsets – had operational characteristics similar to WiFi’s. This could be accomplished by limited the duty cycle of transmitters to a signature that resembles WiFi packets.

    At some point, we’ll need to open more spectrum to use by consumer devices that employ digital communication over wireless, and we’ll be able to manage this use to its peak of efficiency by adopting rules that recognize specific methods of interaction that permit equitable sharing. One way that might work would entail licensing some bandwidth to the WiFi Alliance for exclusive use by devices that pass WiFi Alliance certification tests. Hence you have a commercial entity in control of the spectrum, which should make free marketers happy, and protocol-sensitive rules in place, which makes technologists happy, and a vast array of consumer choices which should make the socialists happy.

    I think this is the scheme that Lessig thinks he’s advocating, he just doesn’t know enough about actual networking practice to express it coherently. In any event, that would be a step forward and a sort of third way that splits the difference between government control and capitalist control. Selling off more spectrum to Verizon, AT&T, or T-Mobile doesn’t help.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    I didn’t find Brito’s paper very illuminating, as there was too much talk about “command-and-control” and “rent-seeking” and not enough about the interaction of technology with regulatory schemes. I take it as given that the “commons model” is an example of government regulation, which isn’t necessarily a bad thing. I think the issue that underlies this debate is that the traditional rule-making system at the FCC follows an analog model of communications, and digital systems create opportunities for regulation that permits more flexible use.

    Lessig is typically dishonest about what this entails: his concept of “light regulation” is actually very intrusive regulation that intends to produce a result that might be expected from “light regulation” but doesn’t in practice.

    WiFi is a success, and there is much that regulators and policy geeks can learn from that success. WiFi would be even more successful if the rules for use of its semi-deregulated spectrum were more in tune with the underlying technology. The FCC limits transmit power level in the 2.4 and 5 GHz band used by WiFi, but it doesn’t mandate the use of the WiFi contention resolution protocols in devices operating in those bands. I’m not suggesting that it should, but the efficiency of WiFi use would improve if the other devices that use these bands – microwave ovens, mobile phones, garage door openers, mobile headsets – had operational characteristics similar to WiFi’s. This could be accomplished by limited the duty cycle of transmitters to a signature that resembles WiFi packets.

    At some point, we’ll need to open more spectrum to use by consumer devices that employ digital communication over wireless, and we’ll be able to manage this use to its peak of efficiency by adopting rules that recognize specific methods of interaction that permit equitable sharing. One way that might work would entail licensing some bandwidth to the WiFi Alliance for exclusive use by devices that pass WiFi Alliance certification tests. Hence you have a commercial entity in control of the spectrum, which should make free marketers happy, and protocol-sensitive rules in place, which makes technologists happy, and a vast array of consumer choices which should make the socialists happy.

    I think this is the scheme that Lessig thinks he’s advocating, he just doesn’t know enough about actual networking practice to express it coherently. In any event, that would be a step forward and a sort of third way that splits the difference between government control and capitalist control. Selling off more spectrum to Verizon, AT&T;, or T-Mobile doesn’t help.

  • Adam Thierer

    Richard, you say that, “At some point, we’ll need to open more spectrum to use by consumer devices that employ digital communication over wireless… ” and that… “One way that might work would entail licensing some bandwidth to the WiFi Alliance for exclusive use by devices that pass WiFi Alliance certification tests.”

    Would the WiFi Alliance be buying the spectrum or are you saying it should be given to them? Because I’m fine with any spectrum aggregator or manager–including the WIFi Alliance–buying a big patch of spectrum and then experimenting in this fashion. I am not OK with it if they are getting it as a result of a spectrum giveaway.

  • Adam Thierer

    Richard, you say that, “At some point, we’ll need to open more spectrum to use by consumer devices that employ digital communication over wireless… ” and that… “One way that might work would entail licensing some bandwidth to the WiFi Alliance for exclusive use by devices that pass WiFi Alliance certification tests.”

    Would the WiFi Alliance be buying the spectrum or are you saying it should be given to them? Because I’m fine with any spectrum aggregator or manager–including the WIFi Alliance–buying a big patch of spectrum and then experimenting in this fashion. I am not OK with it if they are getting it as a result of a spectrum giveaway.

  • http://www.jerrybrito.com Jerry Brito

    Richard,

    In my paper I cite the example of ranchers who together buy common grazing land or water rights and manage them for the benefit of all. That’s a commons and I’m all for it.

