Network disruption. If a network can be disrupted often enough, it becomes useless. The economy is constructed of many networks, overlaid and interdependent. These networks strive to an efficient scale-free topology, under normal and stable market conditions. Those same-scale free networks, because of their very efficiency (part of the efficiency is being not very redundant.), are susceptible to disruption by a planned attack strategy. The optimal network for resisting attack has been shown to be clique and delegation based.

The goal of those who are planning these attacks is network disruption, not symbolic terrorism.

The topology of covert conflict Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson

I’ve updated my post with a more complete response. Here’s the link again:

http://weblog.roth-cline.net/archives/2006/08/more_than_meets_the_eye.html

I’ve updated my post with a more complete response. Here’s the link again:

http://weblog.roth-cline.net/archives/2006/08/more_than_meets_the_eye.html

I’ve replied to this post on my site:

http://weblog.roth-cline.net/archives/2006/08/more_than_meets_the_eye.html

I’ve replied to this post on my site:

http://weblog.roth-cline.net/archives/2006/08/more_than_meets_the_eye.html

However, there exists the possibility that another type of extreme event, utilizing biological weapons, could top, by a large order of magnetude, what happened on 9/11. What is most frustrating is that the threats being planned for now are generally the ones that can’t be controlled (bomb in shopping mall, for example, or in luggage at airport) and would be a blip in terms of the deaths say from road accidents, or infections acquired in hospitals, for example.

However, despite the fact that a biological attack could occur, and it alone (with the exception, say of a lose nuke) could increase by an order of magnitude what occurred on 9/11, almost nothing is being done by the current administration to deal with this threat. Coupled with the dramatic rise in infectious diseases anyway (diseases have historically been transferred from other species to humans at the rate of about one every century, but now, due to a variety of factors, are transmitted at the rate of about one a year) and there are other reasons to begin to build a public health infrastructure.

Thus, a very credible case could be made for increasing public health expenditures, esp. those targeting disease surveillance and public health in general. But almost no progress on these programs is being made by the current administration, primarily because it is afraid, I suppose of ‘socializing medicine’ It’s called being ideologically hamstrung, and unless a dose of pragmatism enters into this debate, many more lives than necessary will be lost to emerging (or re-emerging) infectious diseases.

We’ve actually been very lucky. If for example SARS had an incubation period of just one day longer, current models have predicted it would likely have not been controlled.

It is very true as the the Cato paper states,It should be kept in mind that September 11 continues to stand out as an extreme event.

However, there exists the possibility that another type of extreme event, utilizing biological weapons, could top, by a large order of magnetude, what happened on 9/11. What is most frustrating is that the threats being planned for now are generally the ones that can’t be controlled (bomb in shopping mall, for example, or in luggage at airport) and would be a blip in terms of the deaths say from road accidents, or infections acquired in hospitals, for example. However, despite the fact that a biological attack could occur, and it alone (with the exception, say of a lose nuke) could increase by an order of magnitude what occurred on 9/11, almost nothing is being done by the current administration to deal with this threat. Coupled with the dramatic rise in infectious diseases anyway (diseases have historically been transferred from other species to humans at the rate of about one every century, but now, due to a variety of factors, are transmitted at the rate of about one a year) and there are other reasons to begin to build a public health infrastructure.

Thus, a very credible case could be made for increasing public health expenditures, esp. those targeting disease surveillance and public health in general. But almost no progress on these programs is being made by the current administration, primarily because it is afraid, I suppose of ‘socializing medicine’ It’s called being ideologically hamstrung, and unless a dose of pragmatism enters into this debate, many more lives than necessary will be lost to emerging (or re-emerging) infectious diseases.

We’ve actually been very lucky. If for example SARS had an incubation period of just one day longer, current models have predicted it would likely have not been controlled.

And then they will still allow Pakistani, Saudi and Egyptian Muslims to work in the crews out of political correctness.

The fact that some of the people involved were recent converts does raise a “Muslim problem” with security. On the flip side, it also proves that Islam, not Arab and Pakistani culture, is the root problem.

And then they will still allow Pakistani, Saudi and Egyptian Muslims to work in the crews out of political correctness.

The fact that some of the people involved were recent converts does raise a “Muslim problem” with security. On the flip side, it also proves that Islam, not Arab and Pakistani culture, is the root problem.