    Also, you say, “Lessig is typically dishonest about what this entails: his concept of ‘light regulation’ is actually very intrusive regulation that intends to produce a result that might be expected from ‘light regulation’ but doesn’t in practice.” Well, I’ve done my job. All I set out to do with this paper was show that, despite the rhetoric, which is pervasive not just from Lessig, but other scholars as well, a commons model will not do away with government regulation to any significant degree.

    If we all agree that regulation is inefficient–as the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force Report and even Lessig himself state–and we want less of it, a commons model is not a way to get there. Do we still want to have some parts of the spectrum as a government-managed commons the same way NYC manages Central Park? Perhaps, but let’s not kid ourselves that we’re somehow going to get rid of regulation with a commons system.

  • http://jerrybrito.com Jerry Brito

    Richard,

    In my paper I cite the example of ranchers who together buy common grazing land or water rights and manage them for the benefit of all. That’s a commons and I’m all for it.

    Also, you say, “Lessig is typically dishonest about what this entails: his concept of ‘light regulation’ is actually very intrusive regulation that intends to produce a result that might be expected from ‘light regulation’ but doesn’t in practice.” Well, I’ve done my job. All I set out to do with this paper was show that, despite the rhetoric, which is pervasive not just from Lessig, but other scholars as well, a commons model will not do away with government regulation to any significant degree.

    If we all agree that regulation is inefficient–as the FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force Report and even Lessig himself state–and we want less of it, a commons model is not a way to get there. Do we still want to have some parts of the spectrum as a government-managed commons the same way NYC manages Central Park? Perhaps, but let’s not kid ourselves that we’re somehow going to get rid of regulation with a commons system.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    I don’t think all regulation is inefficient, it’s just that the FCC’s methods are out-of-step with technology. The weaseling you cited about listen-before-talk and making an effort not to interfere shows that they can’t do the job we would want them to do in terms of packing as many users as possible into a chunk of spectrum. The specs for WiFi and WiMax have the requisite detail to ensure that users properly coordinate with each other, but I certainly wouldn’t want to commit them to law or government regulation. These dictates are ridiculously vague and unenforceable unless you get some case law that says “conforming to IEEE802.11 is prima facie evidence of compliance.” May as well take that from the beginning rather than leave it to the courts.

    So the third way I see is to lease the spectrum to an industry group like the WiFi Alliance rather than to one company such as AT&T or to have bureaucrats draft rules that prove difficult or impossible to change as technology improves. And if it can be shown that the WiFi Alliance does a good-enough job of managing the spectrum, I’d be in favor of dropping their lease fee to $1/yr.

    In order to qualify for that lease, they’d also have to draft specs for non-WiFi uses that only required conformance to the sharing portions of the spec and allowed other frame formats and whatnot. It seems to me that the private sector understands how to manage spectrum better than anybody, and as we already have forums for sharing our technologies with each other through our standards bodies and trade groups, that’s the way to go. I take it Lessig wants to use some sort of open source method, and that’s no better than chaos.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    I don’t think all regulation is inefficient, it’s just that the FCC’s methods are out-of-step with technology. The weaseling you cited about listen-before-talk and making an effort not to interfere shows that they can’t do the job we would want them to do in terms of packing as many users as possible into a chunk of spectrum. The specs for WiFi and WiMax have the requisite detail to ensure that users properly coordinate with each other, but I certainly wouldn’t want to commit them to law or government regulation. These dictates are ridiculously vague and unenforceable unless you get some case law that says “conforming to IEEE802.11 is prima facie evidence of compliance.” May as well take that from the beginning rather than leave it to the courts.

    So the third way I see is to lease the spectrum to an industry group like the WiFi Alliance rather than to one company such as AT&T; or to have bureaucrats draft rules that prove difficult or impossible to change as technology improves. And if it can be shown that the WiFi Alliance does a good-enough job of managing the spectrum, I’d be in favor of dropping their lease fee to $1/yr.

    In order to qualify for that lease, they’d also have to draft specs for non-WiFi uses that only required conformance to the sharing portions of the spec and allowed other frame formats and whatnot. It seems to me that the private sector understands how to manage spectrum better than anybody, and as we already have forums for sharing our technologies with each other through our standards bodies and trade groups, that’s the way to go. I take it Lessig wants to use some sort of open source method, and that’s no better than chaos.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    PS: To summarize, I think that spectrum regulation should be out-sourced from government to industry groups.

  • http://bennett.com/blog Richard Bennett

    PS: To summarize, I think that spectrum regulation should be out-sourced from government to industry groups.

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